Entrepreneurs as parallel processors: an examination of a cognitive model of new venture opportunity evaluation.
Kim, Jeong-Nam ; Clelland, Iain ; Bach, Seung 等
INTRODUCTION
One of the central concerns of the entrepreneurship field is new
venture opportunity, particularly the related processes of discovery,
evaluation, and exploitation (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). While
entrepreneurial opportunities are usually created by external factors,
the resulting opportunities can only be transformed into an enterprise
through the processes of discovery and exploitation by individuals
(Venkararaman, 1997). Furthermore, only some individuals are able to
discover and successfully pursue the entrepreneurial opportunities
(Baron, 2004; Corbett, 2007). For this reason, the study of the
individual-situation nexus is a meaningful endeavor to further
understand new venture opportunities (Baron, 2004). In addition,
individual mental processes or cognitive properties have been regarded
as critical factors in explaining the variability of entrepreneurial
behaviors (e.g., Shaver & Scott, 1991; Venkataraman, 1997; Shane
& Venkataraman, 2000; Mitchell, et al., 2007; Baron, 2004; Corbett,
2007).
Entrepreneurial cognition has been defined as: "the knowledge
structures that people use to make assessments, judgments, or decisions
involving opportunity evaluation and venture creation and growth"
(Mitchell et al, 2002, p. 91). These same authors more recently noted
that the central question for research on entrepreneurial cognition is
"How do entrepreneurs think?" (Mitchell et al, 2007) because
this would provide much greater understanding of their subsequent
decisions and actions. Given there are no optimization processes or
simplistic mechanisms in discovering complex entrepreneurial
opportunities (see Venkataraman, 1997 and Shane & Venkataraman, 2000
for further review), individuals' different cognitive structures
play a critical role in identifying entrepreneurial opportunities.
Furthermore, Busenitz et al (2003) posed a question, "... why,
faced with an identified opportunity, entrepreneurs will act and
non-entrepreneurs will not? (p. 299)" To answer this question, we
need to look more closely at the cognitive processes which entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs go through in their evaluations of new venture
opportunities. While the field of entrepreneurship has made much
progress in this cognition-based research, there are still many
unanswered 'why' and 'what' questions regarding
individual differences, particularly in opportunity discovery,
evaluation, and exploitation (Baron, 2004; Shane & Venkataraman,
2000).
The purpose of our study is to contribute to this stream of
research by examining types of cognitive properties that foster
entrepreneurial thinking; situational factors such as motivation and
types of knowledge that are influential; and to test how these
individual level differences and situational factors jointly influence
the likelihood of entrepreneurial choice. By exploring the key factors
and the cognitive processes through which ordinary people or nascent
entrepreneurs make decisions when new venture opportunities are present,
we hoped to better understand the whole picture of entrepreneurial
processes and develop the ways to nurture entrepreneurial initiations
among would-be-entrepreneurs. Also, we suggest countermeasures to remove
(cognitive) barriers that hamper and inhibit entrepreneurial thinking.
The entrepreneurial process is comprised of a number of phases, and
various categories have been developed to characterize them (Baron,
2007; Brockner et al., 2004; Shook et al., 2003). We include existing
and widely known concepts, from cognition studies, self-efficacy
(Bandura, 1997), risk perception (Simon et al., 2000), and opportunity
recognition (Matlin, 2002) in the proposed model (see Figure 1). In
addition, we introduce two new concepts to the model that have not been
considered in the past research: cognitive multilateralism (i.e.,
cognitive breadth and tolerance of different ideas in problem solving)
and referent criterion (i.e., subjective versus objective criteria
activation). These known and new variables are tested in a model that
explores the complexity of internally dueling cognitive processes of
entrepreneurs, namely a promotion focus versus prevention focus; and
decision frames -- gain/non-gain frame versus loss/non-loss frame -- in
selecting and interpreting information given in a business opportunity
(Higgins, 1997). We renamed these two cognitive processes as
entrepreneurial promotion and entrepreneurial prevention and will
illustrate the ways they are intertwined and their relative influences
in prompting entrepreneurial decisions and actions.
Some literature has adopted Higgins' theory of regulatory
focus to advance an "either/or" type explanation of
entrepreneurs: i.e., to test whether (would-be) entrepreneurs are either
promotion or prevention focus-oriented. However, we suggest that
entrepreneurial thinking does not function in an all-or-nothing fashion,
but in a more mixed and complicated way. It appears that (would-be)
entrepreneurs experience both promotion- and prevention-regulatory focus
simultaneously when assessing entrepreneurial opportunities.
Specifically, we proposed that the psychological traits of self-efficacy
and cognitive multilateralism activate both promotive and preventive
types of entrepreneurial cognition and decision frames, and that the
activated cognition and frames lead one to experience varying degrees of
entrepreneurial optimism or pessimism in assessing entrepreneurial
opportunity. Our results generally support, though not completely, that
cognitive processes in entrepreneurial decision making are not mutually
exclusive but concurrent and parallel motivational forces in analyzing
information (Figure 2).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
As a first step, we distinguish the two types of entrepreneurial
thinking we experience in business decision situations. One is promotive
thinking that steers us to see opportunities and encouraging conditions;
the other is preventive thinking that makes us more aware of risks and
hostile information. Promotive thinking leads us to act on
entrepreneurial hunches; whereas preventive thinking leads us to abstain
from taking action.
It seems that we experience these two types of thinking
simultaneously, although the relative dependence varies among people and
situations. That is, entrepreneurs seem to focus more on promotive
thinking, while non-entrepreneurs focus more on more preventive
thinking.
PROMOTIVE THINKING VERSUS PREVENTIVE THINKING
Higgins (1997) proposed a "theory of regulatory focus" to
explain two distinct types of motives - promotion and prevention focus -
applicable to many areas of psychological phenomena such as decision
making in cognitive and organizational psychology. Higgins pointed out
that sole reliance on the "hedonic principles" (seeking
pleasure and avoiding pain) constrains theory development and limits
research on various psychological phenomena. As an alternative Higgins
(1997) proposed promotion and prevention foci which are simultaneously
present and jointly regulating human behaviors and underlying
psychological process.
