Commentary: devolution within the UK.
Armstrong, Angus ; Ebell, Monique
The outcome of the Scottish referendum shows that the clear will of
the Scottish people is to stay in the UK. For the first time it can be
said that the union of the two largest nations is entirely consensual.
(1)
However, the referendum process also revealed considerable
dissatisfaction. The leaders of the UK's main political parties
recognised this two days before the referendum and made a public vow
that "extensive new powers for the [Scottish] Parliament will be
delivered by the process and to the timetable agreed and announced by
our three parties." (2) Not surprisingly, the three main parties,
the Scottish National Party and the Scottish Green Party all have
different ideas of what these 'extensive new powers' should
be. Lord Smith has agreed to oversee the process for reaching agreement
between the parties on which new powers should be devolved by November,
allowing for draft legislation by January.
We believe that the Scottish referendum revealed two clear
preferences. First, there are certain capabilities which the UK provides
that are invaluable to all constituent nations: a successful currency
union and a seat at the top table of the world's leading
international forums, such as the European Union. There may also be
other centrally provided capabilities which are highly valued, such as
security and diplomacy. Second, there is a clear wish for genuine power
to be transferred away from central government to local decision making.
This is not simply a matter of more discretion over public spending but
the responsibility for real economic choices. Only when politicians have
responsibility to make decisions can they be held accountable for the
outcomes.
Whether the vow was wise or not is a moot point. The only way for
Scotland's politicians to be accountable is for them to be able to
take decisions on which they can succeed or fail. This requires changing
the Scottish Parliament's near total dependence on a block grant
decided by Westminster. In addition to more tax powers (other than fully
devolving income tax), a necessary requirement is to allow the Scottish
government to borrow in its own name from capital markets. This requires
removing the extremely cautious borrowing limits in the Scotland Act
(2012). Only by introducing market discipline can the Scottish
government be held to account by its electorate.
UK government finances
The structure of government finances differs in every country
depending on history and who holds economic power. Some states are
described as unitary systems, where most fiscal resources are collected
and disbursed by a central government. Other states are federal systems
where more public services are delivered and paid for through
sub-central tiers of government, such as the US, Germany and
Switzerland. The UK is usually described as a unitary system. However,
because of the amount of devolved spending in recent years it
increasingly resembles a hybrid structure.
The UK is an uneven union of nations. The English make up 84 per
cent, Scots make up 8 per cent and the Welsh and Northern Irish are the
other 8 per cent of the population. Because of the sheer size of England
relative to the other nations, a true federal system of government is
only possible with equally devolved regional powers in England. While
devolving power to regional governments in England has many desirable
features, this is unlikely to be in place in the short term. Yet in
recognition of the different preferences of the other nations in the
Union, a high degree of regional spending power has been devolved. On
the spending side of the ledger, this has similarities to a federal
system.
While spending has been devolved, most revenues are still collected
centrally by Westminster. Spending by regional assemblies and the
Scottish Parliament is funded by central government transfers through a
block grant and formula system administered by the Treasury. A grant is
transferred to the Scottish government based on the UK Spending Review
for those items identified as specifically for Scotland and which are
not reserved for central government. It is then for the Scottish
authorities to spend the funds according to local demands. The size of
the grant changes according to the Barnett formula which links changes
in the UK Departmental Expenditure Limits in the Spending Review to
relative population size.
The important point to recognise is that through the dominance of
the block grant the Scottish government operates a 'balanced
budget' by construction. There is much to commend this system. It
avoids wasteful tax competition, ensures a single macro economic
framework and has maximal risk-sharing and common social protection
across the Union. However, it also means that the Scottish government is
not responsible for raising or lowering taxes or borrowing to finance
its spending decisions. And without these responsibilities it cannot be
accountable to its electorate. It is mostly tasked with spending an
allocated amount of funding. In Armstrong and Ebell (2014a) we describe
this as 'pocket money' devolution.
The Scotland Act (2012) gives the Scottish parliament significant
new tax powers. Yet the powers are structured so that the Scottish
government still effectively operates in a balanced budget context. If
the revenues raised by the Scottish government fall short of target,
then it has three options: first, borrow up to 200 million [pounds
sterling] in any year (500 million [pounds sterling] in total) from the
Treasury for repayment within four years; second, accumulate cash
reserves from the new taxes which can be drawn down in future years; and
third, cut in-year expenditure. The Act also allows the Scottish
government to borrow 240 million [pounds sterling] in any one year and
2.2 billion [pounds sterling] in total for capital spending. Total
borrowing allowed by the Scottish government is one hundredth of 1 per
cent of the UK projected gross debt in 2015.
