Breaking vicious circle of low productivity: a new theoretical model.
Parayitam, Satyanarayana
INTRODUCTION
"Productivity growth raises our standard of living and plays a
central role in our competitiveness in the worldwide economy.
Productivity growth will be even more important as new technologies
accelerate global economic integration as the American population
ages"
(Economic Report of the President, 2006: page 3)
The low rate in productivity growth has been one of the major
issues catching the attention of both academicians and administrators
alike. The literature is replete with efficiency wage models explaining
convincingly the involuntary unemployment (Solow, 1979), (Shapiro &
Stiglitz, 1984), (Salop, 1979), (Weiss, 1980), and a wide baffling variety of models, both interesting and exhaustive which discuss the
operational implications of including certain contract forms (Malcomson,
1984). Though these models differ in several respects in terms of
content, they have one thing in common. They explain why markets often
do not clear; they do not offer any solution to problem of low
productivity. For instance, if we recall the Solow (1979)condition that
a profit maximizing firm is prepared to hire all the labor at the real
wage w * (i.e. the elasticity of effort with respect to the wage is
unity) because it minimizes the labor cost per efficiency unit. Each
firm therefore optimally hire labor up to the point where marginal
product equals real wage. Solow (1979) contends that any decrease in
wage would result in decrease in productivity of all the employees on
the job (p.13). While this is only one side of the coin, it unfolds the
other side quite interestingly. Any increase in wage would automatically
increase productivity but it is feared that wages can go up only at the
cost of more involuntary unemployment.
Vicious circle of low productivity: It is difficult to offer any
precise explanation to low productivity (e.g. of 1970s). However,
researchers (Kahn, 1993; Krugman, 1993, Filardo, 1995) attempt to
explain low productivity growth in terms of slowdown in labor force
growth (Kahn, 1993: p 1). One plausible explanation that can be found is
in terms of vicious circle of low productivity. The argument is that low
rate of economic growth is caused by low productivity, which in turn is
caused by low incentive for the employees to work. Low incentive to work
is caused by low wages. Low wages result from low rate of economic
growth. The cycle is thus complete. The vicious circle of low
productivity is captured in the following figure.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
That higher productivity is considered as one of the ingredients of
economic growth and low productivity can hamper growth needs no
reiteration. If efficiency of inputs rises by 8 percent per year, the
real income and standard of living will be doubled every eight years
[[(1.08).sup.8] = 2.000 app]. A study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1988) has categorically pointed out that productivity growth exerts a
tremendous impact on key economic parameters or performance indicators.
It is felt strongly that (a) productivity growth results in higher
incomes and consumption rather than in additional leisure; (b) a
slowdown in productivity results in sharp increases in price level; (c)
increase in productivity does not result in growing unemployment; (d)
with productivity growth, real wage compensation increases; and (e)
better productivity growth can provide better education, better
environment, medical and health care and would increase the overall
standard of living.
According to the Economic Report of the President (1994: p. 44;
2006: p 159), labor productivity in USA has declined from 2.7% in
1960-73 to 0.6% in 1973-79 and then went up mildly to 1.3% during
1979-89. The Economic Report of the President estimated that the average
annual rate of growth of GDP during 1947-93 was 3.94% whereas it was
only 2.3% during 1973-92. The most significant factor in 1947-73 was
technological change, which alone generated about 1.63% of economic
growth. The productivity growth averaged around 3.8% between 2001
through 2004 (Yellen, 2005). According to the latest Economic Report of
the President (2006: p 159) "Since 1995, the US has enjoyed an
acceleration in labor-productivity growth. From 1973 to 1995, output per
worker grew at 1.4% per year whereas from 1995 to 2004 this rate
accelerated to 2.9% per year, with rates averaging over 3% since 2000.
The implication is that at 2.9% rate of growth, to double the standard
of living it takes 24 years". While post 1995 has seen the period
of acceleration of productivity, it is important to maintain higher
productivity through escalated wage which I call 'motivating wage
rate'.
Wage-productivity--employment relationship: Wage--productivity
relationship is not uniform in all the sectors of the economy. The
efficiency wage hypothesis is relevant particularly in primary sector
(Akerlof &. Yellen, 1990), whereas it is weak in secondary sector.
It is contended that wage differentials are meticulously maintained by
different firms to match the workers of identical characteristics. The
point is that employers are fully aware that the
effort-wage-relationship differs across various groups. The idea that
labor productivity depends on real wages paid by the firm is borrowed
from one of the more popular micro-foundations of efficiency-wage models
of Libenstein (1963).
