The Irish fiscal crisis.

Bergin, Adele ; Gerald, John Fitz ; Kearney, Ide 等

This paper considers the origins and characteristics of the current economic crisis in Ireland. In particular, it examines how fiscal policy contributed to the crisis rather than preventing it. The paper gives details of the major fiscal tightening that is under way. By 2014 the authorities will have implemented a package of ex ante cuts equivalent to one-fifth of GDP. The costs of this package, together with the more permanent effects of the recession on potential output, are discussed and the legacy effects of the crisis for government indebtedness are analysed.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; debt sustainability; Ireland

JEL Classifications: E62; H63; H68

1. Introduction

The Irish economy is facing extremely challenging times as a result of past policy mistakes that allowed a major property market bubble to develop (and burst) and also permitted the banking system to become overexposed to the property sector. The consequences have been a severe contraction in output and a major financial crisis. Due to the collapse in economic activity in Ireland over the period 2008 to 2010, and the associated rise in unemployment, output per head had fallen back to its 2000 level by the end of 2010 (Bergin et al., 2010). Because of a growing dependence of the public finances on transaction taxes on the property sector in recent years (Addison-Smyth and McQuinn, 2010), the severe economic shock had a catastrophic impact on the public finances. Government borrowing shot up to 14 per cent of GDP in 2009, having averaged a small surplus on the public finances over most of the period 2000-7.

This paper considers the origins and characteristics of the economic crisis in Section 2. The policy failures that contributed to the crisis are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the fiscal policy response. By 2014 the authorities will have implemented a package of ex ante cuts equivalent to one-fifth of GDP. The costs of this package, together with the more permanent costs of the recession on potential output are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 considers the legacy effects of the crisis for government indebtedness and the long-term sustainability of the debt burden. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.

2. Double trouble: twin housing and credit bubbles

The Irish economy enjoyed an exceptional period of sustained growth from 1994 through to the early years of the past decade. This growth was driven by the expansion in world trade and a rapid increase in world market share for Irish exports as a result of the competitive nature of the Irish tradable sector. This produced rapid but sustainable growth in Irish output and living standards. By the late 1990s, as unemployment fell to historically low levels, the economy found itself approaching capacity output. Substantial immigration helped relieve labour market pressures (Barrett, Fitz Gerald and Nolan, 2002) but it was clear that growth could not continue at the same rate indefinitely. The natural mechanism to slow the economy was a real appreciation of the currency. In the absence of an independent exchange rate this had to take place through a loss of competitiveness as wage rates and other prices rose more rapidly than in the rest of the Euro Area. Managing this real appreciation through differential inflation was never going to be easy without overshooting. It would have been better, as argued by the EU Commission in 2001 and by Barry and Fitz Gerald (2001), if fiscal policy had been tightened to slow the process. However, the bursting of the dot.com bubble led to a slowdown in the world economy and hence the Irish economy. This slowdown was less severe than had been initially expected and it effectively provided some breathing space for the Irish economy.

2.1 Building bubble

Ireland's demographic structure meant that there was a rapid natural increase in the population in the 1990s. The largest cohort of the population in 2000 was aged 20-24. In addition, the number of retired people was low due to high emigration from the 1930s to the 1950s. Ireland entered the boom period under-endowed with infrastructure in the form of dwellings. The number of adults per dwelling was substantially higher than in the other EU member states (with the exception of Spain). In addition, the boom in the economy meant that many Irish emigrants returned and many immigrants came to work in Ireland, putting further pressure on public and private infrastructure. The rapid rise in incomes together with the increased availability of low cost finance as a consequence of EMU membership and the globalisation of the financial sector resulted in a boom in the building and construction sector. In its early stages this rapid expansion in house building was both sustainable and desirable: people wanted and could afford dwellings. However, from 2003 onwards the housing boom entered a phase that was unsustainable, constituting a growing 'bubble'. As shown in figure 1, housing investment peaked at 14 per cent of GNP in 2006, more than double the EU-15 average. In contrast to the earlier years where growth was driven by exports, the housing boom drove economic growth over the following years so that the level of actual output rose well above the potential of the economy to deliver in a sustainable manner.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The bulk of the additional resources required to fuel the increase in output of the building and construction sector of the economy had to come from other sectors of the economy, leading to a reallocation of resources within the economy (Fitz Gerald and Morgenroth, 2006). Wage rates were driven up across the economy by the rapid growth in labour demand in the building and construction sector and, as a consequence, firms that were dependent on export markets suffered. In effect, the building and construction sector 'crowded out' the rest of the economy, especially the tradable sector. This domestic imbalance began to be reflected in the balance of payments. Having run a surplus on the current account over the export-led boom years, a growing deficit emerged. From 2003 onwards the balance of payments began to move seriously into deficit (see figure 2).

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In 2001 Blanchard, looking at the Irish and Spanish economies, concluded that because of domestic imbalances reflected in the balance of payments deficit, the Spanish economy was growing beyond its potential. However, the Irish economy, with a continuing balance of payments surplus, probably needed some further real appreciation through rising domestic costs. With the benefit of hindsight this may have been a bit optimistic because of the inertia in wage inflation. Nonetheless this analysis suggests that the origins of the crisis were somewhat later, as reflected in the movement to a balance of payments deficit in 2004.