Following Higgins' (1997) theory of regulatory focus, we break
down the entrepreneurial thinking process into promotive thinking and
preventive thinking, two distinct yet concurrent processes one
experiences in business problem solving. As individuals engage in
entrepreneurial decision making, they experience both thinking processes
simultaneously but to varying degrees. Promotive and preventive thinking
hinge on two types of underlying regulatory motivations, promotion and
prevention foci (Higgins, 1997), and the two influence one's
situation evaluation such as opportunity recognition or risk perception
in both quantitatively and qualitatively different ways. We theorize
that each regulatory focus is induced by two types of referent
criterion. A referent criterion is a "gross criterion" or
"general guide" in which other more specific criteria will be
required to fit (e.g., maximum profits, maximum sales, and survival of
the organization) (Grunig, 1966). In the present study, we use the term
to refer to subjective and objective types of knowledge and decision
frames which a person "activates" from memory in a given
business decision situation ("knowledge activation," Higgins,
1996). The promotion focus is related with the absence or presence of
positive outcomes. Individuals with a promotion focus have "an
inclination to approach matches to desired end-states" and are more
sensitive to "aspirations and accomplishments'" (italics
added, Higgins, 1997, p. 1282). In addition, promotion-focused
individuals tend to use "approach as strategic means" and
"insure hits and insure against errors of omission" (p. 1283).
In contrast, the prevention focus is related with the absence or
presence of negative outcomes; individuals with a prevention focus have
"an inclination to avoid mismatches to desired end-states" and
are more sensitive to "responsibilities and safety" (italics
added, Higgins, 1997, p. 1282). In addition, prevention-focused
individuals are more likely to use "avoidance as strategic
means" and "insure correct rejections and insure against
errors of commission" (Higgins, 1997, p. 1283). Shah, Higgins, and
Friedman (1998) found each type of strategic inclination associated with
success in different types of tasks. We extend this examination to the
relative contributions of the two cognitive approaches to
entrepreneurial opportunity evaluation.
We note here that each motivational or regulation focus prompts
different decision frames and thus generates different strategic
inclinations in entrepreneurial decision making. We refer to (cognitive)
strategy as "a pattern of decisions in the acquisition, retention,
and utilization of information that serves to meet certain objectives,
i.e., to insure certain forms of outcome and to insure against certain
others" (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956, p. 54). Specifically,
the promotion regulatory focus triggers a gain/non-gain frame (cf.
"aspirations and accomplishments"). This frame then leads one
to attend to more positive aspects (promotion-oriented gain/non-gain
information) in a business situation - this results in an optimistic
strategic inclination. In contrast, the prevention regulatory focus
prompts loss/non-loss frame (cf. "responsibility and safety").
This frame then leads one to attend to negative aspects
(prevention-oriented loss/non-loss information) in the business
situation which results in a pessimistic strategic inclination. Each
strategic inclination induces one's situation assessment
differently, whether seeing more opportunities or more risks in the
given business proposal. In this vein, it is worthy to understand how
and why one adopts a certain strategic inclination and how this
inclination influences one's situational assessment of a business
opportunity.
As we will see next, the knowledge (entrepreneurial cognition) we
would activate in a business decision situation (Higgins, 1996) steers
us to a different decision frame (gain/non-gain or loss/non-loss frame)
and strategic inclination (approach versus avoidance strategy).
Specifically, the type of knowledge will induce different assessments of
the business opportunities - optimistic versus pessimistic evaluation.
ENTREPRENEURIAL COGNITIVE STRUCTURES
The presence of certain knowledge structures (or cognitive
structures) accessible in decision situations importantly affects the
way we interact with our social and physical environment (Kruglanski,
1989). Research on social cognition suggests persons' subscriptions
to some knowledge structures influence the way they interpret the
present conditions, recall the past experience, and forecast the future
state (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Higgins, 1996). Subscription to a
certain knowledge structure, for example, will favor information
consistent with the cognitive structure or lead to consistent
interpretation with accessible cognitive structures (Kruglanski, 1989).
In this vein, the extent and the way we act in a given decision
situation is influenced by the types of accessible cognitive structures.
Our first conceptual base is, thus, the cognitive structures -
"schemata" (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Gaglio & Katz, 2001)
or "knowledge" (Kruglanski, 1989; Shane, 2000; Sigrist, 1999)
that influence on individual assessment about entrepreneurial
opportunities. We are interested in the functions of accessible
knowledge type in entrepreneurial thinking -- specifically, the
relationships between types of entrepreneurial cognitive structures and
situational assessments of the given entrepreneurial decision situation.
We identify two types of entrepreneurial cognitive structure are likely
to be "activated" in business decision situations (Higgins,
1996). They are objective referent criterion from education and past
experience (cf., "scientific" knowledge structure, Kruglanski,
1989) and subjective referent criterion from one's strength of
motivation related to outcomes (cf., "lay" knowledge
structure, Kruglanski, 1989). Both types of knowledge structures are
functionally identical for making a decision and solving a problem
(Kruglanski, 1989). In an entrepreneurial decision situation, however,
the former is responsible for increasing both promotive thinking and
preventive thinking while the latter is responsible for increasing
promotive thinking but decreasing preventive thinking.
One key assumption in this study is that entrepreneurial decisions
require more promotive thinking and the gain/non-gain frame. To start a
business venture one needs to foresee positive potential outcomes during
the opportunity evaluation phase. The gain/non-gain frame fosters one to
seek and process information about possible gains and prompts one to
seize the chance and to take the risks. However, entrepreneurs also get
benefits from preventive thinking and the loss/non-loss frame. In the
loss/non-loss decision frame, one is more likely to monitor and detect
possible threats and control the negative factors. As a result,
entrepreneurs who also use this frame can better foster the
opportunity's potential.
REFERENT CRITERION AND ITS TYPES
The two thinking processes are induced by the motives for desired
outcomes, past experience, and information and decision rules
(entrepreneurial cognition) recalled and activated in a given decision
situation ("knowledge activation," Higgins, 1996). People
approach their problems by recalling relevant experiences of success
similar to a current problem - a referent criterion (Carter, 1965;
Higgins, 1996). Simon (1957) explained a need for such a general guide
or criterion -- "referent" -- when people encounter similar or
a repetitive problem. This leads one to speculate a generalized query of
the following kind: "what criteria can I discover which can be used
whenever a problem of this kind arises?"
