Using family firm boundary management theory to explain the impact of privacy issues on family firm research.

Envick, Brooke R. ; Langford, Margaret ; Ward, Stephanie G. 等

INTRODUCTION

While the family firm is the most prevailing type of organization in the United States and throughout the world (Shanker & Astrachan; Dyer, 2003), the number of studies conducted on family firms is relatively few. This is especially true for topics relating to internal operations such as business priorities versus family priorities, strategic and financial decision-making processes, and human resource issues that may lead to questions about perceived promises, trust, and fairness. The issue of privacy among family firms has been addressed in the literature, with the overall conclusion being that, in the minds of family business members, disclosing firm-specific information is virtually indistinguishable from disclosing family-specific information (Hoy & Vesper, 1994).

The contribution of this paper is the introduction of Family Firm Boundary Management Theory (FFBM) to help researchers understand why family firms have such a noted penchant for privacy. FFBM is based on Communication Boundary Management Theory (CBM), which is from the family psychology literature. This theory offers an explanation of how communication barriers are established to regulate ownership of private information (Petronio, 1991; 2000). There are four interrelated dimensions of FFBM, which include ownership, control, permeability, and levels. By understanding these dimensions and other aspects of FFBM, researchers can better plan their approach to collect information, select accessible topics for research, and deepen their understanding of family firms' preference for privacy. Family firms are as much, if not more, about the family as they are about the business. Looking to the family psychology literature is an important step in family firm research to enhance our knowledge base and deepen our understanding of how family firms operate and interact with outside entities.

According to Dyer (2003), the family firm is the most dominant organizational form in the world, and it is estimated that 90 percent of all businesses in the United States are family businesses (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996). However, in relation to these numbers, very few studies have been done regarding family firms (Dyer 2003). According to Litz (1997), this is due to informational constraints that limit both the quality and quantity of family firm research. This forces one to consider why these informational constraints are so prevalent.

We address the issue in this paper by introducing Communication Boundary Management Theory (CBM), from the family psychology literature, and offer a new theoretical perspective to the family firm literature called Family Firm Boundary Management Theory (FFBM). A literature review is presented that outlines difficulty in collecting data for family firm research. A case in point is offered as a concrete example of the difficulties that exist. Next, Communication Boundary Management Theory is introduced from the family psychology literature, which is the basis for our theory on Family Firm Boundary Management. The four dimensions and two components of FFBM are presented, followed by conclusions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is an interesting story in the family firm literature that focuses on a unique exercise conducted by a management consultant. The consultant asks the attendees to describe their businesses as if they were automobiles. One business owner compared his business to a sports car, because of its innovative marketing strategies. A second attendee said that her firm is analogous to a station wagon because of its conservative history and conventional product lines. The third business owner compared his firm to an armored car. When asked to explain the parallel, he responded that unlike the other two, his is a family business: no one gets in; no one gets out (Litz, 1997). The purpose of this paper is to offer one plausible explanation why it is so difficult for academic researchers to "get in" and collect the data needed to further our understanding of family firms.

The bottom line is that family firms prefer privacy (Ward, 1987; Whisler, 1988; Litz, 1997). In fact, some researchers have concluded that in the minds of family business members, disclosing firm-specific information is virtually indistinguishable from disclosing family-specific information (Hoy & Vesper, 1994). Simply stated, family firms have a greater unwillingness to disclose firm-specific information than their non-family counterparts. This predisposition to safeguard information from outside entities tends to steer academic researchers towards topics and subjects that are more accessible and manageable (Litz, 1997). This answers the question of why there is such a lack of family firm research and a failure to answer the questions that are not easily discussed (Dees and Starr, 1992). But, what is still missing is a plausible explanation why family businesses have such a noted penchant for privacy.

One primary issue facing upper management in family firms is balancing responsibilities between the family and those to the business (Frieswick, 1996; Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 1996). One responsibility is managing and controlling interactions with any external persons or organizations. If most communication flows through the founding family member(s) and/or upper management, then they ultimately control what information flows both in and out of the business (Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 2001). Family firms also tend to have an inward orientation, and as such, founders and/or upper management often avoid being held accountable to any outside entities (Daily & Dollinger, 1991).

