Demographic change and the European Union labour market.

Lisiankova, Katerina ; Wright, Robert E.

If current demographic trends continue, the combined population of the twenty-five countries that currently make up the European Union will age rapidly and decline in size in the coming decades. As the EU population ages and declines, so will its labour force, which will likely constrain the labour market and generate lower rates of economic growth. Data from the most recent round of United Nation population projections is used to illustrate the scale of these changes.

Keywords: European Union; demographic change; ageing JEL classification: JII

I. Introduction

The twenty-five countries that are currently member states of the European Union (EU) have a combined population of about 460 million inhabitants. This makes the EU the third most populous political entity in the world after China and India. Its population is over 50 per cent larger than that of the United States and it makes up over 7 per cent of the global total. (1) For much of the period since its inception as the European Economic Community in 1958, its population has grown at a steady pace through a combination of positive natural increase (births exceeding deaths) and positive net migration (immigration exceeding emigration) and by leaps caused by 'enlargement'. (2) However, the demographic future is expected to be very different from the past. The populations of all the current member states are expected to age rapidly over coming decades. In addition, the populations of some are currently declining in size, while others are expected to start to begin to decline in the next few years.

In its simplest interpretation, 'population ageing' is the increase in the average or median age of a population. It is the redistribution of relative population shares away from the younger to the older age groups. Population ageing and population decline are ultimately caused by the interaction of the four main demographic variables--fertility, mortality, immigration and emigration. Although this simplifies the issue somewhat, the key determinant of population ageing and decline is low fertility. Fertility in all member states is currently below the so-called replacement level of 2.1 births per woman and this has been the case in most for at least two decades (see Billari, this volume).

The ageing of the population of the EU will lead to an increase in the number of individuals of pension age and a decrease in the number of individuals of working age. This will lead to a large increase in the demand for health care, residential services, housing, pensions and other services consumed by the elderly. Unfortunately, at the same time, the base expected to pay for this increase--essentially people of working age--will become progressively smaller, both in absolute numbers and in relative population share. That is, those 'demanding' will increase while those 'supplying' will decrease. It is not hard to imagine that such a situation of increasing imbalance is unsustainable in the long run and some will argue that cracks caused by population ageing in some member states' pay-as-you-go welfare systems are already starting to show (see Lee and Anderson, this volume, for an analysis of the pension issue for a relatively 'high fertility' country, the USA).

There is a large and growing literature concerned with the economic consequences of population ageing and population decline (see Weil, 1997, for an excellent review). For example, research has considered the impact on key labour market variables such as productivity, earnings, employment, unemployment, mobility, migration, retirement and educational participation.

Likewise, serious attention has been directed towards evaluating the effect of population ageing on savings, consumption, housing and intergenerational transfers. It is safe to conclude that not all the effects of population ageing are negative. For example, it is clear that population ageing will increase the demand for services consumed by older people (e.g. home help) but at the same time will decrease the demand for services consumed by younger people (e.g. schooling).

The purpose of this paper is not to place the EU in the context of the many themes that make up the debate concerning the economic and social consequences of population ageing and population decline. Our starting position is that both are undesirable and problematic and if unchecked will lead to a substantial and sustained fall in the standard of living of many EU inhabitants. Such a starting position, although pessimistic, is not unrealistic when one considers the problems that certain countries are having dealing with the changes brought about by demographic change (with Germany at the moment perhaps being the best example). The focus of this paper is on the labour market implications of population ageing and decline.

Assuming no changes in age-specific employment rates, population decline implies a decline in the size of the labour force and a decline in the number of people employed. However, with population ageing there is not only an increase in the number of older people as a fraction of the total population but also an increase in the fraction of older workers in the total labour force. Put slightly differently, population ageing also implies an ageing of the labour force. To the extent that older workers and younger workers differ in the inputs they supply, the wages and earnings they receive, the occupations they hold and their probabilities of unemployment, population ageing can be expected to have effects in the labour market. More specifically, most production processes use a mix of younger and older workers and population ageing changes the relative supply of workers of different ages. If the optimal age mix cannot be obtained (for example, due to a shortage of younger workers), and if older workers are not perfect substitutes for younger workers (which seems likely), then average labour productivity will be lower, which in turn will lead to lower economic growth (see Borsch-Supan, 2003; Dixon, 2003; Fertig and Schmidt, 2004; Freeman, 1976; Welch, 1976).

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the assumptions used in a set of country-specific population projections carried out by the United Nations.

In Section 3, these country-specific projections are summed in order to provide estimates of what the authors believe will be key demographic developments for the 'EU as a whole'. Section 4 describes the policy challenges that population ageing and population decline will create, with much of the economic pressure being directed at the labour market.

2. United Nations 2004 population projections

While it is not possible to predict the long-term future, it is possible to project what the main demographic characteristics of a population will be in future given a precise set of assumptions. Various organisations, such as the United Nations, Eurostat and the OECD, routinely carry out population projections on a country-by-country basis. The projections that are used in this paper are the most recent set produced by the United Nations (2004).

The base-period for these projections is 1 July, 2005, with the projection period being up until 2050. The projections summarised here are based on the so-called 'medium variant assumptions'. These are a combination of the medium assumptions for fertility, mortality and net migration suggested by the UN. In practice, it is usually the projections based on these medium assumptions that are reported in secondary analysis.

More specifically, the projections assume that in all countries fertility will converge to a long-run total fertility rate of 1.85 births per women, although the time of convergence varies by country. Fertility in the period 2005-15 is assumed to follow the trend in the period 2000-2005. After that, the total fertility rate is assumed to increase by 0.07 per 5-year period. It is assumed that mortality will decline in the future based on recent trends in life expectancy by sex. Net migration is based on past international migration flows and an assessment of immigration policies in each of the countries. Details of the assumptions used can be found at the United Nations website: esa.un.org/unpp.

3. Changing demography of the EU

3.1 Population size Over the next four and a half decades, the combined population of the current 25 member states is not expected to change much. The projections suggest that it will grow from its current 460 million to about 466 million by 2025. After reaching this peak, it is expected to decline to about 450 million by 2050, which is about 10 million fewer inhabitants than in 2005. In percentage terms this is a reduction of about 2 per cent.

Table 1 is a summary of the projections relating to population size for each of the 25 current member states and the four acceding and candidate countries. This table gives the population size in 2005 and 2050, along with the absolute and percentage changes. Also shown is the approximate year that the population is expected to start to decline (if applicable).

It is important to distinguish between the EU-15 and EU-10 member states. The EU-10 are the ten mainly Eastern European countries that joined in May 2004. The EU-15 are the fifteen countries that made up the EU prior to May 2004. There is considerable variation across the EU-15 states in terms of population growth. The projections suggest that there are only five member states (Denmark, Sweden, UK, Ireland and Luxembourg) whose populations are not expected to decline in this period, with large increases being expected for Luxembourg (54 per cent) and Ireland (39 per cent). There are four member states (Finland, Portugal, Netherlands and France) whose populations are expected to be larger in number in 2050 than in 2005 but their populations will begin to decline before 2050. In the remaining six member states (Italy, Austria, Germany Greece, Belgium and Spain) population decline is expected, with the largest decline being in Italy (12 per cent).

The situation is quite different for the EU-10 states. In the period 2005-50 the population of these countries as a group is expected to fall by about 16 per cent, or by about 10-11 million people. Note that in only two of these member states (Malta and Cyprus) is positive population growth expected. In the remaining eight member states (Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slovakia) large population declines are expected, ranging from a low of -9 (Slovakia) to a high of -27 per cent (Latvia).

Population decline is also expected in the two acceding states--by 34 per cent in Bulgaria and by 23 per cent in Romania. In the candidate country of Croatia the situation is very similar, with a population decline of 19 per cent being expected. However, the situation in the other candidate country--Turkey--is very different. Not only does Turkey have the largest population when compared to any of the current EU member states, it is expected to grow by nearly 40 per cent over the next 45 years or so. The implications of Turkey's demographic 'distinctness' on the demographic composition of the EU is discussed below.

3.2 Population aged 65+

Table 2 shows the projected numbers of people in the group aged 65 and older for each of the current member states and the acceding and candidate countries. This age group is of considerable policy relevance since the vast majority of people in this age group are not employed and most are eligible for some form of state-provided pension and other age-related benefits. It is safe to conclude that in all these countries, there will be large increases in the number of people in these age groups.

For the current 25 member states, the number of people aged 65+ is expected to increase by about 67 per cent, from about 76.5 million in 2005 to about 128 million in 2050. The changes for the EU-15 and EU-10 states are 65 and 79 per cent, respectively. The expected change in the number of people in this age group for the acceding and candidate countries of Bulgaria (18 per cent), Croatia (34 per cent) and Romania (50 per cent) are lower. However, the increase for Turkey is very large, where the number of people in this age group is expected to more than triple in the projection period.

3.3 Population aged 85+

Table 3 shows the number of people aged 85 and older. This age group is also of considerable policy relevance since it is often (perhaps inaccurately) referred to as the 'frail elderly'. Individuals in this age group on average suffer from poor health and need a considerable amount of care. All the member states of the EU have some form of publicly provided health care and old age provision. Therefore, an increase in the number of people in this age group suggests an increase in public expenditure aimed at accommodating the health, housing and other needs of these people.

For the current 25 member states, the number of people aged 85+ is expected to increase by almost 250 per cent, from about 7.5 million in 2005 to about 26 million in 2050. The growth in the number of people in this age group is not much different from the EU-15 and EU-10 states--243 and 295 per cent, respectively. The situation for the two acceding states of Bulgaria and Romania and the candidate country of Croatia is not that different from the EU as a whole. However, the situation in Turkey is again very different. In this candidate country, the number of people in the age group is expected to increase ten-fold.

3.4 Population aged 5-19

The large increases in the number of people aged 65+ and age 85+ obviously contribute to the ageing of the population of the EU. In addition, the number of younger people will decrease. One aspect of the latter trend is shown in table 4, which shows the projected number of people aged 5-19, most of whom are in school. This age group is of policy relevance since in all EU member states primary and secondary education is publicly provided.

For the current 25 EU member states as a group, the number of people in this age group in the 2005-50 period is expected to decline by about 13 per cent from about 78 to 68 million. The decline is smaller for the EU-15 states (8 per cent) compared to the EU-10 states (35 per cent). The declines in the acceding countries of Bulgaria and Romania are much larger than the EU-25 average at 47 and 43 per cent, respectively. The same is the case for the candidate country of Croatia (32 per cent). It is interesting to note that in Turkey the number of people in this age group is also expected to fall but only by about 11 per cent.

3.5 Population aged 20-64

The bulk of employment in EU countries is concentrated among people who are aged 20-64. For example, in Scotland 95 per cent of employment (both full-time and part-time) is concentrated in this age range. The number of people in this age group is expected to fall considerably over the next 45 years--a decrease of 17 per cent. Indeed, the number of people of labour force age will drop considerably across almost the complete age range. This suggests that if current demographic trends continue the potential labour force in the EU will shrink considerably. The economic implications of this decrease are discussed below

Table 5 shows the number of people aged 20-64 for each of the EU member states and for the acceding and candidate countries. For the EU-15 states, this age group is expected to decline by about 15 per cent in the projection. For the EU-10 countries, the decline is double the rate for the EU-15 states at 30 per cent. Big declines are also expected in Bulgaria, Rumania and Croatia. However, in Turkey, the number of people in this age group is expected to grow by 44 per cent in the next four decades.

As the number in this age group declines, its age distribution will also change. More specifically, as the population ages, this age group will also age. An example of this ageing is shown in chart 1, which shows the number of people aged 35-64 relative to the number of people aged 20-34. Although not a perfect correspondence, this can be thought of as the ratio of older to younger workers. For the EU-25 countries this ratio will increase up until about 2030 and then it will decline. In the next two and a half decades there will be an increase in the potential supply of older workers and a decrease in the potential supply of younger workers. In the EU-10, the ageing of the labour force is even more dramatic, with this ratio increasing from the current level of 1.6 to nearly 3.0 by 2030.

[GRAPHIC OMITTED]

3.6 Old-age dependency

Chart 2 shows what is often referred to as the old age dependency ratio. This is defined as the number of people aged 20-64 relative to the number of people aged 65+. Although the correspondence is not perfect, it can be thought of as the ratio of workers to non-workers in a population. In addition, many of the challenges that population decline and population ageing is creating for the governments of the EU member states is captured in this ratio.

[GRAPHIC OMITTED]

As the chart shows, this ratio is expected to plummet over the next four to five decades. For the EU as whole, it will fall from about 3.7 in 2005 to about 1.8 in 2050. The fall will be even more dramatic for the EU-10 member states--from 4.6 in 2005 to 1.8 in 2050. If there are no major changes in age-specific employment rates, the ratio of workers to non-workers will become increasingly unbalanced.

4. Discussion and concluding comments

If current demographic trends continue, the combined population of the 25 countries that currently make up the EU will decline in size over the next four to five decades. The population will also age. There will be a large increase in the number of people aged 65+ and an even larger increase in the number of people aged 85+. That is, the proportion of people in the older age groups will increase quite dramatically. At the same time, the number of people aged 5-19 will decline. Finally, the number of people aged 20-64 will also decline. This is a particularly important group since employment in EU member states tends to be concentrated in this age range.

The expected decline in the 20-64 age group is worrying since it implies a decline in the potential supply of workers. Fast-track schemes for immigrants may need to be introduced in order to meet specific short-term labour shortfalls.

The process of enlargement by its very nature provides the potential for generating large migration flows between member states (see Ermisch, 1995). When the ten mostly Eastern European countries joined in 2004, it was thought by many that this would lead to a large wave of immigration to the higher income EU-15 member states. It was also thought by many that this would, at least in the short run, assist in alleviating the labour market constraints caused by population ageing and decline in the EU-15. Although some migration of this type has occurred, the early evidence suggests that these flows are much smaller than anticipated and that there is considerable return migration. It does not seem to be the case that the demographic problems of the EU-15 member states are going to be solved by the movement of people from the EU-10 member states.

From the above discussion it should be clear that both population ageing and population decline are occurring at a more rapid pace in the EU-10 member states compared with the EU-15 member states. Enlargement in 2004 increased the size of the EU by about 75 million inhabitants, or by about 20 per cent. However, this enlargement also has led to an acceleration of population ageing and population decline in the EU as a whole. When the acceding countries of Bulgaria and Romania are added in 2007, the effect will be similar since the populations of these countries are declining and ageing more quickly than is occurring in the EU-25 member states as a group. The situation is the same for the candidate country of Croatia.

The situation of the candidate country of Turkey is very different. When compared with most EU member states, its demography is very different. Although the population of Turkey is ageing, the process is occurring at a much lower rate than in any EU member state, mainly because its fertility is much higher (2.4 children per woman compared, for example, with 1.7 in the UK and 1.4 in Germany) and above the replacement rate. Because of this relatively high fertility, its population is expected to grow quite rapidly over the next four to five decades. It should also be remembered that Turkey is a large country. Its current population is about 73 million and this is expected to grow to over a 100 million by 2050.

If Turkey is allowed to join the EU by 2050 it will have the largest population of any of the current 25 member states (Germany will be second largest). Chart 3 illustrates the significant impact it will have on the population of the EU. It shows the effect that Turkey will have on the total EU population and the population aged 20-64 if is allowed to join in 2010. The arithmetic of the population projections suggests that Turkey's share of the total EU population by 2050 will be 18 per cent. Their share of the population aged 20-64 will be even higher, at over 20 per cent.

[GRAPHIC OMITTED]

It is interesting to note that the combined population of the EU-25 member states is expected to decline by about 12 million in the period 2010-50. In the same period, the population of Turkey is expected to increase by about 23 million. In other words, if Turkey joins, population decline in the EU as whole will be reversed. The impact on the population aged 20-64 is less dramatic. In the combined EU-25 member states, this population is expected to decline by about 52 million between 2010 and 2050. In the same period, the number of people in this age group in Turkey is expected to increase by about 14 million. Therefore, Turkey has the potential to supply the rest of the EU with a large number of workers.

In summary, the process of EU enlargement has been an important mechanism for increasing the overall size of the European Union's population and its labour force. However, since fertility has been below replacement level in most member states for several decades, the population of the EU as a whole is ageing rapidly, although the speed at which this is occurring varies by member state. In addition, if the assumptions used in the projections prove to be correct, the EU population will soon start to decline in absolute numbers, along with the number of people of labour force age. The inclusion of the ten mostly Eastern European countries in 2004 is a factor that has accelerated the ageing process and most of these countries are already experiencing population decline. Although there is considerable uncertainty in terms of the direction of the enlargement process in the future, the inclusion of Turkey could lead to a considerable rejuvenation effect if membership results in the migration of young Turks in sufficient number to the other member states.

REFERENCES

Borsch-Supan, A. (2003), 'Labour market effects of population ageing', Labour, 17 (special issue), pp. 5-44.

Dixon, S. (2003), 'Implications of population ageing for the labour market', Labour Market Trends (February), pp. 67-76.

Ermisch, J.F. (1995), 'Demographic developments and European labour market', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 42, pp. 331-46.

Fertig, M. and Schmidt, C. (2004), 'Gerontocracy in motion? European cross-country evidence on the labor market consequences of population ageing' in Wright, R.E. (ed.), Scotland's Demographic Challenge, Scottish Economic Policy Network, Universities of Stirling and Strathclyde, Stirling/ Glasgow.

Freeman, R.B. (1976), 'The effects of demographic factors on age-earnings profiles', Journal of Human Resources, 14, pp. 289-318. Population Reference Bureau (2005), 2004 World Population Data Sheet, PBR, New York.

United Nations (2004), World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York (http://esa.un.org/ unpp/).

Weil, D. (1997), 'The economics of population ageing' in Rosenzweig, M. and Stark, O. (eds), Handbook of Population Economics, Volume I B, Amsterdam, North Holland.

Welch, F. (1976), 'Effects of cohort size on earnings: the baby boom babies financial bust', Journal of Political Economy, 87 (Supplement), $65-$97.

NOTES

(1) The ten most populous countries (in millions) are: China (1,300); India (1,087); United States (294); Indonesia (219); Brazil (179); Pakistan (159); Russia (144); Bangladesh (141); Nigeria (137); and Japan (128). Mid-2004 estimates. (Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2005.)

(2) The six founding countries were Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, followed by Greece in 198 I, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined. In 2004, the ten states that joined were Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The two acceding countries of Bulgaria and Romania will join in 2007. Most political commentators believe that the two candidate countries of Croatia and Turkey will be allowed to join but the date at which this will happen is still to be negotiated.

Katerina Lisiankova, Heriot Watt University. Robert E. Wright, University of Strathclyde. e-mail: r.e.wright@strath.ac.uk.

Table 1. Population size, EU member and
candidate states, 2005 and 2050 (thousands)

Country 2005 2050 Change %Change Decline?