These strict borrowing limits will become highly problematic if
significant tax raising powers are devolved. Scotland could easily find
itself forced to cut spending and/ or raise taxes in a recession to make
up for a drop in income tax or other revenues and balance its budget. It
is difficult to see how this paltry amount of borrowing could suffice to
smooth out income tax revenues over the cycle, so the Scottish
government might find itself forced into running a potentially damaging
procyclical fiscal policy.
Reserved central government spending
Certain types of public goods and services are better supplied by
central governments. In the UK this is called 'reserved'
spending. This includes spending on defence, foreign affairs and
membership fees and interest payments on the national debt. These items
affect all citizens of the UK, and leaving spending to sub-central
governments may result in a sub-optimal level of supply. Reserved
spending also includes elements of social protection. Central
governments can mitigate regional economic disturbances by pooling
resources and sharing risks across a currency union. Shocks which do not
affect regions equally can then be offset by making fiscal transfers
from one region to another. (3) For this reason transfers related to
regional economic conditions, or the regional business cycle, such as
social protection and welfare payments, are better managed by central
government.
Central government is also the 'risk manager of last
resort'. When crises strike, for example an environmental disaster
or financial crisis, central government is expected to have the
resources to respond. A practical example of the resources the UK
central government must command was its ability to insure 1 trillion
[pounds sterling] of household deposits in 2007. Acting as insurer of
last resort will often require borrowing. Armstrong and Ebell (2013)
explain how central borrowing is, ceteris paribus, cheaper than
subcentral borrowing. The central government always has a further
advantage because it does not have a hard budget constraint. In extreme
events the central government controls the supply of the currency.
These items of central government spending require funding. While
Scotland is less than one-tenth of the UK tax base, it is important that
all constituent nations contribute equally. What does this imply for the
revenue raising powers of central government? (4) Average central
government revenues of OECD countries are 33.5 per cent of GDP (21.2 per
cent for the six high income federal nations). (5) The UK has central
government revenues of 38 per cent of GDP. A reasonable case can be made
for the UK requiring more central resources than other countries (or at
least access to more resources) due to its large financial industry and
high debt position. It is worth noting that the financial sector is
relatively larger in Scotland than in the rest of the UK.
Devolved spending and revenue powers
To see whether more spending should be devolved requires first
looking at the current powers of the Scottish Government and Local
Authorities (SGLAs). Table 1 below summarises all public spending in
Scotland in 2012-13. The first column shows itemised total spending
(current and capital) of 65.2bn [pounds sterling], or 51.6 per cent of
onshore GDP. The second column shows the amount of spending identified
to be for the exclusive benefit of Scottish residents and businesses.
This is spending which has a relatively small spillover into the rest of
the UK. The final column shows the amount of the identified public
spending controlled by SGLAs.
Almost 60 per cent of all public sector spending in Scotland is
controlled by the SGLAs. Of the total spending identified as
specifically for Scotland, 69 per cent is controlled by the SGLAs. This
is equivalent to 45 per cent of onshore GDP. The areas of direct
spending not controlled in Scotland are reserved for the
'benefit' of the whole of the UK such as defence, interest
payments and international payments. The only area of identified
spending which is not substantively controlled by the SGLAs is for
social protection, which includes social security payments such as
unemployment and incapacity benefits. This is entirely consistent with
the principles of efficient risk sharing and fairness. It is difficult
to see what items of spending could be further devolved.
While most UK taxes are collected by Westminster, the Scottish
government's estimates of how much revenue was raised in 2012-13
are presented in table 2. The first column shows the estimated revenue
and the second column is the estimated amount of revenue raising powers
devolved to Scotland. At present only Council Tax and non-domestic rates
are devolved, which generate a paltry 8.4 per cent of onshore revenue.
Significantly more tax raising powers have been granted by the Scotland
Act (2012). Stamp duty and landfill tax are fully devolved and a new
Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT) will be introduced in April 2015. All
UK income tax rates in Scotland will be reduced by 10p and replaced by a
SRIT to be set by the Scottish government. (6) The Scottish government
keeps the revenue from the SRIT but the block grant from the rest of the
UK is reduced accordingly.
The second column in table 2 shows the Scottish government's
estimate of the amount of money which would have been raised in 2012-13
if the devolved taxes had already been in place. (7) This is equivalent
to 15 per cent of identified spending and 22 per cent of spending
controlled by the SGLAs.
Vertical fiscal imbalance
The difference between devolved revenue and spending is sometimes
called the 'vertical fiscal imbalance' (VFI). This is one
measure of the degree of responsibility and accountability at the
sub-central level of government. The weaker the link between changes in
locally controlled taxes and changes in locally controlled public
spending, the less accountable are local politicians. Put another way,
the greater the VFI the greater the block grant to fund the public
spending controlled by the Scottish Parliament. The VFI in Scotland is
the difference between the 69 per cent of Scottish-controlled spending
and 15 per cent of Scottish-raised revenue as a share of identified
spending. In plain words, less than one quarter of the public spending
by the SGLAs is funded by revenue controlled by the Scottish government.