A referent criterion, thus, could be a solution carried from past
situations to repeated problems (Simon, 1957), a cognitive
"schema" (Fiske & Linville, 1980), "categories"
(Carlston & Smith, 1996), it can be a cognitive "schema"
and "cross-situational attitude" to those bits of cognitive
and attitudinal knowledge that guide problem solving and decision making
(Grunig, 1997). Development of such a heuristic rule generally reduces
the need for costly information search by the problem solver. In this
study, we define referent criterion as any knowledge or cognitive
structures either from education and past experience or subjective
judgmental system such as motives for desired-end states one activates
or improvises in problematic life situations. Entrepreneurship
researchers noted that the process of entrepreneurial discovery is often
driven by knowledge one acquired from previous experiences rather than
by new search for knowledge in the decision situations (Kirzner 1997;
Shane, 2000). In other words, one's types of referent criteria
exert specific influence on the way one approaches problem solving
because it provides cognitive guidelines or decision frames to evaluate
and select information during a problem-solving process (Shane, 2000;
Venkataraman, 1997).
OBJECTIVE VERSUS SUBJECTIVE REFERENT CRITERION TYPES
We distinguish entrepreneurial cognitive structures as objective or
subjective referent criterion in assessing and making a decision about a
business opportunity. Objective referent criterion or objective
knowledge structure is a decisional guideline one searches and activates
in a decision situation (Higgins, 1996). It is called
"objective" in that its utilities as a decision rule or a
decision frame have been tested already by oneself or by others who
experienced similar problems in the past. An objective referent
criterion is activated as one enters into a problematic situation and
searches for knowledge internally and externally. The sources of
objective referent criteria are one's previous education or
achieved experience as one experimented and refined a solution or
decision rules in previous problem solving (Shane, 2000; Ucbasaran,
Westhead, & Wright 2009).
In contrast, subjective referent criterion or subjective cognitive
schema is also a decisional guideline but is comprised of any knowledge
one improvises or creates as one enters into problematic situations such
as identified situational goals or desired outcomes ("goals as
knowledge structures," Gollwitzer & Moskowtiz, 1996 ). This
type of decision frame is functionally equivalent in problem solving in
that it guides selection or interpretation of information and helps to
make a decision. Its utilities, however, were never contested in similar
types of problematic situations in the past. Quite often, it is a kind
of "directional motivation" toward the end-state (Kruglanski,
1996). The most common type of a subjective referent criterion is
subjective goals such as wishful thinking or willful thinking about the
desired-end state one brings up in the given situation (Gollwitzer &
Moskowtiz, 1996). It is often improvised when one encounters a problem
and works as a heuristic tool for filtering and selecting information
one takes and gives in the problem-solving process. Despite its
functional equivalence in problem solving it may not be equivalent in
terms of problem-solving efficacy to achieve desired outcomes.
Based on recent research findings (Higgins & Kruglanski, 1996),
motivation, cognitive structures, and cognitive processing are
intertwined in persons' problem solving or decision situations. We
posit, specifically, that whereas education or experience (objective
referent criterion) provides entrepreneurs both preventive thinking and
promotive thinking, our motive or determination about the successful
business (subjective referent criterion) provides mainly promotive
thinking. In other words, the objective type of referent criterion is a
form of competence and the subjective referent criterion is a form of
confidence in problem solving.
Generally speaking, objective referent criteria lead problem
solvers to suffer less from individual biases in problem solving because
they have been tested to some degree in previous situations. In
contrast, subjective referent criteria are more likely to be
self-perpetuating decisional referents (e.g., wishful thinking) and
lower one's problem-solving effectiveness because of their reduced
effectiveness in diagnosing problem characteristics and employing
self-complacent solution building and evaluation. Once a problem solver
retrieves such a self-fulfilling referent (e.g., a goal, a desire, or a
preference), this will strongly influence the interpretations and
selection of the data one encounters during problem solving. The
stronger presence of such self-perpetuating referents will result in
more selective information processing and lead to less than ideal
problem solving (Kim & Grunig, forthcoming).
REFERENT CRITERION AND COGNITIVE FRAMES
Activation of subjective referent criterion from memory will
primarily induce a "gain and non-gain" decision frame, whereas
activation of objective referent criterion will induce both a "gain
and non-gain" decision frame and a "loss and non-loss"
decision frame. If one relies on the gain and non-gain decision frame,
he or she will attend to success potential in the given opportunity
evaluation. In contrast, if one relies on the loss and non-loss decision
frame, he or she will attend to extent of risks embedded in the
opportunity evaluation.
During the same opportunity evaluation, it is likely that objective
referent criterion consisted of both positive types (e.g., successful
business cases or opportunities) and negative types of cognitive
structures (e.g., conditions likely to fail a business cases or risk
factors). For example, much of business-management curricula adopt case
studies in which a substantial portion of the cases are oriented to
lessons learned from negative experiences. In contrast, subjective
referent criterion involves mainly positive or successful business
outcomes because people's desired end-states are almost always
positive ones. Baron (2000a, b) noted that entrepreneurs are often
susceptible to some "heuristics" and cognitive "biases in
thinking" such as overgeneralization or optimistic tendencies. He
(1998, 2000a, Baron & Markman, 2000) also found that pre-nascent
entrepreneurs are less likely to think counterfactually and therefore
could be less attentive to unforeseeable consequences of their
decisions. Such observations and empirical findings explain why would-be
entrepreneurs are likely to activate or be influenced by subjective
referent criterion. So the decision frame induced from subjective
referent criterion (i.e., "gain- and non-gain frame") will
lead the frame holder to attend more to positive information and less to
negative information in the business situation. In contrast, the
decision frame triggered from objective referent criterion (i.e.,
"loss- and non-loss frame") will lead one to attend more to
negative information and less to positive information. In this vein, we
posit:
H1 Greater use of objective referent criterion will result in more
optimistic opportunity evaluation (H1a) and more perceived risk in
opportunity evaluation (H1b).
H2 Greater use of subjective referent criterion will result in more
optimistic opportunity evaluation (H2a) and less perceived risk in
opportunity evaluation (H2b).
With the H1 and H2 hypotheses, we can test if knowledge from
business-management courses would increase optimistic opportunity
evaluation or opportunity recognition. Objective referent criterion
mainly comes from education, experiences, and learning from other
successful business problem solving in the past - i.e., related with
competence in business problem solving. The activation of such types of
knowledge is likely to increase opportunity recognition. However,
reliance on the objective referent criterion type could lower
entrepreneurial potential. Specifically, one's business knowledge
about managerial process would steer one to recognize potential risks
embedded in the business opportunity. A good business opportunity cannot
be risk-free in most cases. Therefore, use of an objective referent
criterion would increase both optimistic opportunity evaluation and
perceived risks in business opportunity at the same time (cf.
double-edged sword).
In contrast, reliance on the subjective referent criterion type is
related more with confidence in problem solving. Subjective refers to
one's state of determination to solve a problem in a preferred
direction. Such preferences can manifest themselves in various ways
mostly in the form of complacent wishful thinking and/or self-fulfilling
willful thinking. Here, we expect that subjective confidence will
increase the desire to seize a business opportunity because of a
heightened, self-fulfilling optimism. In contrast, subjective confidence
or one's desire toward an outcome can make one less conscious about
the potential pitfalls associated with the opportunity evaluation. We
predict that unlike objective referent criterion, subjective referent
criterion will not only increase optimistic opportunity evaluation but
also decrease perceived risks in the business opportunity.
ANTECEDENTS: PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
We now turn to what individual characteristics would influence the
two types of referent criterion. We identified two individual
characteristics: The first, self-efficacy, has an established role in
models of entrepreneurial orientation and opportunity evaluation, and
the second, cognitive multilateralism, is a newly introduced concept
with particular relevance to the examination of cognitive processing
during opportunity evaluation.
Potential entrepreneurs develop more numerous and higher quality
cognitive structures usable in new venture opportunity evaluation when
they exhibit enduring personal characteristics that foster
self-competence and confidence (self-efficacy) and as they explore and
experiment with different ideas (cognitive multilateralism). Thus, we
hypothesize and test whether these two factors would affect activation
of distinct knowledge structures applied to a given entrepreneurial
decision task. We next review and introduce each concept in detail.
SELF-EFFICACY AND OPPORTUNITY EVALUATION
The concept of self-efficacy is an element of social cognitive
theory which assumes that people "enact" or actively shape the
situations and contexts within which they operate rather than just
reacting to external stimuli or factors (Bandura, 1997). As such,
one's perceptions of personal competence are socially embedded and
evolve through ongoing person-environment interaction. The most powerful
contributor to self-efficacy perceptions are the result of one's
own attempts at performance in a certain arena (Maddux & Gosselin,
2003). Bandura (1997) thus defined self-efficacy as the beliefs by an
individual about their ability "to organize and execute courses of
action required to produce given attainments" (p. 3). Although
there are measures of general self-efficacy (e.g., Scherer et al, 1982),
self-efficacy beliefs are usually viewed as perceptions that are cross-
situational, not an inherent personality trait such as optimism.
Self-efficacy is particularly relevant to the context of
entrepreneurial decisions and actions because of its effect on how an
individual regulates their level of effort in an activity, choice of
goal difficulty, and problem solving (Chen, Greene, & Crick, 1998).
High self-efficacy engenders higher motivation and perseverance in
overcoming obstacles even to the point of overestimating personal
capabilities (Bandura & Locke, 2003). Taylor and Brown (1988)
referred to this overestimation potential as "positive
illusions" and Hmieleski and Baron (2008) found that high
entrepreneurial self-efficacy combined with high dispositional optimism
among lead founder-managers operating in highly dynamic environments
produced negative effects on firm performance. This was likely due to
unfavorable biases in judgment.
Exploring this potential bias in judgment as it relates to the
particular entrepreneurial activity of opportunity evaluation and
subsequent judgment on action with regards to a business opportunity is
a key focus of this study. Specifically, do self-efficacy perceptions
regarding one's ability to recognize business opportunities
influence the choice of a subjective or objective referent criterion
used to judge and make an actionable decision about a business
opportunity? It is generally accepted that the higher an
entrepreneur's self-efficacy the greater his/her proactivity, risk
taking, and likelihood of attempting to create a new venture (Cools
& Van den Broeck, 2007; Crant, 2000; Hmieleski & Baron, 2008).
Hence, we predict that self-efficacy will increase the use of both
subjective and objective referent criterion.
H3 The higher the self efficacy, the greater the use of subjective
referent criterion (H3a) and objective referent criterion (H3b).
COGNITIVE MULTILATERALISM
As one recognizes a problematic state - a perceived discrepancy
between experienced state and expected state in a life situation, he or
she initiates cognitive activity and information search efforts for
problem solving to reduce the discrepancy (Higgins, 1996; Kruglanski,
1996). As a narrowing mechanism or problem-solving effort, one starts an
internal search whether there is an applicable solution available
("knowledge activation," Higgins, 1996). If this search does
not lead to a relevant solution, one then starts an external search for
solutions - information seeking ("knowledge action," Kim &
Grunig, in press, forthcoming). Through information-seeking efforts,
problem solvers increase their cognitive inventory of candidate
solutions to facilitate problem solving. The identified pieces of
candidate solutions consist of past experiences, decision rules, or
pieces of information usable in building a new solution (Higgins, 1996).
And the inventory of such candidate solutions could vary across problem
solvers. Kim and Grunig (in press, forthcoming) conceptualize this
varying extent or cognitive breadth one develops in problem-solving
process as cognitive multilateralism.
Cognitive multilateralism is the extent of a problem solver's
"cognitive breadth" he or she adopts during the
problem-solving process, and cognitive breath refers to one's level
of tolerance to competing or contradictory ideas or proposals about a
problem (i.e., prefactual thinking). It can be measured by the number of
alternatives one generates and the granted tolerance of rival
information and alternative solutions during problem-solving process.
Cognitive multilateralism has conceptually related with cognitive
tolerance to ambiguous situations (Bunder, 1962; Begley & Boyd,
1987) and cognitive flexibility (Spiro, Feltovich, Jacobson. &
Coulson, 1995) to structure and restructure knowledge in various ways
matching the changing situational demands. Ambiguity is associated with
novelty, complexity, and insolubility from a situation, and one's
tendency of tolerating ambiguity increases creative behaviors (Budner,
1962). Begley and Boyd (1987) found that business founders are more
likely to tolerate ambiguity than nonfounders. Overall, cognitive
multilateralism is associated with one's cognitive flexibility to
modify one's preference in thinking about solutions (Kim &
Grunig, forthcoming). This tolerance to rivalrous or incompatible ideas
from a fluid environment could foster various opportunities (Timmons,
Smollen, & Dingee, 1985). Thus, as one is more cognitively
multilateral, one tends to recognize more possibilities for action and
solutions within given problem-solving situations.
