首页    期刊浏览 2024年11月07日 星期四
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Forecast error bounds by stochastic stimulation.
  • 作者:Blake, Andrew P.
  • 期刊名称:National Institute Economic Review
  • 印刷版ISSN:0027-9501
  • 出版年度:1996
  • 期号:May
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:National Institute of Economic and Social Research
  • 摘要:What can the National Institute model tell us about the accuracy of forecasting inflation and growth? We make 'point' forecasts over the short to medium term, and assess the accuracy of those forecasts by examining past forecast errors (see Poulizac, Weale and Young, 1996). But the model itself can be used for the same purpose and can inform us better than historical exercises if a new policy regime has been adopted which is a major departure from past experience. In that case, the behaviour of the economy would be expected to be considerably different and so using a model which captures the structural effects of the changes may give a more accurate view of the likely behaviour of policy targets, policy instruments and other variables.
  • 关键词:Economic conditions;Economic forecasting

Forecast error bounds by stochastic stimulation.


Blake, Andrew P.


1. Introduction

What can the National Institute model tell us about the accuracy of forecasting inflation and growth? We make 'point' forecasts over the short to medium term, and assess the accuracy of those forecasts by examining past forecast errors (see Poulizac, Weale and Young, 1996). But the model itself can be used for the same purpose and can inform us better than historical exercises if a new policy regime has been adopted which is a major departure from past experience. In that case, the behaviour of the economy would be expected to be considerably different and so using a model which captures the structural effects of the changes may give a more accurate view of the likely behaviour of policy targets, policy instruments and other variables.

We use stochastic simulation to analyse the forecast accuracy and asymptotic variance of inflation and growth. We assume the monetary policy regime is one of targeting inflation at 2 1/2 per cent using a feedback rule for the interest rate. This is comparable with, although not identical to, the current UK monetary policy framework. That has been reiterated by the Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, in June 1995, as:

'Beyond this Parliament, I propose that our aim will be to continue to achieve underlying inflation ... of 2 1/2 per cent or less. Monetary policy should be set consistently to achieve this target. This should ensure that inflation should remain in the range 1-4 per cent.'(1)

By contrast, we use an explicit rule, outlined below, that we assume is understood by agents and implemented exactly by the monetary authorities. It pays no specific attention to upper and lower limits, but rather concentrates on achieving the target.

The exercise is to subject the National Institute model of the UK economy to representative shocks(2) with a policy rule which guarantees an inflation rate in the long run in the middle of the current target range. This paper is intended to be a largely non-technical assessment of the issues involved in conducting such an exercise. However, we also report new results on our empirically based model which provide a first assessment of how well the UK monetary policy regime could be expected to perform in practice. We hope to make a valuable contribution to assessing the likely effectiveness of an inflation targeting regime in the real world.

There are particular problems associated with using the National Institute model for stochastic simulation because the presence of expectations terms makes this a considerable computational task. There are also issues such as how a suitable policy can be designed and implemented. We have used a method similar to that used by Blake and Westaway (1996) for a small linear model. This determines the form of the policy rule by theory. The rule is calibrated by experimentation rather than by either estimation(3) (which would be wide open to the Lucas critique, particularly in the context of a fairly new policy regime) or optimal control (which is usually rather less than transparent in its application).

In the next section we discuss the ideas behind stochastic simulation and how we approached it in practice. In section 3 we discuss why the policy rule we have used was adopted, and in section 4 describe the statistics that may be calculated and what they tell us about forecast accuracy. Section 5 gives the results of the stochastic simulation exercise. The results do seem to be quite encouraging for the overall effectiveness of an inflation targeting regime in the UK.

2. Stochastic simulation

What is stochastic simulation?(4) Our published forecast is deterministic. The model is solved without unexpected shocks, and the forecast is our best estimate about what would happen if there were no unanticipated disturbances. In a single stochastic simulation representative shocks are added into the solution. These shocks need to be consistent with historical experience and share historical variance-covariance properties. For a typical single replication target variables will be driven away from their desired level. Even if the model has effective policy rules in place it is only on average that targets will be reached. Only after the shocks cease will target variables be forced permanently back to their non-stochastic equilibrium. By running a large number of replications with different sets of shocks it is possible to evaluate the range over which the target variable can be driven away from the deterministic forecast. We can then calculate forecast standard errors and confidence limits for variables of interest.