It should be noted that all sub-national governments have a VFI. It
simply means that they contribute to central government beyond funding
national public goods. The issue is whether Scotland's imbalance is
at odds with other countries. Scotland's VFI of 54 per cent is
considerably higher than an average estimate of 40 per cent by
economists at the IMF. (8) Reducing this gap requires allowing the
Scottish Parliament to control more of its own revenues. Note that
assigning a share of fiscal revenues collected on a UK basis by an
assignment formula, for example for VAT revenues, creates an incentive
to increase the tax base but there is still no direct link with spending
powers.
Will borrowing improve accountability?
Reducing the VFI by devolving more taxation power must go alongside
greater borrowing rights. Clearly there will be occasions when spending
and revenue are out of kilter. The Scottish government ought to be
allowed to borrow in its own name and without bound with the explicit
legal statement that the UK government bears no responsibility for the
debt. Extending greater tax powers to Scotland but without greater
capacity to borrow implies continued balanced budget dependency on
Westminster and therefore no responsibility or accountability.
Only with borrowing added to new tax powers will there be a truly
accountable government in Scotland. In Alexander Hamilton's famous
dictum "the creation of debt should always be accompanied with the
means of extinguishment."
If the Scottish government were allowed to borrow, it could take
responsibility for its decisions in the sense that they may succeed or
fail. This includes being able to finance large infrastructure projects
in the hope that the additional tax revenues generated in the future
would be sufficient to repay the debt incurred to finance them. This
would also reveal the cost of borrowing for Scotland and introduce
market discipline for the Scottish government where it is absent today.
The challenge is to make the ability to borrow compatible with the
currency union. There are two possible incentives for Scotland to
over-borrow. The first is that the real cost of borrowing could be
reduced and imposed on the rest of the UK by creating an 'inflation
bias' at the Bank of England. But since Scotland is less than one
tenth of the UK economy, it is hard to see how the Bank would
accommodate any Scottish fiscal largesse. The second incentive is more
problematic. There is likely to be a 'bail-out bias' simply
because the rest of the UK is large enough to always bail out Scotland.
However, this could be mitigated by the UK government making it explicit
(perhaps in legislation) that it has no liability for Scottish debt. No
fiscal limits or stability pact should be agreed because they imply
culpability.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Scottish government would
not learn to accept the market discipline imposed by borrowing. Indeed,
discovering Scotland's borrowing costs might be an excellent
disciplining device for its government. Even if we are wrong and
underestimate the risk of Scottish profligacy, the amounts involved do
not seem likely to threaten the UK government. After the largest
financial crisis in three generations the average debt burden of the six
OECD federal states is 23 per cent. A similar debt burden for Scotland
is 2 per cent of UK GDR This risk may simply be the price to pay to
ensure that devolution is structured to encourage accountability and
responsibility and reinforces, rather than undermines, the Union.
Which taxes to devolve?
It is not our aim to describe here the pros and cons of devolving
each tax. Yet an emerging consensus in favour of fully devolving income
taxes requires some comment in the context of borrowing. This would
violate at least three economic principles and possibly undermine the
integrity of the union. First, high income earners are particularly
mobile and there is a risk of creating inefficient tax competition. (9)
Second, income tax has a large yield and is highly dependent on the
local economy. Without the capacity to borrow this may create
macroeconomic stability problems. An adverse shock leading to a sudden
fall in taxes would require fiscal tightening perhaps leading to a
deeper downturn. If higher earners migrate then this could worsen the
outcome further.
Finally, there is the issue of fairness to Scotland. The morning
after the referendum the Prime Minister said that it is now time to face
the West Lothian question. (10) If income tax is fully devolved this
greatly strengthens the case for 'English votes for English
laws'. It would be difficult to justify Scottish MPs voting on
income taxes which are in effect exclusively in another jurisdiction.
Yet because England is 84 per cent of the Union, its decisions on income
tax would have a strong influence on macroeconomic policy for the whole
of the UK. Since an English government may not be the same as a UK
government, Scotland would have no say on what would effectively be
UK-wide macroeconomic policy. Imposing a symmetric solution on an
asymmetric union would be undemocratic. (11)
Finally, taxes from North Sea oil and gas are large and clearly of
totemic importance. (12) The ability to borrow would also make devolving
tax revenues from North Sea oil and gas to Scotland feasible. Tax
revenues from North Sea oil and gas are notoriously difficult to predict
accurately and highly volatile: year-to-year drops of 4-5bn [pounds
sterling] (equivalent to more than 10 per cent of total devolved
spending) have occurred twice in the past decade. With the ability to
borrow, Scotland could smooth out these fluctuations.