Cognitive multilateralism can be conceptualized not only as a
within-an-individual trait (an intrapersonal variable), varying across
different problems, but also as a personal trait varying across
individuals (an interpersonal variable). In problem solving some people
have a tendency to obtain more cognitive breadth and tolerance about
rival or alternative solutions than others as an enduring personal
trait. A more multilateral person will be more likely to increase their
cognitive inventory of approaches to a problem and grant more tolerance
among competing or even conflicting candidate solutions. As a result,
multilaterally-thinking people will be more likely to include both
subjective and objective referent criterion in their opportunity
evaluation decision process.
H4 The higher the cognitive multilateralism, the greater the use of
subjective referent criterion (H4a) and objective referent criterion
(H4b).
CONSEQUENCES: SITUATION EVALUATION AND ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION
OPTIMISTIC OPPORTUNITY EVALUATION
Entrepreneurial opportunities have been defined as "situations
in which new goods, services, raw materials, markets, and organizing
methods can be introduced through the formation of new means, ends, or
means-ends relationships" (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003: p. 336). The
issue for the market in coordinating such economic activity is that
information about these opportunities is asymmetrically distributed
across individuals and organizations and the price mechanism is an
insufficient guide. As Eckhardt and Shane (2003) have further
elucidated, price doesn't help explain how to serve new markets,
exploit new technologies, or pursue new ways of organizing. This
requires human agency and the entrepreneur "can develop hunches
(italics added) about how a new variable such as a technological
breakthrough or an environmental change will impact a specific project
long before it can be methodically and rationally explained"
(Busenitz et al., 2003, p. 299).
Characterizing entrepreneurial opportunity evaluation as
"hunches" has been formalized by Kor, Mahoney, and Michael
(2007) as the entrepreneur's subjective productive opportunity set.
They cite the classic work of Penrose (1959) who stated: "the
decision to search for opportunities is an enterprising decision
requiring entrepreneurial intuition and imagination and must precede the
'economic' decision to go ahead with the examination of
opportunities for expansion" (p. 34). The market is then the
arbiter of which new business models are viable, but the initial
opportunity evaluation by the entrepreneur is based on his/her unique
ability to create new business solutions. Doing so entails a combination
of opportunity recognition and evaluation as well as personal motivation
regarding one's own ability and desire to serve as the human
entrepreneurial agent. It is this combination which our model addresses
through two paths; the first examines subjective proclivities that may
contribute to optimistic opportunity evaluation and the second addresses
the knowledge referent applied to opportunity evaluation.
OPPORTUNITY EVALUATION, PERCEIVED RISK, AND DECISION TO LAUNCH
One factor commonly identified in the opportunity evaluation phase
is the entrepreneur's perception and preferences of risk (Grichnik,
2006 Norton & Moore, 2006; Wu & Knott, 2006). Entrepreneurial
risk can be explained as the 'likelihood and magnitude of below
target outcomes which may follow from a given behavior or set of
behaviors' (Mullins& Forlani, 2005: 51). Thus it is easy to
infer the greater risk taking propensity of entrepreneurs, at least from
empirical observations (e.g., the high failure rate of new ventures).
However, some studies have shown that there is no significant difference
of risk taking propensity between entrepreneurs and others (Brockhaus,
1980). This counterintuitive finding can be further explained by the
'perceived risk' of entrepreneurs, instead of their 'risk
propensity' per se. Entrepreneurs make risky decisions (e.g., new
venture formation with uncertainty) because they perceive less actual
risk from their decisions than others typically do (Baron, 2004); they
are not simply risk takers by nature (Palich & Bagby, 1995; Kahneman
& Lovallo, 1993).
As noted by Busenitz and Barney (1997), opportunity evaluation
involves judgments usually in situations that are ill-defined, complex,
and full of uncertainty. In addition to this uncertainty, the
entrepreneur faces potential losses as a result of venture failure and
potential benefits as a result of venture success. A significant
cognitive element of perceived risk is the individual's
conceptualization of subjective values of loss and/or gain (Baron, 2004;
Plous, 1993), and others include, but not limited to, confirmation bias
(Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984), optimistic bias (Shepperd, et al.,
1996), affect infusion (Forgas, 1995), illusion of control (i.e.,
overestimation of entrepreneur's role in success) and belief in the
law of small numbers (i.e., accuracy/generalizability of small samples
of information; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000). Consequently,
entrepreneurs tend to take risky actions (e.g., new venture creation) if
they perceive less than the actual risk embedded in the decision
The focus of this study is on opportunity evaluation. As such, we
are most interested in examining how perceived risk is evaluated by
entrepreneurs when presented with the need to make an actionable
decision about a new venture opportunity. Thus, while others hesitate to
move on to the next level because of a higher level of perceived risk
regarding the existing opportunity, entrepreneurs tend to make a
'go' decision. This lower degree of perceived risk enables
them be more optimistic about outcomes from the given set of behaviors,
ceteris paribus. Therefore, we hypothesize the following,
H5 The more the optimistic the opportunity evaluation, the more
likely a choice will be made to pursue the opportunity.
As we illustrated in preceding sections, we draw another cognitive
aspect in entrepreneurial decision making from the 'regulatory
focus theory' (Baron, 2004: Higgins, 1997). An entrepreneur who is
primarily subscribing to a 'promotive thinking' approach as
his/her regulatory focus, tends to pursue positive outcomes (e.g.,
unique opportunity and future success) and tries to test lots of means,
alternatives, hypotheses to reach to the desired goal. This promotive
thinking parallels the concept of entrepreneurial orientation which is
most commonly thought of as a combination of innovativeness in
creativity and experimentation, risk taking in terms of committing
resources in the face of uncertainty, and proactiveness in
opportunity-seeking and a forward-looking perspective (Runyan, Droge,
& Swinney, 2008). Furthermore, it appears that pre-nascent and
nascent entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in promotive thinking
relative to those with prior experience. For example, in a survey study
of college students, Hmieleski and Corbett (2006) found that
inexperienced, nascent entrepreneurs were more likely to engage in
improvisation (i.e., extending or reconfiguring a course of action based
on the perceived low likelihood of success with current course of
action/referents) than follow a planning or trial-and-error approach. In
other words, they were more likely to extend their promotive thinking in
creative ways to pursue their entrepreneurial objectives than more
experienced entrepreneurs. Their research extended the work by Baker,
Miner, and Eesley (2003) who found through interviewing employees at 68
start-up companies that very few had engaged in rational planning. Such
entrepreneurs are likely to see the brighter side of decisions (e.g.,
opportunity) and, consequently, the odds of exploiting existing true
opportunities is high although there is also a greater chance of
choosing a false opportunity (Baron, 2004).