Family values and the founders' personal goals help shape family firm strategy, and that can lead to family harmony and employment being valued more than firm performance and profitability (Gersick, Davis, McCollom, & Lansberg, 1997; Trostel & Nichols, 1982). Family goals and needs often play major roles in decisions regarding the location of the business, financial strategy, and business strategy (Kahn & Henderson, 1992; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). In some instances, family business owners are forced to choose between what is best for the family versus what is best for the business, which is obviously a very difficult reality facing family firms and their owners (Brockhaus, 1994). In fact, Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) suggest that family firms may incur higher agency costs than non-family firms, since family members in upper management may be unwilling to fire an incompetent family member.

Beyond a family founders' preference for privacy, it is also suggested that family business owners seem to have a disinterest in academic studies, and even if they commit, their discontinuance rate is high, especially for more longitudinal studies (Brockhaus, 1994).

CASE IN POINT

To provide a concrete example of family firms' preference for privacy, the authors have elected to share their experiences in trying to conduct a research project on how psychological contracts work in family firms. It is important to note that we adhered to Brockhaus' (1994) advice on conducting research with family firms. He states that researchers should fully disclose the nature and purpose of the study, state how the information will be compiled, make a guarantee of confidentiality, provide the benefits of participation in the study, and describe their time commitments.

As professors, we hold various ranks in our school, one assistant professor, one associate professor, and one full professor. Together, we have 27 publications in peer-reviewed journals, in addition to numerous conference presentations and proceeding publications. This information is presented to illustrate that we have the requisite experience, knowledge, and skills needed to successfully complete empirical research projects.

Additionally, we adhered to the original research model and survey on psychological contracts, which are individual beliefs in a reciprocal obligation between the individual and the organization (Rousseau, 1989). A psychological contract includes a perceived promise, a valued payment, and acceptance of the exchange ENRfu(Rousseau, 1995). This model and survey has resulted in successful data collection and empirical journal publications over the past 17 years (Rousseau, 1989; Rousseau, 1990; Rousseau & McLean-Parks, 1993; Robinson & Kraatz, 1994; Shore & Tetrick, 1994; Robinson, 1995; Rousseau, 1995; Robinson, 1996; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Turnley & Feldman, 1999; Dabos & Rousseau, 2004; Raja, Johns, & Ntalainis, 2004; and Rousseau, 2004). In an attempt to introduce the concept of psychological contracts to the family firm literature the authors engaged in a research project described in the rest of this section.

Drawing upon Inc. 500 lists for 2004 and 2005, we contacted approximately 225 firms using an on-line survey methodology. The purpose of this "Phase One" of the research study was to determine whether a firm was family-owned, the extent of family-ownership, and whether the firm would be interested in participating in "Phase Two," in which surveys would be sent to both owners and employees, both family and non-family. We fully disclosed the purpose of the research as being to investigate the relationships between employers and employees in family-owned businesses and that we were researching "psychological contracts," trust and fairness, and business performance. Further, we stated that any information provided for the research would be kept completely confidential and no firms would be identified by name in any publication of the research results. We also said that all surveys would be destroyed after the completion of the study. Additionally, we provided the following statement regarding individual participants:

 Procedures to preserve your anonymity and confidentially are in
 place and have been approved by the Institutional Review Board of
 [this university]. No responses will be traceable to you; your
 responses will be aggregated (combined) with all others. Results
 from all companies will be aggregated so that responses from a
 specific company cannot be identified by any person other than the
 investigators and research secretary. Participating companies will
 be sent final, aggregated results of the research. Because of the
 nature of this survey, the researchers do not foresee that you will
 experience any risks as a result of your participation. Nor will
 you receive any direct, personal benefit as a result of your
 participation. However, your participation will allow researchers
 to better understand family-owned business employment relationships
 and practices.

In terms of time commitments, the Phase One survey took less than five minutes to complete. The letter that accompanied the Phase One survey stated that the Phase Two owner survey would take 10-15 minutes to complete, and the employee survey would take 20-25 minutes to complete. Again, the main purpose of Phase One was to determine their willingness to participate in Phase Two.

