Commentary: fiscal policy and the fiscal position.
Weale, Martin
Introduction
When the Government adopts a fiscal policy framework and target
structure, as the current Government did in 1997, there is only limited
interest in criticism of the policy framework itself. Inevitably much
more attention focuses on whether the Government's targets will be
met, rather than on whether those targets are the right targets; this is
a simpler focus for debate.
Now, however, that the policy has failed spectacularly, and with
discussion of the idea that there should be an independent office of
budgetary stability, the related questions (1) what is the appropriate
target structure, and (2) what are the implications of this for fiscal
policy in the current circumstances, are now highly topical and we focus
on these in this commentary.
Fiscal rules
As economics has developed, a number of different fiscal principles
have been suggested. Perhaps the oldest principle was that the
Government should balance its books. This principle was adopted by the
1979 Conservative Government but they delivered a budget in balance or
in surplus only in 1988/89 and 1989/90. The same principle has been
adopted in the Stability and Growth Pact, albeit with an element of
'flexibility' which requires countries to keep their budget
deficits to less than 3 per cent of GDP except during periods of sharply
falling output like the present. This approach was criticised in the
1990s in the United Kingdom on the grounds that, when revenues were
weak, it was easier to cut investment expenditure than to reduce current
consumption. Thus the principle of a balanced budget seemed to lead to a
situation where the public capital stock was deteriorating. By
comparison with other countries, the United Kingdom was, in any case,
short of infrastructure capital. As a result it was easy to make the
case for some alternative principle that would seem less inimical to
public investment.
Pigou (1920) had proposed the principle that the Government should
borrow only to invest. While he did not discuss the question of
averaging over the economic cycle, this principle, as well as being
slightly less old-fashioned than budget balance, seemed to offer an
alternative that would limit profligacy while at the same time giving
room to improve the nation's infrastructure and was the basis for
the current government's first fiscal rule. So as to ensure that it
would not lead to excessive public investment, a second rule was
introduced, that the stock of net public debt should not exceed 40 per
cent of GDP. Since, in practice, investment decisions should be
justified by the return on investment rather than by any rationing of
investment funds, there is obviously a risk that such a rule could lead
to a grossly inappropriate amount of investment taking place. But, given
the difficulty of measuring the return to public capital, it is, perhaps
fortunately, not possible to say whether there are projects with
potentially high returns which are not carried out or alternatively,
whether the economy is over-stocked with public investment. The Pigovian
principle is, of course, quite divorced from a historical perspective.
This shows that the main factors which have led to large-scale
government borrowing have been the three big wars of the last two
hundred years, the Napoleonic Wars and then the First and Second World
Wars.
An alternative and more sophisticated analytical framework was
developed by Barro (1979) and Flemming (1988). This is that the goal of
fiscal policy is to keep expected future tax rates constant. Given that
the Government decided to separate fiscal from monetary policy and use
the latter to contol inflation, this is the approach that should have
been adopted. Barro justified the approach by the argument that, since
there were costs to changing tax rates, expected welfare would be at its
peak if taxes were not expected to change. Such an argument is not very
impressive because it is clear that, while some taxes may be costly to
change, others such as national insurance contributions can be changed
extremely cheaply; indeed the costs of changes to contribution rates are
probably lower than those of changing interest rates. Flemming's
argument was much more sophisticated. It was that expected changes to
tax rates affect people's behaviour. If labour taxes are expected
to rise, then labour supply will be brought forward to the present; if
consumption taxes are expected to rise, then consumption will be brought
forward to the present. Flemming showed that expectations of tax changes
led to lower welfare than the alternative of setting taxes at a constant
rate with the Government relying on credit markets to smooth out timing
differences between revenue and expenditure. Thus he provided the
coherent theoretical background for the principle.
It should be noted that this argument is superficially similar to
the argument, made by politicians in the 1980s and still popular, that
tax rates should be stable to facilitate business planning. That
argument is, however, weak on two grounds. First of all, if there is a
choice between tax rate volatility and interest rate volatility, it is
by no means clear that business planning is better served by stable tax
rates and highly volatile interest rates than by spreading policy
responses across both tax and interest rates should that be possible.
Secondly, a goal of keeping tax rates rather than expected tax rates
constant inevitably means that adjustments to tax rates are delayed when
circumstances change. Thus tax rate stability as a goal can imply
welfare-diminishing changes to expected future tax rates.
An obvious criticism of Flemming's approach is that it has to
rely on forecasts of both revenue buoyancy and spending needs. On those
grounds it might seem as vulnerable to mistaken forecasts as the
Government's framework proved to be. Indeed if the only
disturbances to revenue were the normal economic cycle, then the goal of
balancing the current budget over the cycle might not be very different
from the aim of keeping expected future taxes constant. After all, if
the current budget is in deficit in periods of weak economic growth and
in surplus in periods of strong economic growth and if public investment
is stable as a share of trend GDP, then the required target can be met
without changes to tax rates during the course of the economic cycle.
And, as is well documented, no forecaster anticipated either the current
recession or its fiscal impact, as opposed to warning what might happen.
Thus Flemming's approach might seem no more helpful than the
Government's rules as a guide to fiscal management, while being
even more likely to lead to relatively fruitless debates about what the
long-term prospects for the economy were. There are, however, two key
differences for an economy structured round Flemming's approach
from one based on the Government's fiscal rules, both of which
would have pointed to a tighter fiscal policy in the boom.
Fiscal policy in normal times
First of all, the key to Flemming's analysis was that fiscal
shocks, such as those associated with major wars, might happen even
though they could not be forecast. To put that in its current context,
during normal economic times fiscal policy should have been set to save
up for a recession even though the timing of it could not be known.
There is obviously plenty of room for debate about how much preparation
should have taken place. But the point is that the fiscal framework
effectively assumed that there was zero chance of a recession; whatever
the risk might be it can hardly have been sensible to assume that it was
zero.
There are obvious problems in planning for risks which materialise
only infrequently. The recessions that the economy has experienced have
had very different budgetary effects, in part because policy aims have
varied. In 1931 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Snowden, implemented
a range of cuts as a result of which he stated that the budget was
securely balanced. The recessions of 1973-6 and 1979-83 were periods of
high inflation; this amounted to a hidden tax on the national debt and
meant that government debt was not much affected by high borrowing. As a
result of the 1989-92 recession, however, public sector net debt rose
from 26 per cent of GDP in 1991 to a peak of 42.6 per cent in 1996 (and
the decline in public sector net worth, from 78 per cent of GDP in 1988
to 14 per cent in 1998, was much sharper). Debt levels fell to just
below 30 per cent by 2002 but rose to 36.5 per cent of GDP by the start
of the current recession. Obviously it is highly uncertain how much debt
will rise as a consequence of the current recession. Our forecast shows
the level rising to around 100 per cent of GDP after taking account of
any bank losses which the taxpayer has to bear.
With this background, we set up some simulations taking a perhaps
optimistic view that the increase in debt in a recession is 30 per cent
of GDP and that on average such a recession occurs one year in twenty.
We consider an economy growing at 4 per cent per annum in nominal value in normal times, with an interest rate of 5 per cent per annum. For an
economy to stabilise its expected debt at 40 per cent of GDP, an overall
deficit of 1.6 per cent of GDP could be afforded if there were no risk
to consider. If there is a one in twenty chance of a recession which
adds 30 per cent of GDP to the national debt when it happens, then in
normal times a surplus, before allowing for interest payments, of 2 per
cent of GDP is needed. With an allowance for average interest payments,
the required target for normal times is therefore on average budget
balance. This is of course independent of how much public spending goes
on investment.
In practice, as the experience of both the last and the current
recession shows, deficits do not disappear immediately recessions come
to an end. If we assume that a crisis results in a primary deficit of 3
per cent of GDP for ten years, instead of one very bad year, then in
normal years a primary surplus of 2.8 per cent of GDP or 0.8 per cent of
GDP inclusive of average interest payments is needed; this is perhaps a
better guide to policy. It suggests that, if the Government aimed to
invest 2 per cent of GDP, its fiscal rule of delivering current balance
over the cycle was too slack by about 3 per cent of GDP because it did
not pay any attention to the risk of recessions.