In this paper we consider a scenario where the inflation rate is driven away from the target level by exogenous shocks and interest rates are used to return it to the target level. For our chosen policy rule we use the model to evaluate the standard errors for the forecasts of inflation, interest rates and GDP growth. These grow as the forecast horizon extends until they settles down at some long-run (asymptotic) level. They must grow because at any one time the uncertainty in the next period is a function of next period's shocks. The period after has an additional set of shocks to contend with. This continues until the additional shocks in a future period do not contribute further to the overall forecast uncertainty.

To explain how shocks are applied, it is necessary to consider the nature of the equations for the variables of our model. These are of several types. Firstly, there are behavioural equations that represent decisions made by agents, perhaps the factors which affect consumption or investment behaviour, or the evolution of prices in response to movements in relative costs or the changing demand for goods. A second type are identities, which might be simple adding up constraints such as the GDP identity, or reflect the stock behaviour of flow variables, such as capital stocks being the sum of investments. A third group are policy equations, where policy instruments are adjusted to keep policy targets on track, most notably, for our purposes, interest rates being moved in response to changes in inflation, designed to keep inflation at a specified target level. These three types of equation describe the movements of endogenous variables, whose values are determined by the model itself. By contrast, exogenous variables are determined outside the model. Such variables can be thought of as not having an equation. It is simple to turn an endogenous variable into an exogenous one by suppressing the equation for it, for example omitting the interest rate reaction function.(5)

The classification of variables and their equations is very important when considering the stochastic properties of the model. There are (or at least should be) no shocks to the identities, and these equations and data add up exactly so there are zero residuals.(6) Behavioural equations have residuals that represent the unexplained part of the time series over the estimation period. We treat the residuals of these equations as unexplained shocks to those variables. A stochastic simulation adds in shocks consistent with the residuals to replicate the type of disturbances that hit the economy. However, there must also be added noise from the exogenous variables, which although not modelled, clearly have random components. For this exercise we have used simple time-series equations for the exogenous variables and the residuals from these as the shocks. This will somewhat overstate the amount of noise associated with these equations as there are much more sophisticated equations that could be used to explain the behaviour of these variables.(7) However, the residuals of some behavioural equations are smaller than they would have been if the equation had been freely estimated, as in some cases shocks have been identified and removed in estimation through the use of dummy variables. This implies that the behavioural equations should be examined to check where genuine shocks are suppressed or exaggerated by the final equation. The relative importance of the overstating of external disturbances relative to endogenous ones is a question deserving further, future research. For now, we simply note that some shocks are clearly 'too big' and some 'too small'.

Finally, the policy variables are treated as following deterministic equations. This need not be the case, as sometimes a policy might be implemented with error, perhaps because of difficulties in measurement. We have so far ignored such considerations. There are about 250 behavioural equations and 30 exogenous variables to shock.

A single stochastic simulation is then achieved by applying a series of shocks to the model. The shocks have to be consistent with the residuals for the equations described above. In particular they should have the same contemporaneous covariance structure. This is because a shock to investment might be correlated with a shock to consumption or stockbuilding. A variety of methods exist to generate pseudo-random shocks consistent with the patterns found in the residuals, and we refer to Ireland and Westaway (1990) for a description. We have relied on something rather simpler but nonetheless effective. Instead of generating new shocks, we have used the historical ones and randomly picked the order that we use them in. Therefore all shocks for a particular historical time period are applied across all the equations. This, of course, maintains the historical variance-covariance properties of the data across variables but not through time. This 'bootstrap' method requires that shocks are serially uncorrelated. The method eliminates the need both to artificially truncate shocks which are simply too big, and to consider their variance-covariance properties. This approach also reduces the amount of intervention required before the model begins to solve reliably. More general methods can be applied at a later date.

The model must then be solved. For rational expectations models there are complications. If there were no forward expectations in models, then the procedure would be straightforward. The shocks are added in as residuals and the model solved for the current period. In the next period, a new set of shocks is added in and the model solved again and so on. For a five year simulation a quarterly model is to be solved for each of the twenty quarters and the computational burden is only increased over a deterministic simulation (i.e. one where the shocks are not added in) by the fact that in general the more noise the slower the solution is found. This is likely to be much less than a doubling of solution time for a single replication.