We received 23 responses. Of these, only four stated that they would be interested in participating in Phase Two (less than 2% of the original number). We sent two reminder e-mails to the non-responding firms without success (except a few requests to be removed from the mailing list). Within two weeks of contact by the "yes" firms, we mailed Phase Two surveys (along with cover letters reminding participants of the purpose of the research and assuring anonymity) for both owners and employees of each. The number of surveys mailed ranged from 20 to 80 per firm.

As we awaited these Phase Two surveys to be returned, we discussed why the response rate was so low to the Phase One inquiry and concluded that one reason might be the on-line methodology itself being off-putting. We decided to use a different approach to find more family firms willing to participate. In our revised approach, we used Fortune's "Fastest Growing Companies in 2006" list and mailed the Phase One inquiry survey to 99 firms via standard mail. We received no replies.

We moved on to more lists that might yield additional family firms. We used Family Business Magazine's lists of "America's 150 Largest Family Businesses" and, somewhat later, "America's 150 Oldest Family Businesses." From the former list, the CEO/owner of a very large firm responded that he would like his firm to participate in Phase Two. Because of the size of the firm (many thousands of employees), we realized that we would need to use a vendor to set up a Phase Two survey that could be completed on-line anonymously and easily by employees and owners. One of the authors worked with the vendor to refine an on-line version of the Phase Two survey as well as kept in direct contact with the CEO to assure continuance in the project. We also contacted potential participants via yet another list, Forbe's "Largest Private Companies for 2006" (360 companies). From this list, two responded that they would like to continue with Phase Two. One was large enough to utilize the on-line method for Phase Two and we established and maintained contact with the CEO of this firm as well. For the second firm, due to its relatively smaller size, we mailed approximately 800 hard-copy surveys. Also, during this general time frame, we mailed Phase One inquiry surveys to companies on Fortune's list of the 100 "Fasting Growing Small Public Companies." We received one "no" response and no others. Also, another of the authors, through a research colleague, established contact with yet another group of family firms, eight of which agreed to participate.

Surveys from the very first effort (that yielded only four companies willing to participate in Phase Two) had earlier trickled in from only two of the four companies. We never heard from the other two. From the two participating firms, we received two owner surveys and 36 employee surveys combined.

As we continued to work with the Phase Two on-line vendor, we were contacted by the firm to which we had sent 800 hard-copy surveys. Upon receiving the surveys, the firm decided not to participate and subsequently mailed the surveys back. At this point, we decided that the nature of the research itself--essentially exploring elements of trust, fairness, and promise-keeping--might be a contributing factor to lack of response. We could not afford to have the on-line vendor move forward with the Phase Two survey if the two firms would also decide not to participate after all. The author who had been maintaining contact with these two larger firms contacted them again, submitting the surveys for the CEO/owners to peruse. Both now declined to participate further.

As of this writing, a year after the original on-line Phase One step, we have contacted approximately 1,030 firms. We have received only six surveys from owners and 43 from employees. This has forced us to really consider why there is such a noted unwillingness of these family firms to participate, especially since there was initial commitment to participate by several firms. However, upon seeing the survey questions or being provided information about specific elements of psychological contracts (i.e. trust, fairness, promise-keeping), they chose to withdraw from the study.

COMMUNICATION BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT THEORY

Based on the experience described in the aforementioned case in point, the authors began researching privacy issues in family firms, going beyond what is currently available in business literature and into family psychology literature. Communication Boundary Management Theory (CBM) offers an explanation of how communication barriers are established to regulate ownership of private information (Petronio, 1991; 2000). CBM theory focuses on (1) how boundaries are structured--who and who does not have access to information; and (2) a rule of management system--the factors that govern decisions about what private information to reveal or conceal (Petronio, 2000).

Communication boundary structures have four interrelated dimensions: ownership, control, permeability, and levels. Ownership refers to a family member's right to govern whether private information about them is revealed to or concealed from others. Therefore, each family member owns this control over his or her own words, behaviors, and attitudes. Control takes into account the dimension of ownership in addition to risk. The amount of risk associated with revealing different types of information varies. The amount of risk also affects who has access to that information. Permeability refers to how open the information is within the family. The more people within the family who have access to specific information, the more likely it will be exposed outside the family. The final dimension is levels, which takes into account different family member roles. Some information may only be known and discussed by family members of a certain generation, and not disseminated to family members in later generations. In other cases, the information may be spread to only one side of the family (in marital relations), or perhaps certain information is only shared among members of a certain gender. This results in subgroups of a family having access to information kept secret from other subgroups.