Funding age-related expenditure
The second important difference between the fiscal rules and
Flemming's approach is the way that they treat the effects of an
ageing population. Cardarelli, Sefton and Kotlikoff (2000) explored the
sustainability of the UK's fiscal position as it seemed on the
basis of policy at that time, on the assumption that there would be no
adverse fiscal shocks. They found a reasonable balance, at least on the
assumption that there would be no sharp increase in health expenditure.
This assumption was in keeping with government policy at the time,
but seemed politically unsustainable given the general upward pressures
on health spending. Shortly afterwards, following the Wanless Report
(2002), a sharp increase in health spending was announced, financed by a
2 percentage point increase in national insurance contributions (half
collected from employees and half from employers). This, in keeping with
the other revenue projections, seemed to the Government to be adequate
to deliver the fiscal rules. But higher general expenditure on health
almost certainly creates further pressures associated with population
ageing, and particularly so since healthy life expectancy is rising
slower than overall life expectancy (Khoman, Mitchell and Weale, 2008).
So a recognition of political pressures for increased spending should
also have led to the expectation of additional spending in the future.
A second feature of the work was that it was done on the basis of
the population projections provided by the Government Actuary at the
time. The sharp rise in life expectancy which has taken place since then
is bound to have increased age-related expenditures as compared with the
situation described by Cardarelli and Sefton. Had Flemming's
approach been followed, taxes would have been raised in response to each
'surprise' about future life expectancy; in effect the future
expenditure would be funded. By contrast, the Government's fiscal
rules have simply left this as a problem to be dealt with later.
The implications of current longevity estimates for future
expenditures cannot be drawn without repeating Cardarelli and
Sefton's calculations. However, a reasonable conclusion is that
they will shift the required balance on the government current account
further into surplus.
The economy as a whole
With the exception of the comments on spending in recessions, the
analysis above has been entirely in terms of the financing needs of the
public sector considered in isolation. In that sense it is firmly
pre-Keynesian. The broad lesson from Keynes was that policy instruments
should be set not with respect to narrow goals but with reference to the
needs of the whole economy. On these grounds Weale et al. (1989) argued
that fiscal policy should reflect the savings requirements of the
economy as a whole. The costs of financing the Second World War meant
that the ratio of the nation's produced wealth (net foreign assets
plus domestic capital goods excluding land) to GDP fell from three times
GDP in 1938 to twice GDP by 1944. The capital loss was made good by the
mid-1970s. But since the mid-1980s the ratio has again fallen from three
times GDP to around twice GDP; the explanation is probably that rising
land prices have crowded out produced capital and Khoman and Weale
(2008) have argued that the economy is now short of savings, in that
current consumption patterns cannot be afforded. Even before the current
recession, their results showed that without an increase in working
lives, consumption needed to fall by about 8 per cent to move onto a
sustainable basis. There is a strong argument that the policy framework
should take account of the funding needs of the economy as a whole, and
not simply those of the public sector. But that is a separate issue. To
establish the principle that in normal times the current account on the
budget should average a surplus of I per cent of GDP would be a
considerable improvement on the budgetary mismanagement of the past few
years.
The current fiscal position and the medium-term outlook
Since the risk of a substantial economic slowdown first became
apparent, in the Spring of last year we argued that it would be a
mistake to tighten fiscal policy. As the recession developed we argued
prominently for a fiscal stimulus, although also that a VAT reduction
was less suitable than a tax rebate (see Barrell and Weale, 2009).
Despite the arguments above for a fiscal surplus in normal periods, the
case for a further fiscal stimulus in the recent budget was strong. But
given that the Government decided against this, attention has instead
focused on the medium-term prospects for the public finances.
As always in looking at long-term fiscal forecasts, the key
determinants are (i) the normal level of output, (ii) the trend rate of
growth, (iii) the extent to which any deviation from trend is closed,
and (iv) the tax take (the share of taxes in GDP). It is generally
recognised that increased risk premia in financial markets are likely to
reduce long-run output, and also that shrinkage of the financial sector
is likely to lead to a further reduction. The National Institute sees an
output fall similar to that of the Treasury, but notes that losses in
the banking system mean that income (which provides the tax base) is
likely to decline more than output. Two other factors lead to a more
substantial gap in actual output projections. First of all we see the
economy as being further above trend in 2007 than the Treasury had
assumed and secondly we see the trend growth rate being slightly lower.
