Sinai upside-down: the theological message of a Midrash.
Apple, Raymond
The two major lines of Jewish exegesis are peshat--the plain
meaning, and derash--the homiletical interpretation. It could be said
that peshat is more objective and derash more subjective, but this
generalization should not be pressed too far. There is a popular notion
that derash is a sort of Jewish Aesop's Fables, a collection of
legendary material that provides extra drama and color; but it would be
a mistake to imagine that the masters of Midrash were mere tellers of
tales. In most midrashim there is a message which we can begin to
uncover by asking: What idea does the midrashic text want to teach? When
we ask this question we find that the Sages of the Midrash were serious
philosophers who often used derash to address major problems in theology
and ethics.
This paper shows how the exegesis of an ambiguous word in the Bible
leads in two different directions, with the contrast between peshat and
derash allowing the rabbinic Sages to read important theological content
into--or out of--a seemingly innocuous verse. That verse is Exodus
19:17, which speaks about where the Israelites were when the Torah was
given.
The verse reads: va-yityatzevu be-tahtit ha-har. If we try to
imagine the scene, we may visualize a large crowd gathered in open
country with the mountain looming in the background, apparently
indicating a peshat of they stood at the foot of the mountain. Tahtit is
connected with tahat, "under, below, beneath." These
translations appear to be interchangeable synonyms, and are generally
treated as such. (1) However, they are capable of being separated into
two categories--"low/lower/lowest" and also
"below/under/beneath." Because of the ambiguity of the Hebrew
words, the translations of tahat and tahtit waver between "at the
foot of" and "beneath." In Brown, Driver and Briggs'
Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, (2) ad she'ol
tahtit (Deuteronomy 32:22) is translated as to the lowest She'ol
(the nether-world). The Jewish Publication Society of America 1917
translation of the Bible renders the phrase unto the depths of the
nether-world; the 1962 translation gives to the base of the hills. Three
times, in Ezekiel 31:14, 16, and 18, the text has eretz tahtit, meaning
the nether parts of the earth according to the JPS 1917 translation, but
the lowest part of the nether-world in the 1962 version, which--probably
in view of the parallel bor, the pit, at the end of verse 14-sees it as
a reference to She'ol, the subterranean abode of the dead. In that
case tahtit is not at the base of something, but below the surface. We
thus see that the translation of tahtit varies between "low"
and "under."
However, when it comes to Exodus 19:17b, the 1917 JPS version
translates the Hebrew as They stood at the nether part of the mount.
Similarly, the 1962 version reads: They took their places at the foot of
the mountain. This indicates--as we noted above--an assemblage in open
country at the foot of the mountain: the camp is on terra firma, beside
but close to the base of the mountain, with Mount Sinai as an impressive
backdrop. This is accepted by Rashi, who writes: "In its literal
meaning, (be-tahtit ha-har) signifies be-raglei ha-har, at the foot of
the mountain." Similarly, Moses' recollection of the event in
Deuteronomy 4:11, Va-ta'amdun tahat ha-har, is understood in both
the 1917 JPS version (Ye stood under the mountain) and the 1962 version
(You stood at the foot of the mountain) as having tahat refer to the
base of Mount Sinai.
Rashi adds to his first, peshat-based comment, a second,
contrasting derash that the people were standing not at the base of but
literally beneath the mountain. This derash is linguistically possible
in view of the evidence above that both tahtit and tahat can be at the
foot of and beneath. However, Rashi justifies the derash not on the
basis of linguistics, but on an aggadah in TB Shabbat 88a (with
parallels in Avodah Zarah 2b, Mekhilta Ba-Hodesh 3, etc.), where Rabbi
Avdimi (elsewhere called Dimi) bar Hama says: "The Holy One,
Blessed be He, lifted the mountain over them like an [inverted] barrel
(giggit) and said, 'If you accept the Torah, all will be well: but
if not, this will be your burial place'." (3) The biblical
text itself lends no explicit support to this tableau, although the
Sages read it into the story in order to draw out a religious teaching.
In this aggadah, giggit is generally, but not necessarily,
understood to mean a barrel. Jastrow (4) gives several alternatives:
"something arched, roofing, a huge vessel, tub, tank (for brewing
beer); reservoir." The word is rather clearly based on the Biblical
Hebrew gag, a roof (e.g., Judg. 9:51). The idea of inverting a giggit is
not unique to this aggadah; there is also a halakhic discussion in the
Talmud (Sanhedrin 77a) which reads, "Kafah alav giggit ... if one
inverts a tub over a man so that he dies." It should be noted that
if a mountain is dropped, its weight and solidity would crush the
victim/s, whereas a presumably empty tub, barrel, etc., would kill by
suffocation.