On the other hand, an entrepreneur who is primarily subscribing to
a 'preventive thinking focus' usually looks for a safe
solution (not having negative outcomes) over achieving positive
accomplishments. Therefore, these entrepreneurs typically tend not to
learn much about the potential of existing opportunities and are very
passive and conservative in espousing uncertain opportunities. Indeed,
in a survey study of 517 nascent entrepreneurs in the pre-startup phase,
Gelderen, Thurik, and Bosma (2005) found that perceived market risk was
the only significant predictor of success probability for those with
considerable work experience. Therefore, regardless of the quality of
opportunities, an entrepreneur subscribing more to a promotive thinking
focus is more proactive and optimistic about the existence of
opportunity while an entrepreneur subscribing more to a preventive
thinking focus is more doubtful and pessimistic about the existence of
opportunity. This logic is represented in the following hypothesis:
H6 The greater the perceived risk in the opportunity evaluation,
the more likely a choice will be made not to pursue the opportunity.
METHOD
SAMPLE
Ideally, primary data collection in entrepreneurship research
should be conducted with samples of individuals or teams engaged in the
creation of new ventures. The key issue, as with top executives, is
access due to time constraints and a reluctance to divulge proprietary
information. While not a substitute for such data collection, Shook et
al. (2003) have suggested that the use of simulations, scenarios, and
laboratory experiments are a viable complement to gathering information
related to the new venture creation decision making process. This study
intended to further understanding of the "go/no-go" decisions
related to evaluating a new venture opportunity and we included such a
scenario in our survey data collection for measurement of our dependent
variable. In addition, we had access to a diverse population of business
and non-business students at three universities in different geographic
areas of the U.S.: Eastern, Midwestern, and Western regions. Thus, to
test our hypotheses we administered a role-playing scenario embedded in
a survey that asked questions prior to and after the respondents read
the scenario. A total of two-hundred-and-seventy-nine undergraduate
business and communication students served as participants in exchange
for extra credit. To compare the model findings between business and
non-business majors, we divided our sample in two groups: a business
student group (n = 206) and a communication student group (n = 73).
PROCEDURE
The researchers complied with the American Psychological
Association's ethical standards in the treat of our participants by
obtaining review and approval of the stimuli and procedures by
Institutional Review Board offices of all three universities.
In data collection, the researchers visited the capstone strategy
classes for senior business undergraduates and the mass media and public
relations classes for junior and senior communication majors. Assembled
in small groups, participants were instructed about the purpose and
steps in the study. Participants were given a survey booklet that
contained the general instructions of the study, questions and scales
measuring sociodemographics, psychological traits, entrepreneurial
cognition, a scenario of a potential startup business opportunity
adapted from Keh, Foo, and Lim (2002; see Appendix I), and evaluation
and decision questions of the new business proposal.
MEASURES
OBJECTIVE REFERENT CRITERION
Four items measured the objective referent criterion on a
seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely): (a)
"I am very knowledgeable in management principles," (b)
"I got A's in most business management courses," (c)
"I am confident about my knowledge in dealing with problems in the
above case," and (d) amount of time worked for a small and/or
family businesses (years). The reliability of the four items was at a =
.75.
SUBJECTIVE REFERENT CRITERION
Three items measured the subjective referent criterion on a
seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely): (a)
"I strongly support a certain way of approaching the problems in
the above case," (b) "I have a strong preference for how the
problems in the above case should be settled," and (c) "No
matter what happens I will pursue this venture." The reliability
was at [alpha] = .79.
SELF EFFICACY
As noted by Maddux and Gosselin (2003) in their review of
self-efficacy research, the measurement of self-efficacy beliefs must be
specific to the domain(s) of interest. This study was most interested in
individual beliefs about one's ability to recognize new business
opportunities. While a comprehensive scale of overall entrepreneurial
self-efficacy has been developed (De Noble et al., 1999), for reasons of
survey length and the narrower scope of opportunity evaluation, we
adapted Tierney and Farmer's (2002) scale for creative
self-efficacy.
We used their eight items with a business opportunity recognition
referent rather than a creativity referent to measure the self efficacy.
Sample items were: "I am confident about my ability to recognize
new business opportunities," "I have the ability to recognize
previously unnoticed new business opportunities," "I have the
ability to recognize new business opportunities before most of my
peers" (strongly disagree = 1 - strongly agree = 7)." The
Cronbach's alpha was .92.
COGNITIVE MULTILATERALISM
We used four items to measure the cognitive multilateralism on a
seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely): Sample
items were: "I love to know many solutions to one problem,"
"I often consider contradictory suggestions at the same time,"
and "I always look to alternative solutions to solve a
problem." The Cronbach's alpha was .82.
OPTIMISTIC OPPORTUNITY EVALUATION
Three items measured the extent of optimistic opportunity
evaluation on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(extremely): (a) "I would consider this business an
opportunity," (b) "This business is worth considering,"
and (c) "This business is feasible in this situation." The
reliability of the three items was at [alpha] = .88.
PERCEIVED RISK IN BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
We used four items to measure the extent of perceived risk in the
business opportunity on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all)
to 7 (extremely): (a) "The overall risk of the business is
high," (b) "The probability of failure is high," (c)
"The founder stands to lose a lot financially," and (d)
"There is a lot of uncertainty when predicting how well the
business will do." The reliability of the four items was at [alpha]
= .74.
ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION
Participants' opportunity evaluation judgment about the new
venture scenario was measured ("I want to make this business
venture happen") on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all)
to 7 (extremely). Responses were then median-splitted and recorded into
likely to invest (= 1) versus not-likely to invest (= 0).