2.2 Credit bubble

The second strand of the Irish crisis is the failure of the financial sector. The combination of EMU membership and the globalisation of financial markets meant there was less concern about the balance of payments deficit than there would have been in the past. It was seen as being easily financeable. While domestic savings were sufficient to fund the housing boom up to around 2003, thereafter they proved increasingly inadequate. Instead, the banking sector financed the boom by borrowing increasing sums abroad and relending these funds domestically to the property sector. Because the foreign borrowing by the banks was undertaken on a short-term basis, while the property loans were long-term in nature, this left the banking sector increasingly exposed to any shock. The regulatory authority permitted this dramatic increase in exposure. To finance the housing boom the banking sector borrowed extensively abroad so that the net foreign liabilities of the banking system rose from a low of 10 per cent of GNP in 2003 to over 60 per cent of GNP by 2007 (see figure 3). The share of lending by banks in Ireland to the property/housing sector increased dramatically over this time period (see figure 4).

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3. Policy failures

As discussed earlier, the origins of the crisis which hit the Irish economy in 2008 go back to the early years of the decade. A very large property market bubble was allowed to develop over the period 2001-7, financed by the domestic financial sector. When it finally burst, it did huge damage to both the financial sector and the real economy.

Over the years 2001-7 some attention was given in public debate to the potential dangers in the property market (Fitz Gerald, 2011). However, these warnings were not widely accepted by policymakers (Nyberg, 2011). A false sense of security lulled households and many companies into believing that the boom was sustainable and it also persuaded policymakers that a soft landing was likely. This hubris was not just confined to domestic policymakers who failed to see the gravity of the problem; O'Leary (2010) shows that the EU Commission and the IMF also failed to warn of the need for a change in domestic policy. We now know the results of this false sense of security.

One element in the failure by external onlookers to suggest a change in fiscal policy stance was the fact that Ireland was respecting the Stability and Growth pact guidelines over the period to 2007. (1) The existence of this rule seemed to absolve external observers from undertaking a rigorous analysis of the actual situation on the ground in Ireland. Meanwhile, the deterioration in the balance of payments from 2003 onwards should have provided ample warning of the dangers arising from growing domestic imbalances.

There was nothing inevitable about the crisis. If the telltale signs of danger had been heeded in time the bubble and its consequences could have been avoided by either (or both) appropriate fiscal policy action or appropriate action by the financial regulator. Thus the crisis was the result of a failure of domestic economic policy in two main areas:

* the stance of fiscal policy was inappropriate for most of the period 2001-7 and the regulator of the financial sector did not move to defuse the growing crisis by imposing an appropriate regulatory framework on the domestic financial system. (2)

3.1 Fiscal policy

The advent of Economic and Monetary Union in 1999 enhanced the role and importance of fiscal policy in all member states of the union. While individual member states had independent monetary policies it was always open to the national central banks to adjust interest rates to directly influence investment in the building and construction sectors of their national economies. However, from 1999 onwards, with monetary policy being set by the ECB to maintain inflation at a low level and with idiosyncratic property markets within the Euro Area, monetary policy could not play this role for individual regional economies.

The fact that monetary policy could no longer be used to influence regional asset market bubbles meant that fiscal policy was left as a key instrument for this purpose (Conefrey and Fitz Gerald, 2010).Where a regional economy in EMU is growing more rapidly than potential output, and domestic costs are rising at an inappropriate rate, there are medium-term dangers which need to be addressed (Blanchard, 2007). With an independent exchange rate, if the imbalances get out of hand and adjustment must be made to restore competitiveness, this can be achieved rapidly without much disruption through changing the exchange rate. By contrast, within a monetary union a real exchange rate depreciation can only be achieved by adjusting domestic prices, especially the price of labour. Such an adjustment can be painful and it also takes a number of years to effect even if labour markets are flexible. Where labour markets are inflexible this can be a very long drawn out affair. Under these circumstances the instrument of choice for controlling domestic inflationary pressures is fiscal policy. In particular, if there is a danger of a domestic property market bubble getting out of hand, fiscal policy can be used to reduce overall demand pressure and to specifically target exorbitant property market pressures.

In the light of the rapid growth in house prices Barry and Fitz Gerald (2001) suggested that a tax on mortgage interest payments could have been used to raise the cost of borrowing for households, mirroring the effect of a rise in interest rates. The UK Treasury (2003) recognised the significance of this new role for fiscal policy if the UK were to join EMU and they suggested a similar mechanism might be required to manage the UK economy in such an eventuality. (3) In the case of Ireland, instead of tightening fiscal policy in the early years of the past decade, tax incentives to invest in certain property assets were increased and a general tax exemption for mortgage interest payments was maintained.

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Figure 5 shows our estimates of the fiscal stance in Ireland over recent decades. Using the ESRI HERMES model of the Irish economy, this is estimated by comparing a scenario where both government expenditure and taxes are indexed with the actual budgetary outturn for each year. The methodology is described in Kearney et al. (2000). A positive difference implies an expansionary budget and a negative sign indicates a contractionary budget.

Scanning across figure 5 we can see that the origins of the fiscal crisis of the mid-1980s can be traced to inappropriately stimulatory fiscal policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While tough budgets in 1983 and 1984 began the process of bringing the deficit under control, the process was only completed with further very tough budgets in 1988 and 1989 (Honohan, 1999). A consequence of this long drawn out adjustment was a lost decade in terms of growth. This experience argues for a more concentrated period of adjustment this time around.