As regards the productivity and unemployment relationship, the
famous Okun's (1970) law can be recapitulated here. According to
this law, higher unemployment rates correspond to lower productivity.
One of the startling revelations is that even in downturn caused by
decline in marginal productivity of labor to a decline in real price of
output should lower real wages but leave productivity (effort) unchanged
(Shapiro & Stigltz, 1984). Normally it is assumed that higher
unemployment rate at higher wages will make employees more productive
because of the fear of loss of employment. Therefore, higher wages
result in higher productivity, especially when unemployment is high.
(A) Traditional View:
PRODUCTIVITY - WAGE RELATIONSHIP
Higher productivity [right arrow] Higher wages
Lower productivity [right arrow] Lower wages
(B) Contemporary View: (Motivating Wage Theory)
Higher productivity [right arrow] Higher wages
Higher wages [right arrow] Higher productivity
Therefore: [left and right arrow] Higher wages
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
THE MODEL
Let us take the conventional production function Q = F{[L.sup.*],
[K.sup.*], e(w)}, where Q = Total Physical Product; L = Labor; K =
Capital; e(w) is effort the labor as a function of wage (w); the
after-tax profits (t = tax on profits) are derived as follows:
[[PI].sup.*.sub.BT] = p f([L.sup.*], [w.sup.*], [K.sup.*],
[v.sup.*]) - [w([L.sup.*]) + [PSI] ([K.sup.*])] (1)
[[PI].sup.*.sub.AT] = ([[PI].sup.*.sub.BT] - t
[[PI].sup.*].sub.BT]) (2)
[[PI].sup.*.sub.AT] = [[PI].sup.*.sub.BT](1 - t) (3)
[[PI].sup.*.sub.AT] = (1 - t) {p f([L.sup.*], [w.sup.*], [K.sup.*],
[v.sup.*]) - [w([L.sup.*]) + [PSI]([K.sup.*])]} (4)
When t = 0, [[PI].sup.*.sub.BT] = [[PI].sup.*.sub.AT] and normally
when t > 0, [[PI].sup.*.sub.BT] > [[PI].sup.*.sub.AT]
Proposition: Motivating wage increases productivity. Let us see
what happens when the total tax receipts are spent on enhancing wage, we
call it 'motivating wage' as distinct from 'prevailing
wage'.
[??] > [w.sup.*] (5)
where '[??]' is the 'Motivating wage' and
'[w.sup.*]' is the prevailing wage. When the total tax
receipts are redistributed to enhance wage then:
[??] = [w.sup.*] + [t [[PI].sup.*.sub.BT]/L]
[??] = [[L.sup.*] [w.sup.*] + t [[PI].sup.*.sub.BT]]/[L.sup.*] (6)
When the production is (where [OMEGA] is the rate of interest):
Q = [PSI] {[L.sup.*] (w), [w.sup.*], [K.sup.*] ([OMEGA]),} (7)
and when the prevailing wage is [w.sup.*], marginal productivity of
the factor is given by:
[MP.sub.L] = [delta]Q/[delta][L.sup.*] = [f.sub.L]
[[delta][L.sup.*]/[delta]w] (8)
After increase in wage the production function is transformed as:
[Q.sub.1] = [PSI] {[L.sup.*] (w), [??], [K.sup.*] ([OMEGA]),} (9)
And, [??] > [w.sup.*]
Therefore, it is logical assume that:
[MP.sub.L1] = [delta]Q/[delta][L.sup.*] = [f.sub.L1]
[[delta][L.sup.*]/[delta]w] (10)
It should be remembered that [MP.sub.L1] > [MP.sub.L]
Proof: If we assume other factor ([K.sup.*]) is constant, when the
wage is '[w.sup.*]'
[Pf.sub.L] - w = 0 (by virtue of first order condition for
maximizing profit), and
[f.sub.L] = [w.sup.*]/P (11)
By the same token, at the new wage the first order condition
specifies
[Pf.sub.L1] - [??] = 0, i.e., (12)
which implies [f.sub.L1] = [??]/P (13)
and since [??] > [w.sup.*]; [f.sub.L1] > [f.sub.L] (Holding P
constant) (14)
It has long been established that when wage rate enters the
production function:
Q = f {L, [w.sup.*], K, [OMEGA]} (15)
It is reasonably assumed that
[delta]Q /[delta][L.sup.*] > 0; [delta]Q/[delta][omega] > 0;
[[delta].sub.2]Q/[delta][L.sup.*2] < 0;
[[delta].sub.2]Q/[[delta].sup.2][omega] < 0
From the employer's point of view, since L = L(Q, [w.sup.*])
holding [K.sup.*] and [[OMEGA].sup.*] constant, [L.sup.*] determines the
optimum level of employment and [w.sup.*] is the optimum wage. There
will be no incentive for the employer to change from this position. If
at all he were to increase the wage rate, this will be at the cost of
his total profits (which will not be maximum at this position) and
further, he has to lay off some workers.