REFERENCES
Armstrong, A. and Ebell, M., (2013), 'Scotland's currency
options', National Institute of Economic and Social Research
Discussion Paper 415.
--(2014), 'Monetary unions and fiscal constraints',
National Institute Economic Review, 228, pp. F4-11.
--(2014a), 'Real devolution the power to borrow', NIESR
Discussion Paper 437.
--(2014b), 'Real devolution: a reply', NIESR blog.
Armstrong, A. and McCarthy, D. (2014), 'Scotland's lender
of last resort options', National Institute of Economic and Social
Research Discussion Paper 426.
Cameron, D., Miliband, E. and Clegg, N. (2014), The Vow, Daily
Record, p. 1.
Carney, M. (2014), The economics of currency unions', speech
given at the Scottish Council for Development and Industry, 29 January.
Eyrand, L. and Lusingan, L (2011), 'Decentralising spending
more than revenue: does it hurt performance?', IMF Working Paper
WP/11/226.
Kenen.R (1969),'The theory of optimum currency areas:an
eclectic view', in Mundell, R.A. and Swoboda, A.K. (eds), Monetary
Problems of the International Economy, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, pp. 41-60.
Scottish Government (2013), Government Expenditure and Revenue
Scotland 2011-12, The Scottish Government.
NOTES
(1) There is no similar campaign for other constituent nations to
leave the UK.
(2) Daily Record (2014), pi.
(3) This is the important insight from Kenen's (1969) work on
the optimal currency area.
(4) Governor Carney noted that effective unions typically have
centralised spending of over 25 per cent of GDP.The difference between
the two totals is generally the amount of funding allocated to local
government.
(5) An average of OECD countries which report central government
funding. Data are from 2011 and 2012 except Australia which is from
2007.The six federal states are Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain,
Switzerland and US.
(6) The SRIT provides the Scottish government with some discretion
to set the overall rate of income tax and to keep part of the revenues
from widening the tax base. However, the percentage point difference
between the tax rates (e.g. currently the 25p difference between the top
and bottom rates) will continue to be set by the UK government. Higher
tax rates for the highest earners would also imply higher tax rates for
the lowest earners. Of course, the lower earners could then be
compensated through new social spending programmes.
(7) This assumes the Scottish government chose to set the SRIT at
10p.
(8) Eyrand andf Lusingan (2011).
(9) One could argue that the risk of human capital flight would be
a disciplining device for the Scottish government and thus discourage
high taxes.
(10) This question is whether MPs from outside of England should be
able to vote on exclusively English matters.
(11) There are many other ways this would violate the fairness
principle. Suppose that there is another banking crisis. The UK
government is the ultimate backstop but Scotland would enjoy tax
revenues from its financial sector just as much as England. If the UK
government raised income taxes but the Scottish government chose to cut
taxes this would rightly be seen as unfair. Perhaps the Scottish
government may simply cut high income taxes to attract the financial
sector, knowing that the backstop would not be Scottish taxpayers.
(12) One possibility is that these are awarded back to Scotland on
a smoothed basis to make fiscal planning easier.
Angus Armstrong and Monique Ebell, National Institute of Economic
and Social Research and Centre for Macroeconomics. E-mail:
a.armstrong@niesr.ac.uk.
Table 1. Estimated public spending
Total Identified SG & LAs
Social protection 22,458 21,969 5,539
Health 11,284 11,178 11,169
Defence 3,027 4 4
Education and training 7,651 7,650 7,625
Public order and safety 2,529 2,402 2,274
General public services 6,381 4,998 4,828
Other 7,856 7,602 7,105
Public sector debt interest 4,020 0 0
65,206 55,803 38,544
Source: Scottish Government (2013) and NIESR calculations.
Table 2. Estimated fiscal revenue
Devolved
Total 2015
Income tax 10,865 4,231
VAT 9,347 0
National insurance contributions 8,521 0
Gross operating surplus 3,247 0
Corporation tax (excl North Sea) 2,872 0
Fuel duties 2,258 0
Alcohol and tobacco duties 2,108 0
Council tax 2,006 2,006
Non-domestic rates 1,981 1,981
Vehicle excise duty 481 0
Stamp duties 472 283
Capital gains tax 292 0
Other taxes on income and wealth 271 0
Inheritance tax 243 0
Air passenger duty 234 0
Landfill tax 100 100
Other taxes, royalties and adjustments 2,267 0
Total (excl. North Sea revenue) 47,566 8,601
North sea revenue (geographical share) 5,581
Source: Scottish Government (2013) and NIESR calculations.