A further note should be added about tahtit and giggit: since both
end in it, the Sages--perhaps with a droll sense of humor--may be
positing a contrast of opposites (something low with something high).
There are several--non-identical--manuscripts of Rashi's
commentary extant, and in some the threat is not "this will be your
burial place" but "I will turn the world back to confusion and
chaos" (tohu va-vohu; Gen. 1:2). This type of threat is found in a
number of other places, e.g., a piyyut (liturgical hymn) that puts into
God's mouth the words, "(If you cavil at My decrees) I will
turn the world back to water, to tohu va-vohu." (5) Still, despite
their disagreement over details, the various versions of the Midrash all
agree that the people were terrified that God would drop the heavy
mountain upon them and bury them alive and/or destroy the whole earth,
so they had no choice but to accept the authority of the Torah. (6)
However, the idea that the Torah was imposed by force alarmed Rabbi
Aha bar Ya'akov to such an extent that he feared it would undermine
the authority of the Torah by providing an excuse for breaking the
commandments (Shabbat 88a). His argument is that since the people were
under Divine compulsion at Sinai, if they later sinned they could plead,
"Why blame us and punish us? It is not our fault. You forced us to
accept the Torah!" By way of response, TB Avodah Zarah 2b-3a
advances a theory that even without fully voluntary motivation, which is
the ideal, there would still be some degree of reward for observing the
commandments. In Shabbat 88a, Rava gives an answer founded on the
statement that in the days of Mordecai and Esther, kiyyemu ve-kibbelu
hayehudim--the Jews confirmed and accepted the duty to commemorate the
events leading up to the festival of Purim (Esth. 9:27). Rava explains
that the people took time to affirm their previous acceptance of the
Torah at Sinai; at first there was an element of compulsion, but
now--although the new attitude needed several centuries to develop--they
willingly affirmed it. Rava's actual words are: "They
reaccepted it [the Torah] in the days of Ahasuerus; they confirmed what
they had accepted long before." (7) Whether there is a literal
significance in the words "in the days of Ahasuerus" is open
to question. The fact that the people's affirmation is attributed
to that period may simply indicate "a long time afterwards."
It may possibly hint at the renewal of the covenant in Ezra's time
(Neh. 10:30). (8)
The midrashic story of the mountain that became a barrel upturned
over the people's heads introduces a new theological idea--that God
forced the Israelites to accept the Torah. In line with common rabbinic
practice, the story presents this concept in vivid, homely terms.
Without academic philosophical analysis, the story forces the reader to
confront head-on the issue of coercion and responsibility. The midrash
seems to teach us that in receiving the Torah there was an element of
coercion, along with the willing acceptance mentioned explicitly in the
Biblical account (Ex. 19:8).
The central question that must be asked is: Why did the rabbis
introduce the idea that the Jewish people were forced by God to accept
the Torah? The language of the phrase, be-tahtit ha-har, could easily be
interpreted to mean "at the foot of the mountain," and all
other indications from the Bible are that the Israelites accepted the
Torah willingly. So why did the Sages create a midrash that introduces
the difficult concept of coercion and then have to devise ways to
explain that there was also a willing acceptance of the Torah?
This question is dealt with by Tosafot (TB Shabbat 88a, kaffa).
Tosafot asks: "Since they said, 'na'aseh ve-nishma--We
will do and we will hear' [Ex. 24:7: ve-nishma can be translated
and obey: see the 1917 JPS version], why did they need a Divine
threat?" If--as na'aseh ve-nishma implies--they accepted the
Torah of their own free will, why did they need to be coerced? Tosafot
explains that it was to make sure the Israelites did not later change
their mind. Something that is accepted voluntarily may then be
discarded, and it was historically necessary for the Torah to be kept
forever by the Jewish people. The lesson would then be that voluntary
acceptance might later be abandoned and is therefore not sufficient;
there must be a core feeling of loyal obligation that motivates
observance of the mitzvot.