EU-15:
Italy 58,092 50,915 -7,177 -12% 2010
Austria 8,120 7,377 -743 -9% 2005
Germany 82,561 79,146 -3,415 -4% 2010
Greece 11,119 10,742 -377 -3% 2015
Belgium 10,358 10,221 -137 -1% 2025
Spain 43,063 42,546 -517 -1% 2020
Finland 5,248 5,329 81 +2% 2030
Portugal 10,493 10,724 231 +2% 2030
Netherlands 16,298 16,954 656 +4% 2035
France 60,714 64,231 3,517 +6% 2040
Denmark 5,431 5,850 419 +8% >2050
Sweden 9,043 10,054 1,011 +11% >2050
UK 59,668 67,146 7,478 +13% >2050
Ireland 4,147 5,765 1,618 +39% >2050
Luxembourg 465 716 251 +54% >2050
All EU-15 384,820 387,716 2,896 1% 2030
EU-10:
Latvia 2,309 1,678 -631 -27% <2005
Lithuania 3,429 2,564 -865 -25% <2005
Hungary 9,786 7,590 -2,196 -22% <2005
Slovenia 1,965 1,631 -334 -17% <2005
Czech Republic 10,216 8,550 -1,666 -16% <2005
Estonia 1,327 1,118 -209 -16% <2005
Poland 38,515 33,005 -5,510 -14% <2005
Slovakia 5,411 4,947 -464 -9% 2015
Malta 400 431 31 +8% 2040
Cyprus 835 1,175 340 +41% >2050
All EU-10 74,193 62,689 -11,504 -16% 2005
All EU-25 459,013 450,405 -8,608 -2% 2025
Acceding/Candidate:
Bulgaria 7,727 5,064 -2,663 -34% <2005
Romania 21,710 16,756 -4,954 -23% <2005
Croatia 4,550 3,684 -866 -19% 2005
Turkey 73,191 101,207 28,016 +38% >2050
All AC-4 107,178 126,711 19,533 +18% 2045

Source: United Nations (2005).

Table 2. Population aged 65+, EU member and candidate
states, 2005 and 2050 (thousands)

Country 2005 2050 Change % Change

EU-15:
Germany 15,351 22,121 6,770 +44%
Belgium 1,829 2,778 949 +52%
Italy 11,600 18,092 6,492 +56%
Sweden 1,556 2,487 931 +60%
Greece 2,020 3,247 1,227 +61%
Denmark 816 1,330 514 +63%
UK 9,525 15,560 6,035 +63%
Austria 1,337 2,261 924 +69%
Finland 833 1,417 584 +70%
France 9,902 16,980 7,078 +71%
Portugal 1,792 3,245 1,453 +81%
Netherlands 2,299 4,194 1,895 +82%
Spain 7,092 14,506 7,414 +105%
Luxembourg 64 156 92 +144%
Ireland 452 1,494 1,042 +231%
All EU-15 66,468 109,868 43,400 +65%
EU-10:
Latvia 391 488 97 +25%
Estonia 219 283 64 +29%
Lithuania 530 737 207 +39%
Hungary 1,477 2,183 706 +48%
Slovenia 305 535 230 +75%
Poland 4,963 9,368 4,405 +89%
Czech Republic 1,452 2,751 1,299 +89%
Slovakia 632 1,353 721 +114%
Malta 53 122 69 +130%
Cyprus 101 269 168 +166%
All EU-10 10,123 18,089 7,966 +79%
All EU-25 76,591 127,957 51,366 +67%
Acceding/Candidate:
Bulgaria 1,299 1,531 232 +18%
Croatia 783 1,051 268 +34%
Romania 3,204 4,809 1,605 +50%
Turkey 3,983 17,229 13,246 +333%
All AC-4 9,269 24,620 15,351 +166%

Source: United Nations (2005).

Table 3. Population aged 85+, EU member and candidate
states, 2005 and 2050 (thousands)

Country 2005 2050 Change % Change

EU-15:
Denmark 106 262 156 +147%
Sweden 215 547 332 +154%
UK 1,212 3,204 1,992 +164%
Greece 171 515 344 +201%
Netherlands 250 849 599 +240%
Belgium 187 637 450 +241%
France 1,105 3,850 2,745 +248%
Italy 1,218 4,413 3,195 +262%
Portugal 151 559 408 +270%
Germany 1,347 5,102 3,755 +279%
Finland 87 330 243 +279%
Austria 135 515 380 +281%
Spain 730 2,895 2,165 +297%
Luxembourg 6 28 22 +367%
Ireland 45 218 173 +384%
All EU-15 6,965 23,924 16,959 +243%
EU-10:
Latvia 33 85 52 +158%
Estonia 15 42 27 +180%
Hungary 96 279 183 +191%
Lithuania 39 132 93 +238%
Poland 331 1,377 1,046 +316%
Czech Republic 93 417 324 +348%
Slovakia 40 182 142 +355%
Slovenia 20 99 79 +395%
Cyprus 8 44 36 +450%
Malta 4 25 21 +525%
All EU-10 679 2,682 2,003 +295%
All EU-25 7,644 26,606 18,962 248%
Acceding/Candidate:
Bulgaria 58 185 127 +219%
Romania 148 490 342 +231%
Croatia 41 178 137 +334%
Turkey 110 1,327 1,217 +1,106%
All AC4 357 2,180 1,823 511%

Source: United Nations (2005).