The current problems for the economy have their origins in the early and middle years of the past decade. As the economy was growing close to or above capacity over much of the decade, the effect of the substantial fiscal stimuli of the 1999-2002 period was to add to inflationary pressures, especially pressures on the housing market. The stimulatory budgets of 2005-7 further aggravated the situation. The run-up to the election years of 2002 and 2007 saw a significant fiscal stimulus. The generally pro-cyclical policy of the government was encapsulated in the then Minister for Finance's statement: "if I have it, I'll spend it". (4)

The budgetary tightening over the period 2008-11, equivalent ex ante to 13 per cent of GDP, had a cumulative ex post impact of 7 1/2 per cent of GDP. While this is very severe, our estimates suggest it was not as severe as the sum of the austerity budgets of 1983, 1988 and 1989 together at 10 per cent of GDP. The reason for this is relatively straightforward, while the nominal cuts introduced in these recent budgets (2008-11) may well be unprecedented, in real terms their effect is more muted since prices and wages were also falling in the economy. By contrast in the 1980s, relatively high rates of inflation meant that a nominal freeze in pay rates or welfare payments translated into a more severe real reduction.

As discussed in Lane (2010) it would have been much more appropriate to have run a much tighter fiscal policy over the course of the past decade, resulting in a substantial and increasing surplus up to and including 2007. Such a policy was implemented in Finland and Sweden who had had previous experience of a financial crisis at the end of the 1980s. If tighter fiscal policy over the past decade had included specific measures to target the property market bubble, the major dislocation of the past four years could have been avoided. In addition, the surpluses run up over the decade would have provided a buffer against the effects of the international recession. Finally, by avoiding the property market bubble, the catastrophic losses in the banking system would almost certainly also have been prevented.

4. The economy after the crisis

The depth of the fiscal crisis, coupled with mounting costs for the government from the financial crisis, forced the Irish authorities to make very significant interventions to stabilise the deficit. To date, the total amount of ex ante cuts implemented is equivalent to more than 20 billion [euro] (13 per cent of GDP), with a further 10 billion [euro] in cuts planned for 2012-14. We discuss the knock-on effects of this austerity programme on the wider economy in this section. In addition to the costs of these policy actions, the recession has left a deep scar on the Irish economy with a permanent loss of output of between 15 and 20 per cent per head. Taking these effects together, the question arises as to the future growth prospects of the economy. While the permanent costs have been very high, the traded sector of the economy has so far emerged relatively unscathed with exports performing well. (5) The substantial reduction in the Irish cost base over the past three years should see substantial continuing growth in Irish exports over the next few years once world output picks up.

4.1 Fiscal consolidation and the costs of austerity

Since the summer of 2008 the Irish fiscal position has deteriorated very rapidly. Beginning in autumn 2008, the authorities responded to this deterioration with a series of austerity budgets designed to stabilise the deficit. The speed of the widening of the deficit, even in the face of these measures, warranted a supplementary budget in the spring of 2009 and it was not until 2010 that the measures undertaken were sufficient to see the deficit stabilise. Table 1 summarises the ex ante measures undertaken over the period 2008-10; in total they were equivalent to over 14 billion [euro] or 9 per cent of 2010 GDP. By the end of 2010 the general government deficit had stabilised, however at a very high level of 11 1/2 per cent of GDP. In November 2010 the Irish government agreed a package of loans from the EU/IMF designed to help fund Irish debt over the period 2011-13. That agreement also mapped out a further package of austerity measures designed to bring the deficit below 3 per cent of GDP by the middle of the decade.

Table 1 also summarises the agreed measures for 2011-14. Roughly two thirds of the actual and planned austerity package relates to cuts in expenditure, both current and capital. In 2009 and 2010 significant cuts in public sector pay levels were introduced, equivalent to up to 15 per cent of gross salary. There have also been very large cuts in expenditure on capital projects. On the revenue side, taxes on income have risen substantially in these years. Over the period 2011-14 the consolidation measures total 15 billion [euro], or 10 per cent of 2010 GDP. This means that cumulatively by 2014 the Irish authorities will have introduced ex ante austerity measures equivalent to 20 per cent of GDP over a continuous seven-year period.

As shown in figure 5 above, these packages have had significant effects on the real economy. Using the measure of fiscal stance described in Section 3.1 above, we estimate that the cumulative ex post effect of the 2008-10 consolidation was 4.6 per cent of GDP, less than half the ex ante measures. As can be seen in figure 6, these measures have been sufficient to stabilise the explosion in the deficit.

The new package of 15 billion [euro] in austerity measures, 5.3 billion [euro] of which have been introduced in 2011, will prove more difficult to implement, following on from three years of significant fiscal cuts. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly the 'low-hanging fruit' have been picked so that the additional measures that will be needed will have a higher opportunity cost. Secondly, the Irish economy now faces very high unemployment and, at best, sluggish domestic demand, so that a continuation of a policy of increasingly costly austerity measures will only exacerbate the problems facing the domestic sector. Having pursued a pro-cyclical fiscal policy for most of the first decade, the authorities now find themselves faced with the same perverse policy outcome in the first years of this decade. The one advantage that Ireland has, in the face of such a very large adjustment, is that the process of fiscal adjustment will lead to a substantial reduction in imports (6) and a reallocation of resources to the export sector. This will help transmit some of the effects of the fiscal adjustment to Ireland's EU neighbours.

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In Bergin et al. (2010) we simulated the effects of an illustrative package of expenditure cuts and tax increases of 15 billion [euro] over the period 2011-14 on the wider economy. GDP would be reduced by a cumulative 4 per cent over the four years with higher unemployment and emigration as a consequence. The fact that the negative effects of such a large package on the domestic economy are not greater reflects the openness of the economy and the relatively low fiscal multipliers. On the basis of this analysis, while the 15 billion [euro] in cuts over the period 2011-14 will act as a substantial drag on demand and output, it should be sufficient to bring the external balance into surplus over the medium term and to produce a significant primary surplus. The ex post effect on the government deficit would be a reduction in the range of 4.5 to 5.5 per cent of GDP. In addition, the balance of payments surplus would be increased by around 5 percentage points of GDP.

4.2 The permanent cost of the crisis to the real economy

The current crisis is estimated to have caused significant permanent damage to the economy. Bergin et al. (2010) estimate the permanent loss of output due to the recession ranges from 15 to 20 per cent of GNP per head by 2015 (figure 7). A significant part of this loss of output reflects the costs resulting from a huge rise in the burden of government debt.

The financial crisis could have an additional serious long-term impact through two channels: the cost and availability of capital and labour supply. As a result of the financial crisis there has been a big rise in the cost of capital for Irish business dependent on the domestic banking sector for finance. There is also evidence of credit rationing as a result of the ongoing problems in the banking system. This highlights the problems for a peripheral economy with a national rather than an EUwide banking system (Barrell et al., 2011). The exposure of the tradable sector to developments in Irish capital markets is uneven. In the high technology manufacturing sector the bulk of output and employment is in foreign owned firms who will not be affected by the cost or availability of finance in Ireland. In the case of the food processing sector, the Irish owned firms are multinationals with substantial foreign operations. They too may be less dependent on the Irish capital market. Similarly, a significant part of the business and financial services sector that is exporting is also foreign owned. The sectors where Irish firms are important is in some key sectors of business and financial services (IT services) and in traditional manufacturing and certain other services serving the domestic market. In those cases investment and output in the medium term could be affected by developments in the financial sector. The very high propensity for Irish workers--and especially highly skilled workers--to migrate when unemployment rises poses a difficulty for future potential labour force growth. While the experience of the 1990s was that most of the emigrants of the 1980s returned, it is not certain that this experience will be repeated later in this decade for those currently leaving. If the current emigration, especially of skilled workers, proved long-term in nature, it could have a permanent effect on the potential output of the economy. (7)

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5. Growth, the deficit and implied debt dynamics

In this section we examine the current and likely future debt burden. Based on current forecasts, both from domestic and international agencies, our analysis suggests that in the absence of any new shocks the net debt burden will exceed 100 per cent of GDP in the early years of this decade. Beyond 2013 we estimate that net debt will stabilise and start to decline. In these circumstances, the current and future debt burden, while very high, could prove sustainable.

At the end of 2010 the total gross general government debt was 148 billion [euro]. This is equivalent to 96 per cent of GDP or 119 per cent of GNP. As shown in figure 8, this is composed of 90 billion [euro] of government bonds, 31 billion [euro] promissory notes and 27 billion [euro] of other debt. (8) These are very high gross debt to income ratios, and stabilisation will require either substantial economic growth or significant reductions in borrowing in the coming years. However, the Irish authorities are unusual in holding such large liquid financial assets and, when these liquid financial assets are taken into account, the position looks less dramatic. At the end of 2010 the government held liquid financial assets valued at 31 billion [euro]. (9) Including these liquid financial assets, the net indebtedness of general government at end-2010 was 76 per cent of GDP or 94 per cent of GNP.

In the autumn of 2010 the government still expected to be able to fund itself on financial markets. To facilitate this process they held a large amount of liquid financial assets so they would not be forced to have recourse to the markets until towards the end of the following year. However, the need to fund the huge losses in the banking system meant that the government had to seek aid from the IMF/EU towards the end of 2010.

Over the period 2000-7 Irish government debt was low and falling (see figure 9). In 2001 the government set up the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) which invested 1 per cent of GDP in each year to fund future pension requirements. The value of the fund grew rapidly to a peak of 24 billion [euro] in 2007. Along with some cash balances and surpluses on a number of other managed funds, these investments meant that the gap between gross and net government debt grew steadily between 2001 and 2007 from 8 percentage points of GDP in 2001 to 13 percentage points of GDP in 2007. By the end of 2007, while gross government debt was just 25 per cent of GDP, net government debt was a mere 12 per cent of GDE In 2008 the Irish authorities pre-funded future deficits by borrowing significant additional sums which increased total liquid assets by 15 billion [euro] in 2008 so that liquid assets--in the form of both cash holdings and the NPRF sovereign wealth fund--amounted to almost half of total gross government debt in 2008 (figure 9).

[FIGURE 9 OMITTED]

The very rapid deterioration in the fiscal position from 2007 onwards, together with significant transfers of funds to the banking system and injections of capital into the banks, meant that by the end of 2010 gross and net government debt amounted to 96 per cent of GDP and 76 per cent respectively. Figure 10 shows the dramatic impact that government intervention in the banking system since the beginning of 2009 has had on the government debt figures. By the end of 2010 the government's total direct intervention in the banking system amounted to over 45 billion [euro], of which 35 billion [euro] was a direct transfer.

In examining the dynamics of the debt over the medium term we adopt assumptions on the time path for the nominal growth rate and the general government deficit, together with the level of bank recapitalisation funds required as detailed in the Appendix. There remains the possibility that growth in the post-2012 recovery phase could significantly exceed this figure. There is also the possibility that further shocks to the economy could postpone the return to substantial growth beyond 2013 or 2014.

On these macroeconomic assumptions, our projections imply that the government finances would move into surplus net of debt interest--the primary balance--by 2014. Despite this, gross funding needs over the period 2011-14 are estimated to be approximately 108.9 billion [euro] (see table 2). Of this, 67.5 billion [euro] is available from EU/IMF funds out to 2013. The authorities also have 31 billion [euro] in liquid assets available. We assume that out to 2014 26 billion [euro] of these liquid assets will be used to fund the debt. This means that a total of 15.4 billion [euro] would have to be borrowed from sovereign debt markets between 2013 and 2014.

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The strategy in relation to the use of liquid assets will be critical in determining how soon the Irish government would have to return to the markets and also will affect the total interest bill over the period 2011-14. In table 3 we compare our illustrative figures (detailed in the Appendix) with the latest figures from the Department of Finance, IMF and European Commission. (10) Our figures contain two critical differences from the other agencies. The first is that we assume that 3 billion [euro] of the PCAR (11) bank recapitalisation monies will be refunded in 2014 bringing the total cost of bank recapitalisations to 17 billion [euro]. The second is that we assume that 26 billion [euro] of liquid assets will be used to finance the deficits over the period. This compares with an estimated 15 billion [euro] implicit in the Department of Finance (DOF) numbers, 12 billion [euro] in the EC figures and just 10 billion [euro] in the IMF figures.

Because our figures include a much more significant rundown of liquid assets, the residual funding needs out to 2014 are much lower. In comparison to the EU/IMF figures, residual funding needs are some 20 billion [euro] lower. This in turn means that the cumulative interest bill under our projections is significantly lower. While there is clearly a strong argument for having a buffer fund in times of financial crisis, the figures here do give an indication of just how expensive a strategy this is with an interest cost of an additional 3 billion [euro] attendant on holding very large cash balances at a time when the interest rate on new government borrowing is between 5 and 6 per cent.

On these figures, the gross debt-GDP ratio would fall beyond 2013 but the net debt-GDP ratio stays above 100 per cent out to 2015. Figure 11 shows the net debt trajectories implicit in our macroeconomic assumptions, and also the official forecasts from the Department of Finance, European Commission and IMF. All of these scenarios involve a net debt-GDP ratio above 100 per cent out to 2015. This is very high and is one of the reasons there are concerns around the sustainability of Ireland's current debt position. Nonetheless these figures do indicate that the debt will stabilise by 2014 or 2015 if current fiscal targets are followed.

[FIGURE 11 OMITTED]

There are a number of methods of stabilising the debt at an earlier date. At one extreme, eliminating the primary deficit (expected to be 10bn [euro] in 2011) immediately, while exceptionally painful, would serve to stabilise the gross debt-GDP ratio below 100 and bring the net debt figure to around 150 billion [euro] in 2012, equivalent to 90 per cent of GDP or 115 per cent of GNP. While less extreme, a more rapid reduction in the primary balance than currently envisaged would produce a stabilisation of the debt-GDP ratio at an intermediate figure.

Alternatively, a lower initial level of debt would also see the dynamics stabilise earlier and at a lower level. If there were a reduction in the initial level of debt of around 20 billion [euro], the debt-GDP ratio would stabilise significantly below 100 per cent by 2015. Any reductions in the current stock of debt--through privatisation of state assets, disposal of assets, or burden-sharing--could have a very significant effect on the trajectory of the debt in the middle part of the decade. In the longer term, the sale of the state's stake in Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland (total investment of 29.4 billion [euro]) can be envisaged as a means of reducing the state's public debt burden. It is uncertain how much of a reduction such a sale would realise, but even on conservative assumptions of the market value of the nationalised banks, this sale alone would be enough to reduce the debt to GDP ratio by a significant amount. (12)

There are few easy options in tackling the current levels of debt facing the Irish government. The current programme of austerity, with an agreed package of cuts totalling 30 billion [euro] over the period 2008-14, will, on these assumptions, be sufficient to all but close the primary deficit by 2013. However the very high current levels of debt mean that if growth were to prove less than assumed it would still not be sufficient to stabilise the debt-GDP ratio. On the other hand, a more robust recovery would both improve the primary balance more rapidly and also ensure that the debt-GDP ratio began to fall at an earlier date.

6. Conclusions

Major domestic policy failures in the past decade played a key role in the build-up to the Irish economic crisis of 2008-10. If an appropriate fiscal policy had been pursued, the property market bubble and related financial collapse could have been avoided. Appropriate regulation of the financial sector could also have prevented the financial collapse. In restricting the availability of credit it could also have halted the property market boom before it became dangerous. Thus the crisis is the result of twin policy failures.

Since the financial collapse began, in late 2008, there has been a corresponding dramatic reduction in output. It seems probable that this loss of output will not be restored and that the economy will be permanently 'scarred' as a result. However, there appears to have been limited damage to the tradable sector of the economy. Already this sector has rebounded and exports have reached record levels (exports are greater than GDP). This export growth is not very job intensive so that recovery in the labour market will await a recovery in domestic demand.

In order to restore order to the public finances and to help fund the huge losses in the Irish banking system since the middle of 2008, fiscal policy has seen major tightening, with a combined ex ante adjustment of almost 10 per cent of GDP between 2008 and 2010. Further adjustment of a cumulative 10 per cent of GDP is planned for 2011-14. This should ensure that the burden of debt stabilises by 2013 or 2014. This will be achieved through running a primary surplus by 2014. However, the effect of this very tight fiscal policy will be to delay recovery in domestic demand.

With the need for continuing fiscal tightening for the next three years it seems unlikely that domestic demand will recover before 2013. However, with a rapidly growing balance of payments surplus, when domestic demand eventually does recover there could be a period of quite rapid growth.

Finally, the debt-GDP ratio, which has risen so dramatically between 2007 and 2010, is likely to reach a plateau by 2013. When holdings of liquid assets are taken into account, the net debt-GDP ratio is likely to peak at between 100 and 105 per cent of GDP. In addition, when the recapitalised banks are eventually sold, any proceeds that accrue to the government would result in a significant step reduction in the debt burden. In the interim, the Irish economy remains vulnerable to any new shocks which might negatively impact on growth or add to the woes of the domestic banking system.

Appendix 1. Details on debt dynamics

In examining the dynamics of the debt over the medium term we adopt assumptions on the time path for the nominal growth rate and the general government deficit, together with the level of bank recapitalisation funds required. Our projections for GDP and GNP growth in 2011 and 2012 are based on forecasts from the Spring 2011 Quarterly Economic Commentary. The GDP figures for 2013-15 are based on an assumed 4 per cent nominal growth in GDP. (13)

Along with these growth and deficit projections, we make the following assumptions in relation to bank recapitalisation, the treatment of liquid assets and the likely timing of a return to the markets:

* We assume that the bank bail-out in 2011 will cost the exchequer an additional 20 billion [euro]. (14) This is largely financed through a reduction in cash balances of 8 billion [euro] and the NPRF discretionary portfolio of 10 billion [euro]. Therefore it has a marginal effect on the gross debt in 2011 of 2 billion [euro]. We further assume that 3bn [euro] of these monies will be repaid in 2014 as foreseen in the recent PCAR agreement. (15)

* We assume that the EU/IMF funds not needed to recapitalise the banks will still be made available to Ireland by the end of 2013. This would ease the funding pressures on the government and facilitate an orderly return to the markets in 2014/15.

* We assume that the government does not borrow from the markets until 2014. (16) Instead it uses the EU/IMF facility together with a run-down of liquid assets to fund its borrowing needs out to 2014.

* By 2015 we assume liquid assets have been all but run down with a residual of just 3 billion [euro].

* In relation to interest rates, we assume that the interest rate on EU/IMF borrowing will fall from 5.8 per cent in 2011 to 5.5 per cent thereafter. The interest rate on new borrowing from 2014 onwards is assumed to be 6 per cent, with interest rates on retail debt assumed to be 3.5 per cent. The interest rate on liquid asset holdings is assumed to be just 0.5 per cent. Hence there is a very significant cost to holding these assets over a prolonged period of time.

Table A1 shows our stylised estimate of the debt and deficit dynamics out to 2015. These numbers compute the funds that would be needed in each year from the EU/IMF funds based on the sum of the projected deficit, bond refinancing, bank recapitalisation and change in liquid assets.

New borrowing needs for 2011 are projected to be 18.1 billion [euro], which is comprised of a projected deficit of 16.3 [euro] billion, bank recapitalisation costs of 20 billion [euro] and a run-down in liquid assets of 18.2 billion [euro]. In addition to new borrowing, there will also be significant debt roll-over. In 2011 there are 4.6 billion [euro] in government bonds and 3.1 billion [euro] in promissory notes to be paid. In addition, we assume that there will be no roll-over of short-term debt with a consequent repayment of 7.0 billion [euro] in short-term debt, offset by an additional 1.2 billion [euro] in retail debt raised. So the total amount borrowed from the EU/IMF of 31.5 billion [euro] includes 18.1 billion [euro] in new borrowing and 13.5 billion [euro] in debt rollover.

Table A1. Debt and deficit dynamics

 2010 2011

FLOWS:
GDP in current prices, bn [euro] 153.9 158.1
Borrowing needs:
A. General government deficit, bn [euro] 49.9 16.3
B. Bank recapitalisation, bn [euro] 20.0
C. Change in liquid assets bn [euro] -18.2
Total new borrowing bn [euro] A+B+C 18.1
STOCKS:
Bonds outstanding (a) 90.1 85.5
Other (b) 27.2 21.4
Promissory notes 30.8 27.7
EU/IMF borrowing bn [euro] 0.0 31.5
Residual Funding needed: bn [euro] 0.0 0.0
Total gross government debt A+B+C 148 166
(% of GDP) 96 105
Liquid assets 31 13
(% of GDP) 20 8
Total net government debt A+B 117 153
(% of GDP) 76 97

 2012 2013

FLOWS:
GDP in current prices, bn [euro] 164.1 170.6
Borrowing needs:
A. General government deficit, bn [euro] 13.0 10.0
B. Bank recapitalisation, bn [euro] 0.0 0.0
C. Change in liquid assets bn [euro] 0.0 -2.8
Total new borrowing bn [euro] A+B+C 13.0 7.2
STOCKS:
Bonds outstanding (a) 79.8 73.7
Other (b) 22.6 23.6
Promissory notes 24.6 23.3
EU/IMF borrowing bn [euro] 52.1 65.8
Residual Funding needed: bn [euro] 0.0 0.0
Total gross government debt A+B+C 179 186
(% of GDP) 109 109
Liquid assets 13 10
(% of GDP) 8 6
Total net government debt A+B 166 176
(% of GDP) 101 103

 2014 2015

FLOWS:
GDP in current prices, bn [euro] 177.5 184.6
Borrowing needs:
A. General government deficit, bn [euro] 8.3 7.1
B. Bank recapitalisation, bn [euro] -3.0 0.0
C. Change in liquid assets bn [euro] -5.0 -2.1
Total new borrowing bn [euro] A+B+C 0.3 5.0
STOCKS:
Bonds outstanding (a) 61.8 61.8
Other (b) 24.6 25.6
Promissory notes 21.8 20.2
EU/IMF borrowing bn [euro] 67.5 67.5
Residual Funding needed: bn [euro] 11.0 16.6
Total gross government debt A+B+C 187 192
(% of GDP) 105 104
Liquid assets 5 3
(% of GDP) 3 2
Total net government debt A+B 182 189
(% of GDP) 102 102

Notes: (a) Based on stock of debt as of end December 2010. (b) Short
term debt, retail debt, local government debt etc.

REFERENCES

Addison-Smyth, D. and McQuinn, K. (2010), 'Quantifying revenue windfalls from the Irish housing market', Economic and Social Review, 41, 2, Summer, pp. 201-22.

Barrell, R., Fic, T., FitzGerald, J., Orazgani, A. and Whitworth, R. (2011), 'The banking sector and recovery in the EU economy', National Institute Economic Review, 216, April, pp.R41-52.

Barrett, A., Fitz Gerald, J. and Nolan, B. (2002), 'Earnings inequality, returns to education and immigration into Ireland', Labour Economics, 9, 5.

Barrett, A. and Goggin, J. (2010), 'Returning to the question of a wage premium for returning migrants', National Institute Economic Review, 213, July, pp. R43-51.

Barry, F. and Fitz Gerald, J. (2001), 'Irish fiscal policy in EMU and the Brussels-Dublin controversy', in Fiscal Policy in EMU: Report of the Swedish Committee on Stabilization Policy in EMU, Stockholm, Statens Offentliga Utredningar.

Bergin, A., Conefrey, T., Fitz Gerald, J. and Kearney, I. (2009), 'The behaviour of the Irish economy: shocks to the HERMES macroeconomic model', ESRI Working Paper no. 287, Dublin, The Economic and Social Research Institute.

Bergin, A., Conefrey, T., Kearney, I. and Fitz Gerald, J. (2010), 'Recovery scenarios for Ireland: an update', in ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer.

Blanchard, O. (2001), 'Country adjustments within the euro area: lessons after two years', in Defining a Macroeconomic Framework for the Euro Area, London, CEPR.

--(2007), 'Current account deficits in rich countries', NBER Working paper No. 12925.

Conefrey, T. and Fitz Gerald, J. (2010), 'Managing housing bubbles in regional economies under EMU: Ireland and Spain', National Institute Economic Review, 211, 1, pp. 211-99.

Department of Finance (2011), Stability Programme Update, April 2011 http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/reports/2011/ spuirelandapr2011.pdf.

European Commission (2001), European Economy--Public Finances in EMU, No. 3.

--(2011), The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland, Spring 2011 Review, April..

Fitz Gerald, J. (2011), 'The Irish economy today: albatross or phoenix?', ESRI Working Paper No. 384, April 2011.

Fitz Gerald J., Bergin, A., Kearney, I., Barrett, A., Duffy, D., Garrett, S. and McCarthy, Y. (2005), Medium-Term Review: 2005-2012, Dublin, The Economic and Social Research Institute.

Fitz Gerald, J. and Morgenroth, E. (eds) (2006), Ex Ante Evaluation of the Investment Priorities for the National Development Plan 2007-2013, Policy Research Series No. 59, Dublin, The Economic and Social Research Institute.

HM Treasury (2003), Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU, London, HM Treasury.

Honohan, P. (1999), 'Fiscal adjustment and disinflation in Ireland: setting the basis for economic recovery and expansion', in Barry, F. (ed.), Understanding Ireland's Econmic Growth, London, Macmillan, pp. 75-98.

IMF (2011), Ireland Country Report 11/109, May.

Kearney, I., McCoy, D., Duffy, D., McMahon, M. and Smyth, D. (2000), 'Assessing the stance of Irish fiscal policy', in Barrett, A. (ed.), Budget Perspectives, Proceedings of a Conference held on 19 September 2000, ESRI.

Lane, P. (2010), 'A new fiscal framework for Ireland', Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, XXXIX, 2009/10.

McCarthy, Y. and O'Malley, E. (2006), 'New drivers of growth? Sectoral contributions to the Irish economy', Special Article in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer, ESRI.

Nyberg, P. (2011), 'Misjudging risk: causes of the systemic banking crisis in Ireland', Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland, available at: http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/reports/2011/ nybergreport.pdf.

O'Leary, J. (2010), 'External surveillance of Irish fiscal policy during the boom', Irish Economy Note No. 11, available at: http:// www.irisheconomy.ie/Notes/IrishEconomyNote11.pdf.

Regling, K. and Watson, M. (2010), 'A preliminary report on the sources of Ireland's banking crisis', available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/.

NOTES

(1) The situation was rather similar in Spain (Conefrey and Fitz Gerald, 2010).

(2) We do not focus on financial regulation in this paper, but with the benefit of hindsight the collapse of the domestic financial system could and should have been prevented, firstly by the management and boards of the commercial banks (Nyberg, 2011) and, secondly, by the financial regulator who should have seen the dangers and prevented the disaster (Regling and Watson, 2010).