Another way to understand the role of this midrash is that it
serves to point out that everywhere in human experience we are subject
to considerable--and inescapable--coercion. Real spontaneity of action
hardly ever happens. Everyone is--consciously or not--constantly
affected by lineage, upbringing, and surrounding influences, by heredity
and environment, society and state. The Israelites themselves were
"coerced" to accept the Torah by the awesome miracles that
they had recently witnessed, the ten plagues, the splitting of the sea,
and the awesome display of God's Presence at Mount Sinai.
Psychologically, could they really reject the Torah under these
circumstances?
An interesting parallel is found in TB Sotah 34a, where Joshua
tells the Israelites while crossing the Jordan that the purpose of their
crossing is to conquer the Land of Israel, and if they do not agree to
this the water will come and wash them away. The Jerusalem Talmud (Sotah
7:5, quoted by Tosafot; TB Sotah 34a, odam) presents a similar scenario.
There, Resh Lakish states that when crossing the Jordan, the Israelites
accepted responsibility for each other's private transgressions.
Joshua is then presented as telling the Israelites, "If you do not
accept responsibility for each other's hidden transgressions, the
waters will come and wash you away." Here again, the Israelites are
forced to accept responsibility under pain of death. Conceptually, what
does this account have in common with the Mount Sinai episode? Perhaps
the idea is that the acceptance of the Torah, the willingness to fight
for the Land of Israel, and the concept of mutual responsibility are all
fundamental to the idea of the Jews as a people. Without a shared set of
values and a sense of a common homeland and destiny, there is no glue
holding the Israelites together as a distinct entity. That is why they
are "forced" to accept these obligations, for without them the
Israelites would cease to exist as a people and be washed away like many
other civilizations.
Another way of viewing this midrash is that it teaches us that the
relationship of the Jewish people with the Torah develops over time.
Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (Ein Ayah, vol. 4, on TB Shabbat 88a) develops
this point by suggesting that it is a basic element of Jewish experience
and identity that a Jew should constantly internalize--with increasing
depth--the Judaism he/she already has. The midrash notes that the
acceptance of the Torah at Sinai was just the first step in a process
that culminated only in the time of Esther, at the very end of the
biblical period.
One is reminded of the question--said to have been asked of one of
the Hasidic teachers--as to why the calendar has a gap of several months
between the festival of Shavu'ot, when the Torah was given, and
Simhat Torah, when it is celebrated. The response attributed to the
particular Rebbe was that the encounter at Sinai which bound God and
Israel started as an arranged marriage, a shiddukh, but then, with time,
the spouses came to know and love each other and could now rejoice with
one another unrestrainedly.
This concept of a developing relationship with the Torah may also
lie behind the approach offered by Midrash Tanhuma (No'ah, ch. 3),
which states that na'aseh ve-nishma denotes the Written Torah and
har ke-giggit the Oral Torah. This distinction is quoted and apparently
accepted by Hizkuni, who ends his remarks on Exodus 19:17b with the
brief statement, Torah she-be-al peh lo kibbelu adayin, "They had
not yet accepted the Oral Torah." This implies that the people
accepted the Written Torah at Sinai, but were initially reluctant to
commit themselves to the Oral Torah, although time allowed them to
subsequently discover and recognize its wisdom, and that is when they
confirmed it. This approach indicates the crucial role of the people
themselves in the evolution of the Oral Torah.
The midrashic material that we have assembled provides a way of
addressing philosophical issues, especially the ideas of coercion and
willing acceptance. The rabbinic derash on a verse in Exodus is thus a
peg on which to hang an exercise in serious philosophy and must not be
dismissed as merely a colorful narrative, a figment of the homiletical
imagination.
NOTES
(1.) Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases, abridged
edition (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1964) sec. 207.
(2.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 1066.
(3.) In his comment to Exodus 19:17, Rashi slightly varies the
midrash as found in the Talmud, basing himself on the terminology of the
Mekhilta (loc. cit.): "The mountain was plucked up from its place
and arched over them like a barrel." There may be some significance
in this version's lack of a direct ascription of the upturning of
the mountain to the Holy One, Blessed be He, since Rashi's text
uses a passive formulation: "The mountain was plucked up (nitlash)
... and arched (nikhpah)."
(4.) Marcus Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, etc. (New York:
Title Publishing Company, 1943) p. 234.
(5.) Elleh Ezkerah, Musaf service for Yom Kippur.
Rabbi Dr. Raymond Apple is emeritus rabbi of the Great Synagogue,
Sydney, and a former president of the Australian and New Zealand
orthodox rabbinate.