Table 4. Population aged 5-19, EU member and candidate
states, 2005 and 2050 (thousands)

Country 2005 2050 Change % Change

EU-15:
Austria 1,370 1,008 -362 -26%
Italy 8,325 6,846 -1,479 -18%
Greece 1,690 1,463 -227 -13%
Finland 949 829 -120 -13%
Belgium 1,795 1,573 -222 -12%
Germany 13,189 12,087 -1,102 -8%
Netherlands 2,970 2,747 -223 -8%
France 11,217 10,427 -790 -7%
Portugal 1,691 1,587 -104 -6%
Sweden 1,684 1,619 -65 -4%
UK 11,355 11,097 -258 -2%
Spain 6,197 6,067 -130 -2%
Denmark 1,004 1,005 1 0%
Ireland 824 889 65 +8%
Luxembourg 85 118 33 +39%
All EU-15 64,345 59,362 -4,983 -8%
EU-l0:
Lithuania 707 334 -373 -53%
Latvia 423 227 -196 -46%
Hungary 1,698 1,090 -608 -36%
Poland 7,406 4,817 -2,589 -35%
Slovenia 309 207 -102 -33%
Czech Republic 1,693 1,165 -528 -31%
Slovakia 1,054 742 -312 -30%
Estonia 244 177 -67 -27%
Malta 80 63 -17 -21%
Cyprus 181 185 4 2%
All EU-10 13,795 9,007 -4,788 -35%
All EU-25 78,140 68,369 -9,771 -13%
Acceding/Candidate
Bulgaria 1,246 662 -584 -47%
Romania 4,015 2,272 -1,743 -43%
Croatia 783 532 -251 -32%
Turkey 20,805 18,620 -2,185 -11
All AC-4: 26,849 22,086 -4,763 -18%

Source: United Nations (2005).

Table 5. Population aged 20-64, EU member and
candidate states, 2005 and 2050 (thousands)

Country 2005 2050 Change % Change

EU-25:
Italy 35,505 23,827 -11,678 -33%
Spain 27,557 20,022 -7,535 -27%
Austria 5,062 3,769 -1,293 -26%
Greece 6,895 5,541 -1,354 -20%
Germany 50,391 40,920 -9,471 -19%
Portugal 6,449 5,394 -1,055 -16%
Belgium 6,178 5,351 -827 -13%
Finland 3,187 2,810 -377 -12%
Netherlands 10,056 9,141 -915 -9%
France 35,763 33,515 -2,248 -6%
Denmark 3,285 3,195 -90 -3%
Sweden 5,315 5,404 89 +2%
UK 35,421 36,745 1,324 +4%
Ireland 2,568 3,092 524 +20%
Luxembourg 287 402 115 +40%
All EU-15 233,919 199,128 -34,791 -15%
EU-10:
Latvia 1,394 886 -508 -36%
Hungary 6,178 3,966 -2,212 -36%
Czech Republic 6,622 4,260 -2,362 -36%
Slovenia 1,265 820 -445 -35%
Lithuania 2,042 1,379 -663 -32%
Poland 24,321 17,255 -7,066 -29%
Estonia 800 601 -199 -25%
Slovakia 3,451 2,612 -839 -24%
Malta 247 225 -22 -9%
Cyprus 504 659 155 +31%
All EU-10 46,824 32,663 -14,161 -30%
All EU-25 280,743 231,791 -48,952 -17%
Acceding/Candidate
Bulgaria 4,847 2,659 -2,188 -45%
Romania 13,437 8,942 -4,495 -33%
Croatia 2,777 1,925 -852 -31%
Turkey 41,191 59,358 18,167 +44%
All AC-4 62,252 72,884 10,632 +17%

Source: United Nations (2005).