RESULTS
We conducted structural equation model (SEM) analysis using the EQS
6.1 to test hypotheses. We summarized all hypotheses in Figure 1. In
Figure 2 we summarized the outputs of tested model and parameter
estimates. As presented in Figure 2, the structural models tested
reached adequate model fits (RMSEA = .052 and SRMR = .089) based on Hu
and Bentler's (1999) joint criteria (i.e., CFI [greater than or
equal to] .96 and SRMR [less than or equal to] .10, or RMSEA [less than
or equal to] .06 and SRMR [less than or equal to] .10). To examine
non-significant paths we conducted two separate model tests for
Business-management student group (n = 206) and Communication student
group (n = 73). We summarized the model fit information and parameter
estimates in Figure 3. As shown, the Business student model reached an
acceptable model fit (RMSEA = .050 and SRMR = .095) but the
Communication student model did not (RMSEA = .092 and SRMR = .122) -
although it approached the acceptable joint-criteria.
H1a-b and H2a-b were to examine the relationships between types of
referent criterion employed, optimism about the new venture, and
perceived risk of the new venture. In H1a and H1b we posited subjective
referent criterion fosters more optimistic evaluation (H1a), while
suppressing risk perception (H1b). We found support for both hypotheses:
.74, p < .001 for H1a and -.36, p < .01 for H1b. In H2a and H2b we
predicted a positive influence of objective referent criterion on
optimistic evaluation (H2a) and to risk perception (H2b). We found
support for H2b (.28,p < .01) but not for H2a (.05, n. s.).
H3a-b and H4a-b tested two personal characteristics, self efficacy
and cognitive multilateralism, favorable personal traits in
entrepreneurial thinking process. We hypothesized that these factors
would influence opportunity evaluation as they trigger search for
"available" and "applicable" cognitive structures --
types of activated "knowledge" (Higgins, 1996) -- one utilizes
in a given entrepreneurial decision situation. In H3a-b, we predicted
that higher self-efficacy in business problem solving would induce both
subjective (H3a) and objective (H3b) types of referent criterion. We
found support for both predictions: .41, p < .001 for H3a and .52, p
< .05 for H3b. In H4a-b, we again postulated that one's
cognitive breadth and tolerance for competing or conflicting ideas will
increase use of both subjective (H4a) and objective types (H4b) of
referent criterion. The findings support these two predictions as well:
.15, p < .05 for H4a and .16,p < .05 for H4b.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
H5 posited a positive relationship between optimistic opportunity
evaluation and a positive opportunity evaluation. H5 was supported. H6
predicted a negative relationship between perceived risk in the new
venture opportunity and a positive opportunity evaluation. H6 was not
supported.
Overall, our hypotheses tests were all supported except for H2a and
H6. Two situationally based cognitive paths represented in the
conceptual model, promotive thinking and preventive thinking, were
expected to jointly influence the likelihood of pursuing the new venture
opportunity. We based these two distinct yet concurrent paths on
Higgins' (1997) theory of regulation focus, wherein human behaviors
or decisions are explained as the products of two motivational forces
(promotion focus and prevention focus). This theoretical approach
received strong support for our test of the dual path model and points
to a promising way to understanding how entrepreneurs think and make
decisions about opportunity evaluation.
Regarding H2a, another unsupported hypothesis, our model
comparisons between business-management student and
non-business-management student groups introduced some insights.
Originally, we posited a positive influence from objective referent
criterion such as education and past working experience to optimistic
opportunity evaluation. In the business-management student model, the
path was found still non-significant. Interesting in the communication
student model, however, the path was positive and significant (.25, p
< .05) despite the lack of power related to small sample size. With
some caution, we interpret this as an educational effect for opportunity
recognition. In the business student sample, the education about
business principles and knowledge might not vary as much within the
sample as it would in the non-business sample, who took fewer business
courses and a wider range of other courses. The positive and significant
path seems to suggest that business experience and education would
improve opportunity recognition for non-business majors wishing to start
new businesses.
Finally, regarding the unsupported hypothesis H6, the path from
risk perception to opportunity evaluation decision, it seems that risk
perception is a relatively less important factor in entrepreneurial
decision making than optimistic opportunity evaluation, particularly for
pre-nascent entrepreneurs. Optimistic thinking in business decision
situations is more important in understanding who becomes an
entrepreneur.
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we identified and tested the influence of person and
situation variables on an inexperienced, pre-nascent entrepreneur's
likelihood of deciding to pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity. We
identified self-efficacy and cognitive multilateralism as antecedent
individual variables that we hypothesized to activate distinct types of
entrepreneurial cognitions as well as subjective and objective referent
criteria. Each type of entrepreneurial cognition then exerts influences
on one's situational assessment in two ways: optimistic opportunity
evaluation vs. perceived risk in the business.
Specifically, we hypothesized that the subjective referent criteria
are likely to foster an optimistic opportunity evaluation while they are
likely to suppress risk perception embedded in the entrepreneurial
situation. In contrast, we posited that the objective referent criteria
are likely to foster both risk perception in the situation and
optimistic opportunity evaluation. For example, education and past
working experience in a small/family business (objective referent
criterion) are likely to trigger both promotive thinking and preventive
thinking in the given business decision situation; whereas willful or
wishful thinking about the desired outcomes (subjective referent
criteria) trigger more promotive thinking and suppress preventive
thinking. Our predictions are also supported by the types of decision
frames (gain/non-gain as well as loss/non-loss frame) that will steer
one in different directions in the recognition of opportunities and
risks.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH
In this paper we introduced the concepts of cognitive
multilateralism and two different types of referent criteria--subjective
and objective--to the study of entrepreneurial cognition research. These
individual and situational concepts illustrate the parallel thinking
processes adopted by entrepreneurs during the opportunity evaluation
phase of the new venture creation process. This study thus makes several
significant contributions to theory building for entrepreneurial
cognition research.
First, as we applied the new conceptual variables within the theory
of regulation focus (Baron, 2004; Higgins, 1997), we created a
comprehensive model that describes how the dual-motivational forces -
promotion focus and prevention focus - are produced in the
entrepreneurial opportunity evaluation. We explained how the two
motivational forces are activated and influence an entrepreneur's
thinking when situational activation of two types of cognitive
structures occurs. We further accounted for how the two types of
cognitive structures are likely to be activated from two enduring
individual factors. Our review of extant early literature suggests that
most of it assumed people experience entrepreneurial optimism (promotive
thinking) and entrepreneurial pessimism (preventive thinking) in a
mutually exclusive way - one is only present at the expense of the
other's absence. However, as we have shown, it seems
entrepreneurial thinking on business venturing is more intertwined with
conflicting or at least competing motives and decision frames in
practice. The two frames of gain/non-gain and loss/non-loss are the yin
and yang of entrepreneurial thinking we would adopt in reality. In this
sense, our conceptual model is a viable description of the phenomenon --
how the entrepreneur's mind is working during opportunity
evaluation situations.