The rule of management system is the second component of CBM theory. This is an internal system used to control who has access to certain information and when it should be protected. This can include who is told, how much is told, what kind if information is revealed, and even reasons behind why certain information is disclosed, while other information is concealed.

In the family psychology literature, CBM theory has been used to better understand the disclosure of private information between marital couples (Petronio, 1991); to compare boundaries across different family forms (Caughlin, Golish, Olson, Sargent, Cook & Petronio; 2000); to uncover motivations underlying topic avoidance in close relationships (Afifi & Guerrero, 2000); and to analyze parental privacy invasion in family interactions (Petronio, 1994), among other different types of family relationships and issues.

The theory of Communication Boundary Management has also been applied in the information technology and e-commerce literature to better understand privacy issues. For example, with the rising popularity of the Internet, people are becoming more concerned with the privacy and security of sensitive information. Stanton (2003) developed a new theoretical perspective (based on Petronio's theory) called Information Boundary Management Theory, that describes whether, when, and why employees care about the privacy and security of sensitive information at work. Likewise, Metzger (2007) applied CBM to understand the tension between information disclosure and privacy within e-commerce relationships.

In this paper we use Communication Boundary Management Theory to offer a new theoretical explanation called Family Firm Boundary Management Theory (FFBM) to help explain why it is so difficult to access the information needed to truly further our understanding of family firms.

FAMILY FIRM BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT THEORY

As mentioned in the literature review, in the minds of family business members, disclosing firm-specific information is virtually indistinguishable from disclosing family-specific information (Hoy & Vesper, 1994). The family and the firm systems are isomorphic and virtually impossible to separate. This is why it is so difficult to tap into how family firms make certain decisions (Handler, 1992); issues of ethics, principles, and values (Ackoff, 1987; Wilson, 1980; Chrisman & Fry, 1982); or issues of family firm mismanagement (Dees & Starr, 1992). Instead, most research focuses on how family businesses contribute to the GNP and employment (Brockhaus, 1994); or the firm's reputation among customers and suppliers (Litz, 1997); as well as broader issues of family firm strategy and succession planning.

In this section, the original Communication Boundary Management Theory components and dimensions (Petronio, 1991; 2000) are discussed in terms of how they may play into preference for privacy issues and FFBM theory resulting in a lack of academic research. The authors contend that this is helpful for researchers of family firms to understand when faced with the collection of more sensitive data or information that is not readily available.

Ownership

Assume that family member A views family member B as having a bias against non-family member employees. Regardless of that opinion, and even if certain factual evidence may exist, "ownership" suggests that family member A does not have the right to choose whether that information is revealed to or concealed from outside entities; only family member B would have that right. Family member A would find answering the survey very difficult, especially if it contained sensitive or controversial information. That is, a family member might easily answer a survey with questions pertaining only to them, but have difficulty answering questions about more broad management issues or anything he or she observes in the behaviors of other family members. As a result, the amount of information that can be shared, according to the dimension of ownership, can be very restrictive.

Control

This dimension adds the variable of risk into the equation. Revealing how much the family firm has grown over that past five years may be considered low risk. Revealing how the firm views social responsibility may be considered moderately risky. Revealing how non-family members in the firm are evaluated and promoted versus family members may be considered high risk, as now you are tapping into how decisions are made and possibly issues of ethics, values, fairness, and trust. As such, family firm management may prefer tighter control over that type of information. The second aspect relates to who has access. While information may be provided to a board of advisors, the same information may not be offered to academic researchers because of the risk associated with a lack of perceived control over what will actually be done with the data (even if there is a statement of confidentiality and so forth). Additionally, they choose who is on the board, whereas in most cases, they have not chosen or initiated a relationship with academic researchers.