With rational expectations the procedure has to be different. At any given time all future shocks are unknown, and only those shocks which happen contemporaneously are observed. So a sequence of full rational expectations solutions needs to be found for each shock, where the only new information in a given period is the current shock. At any given period the future is important and affects today but because future shocks are unknown and despite there being an expectation of future disturbances the best guess is that they are zero. To find the solution values for the current period the model has to be solved into the future far enough so that the first period solution is unaffected by the terminal date. To solve a five year stochastic simulation requires a data base of the five years plus long enough for a full rational solution past the end. For the main exercise we solved the model over twenty years, with the last nineteen years and three quarters discarded every time and the first quarter retained as the initial condition for the next drawing of shocks. It this way it can be likened to an econometric exercise of a 'rolling regression' where a twenty year window is moved forward through a twenty five year data period. In comparison with a deterministic simulation, where for a full rational expectation solution for the first five years a single solution of twenty five years would be expected to give reliable results, the stochastic solution requires twenty twenty-year simulations. It would be unsurprising if this were to be twenty times as expensive for a single replication. In what follows we did fifty replications, a total of a thousand model solutions.

3. Inflation Dynamics, Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy

A substantial difference between the approach adopted here and an historical exercise is that the monetary policy rule has been designed to guarantee the target inflation rate in a non-stochastic equilibrium. The behaviour of inflation is thus expected to be very different from historical experience. It is often hard to reject the hypothesis that the annual inflation rate in the UK is non-stationary (i.e. it is integrated of order one and will only revert to a mean value as a differenced series). Even if we accept stationarity, the mean inflation rate over the past is somewhat higher than the current avowed target range. Neither of these is a problem for our analysis, as we are assuming that the behaviour of inflation over the future is determined by a policy regime which is patently different from previous ones.

What determines a good policy rule? Considerable attention has been devoted to studying such a question, and a complete account can be found in Weale et al. (1989). Here we offer an intuitive explanation of how we have decided on a policy rule. Firstly, it should be a feedback rule, which relates the setting of the policy instrument (interest rates) to the final target of policy (inflation as a deviation from its target rate). There is scope for the additional use of indicator variables, such as pressure of demand. This might indicate that a particular shock is likely to cause the inflation rate to deviate from target in the future and therefore reaction now will suppress it early. However, this requires model-based analysis of what is a good indicator, and it turns out that we can do rather well even without that.(8) For an analysis of the design of rules which investigates such an approach more thoroughly see Blake and Westaway (1996). The simplest rule is that if inflation is above target the interest rate should be raised, and if it is below it should be reduced. Experimentation is used to determine an appropriate strength of response.

In practice it is better to make two modifications to such a simple rule. Firstly, when one incorporates a model with a pure proportional rule of this sort, it is easy to show that an equilibrium can be reached where the nominal interest rate has been raised and inflation remains above base, such that the equilibrium real interest rate is reached at a higher than desired inflation rate. In these circumstances, it is important to ensure that the interest rate continuously varies unless the target is actually met. This means that the change in the interest rate is then related to the difference from target. This is technically known as an integral control rule, because it can be expressed as relating the level of the interest rate to the integral of all past errors in tracking the target. This, however, introduces a further complication. It can mean that the nominal interest rate is excessively and needlessly volatile. The simplest remedy for this is to use the ex post real interest rate as the instrument. Practically this is done by having a policy rule for the change in the nominal interest rate and including the change in the inflation rate on the right hand side. This turns out to be a perfectly adequate rule, and a little trial-and-error determines that a real interest rate rule(9) with an integral coefficient of 0.25 gives satisfactory deterministic control.

The target level for inflation we have adopted is 2 1/2 per cent. This is consistent with the forecast base over which the exercise is conducted, and although it represents the maximum of the stated policy objective over the medium term we are taking it to be the level that the inflation rate is desired to be 'on average' rather than on or below. The rule then looks like:

[[Delta]RBASE.sub.t] = [[Delta]INF.sub.t] + 0.25([INF.sub.t] - 2.5)

where RBASE is the base rate of interest INF is the annual inflation rate defined as ([RPIX.sub.t] - [RPIX.sub.t-4])/[RPIX.sub.t-4] where RPIX is the retail price index excluding the mortgage interest component.

Note that our monetary policy rule does not have provisos for intervening more heavily if a particular ceiling is breached, and has the implication that if one really did want an inflation rate below 2 1/2 per cent then a target of much less than that would have to be aimed for. This departure from the announced UK policy framework should be borne in mind when assessing the results.

Although our focus is primarily on monetary policy and inflation targeting it is important to specify fiscal policy rules for the behaviour of policymakers to be properly articulated. A reasonable approach is to use rules(10) intended to ensure 'fiscal solvency' over the long run. Governments cannot run up debt as a proportion of GDP indefinitely without there being some unfavourable consequences, some of which will be inflationary. Rules for spending and taxes which pay attention to the public sector's financial position ensure fiscal solvency. The fiscal rules used in this exercise:

[Mathematical Expression Omitted]

where PAC is government current expenditure, GDP is gross domestic product at factor cost, DFAPY is the net acquisition of financial assets by public sector as a proportion of GDP, [DFAPY.sub.*] is the target level of DFAPY and TRS is the standard rate of income tax. The target level is phased in over the forecast base to be zero in the long run. Set up this way the spending to GDP ratio is used as an instrument, with both proportional and integral control, there is simple proportional control for income tax. As the target value is public sector financial saving as a ratio to GDP the coefficients are set to reduce taxes and encourage spending with a surplus. Neither of the fiscal rules targets inflation explicitly, although they may help mitigate long run inflationary pressures. In stochastic simulation the interest rate rule will do almost all the work in keeping the inflation rate on target.

4. Some Representative Simulations

Although the main interest in stochastic simulation is in the statistical properties of forecasts the actual numbers generated can be interesting in their own right. To obtain a clear visual impression of the results we ran two ten-year simulations and plotted the resulting inflation paths in Figure 1a and Figure 1b. The method used is exactly the same as described above but the twenty-year window is rolled forward an additional five years. Note that below we find that five years seems amply long enough to determine the asymptotic standard error, so the forecast standard error should be assumed to be the asymptotic one over the additional five years.

The figures show the target measure of inflation over the past, the deterministic forecast and a stochastic simulation. The target measure is, of course, annual RPIX inflation with the historical value starting in the first quarter of 1986. The stochastic simulation begins in the first quarter of 1996. The deterministic forecast is that of our November 1995 Review shown as a dotted line. Note first that the stochastic simulations appear noisier than the historical series. This is actually more a reflection that the very recent past has been much smoother than usual, and it is much less noticeable if the historical series is extended further back. It is also very noticeable that the two realisations are markedly different, although they do both appear to revert towards the non-stochastic mean.

Figure 1a shows fairly uniform variation around the target with a maximum inflation rate over the future of 5.1 per cent, but in Figure 1b there is quite a high peak, in excess of 6.7 per cent. There is nothing to rule out such behaviour. It might be a reflection of an inadequate control rule, but in deterministic simulation the rule delivers the desired 2 1/2 per cent inflation rate within two years from a variety of starting points, which seems quite rapid.

The point of doing a large number of replications is to see just how unlikely that 6.7 per cent inflation rate is. In particular, we can calculate standard error bounds around the forecasts or 'event probabilities' (Fair, 1993). The latter are simple to do if a stochastic simulation exercise is being carried out, but are nonetheless very informative. We pick an event, count the number of times it occurs and divide by the total number of replications. The event can be anything, but favoured ones are the inflation rate exceeding a specified level and recessions. Using standard error bounds as confidence limits for the inflation forecast requires further assumptions, such as the distribution of the deviations from the deterministic forecast being normal. We turn to the statistical properties revealed by the simulations next.

5. Standard Errors and Event Probabilities

The main stochastic simulation exercise, then, consists of fifty replications of five year simulations. The per period standard errors are easily calculated as the square root of the sum of the squares of the forecast errors, divided by fifty, in each of the twenty forecast periods. For inflation these rise steadily from 0.4 in the first period to 1.1 from about two years onwards. In Figure 2 we plot the deterministic forecast and one and two standard errors either side. We have smoothed the error bounds a little to provide clearer graphs.

If the distribution around the mean is approximately normal, then it should be expected that actual RPIX inflation rate should be within two standard errors of the forecast about 95 per cent of the time and within one standard error 70 per cent of the time. Given the structure of the interest rate reaction function, where intervention follows a simple linear rule, this does not seem to be too strong an assumption. It might be if intervention was much stronger at a boundary rather than in the centre, so the inflation rate drifted towards a boundary faster than it passes it.

Given the standard errors and the present inflation rate there is only a 15 per cent chance that the inflation rate will exceed 4 per cent at the end of two years. This is not the same, of course, as assessing the likelihood of exceeding 4 per cent inflation during the next two years. This can simply be assessed by counting the number of times that the inflation rate exceeds that mark in the first two years of the stochastic simulations. For the fifty replications we carried out this happened thirty-five times. This seems to indicate a 70 per cent chance of a greater than 4 per cent inflation rate. Higher rates of inflation were achieved correspondingly fewer times. 5 per cent was exceeded 34 per cent of the time in the first two years, and 6 per cent only 4 per cent of the time. This seems rather pessimistic on the 4 per cent 'upper limit', but optimistic about how inflation can be quite easily contained.

Over the longer, five year horizon, all but one simulation exceeded 4 per cent at one time or another, and in 58 per cent of the simulations 5 per cent was breached. Only 12 per cent of simulations ever breached 6 per cent. This indicates that the simulation depicted in Figure 1b is indeed something of an unlikely one, and shows why it is risky to base too many conclusions on a single realisation.

As interest rates are continuously manipulated to maintain the inflation rate within these bounds there is an associated standard error for the policy instrument. In Table 1 we list the per period standard errors for the first two years of the simulations and the average for the last two years for each of inflation, interest rate and growth. We discuss the last shortly.

Although further replications would improve the accuracy of our estimated standard errors, there is a clear pattern in all of them. The interest rate standard error is almost double that of the inflation rate. This reflects the vigourous use of interest rates implied by our policy rule to achieve the given target. The price to pay for a stable inflation rate may be quite high interest rate variability. This high degree of intervention is not something that a deterministic analysis always suggests (Blake and West-away, 1996).

Before examining the impact on growth, we draw two conclusions for inflation targeting. Firstly, 4 1/2-5 per cent inflation seems likely even if the inflation rate is targeted around 2 1/2 per cent. To ensure average inflation less than 4 per cent more than about 95 per cent of the time seems to require a much lower target rate, perhaps as low as 1 per cent. Secondly, whilst the forecast standard errors and eventual asymptotic standard error (which we estimate to be about 1.1 per cent) are perhaps a little wider than would be desired, overall control of inflation in the face of a wide variety of fairly large shocks is quite successful.
Table 1. Forecast Standard Errors (Variances)


 Inflation Interest rate Growth


1996Q1 0.42(0.18) 0.52 (0.27) 0.81 (0-66)
Q2 0.58(0.34) 0.77 (0.59) 0.83 (0.69)
Q3 0.72(0.52) 1.03 (1.06) 1.17 (1.37)
Q4 0.76(0.58) 1.21 (1.46) 1.30 (1.69)


1997Q1 0.96(0.92) 1.52 (2.31) 1.54 (2.37)
Q2 0.99(0.98) 1.57 (2.46) 1.74 (3.03)
Q3 0.85(0.72) 1.41 (1.99) 1.45 (2.10)
Q4 0.98(0.96) 1.48 (2.19) 1.51 (2.28)


(1999 Q1-
2000Q4)/8 1.07(1.14) 1.95 (3.80) 1.77 (3.13)


We turn now to the variance of output growth and the probability of a recession over the forecast horizon. Table 1 gives annual GDP growth standard errors. As we are not specifically targeting growth, the behaviour of growth is not tied to any one particular value, and we would expect it to cycle around the model equilibrium. As we do not know the equilibrium with the same certainty as the inflation rate - that is designed to be 2 1/2 per cent - we have to assume that the five year growth forecast is somewhere near equilibrium. The standard errors are quite large, and imply that the 95 per cent confidence interval is between -1 and 6 per cent. This is much more in line with historical experience than the inflation standard error and implies that there is little point in forecasting anything other than the mean of any stationary process over a distant enough forecast interval. Whilst a forecast other than the mean can outform a forecast equal to the mean in the short term, in the long run the mean is always the best guess. More generally this amounts to identifying the trend.

What about event probabilities? If we define recession as falling output in two successive quarters, the number of times a recession occurs within the first two years is 14, giving a 28 per cent chance in the short term. Over five years, output falls in two successive quarters 33 times, a 66 per cent chance of a recession. This is of course dependent on where the stochastic simulation starts from, but a 1/3 chance of a recession in two years and a 2/3 chance over the next five seems to accord very much with historical experience and general expectations. Perhaps it is a little disappointing that an effective inflation targeting regime cannot reduce the expected frequency of recessions below the numbers we obtained.

6. Conclusions

We have shown how to use an empirical model of the economy to evaluate the forecast and steady-state standard errors of both inflation and growth when there is an entirely new policy regime in place. The inflation standard error is smaller than that found by Poulizac, Weale and Young (1996), who use historical data to assess the forecast standard error. We think this is a very useful alternative to their approach, with the model used to analyse the change in policy regime. Given that the National Institute model has changed very little since the November forecast the standard errors in Table 1 can be used with our present forecast to assess the approximate likelihood of breaching the target ranges. Although the computational burden is quite high, reflecting the relatively few replications that we have been able to carry out, nonetheless it now seems computationally feasible for even a large rational expectations model. The method used here should be added to the forecasters' routine armoury.

NOTES

(1) Noted by Bowen (1996). He describes the UK inflation targeting regime in detail, discussing aspects of appropriate targets, credibility and operation.

(2) The Institute has frequently been in the vanguard of research using stochastic simulation for diagnostic purposes. See Hall and Henry (1987) and Ireland and Westaway (1990) for previous related work.

(3) This approach has been adopted by the proponents of so called 'Taylor' rules, see Taylor (1993).

(4) As noted above, this is intended to give a non-technical flavour of how to approach stochastic simulation of a nonlinear rational expectations macroeconometric model. More complete accounts can be found in Hall and Henry (1987) and Fisher (1992). Further discussion including alternative policy regimes can be found in Bryant et al. (1993).

(5) In practice, some 'exogenous' variables do have equations, but usually they only depend on their own past values. In the case of something like world trade it would usually be a first-order difference equation in log of the variable, for example the Institute model has: In [WT.sub.t] = 0.01 + ln [WT.sub.t-1].

(6) Residuals are sometimes known as 'add-factors'.

(7) For variables such as world trade we have an entire world model which could be used to explain variations from the individual behavioural equations.

(8) The rule described in the forecast chapter does use an indicator by feeding back an output. We feedback only on the final target, and have found this adequate for our purposes.

(9) Alternatively this can be viewed as approximately equivalent to a proportional coefficient of unity.

(10) Weale et al. (1989) discuss various fiscal policy regimes and assess both the requirement for fiscal activism and appropriate rules. Barrell and In't Veld (1992), used a tax rule to control the budget deficits. They provide an analysis of the fiscal solvency approach.

REFERENCES

Barrell, R. and In't Veld, J. (1992), 'Wealth effects and fiscal policy in the National Institute Global Econometric Model', National Institute Economic Review, no. 140.

Blake, A.P. and Westaway P. (1996), 'Credibility and the Effectiveness of Inflation Targeting', The Manchester School, forthcoming.

Bowen, A. (1996), 'Targeting inflation: the British experience', Centre Piece, no. 1, pp. 10-14.

Bryant, R.C., Hooper, P. and Mann, C.L. (eds.) (1993), Evaluating Policy Regimes: New Research in Empirical Macroeconomics, Washington: Brookings.

Fair, R.C. (1993), 'Estimating event probabilities from macroeconometric models using stochastic simulation', in J.H. Stock and M.W. Watson (eds.) Business Cycles, Indicators, and Forecasting, NBER Studies in Business Cycles Volume 28, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fisher, P.G. (1992), Rational Expectations in Macroeconomic Models, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Hall, S.G. and Henry, S.G.B. (1987), Macroeconomic Modelling, Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Ireland, J. and Westaway, P.F. (1990) 'Stochastic simulation and forecast uncertainty in a forward-looking model', National Institute Discussion Paper no. 183.

Poulizac, D., Weale M. and Young G. (1996), 'The Performance of National Institute Economic Forecasts', National Institute Economic Review, no. 156.

Taylor, J.B. (1993), 'Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice', Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, no. 39, pp. 195-214.

Weale, M., Blake, A., Christodoulakis, N., Meade J. and Vines D. (1989), Macroeconomic Policy: Inflation, Wealth and the Exchange Rate, London: Unwin Hyman.
联系我们|关于我们|网站声明
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有