These taken together lead us to expect output to be about 2 1/4 per cent
lower than the Treasury has probably assumed for 2017. We also expect
prices to rise less rapidly, but this affects nominal rather than real
aggregates.
If we let real government spending grow by 0.7 per cent per annum,
measured with reference to the GDP deflator in the period from 2013/4 to
2017/8, while we let social security benefits grow in line with
underlying GDP and reflect changes in labour force participation and
population structure, we then find that nominal spending on goods and
services has to stagnate from 2012 onwards. Real spending measured with
reference to the GDP deflator falls at about 1 3/4 per cent per annum
from 2012/3 to 2017/8, giving an overall annual decline of nearly 1 per
cent per annum over the period 2009/10 to 2017/8 and taking the share of
public consumption in GDP down to levels not seen since the Second World
War. Freezes on public sector pay will be needed if cuts in public
services are to be avoided. Obviously the squeeze on public consumption
could be mitigated by reducing social security benefit entitlements.
Even with this squeeze tax increases of about 2p in the standard rate of
income tax are needed to bring the current account deficit to just below
4 per cent of GDP.
An alternative would be to let public spending grow faster, to
sustain positive real growth of consumption of goods and services of 0
to 1 per cent per annum from 2012/3 onwards and over the whole period
from 2009/10 to 2017/8, as measured with reference to the GDP deflator.
This would maintain the share of public consumption in GDP at its
average for the first part of this decade. But it would require an
increase in the standard rate of tax of 9-10p in the pound, taking the
share of taxes in GDP to a record level while once again leaving the
deficit on the current account at just under 4 per cent of GDP. These
choices are summarised in table 1. The fiscal tightening needed to
deliver the 1 per cent budget surplus we propose for 2017-18 is simply
unimaginable without major structural change to the economy. Barrell and
Kirby (pp. 61-5 of this Review) discuss the fiscal position in more
detail.
Conclusions
A sound fiscal policy framework would take account of the risk of
recessions and their budgetary implications. It would also take account
of the costs associated with an ageing population and attempt to offset
low saving by the private sector. Simply to take account of the risk of
recession suggests that a budget surplus of the order of close to 1 per
cent of GDP in normal economic times is probably desirable. This is
obviously also practical in policy terms since it is similar to the tax
share of the early 1980s.
REFERENCES
Barrell, R. and Weale, M.R. (2009), 'The economics of a
reduction in VAT', Fiscal Studies, 30, pp. 3-16.
Barro, R. (1979), 'On the determination of the public
debt', Journal of Political Economy, 87, pp. 940-71.
Cardarelli, R., Sefton, J. and Kotlikoff, L. (2000),
'Generational accounting in the UK', Economic Journal, 110,
pp. F547-74.
Flemming, J.S. (1988), 'Debt and taxes', Scottish Journal
of Political Economy, 35, pp. 305-17.
Khoman, E. and Weale, M.R. (2008), 'Are we living beyond our
means? A comparison of France, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom', Peston Lecture, Queen Mary College, National Institute
Discussion Paper No. 311, http://www.niesr.ac.uk/ pdf/100408_94720.pdf
Khoman, E., Mitchell, J. and Weale, M.R. (2008),
'Incidence-based estimates of healthy life expectancy for the
United Kingdom: coherence between transition probabilities and aggregate
life tables', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A.,
171, pp. 203-22.
Pigou, A.C. (1920), The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan and Co.
Wanless, D. (2002), 'Securing our future health: taking a
long-term review', Department of Health, www.dh.gov.uk/en/
Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/
PublicationsPolicyandGuidance/DH_4009293.
Weale, M.R., Blake, A., Christodoulakis, N., Meade, J.E. and Vines,
D.A. (1989), Macroeconomic Policy: Inflation, Wealth and the Exchange
Rate, London, Unwin Hyman.
Table 1. The budgetary choices for 2017
Government consumption Standard rate of
average annual growth income tax
2009/10-2017/8
Severe squeeze -0.9% p.a. 22p
High taxes 0.6% p.a. 30p
Total tax revenue Government current
(% of GDP) account balance in 2017
Severe squeeze 36.1 -3.8%
High taxes 39.2 -3.8%