Permeability

How open the family is with information in the family firm is important to consider. The more people within the firm who have access to specific information, the better chance it will be leaked to outside entities. This taps back into the concept of risk. In some cases, very risky information may be shared with certain family members, but not with other family members. For example, the founding member may know the firm is in serious trouble for one reason or another. He may decide to share that information with his brother, who is a co-founder, but not his daughter, who is first in line to take over the family firm. So, in some cases closely guarded information may remain fairly impermeable, whereas in other cases, the free exchange of information leads to a more permeable communication boundary. The more impermeable, the more likely there are intra-family secrets. This is different from information that is merely kept private from external entities, as family members who hold this information tend to keep it more closely guarded (Bok, 1983; Vangelisti, 1994). Therefore, the more impermeable a family firm is in regard to internal operations, the less likely any information will be available to the academic researcher.

Levels

The final dimension is levels, which takes into account hierarchical roles. Some information may only be privy to upper level management, and not disseminated to family members in lower level positions within the firm. In other cases, the information may be spread through all levels in the business, but only to family members. This can result in certain family members having access to information kept secret from non-family members occupying higher-level positions in the firm. This could include decisions about the business that put family values and interests above profitability and performance. If any of this type of information is kept from any party within the business, it will most certainly be kept from academic researchers.

The rule of management system is the second component of CBM theory, which is an internal system used to control who has access to certain information and when it should be protected. As mentioned in the literature review, the founding members and/or upper management tend to control information flowing both in and out of the family firm (Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 2001). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that they create and maintain the rule of management system. So, not only will academic researchers not get the information they need for research, they may also not know or understand the rule of management system(s) within the firms in their prospective participant pools. The rule of management system will likely be different from firm to firm, causing even more confusion and varying results.

CONCLUSIONS

Deepening our understanding of the "family side" of family firms is crucial if we are going to increase the number of studies conducted in the field. It is oftentimes easier to choose other types of research projects, rather than deal with the privacy issues in family firm research. Our take is that the family firm is as much, if not more, about the family as it is about the business. Therefore, we sought out theories and empirical studies from the family psychology literature to further our own understanding of how communication barriers are established to regulate ownership of private information (Communication Boundary Management Theory: Petronio, 1991; 2000).

This paper's contribution is the introduction of Family Firm Boundary Management Theory to help researchers not only understand why family firms prefer privacy, but with the hope that this understanding will help them better plan for and develop research projects in the field. We also hope that this paper will inspire others to look further into the family psychology literature for other theories and empirical studies that may help develop our knowledge base and thus strengthen the family firm literature.

Although communication boundaries are metaphorical (Altman, 1976; Petronio, 1991), the stable nature of them is an excellent indicator of why academic researchers have been relatively unsuccessful in acquiring necessary information to appropriately develop family firm literature. Drawing from the family psychology literature to understand how families view and communicated with outside entities is an important step in family firm research.

This paper focuses on one theory from this body of literature, Communication Boundary Management Theory (Petronio, 1991; 2000), which has been used to help understand different family forms, marital relationships, and other types of family interactions. Using the foundation of the two components (boundary structures and the rule of management system) and four dimensions (ownership, control, permeability, and levels) of CBM, the authors offer Family Firm Boundary Management Theory to help family firm researchers better plan their approach to collect information, select accessible topics for research, and deepen their understanding of family firms' preference for privacy. Not all dimensions may be at play in all research projects, or some dimensions may be more dominant. For example, in our research project on psychological contracts, it appears that issues of control and ownership are most prevalent in preventing owners from allowing employees to share their perceptions. Once employees' perceptions of promise keeping, fairness, and trust leave the organization, true ownership and control over how it might be used and communicated is lost. Permeability and levels may not being playing as large of a role, because employees have various perceptions of management and operations even if they are not privy to all information. It is important for researchers to consider which of the four dimensions might affect their project, and always remember the rule of management system as a factor.

Since family firms appear to be as much, if not more, about the family as they are about the business, we suggest that more family firm researchers look to the family psychology literature at other theories and empirical studies to help further our understanding of family firms.

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Brooke R. Envick, St. Mary's University

Margaret Langford, St. Mary's University

Stephanie G. Ward, St. Mary's University