In addition, the newly introduced concept, cognitive
multilateralism, is worthy of further application in entrepreneurship
research. Prior theory development suggests that entrepreneurs are
better able to discover or create something unusual that others cannot
identify, often ignore as trivial, or dismiss as not worthy of
additional information search or learning costs (e.g., Zahra, 2008).
Such a distinct tendency is conceptually captured and predicted by
cognitive multilateralism - as one possesses a cognitive breadth and
tolerance for inconsistent or rivalrous ideas, she or he is more likely
to find some "unthinkable" solutions. We thus have another way
to distinguish entrepreneurs' unique cognitive style in addition to
the extant psychological concepts such as self-efficacy.
In addition to differing referent criteria, there are the cognitive
structures we may retrieve from memory or improvise spontaneously in a
given decision situation. While the conceptual ideas might lack novelty,
the distinctions between subjective and objective referents allow us to
make additional predictions on two competing situational assessments
during opportunity evaluation. The utility of the different types of
referent criteria seems promising in that they are new concepts that
help to explain entrepreneurial cognition linkages between individual
factors and situational judgment.
Finally, we introduced and tested two cognitive processing paths,
promotive and preventive thinking, to capture the general parallel flow
of entrepreneurial opportunity evaluation. These concepts present a
useful and intuitive conceptual frame to illustrate the notion of
dual-motives and dual-thinking paths toward entrepreneurial decisions
and actions. This is a significant contribution to the entrepreneurial
cognition literature because we can develop normative or prescriptive
research to devise measures to foster more effective entrepreneurial
opportunity evaluation in future research.
Methodologically, the use of inexperienced pre-nascent
entrepreneurs is a limitation to the study in terms of generalizability,
but also has its strengths as pointed out by Bishop and Dixon (2006).
The use of such a sample reduces prior learning effects related to our
dependent variable--judgment of action on a new venture opportunity. In
addition, examining such a sample provides base rate data and findings
for comparison to studies of similar cognitive models with samples of
more experienced entrepreneurs.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP PRACTICE
Experienced entrepreneurs consider awareness of danger as well as
opportunity, whereas novice entrepreneurs are more focused on newness,
novelty, the perceived superiority of their ideas, and intuition (Baron
& Ensley, 2006). These researchers suggest that novice entrepreneurs
might be 'cognitively dazzled' by novelty and the perceived
potential of the unique business ideas they generate such that they may
fail to devote sufficient attention to financial and business factors.
The Catch-22, of course, is that premature application of preventive
reasoning will result in fewer and less frequent new business ideas.
This seeming trade-off between promotive and preventive thinking may
help to explain two observed phenomena: founding rates of new ventures
and failure rates for new ventures.
As reported in the GEM Global Report (GEM Consortium, 2005)
opportunity-driven entrepreneurs have lower failure rates among
early-stage businesses and all early stage entrepreneurs perceive less
market competition (i.e., risk) than established business owners. In
examining closure rates of small businesses, Headd (2003) found that a
substantial minority of firms that closed their doors were not failures
in that they were planned exits either through selling a viable business
or retiring from the workforce. Firms considered successful at closure
tended to have young owners and no debt. While this is at a late stage
in the new venture process, it suggests that pre-nascent and nascent
entrepreneurs may view the motivation to create a new venture or the
goals for their new ventures quite differently from experienced
entrepreneurs.
Perhaps these young and/or inexperienced entrepreneurs are often
less motivated by personal wealth creation, more interested in creating
a unique solution to a perceived or imagined future need, and are less
vested in controlling the eventual success of the new venture than
experienced entrepreneurs--recognizing and creating a new venture is
much more of a 'grand life experiment'. This would support a
greater balance and presence of parallel cognitive processing in
pre-nascent and nascent entrepreneurs. This would also help to explain
differential founding and failure rates between pre-nascent/nascent
entrepreneurs and experienced entrepreneurs (GEM Consortium, 2005). The
former group would be more likely to found a new venture due to greater
"over-optimism" from employment of subjective referent
criteria and lower perceptions of risk. Experienced entrepreneurs
meanwhile would likely to be more pessimistic, employ objective referent
criteria, perceive greater risk, and less likely to found a new venture.
Both cognitive paths are employed but differentially by
pre-nascent/nascent versus experienced entrepreneurs. This also helps to
explain differential closure rates and potentially, failure rates, in
that pre-nascent/nascent entrepreneurs would have started more new
ventures, but of lower success potential, on average than those founded
by experienced entrepreneurs. So, "liability of newness" may
be less of a concern for young entrepreneurs because closure may not be
perceived as, or actually, a failure. The first new venture opportunity
is, rather, a life experiment whose learning outcomes are more valued
than financial success.
APPENDIX I
Business Opportunity Scenario (Adapted from Keh, Foo, & Lim,
2002)
Instructions: Please answer the questions below after you read this
brief case study.
Jimmy Parker has been a successful manager for a medium-sized local
company for five years. The idea of being his own boss, taking
calculated risks, and making a fortune all appeal to him. He has an idea
for his first new business and decides to ask around to see if it is a
good idea. He has some very positive feedback from some potential
customers and some associates who know the industry well. Jimmy does not
have the resources to do in-depth market research to find out whether
the business is going to work and published data are too general to be
useful. However, he feels that there is money to be made based on the
positive feedback from potential customers and his associates. He is
enthusiastic about starting the business even though he has no
experience in the particular industry in which his start-up would
compete.
There are a few, large companies in the same industry but they have
not targeted the market segment Jimmy is aiming for. He feels that these
large companies are likely to move into the market segment if his new
business proves successful and he will not be able to prevent this major
threat. He is unsure whether the market is still growing or has matured.
If the market reaches maturity, it is likely a new business will be
squeezed out. If the market is still growing, the new business will be
able to survive the entry of large companies into this market segment.
Jimmy finds out that there are only a few, small businesses that are
still surviving in the industry.
Jimmy estimates he will need at least $150,000 to finance the new
business. As he only has $40,000 in savings, he has to borrow from the
bank or find partners to get the rest of the investment funds needed.
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Jeong-Nam Kim, Purdue University
Iain Clelland, Radford University
Seung Bach, California State University--Sacramento