(3) The Treasury suggested using stamp duty as the mechanism temporarily to raise the cost of housing and discourage overinvestment. While this mechanism would work to cut housing demand, by raising the price for buyers it could lead to higher household indebtedness. In the case of a mortgage interest tax the effect would be to reduce the ability of households to take on additional debt, reducing their long-term liabilities.

(4) http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/budget2006/mccreevyprofile.htm.

(5) Exports of goods and services grew by 6.3 per cent in 2010 in real terms (8.1 per cent in nominal terms).

(6) Observers who are unfamiliar with the structure of the Irish economy tend to overestimate the domestic multiplier effects of fiscal retrenchment. Bergin et al. (2009) sets out estimates of the multiplier effects of raising different types of taxes and cutting different types of government expenditure. The magnitude of these multipliers is much lower than would be the case in larger more closed economies such as the UK, Germany and France. The reason why fiscal impulses have a lower impact in open economies is because so much of what is consumed is imported. In the case of Ireland, the import share of final output rose rapidly from the 1960s through to the 1990s. Table 2 from Fitz Gerald et al. (2005, Chapter 2) shows the import content, direct and indirect, of each component of final demand for a range of years. Further details of this analysis are given in McCarthy and O'Malley, 2006.

(7) However, it should also be noted that research has shown that returned emigrants earned approximately 7 per cent more than non-emigrants, presumably as a result of experience and skills obtained working abroad (Barrett and Goggin, 2010).

(8) Other debt includes short-term debt (Treasury bills and commercial paper), retail debt, local government debt and other debt instruments.

(9) This includes 16.2 billion [euro] in cash deposits and 14.9 billion [euro] in so called 'discretionary funds' held at the state's sovereign wealth fund, the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF). The total value of the NPRF at the end of 2010 was 24.4 billion [euro], of which 9.5 billion [euro] is in the 'Directed Portfolio' constituting injections of capital into two of the large Irish banks, Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland. These are excluded from liquid assets.

(10) The Department of Finance figures are from the April 2011 Stability Programme Update; the IMF figures are from the IMF Ireland Country Report 11/109 (May 2011) and the European Commission figures are from the The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland, Spring 2011 Review, April 2011.

(11) The Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR) was completed at the end of March 2011. It determined that the Irish banks would need a total of 24 billion [euro] to fully capitatise them under stressed scenarios.

(12) After the planned recapitalisation the tier I capital in these two banks will amount to over 20 per cent of GDP.

(13) The general government deficit figures are consistent with these forecasts.

(14) We assume that 4 billion [euro] of the 24 billion [euro] needed to recapitalise the banks comes from a reduction in the liabilities to subordinated bond holders.

(15) On 31 March 2011 the Minister for Finance announced the results of PCAR stress tests of the Irish domestic banks. The results suggested that the banks would need a total of 24 billion [euro] in additional capital in order to fully recapitalise the banking system.

(16) There is one exception here. We assume that retail debt will increase by 1.2 billion [euro] in 2011 and 2012, and by 1 billion [euro] in subsequent years. The most recent data from the NTMA indicate that over 0.7 billion [euro] in retail debt was raised in the first quarter of 2011 so this assumption is likely to be conservative.

Adele Bergin, John Fitz Gerald, Ide Kearney and Cormac O'Sullivan *

* ESRI, Dublin. e-mail: John.Fitzgerald@esri.ie.

doi: 10.1177/0027950111420920

Table 1. Summary of actual and planned austerity
measures over period 2008-14, bn [euro].

 2008-10 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011-14

Revenue 5.6 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.1 5.1
Expenditure 9.2 3.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 10.0
of which Capital 1.6 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 3.1
Total 14.7 5.3 3.6 3.1 3.1 15.1
% of 2010 GDP 10% 3% 2% 2% 2% 10%

Table 2. Decomposition of the gross funding needs of the
Irish government, bn [euro]

 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
 2011-14

General govt deficit 16.3 13.0 10.0 8.3 47.6
Bank recapitalisations 20.0 0.0 0.0 -3.0 17.0
Refinancing needs
 Bonds 4.6 5.8 6.1 11.9 28.3
 Promissory notes 3.1 3.1 1.3 1.5 9.0
 Other 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0
Gross funding
 need (euros) 50.9 21.8 17.4 18.7 108.9

Table 3. Cumulative gross and net debt figures 2011-14,
and gross funding requirements bn [euro]

 Own DOF EC IMF
 estimates

GGD end 2010 148.1 148.1 148.1 148.1
Cumulative deficits 2011-14 47.6 49.8 52.2 51.6
of which:
 Cumulative interest payments 31.5 34.7 34.6 34.3
 Cumulative 'primary' deficits 16.1 15.1 17.6 17.3
Bank recapitalisations 17.0 20.0 19.0 19.0
Change in liquid assets (a) -26.0 -15.3 -11.7 -10.4
GGD end 2014 186.7 202.6 207.6 208.3
Liquid assets end 2014 5.1 15.1 18.1 21.1
Net debt end 2014 181.6 187.5 189.5 187.2
Gross funding needs 108.9 114.1 115.5 114.9
Market funding needs (b) 15.4 31.3 36.4 37.0

Notes: (a) Imputed residual. (b) Additional to funding from EU/IMF
programme and liquid assets.

Figure 8. General government debt in billions of euro at
year end 2010

Promissory Notes 30.8 [euro]
Other, 9.4 [euro]
Retail Debt 10.8 [euro]
Short debt 7.0 [euro]
Bonds 90.1 [euro]

Note: Table made from pie chart.