Thus [L.sup.*] being unalterable, and [w.sup.*] being sticky
(rather than rigid and this is a very restrictive assumption) using the
Solow's (1979) terminology, the constant (or low) productivity trap
is laid. This explains the 'vicious circle of low
productivity' (see Figure 1).
Now, following Libenstein (1963), an increase in [w.sup.*] will
shift the marginal productivity curve upwards (because of physical,
economic, and psychological reasons). Hence to increase the productivity
an external pressure may be employed by influencing the wage. As
Libenstein (1963) contends, the average productivity (and marginal
productivity)of a group will depend on their wage. The higher the wage
the greater the units of work per laborer and hence up to some point,
the higher the wage the higher the per capita productivity of the group
(p.31). Figure 2 captures the relationship between wages and worker
productivity and Figure 3 shows the marginal product curve shifts
upwards with increases in wages.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Figure 4 shows how the increased wage rate results in increased
productivity.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
ANALYSIS
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (16)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (17)
The cost of the increase in productivity is equal to
([w.sub.2.sup.*] [w.sub.1.sup.*]) [L.sup.*]. It follows that if:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (18)
it becomes feasible to increase the wage. That is to say, it will
be advantageous to implement a 'motivating wage.'
To break the vicious circle of low productivity, an entrepreneur
may take the initiative in identifying the 'motivating wage'
and increase productivity. If the entrepreneur is unable to do so, the
State may take the initiative to increase wages. It can be argued that
State can increase productivity breaking the vicious circle of low or
constant productivity. The State can do so by offering a subsidy to the
fullest possible extent of the increased wage. If the investment is made
initially by the government (i.e. an increase in wage rate is subsidized
by the state), the entrepreneur will have least objection. The
government can do this conveniently by transferring the tax revenue to
the 'Motivating wage fund'. Doing so will be beneficial to
both the entrepreneur and the state.
I Gross benefit to the State: Increase in production (productive
capacity) which is tangible. Other benefits include the increased
corporate taxes due to increased profits, and Increased personal income
taxes (from the individuals).
II Employer's Gross Benefit: If the increased wages are
subsidized by the government, the effective wage from the viewpoint of
the employer is w whereas the efficiency wage is [w.sup.*]. Therefore,
the benefit to the employer can be seen in terms of the increased
productivity associated with this new wage [w.sup.*].
This relationship is:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (19)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (20)
New profits are therefore inflated because of the increased
production as shown above.
Employer's net benefit = (1 - t) (*) (21)
Benefit for the State:
Investment = ([w.sub.2.sup.*] [w.sub.1.sup.*]) [L.sup.*] (seen in
terms of subsidy) (22)
Return = Increased productivity (GSP) + Tax on employer's
additional profits + Personal and individual taxes:
= (.) + [t.sub.c] (.) + [t.sub.p] ([L.sup.*])([w.sub.2.sup.*] -
[w.sub.1.sup.*])
= (1 + [t.sub.c]) (.) + [t.sub.p] ([L.sup.*])([w.sub.2.sup.*] -
[w.sub.1.sup.*]) (23)
It can be easily inferred that Equation (23) > Equation (22).
Net benefit to individual workers = Gross Benefit - personal taxes:
NB = ([w.sub.2.sup.*] [w.sub.1.sup.*]) [L.sup.*] - [t.sub.p]
NB = (1 - [t.sub.p]) ([w.sub.2.sup.*] [w.sub.1.sup.*])
CONCLUSION
This paper is essentially a theoretical construct. Taking cue from
the much illustrated Leibenstein's shifting marginal productivity
curve, this paper highlights the fact that higher productivity can be
achieved at higher wages, called motivating wages. Increase in wage acts
as a primary motivators for increasing productivity and break the
vicious circle of low productivity. As President's report (2006)
mentions: "studies show that firms that are engaged in the
international market place tend to exhibit higher rates of productivity
growth and pay higher wages and benefits to their workers" (p.155).
The present model explains how paying higher wages further increases
productivity and economic growth.
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Satyanarayana Parayitam, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth