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  • 标题:Redefining Global Strategy: Crossing Borders in a World Where Differences Still Matter.
  • 作者:Thakur, Rajiv Ranjan
  • 期刊名称:Paradigm
  • 印刷版ISSN:0971-8907
  • 出版年度:2008
  • 期号:January
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Institute of Management Technology

Redefining Global Strategy: Crossing Borders in a World Where Differences Still Matter.


Thakur, Rajiv Ranjan


Redefining Global Strategy: Crossing Borders in a World Where Differences Still Matter

Pankaj Ghemawat

Harvard Business School Press, 1st Edition, 2007, pp. 257

ISBN-13: 978-1-59139-866-0

Price: US$29.95

Ghemawat, in his text, has taken a different view in highlighting the true characteristics of business on the globe today and term it as semi-globalized, rather than few of the oft-repeated pronouncements made by, either likes of Thomson Friedman in recent times or by Levitt, three decades ago, regarding globalization of markets and an integrated world. The latter on this premise suggest companies following global strategies i.e. one-size-fits-all character. Phrases like, 'The world is flat', 'Death of Distance', 'the End of History' or Levitt's favourite, 'the convergence of taste' are few popular ones, used by different people to emphasize the integrated world. The basic premise, which Ghemawat suggests in his book, is that even today, differences between countries are larger than acknowledged and therefore, there is a need for redefining global strategies to describe broader set of strategic possibilities.

In his opinion, the strategies that presume complete global integration tend to place far too much emphasis on international standardization and scalar expansion. While it is, of course, important to take advantage of similarities across borders, it is also critical to address differences. He further adds that in near and medium term, effective cross border strategies will reckon with the reality, that the author calls semi-globalization. The primary goal, he has determined is to stretch thinking about cross-border strategies for a semi-globalization world. Illustrating, Coke's strategy over three decades or so, it has been suggested, how, Coke following a global strategy got adrift in a sea of trouble and that, only recently, it started to regain its bearings. The author in his detailed research highlights the different shades of strategy which Coke faced under different leadership, Roberto Goizutea exploiting similarities, Douglas Ivester staying with the course, Douglas Daft succumbing to differences and finally, Neville Isdell managing similarities and differences. While, Coke is found to be unususal along certain dimensions, other more 'typical' companies may experience similar biases towards adopting one-size-fits-all strategies, is what the author has concluded.

Supported by his extensive research and loaded with data, Ghemawat is authoritative in his conclusion that most types of economic activity that can be conducted either within or across borders are still localized by country. Moreover, he goes on to make a finer point, that, it is possible to turn the clock back on globalization-friendly policies. While the technological drivers of increased cross-border integration may be irreversible, the same can not be true about policy drivers.

Chapter 1 summarizes evidence that the current state of the world is one of semi-globalization: levels of cross-border integration are generally increasing and, in many instances, setting new records but fall short of complete integration and will continue to do so for decades. The chapter goes on to explain, why semi-globalization is essential for cross-border strategies to have distinct content--as well as why failing to keep it in view can be a recipe for poor performance.

Chapter 2 collects the reasons, that, borders still matter and classifies them in the cultural, administrative, geographic and economic (CAGE) distances between countries. In the CAGE framework, four components often intertwine, for example, it is hard to imagine countries being close to each other administratively--say, part of a trade area--unless they happen to be close culturally, geographically, or economically. The multiple dimensions of distance still matter a great deal. Examples of Google, it is not difficult to understand how distances matter using the CAGE framework. Biggest problem in Russia seems to have associated with a relatively difficult language (cultural). Difficulties in dealing with Chinese censorship reflect the differences between Chinese administrative and policy frameworks and those in its home country, the US (administrative). Though Google's products can be digitized, it had trouble adapting to Russia from afar and has had to set up offices there (geographic). And with respect to Economic Distance, the underdevelopment of payment infrastructure in Russia had been another handicap for Google relative to local rivals. This framework is best applied at the industry level because different types of distance vary greatly in importance from industry to industry. It reaches conclusions as how different industry kinds are particularly sensitive to each component of distance. Applications of the CAGE framework include making differences visible, understanding the liability of foreignness (L'Oreal of France in S Korea facing the local competitor, Amore Pacific), comparing foreign competitors, comparing markets and discounting market size by distance.

Chapter 3 discusses why--if at all firms should globalize in a world in which distance still matters. It presents a scorecard for tracking value creation that includes but goes beyond the familiar components of size and economies of size. It also supplies a set of analytical guidelines and a list of specific questions to ask and answer. The aim is to foster more realism about how cross border strategies will add value in the face of large cross border differences. Using examples of WalMart, Cemex and Philips, Ghemawat tries to find a common thread in their globalization initiative, which is insufficient attention to the creation of economic value. What is instead, noticed, is value being ignored or analyzed superficially, survival being treated as proxy for value creation or a focus on trailing indicators of performance. The obvious antidote is to adapt and extend the rigorous focus on value creation that has been proven to work in single-country strategy. The ADDING Value scorecard follows, single-country strategy in four of its six value components: adding volume (growth), decreasing costs, differentiating or increasing willingness to pay, and increasing industry attractiveness. The other two components are normalizing risk and the generation of knowledge and other resources, which reflect the large differences across countries. The ADDING Value scorecard provides a basis for assessing whether a particular strategic move makes sense which must be supplemented with concerns, if the selected strategic option is likely to lead to sustained value creation and capture.

What to do about differences? Chapters 4-6 introduce the AAA strategies for responding to differences: adaptation, aggregation and arbitrage. Chapter 4 focuses on adaptation strategies that adjust to differences across countries. Since this category of responses to differences will already be familiar, the chapter aims to stretch thinking by emphasizing the levers and sub levers available for adapting more effectively. The first, most obvious approach to adapting to differences across countries is variation. Electrolux of Sweden exemplified this approach to extreme and even experimented with individualization. A second lever for dealing with adaptation challenges involves focus on particular geographies, products, vertical stages and so forth as a way of reducing heterogeneity. Smaller players in top ten--companies such as Indesit of Italy, Arcelik of Turkey and Maytag focus on particular regions instead of operating globally. A third lever for adaptation involves externalization--through joint ventures, partnerships and so forth--as a way of reducing its internal burden. An example is Haier's partnership with Michael Jemal, as a way of adapting to unfamiliar requirements of the U.S. markets. A final lever discussed is that of innovation which given its cross--cutting effects can be characterized as improving the effectiveness of adaptation efforts. The framework further elaborates Variation which encompasses changes in products, policies, business positioning and even metrics or parameters and also makes explicit, the sub-levers, namely, product focus, geographic focus, vertical focus and segment focus. Change is aided by a flexible, realistic and open mindset--and may require a major organizational push.

However, even with full exploitation of adaptation related possibilities, adaptation as a strategy for dealing with semi-globalization suffers from two distinct sets of limitations. First, assuming that centralized decisions are made at the global level and decentralized decisions at the local level fails to account for cross--border aggregation mechanisms that operate at levels intermediate to the country and the world. Second, adaptation strategies almost, by definition, treat differences across countries as constraints to be coped with and thereby, ignore the possibilities of capitalizing on them.

Chapter 5 focuses on aggregation strategies, that, overcome some differences among countries by grouping them based on similarities. Aggregation is all about using various grouping devices to create greater economies of scale than country-by-country adaptation can provide. While there are many possible bases of aggregation, the chapter, focuses on geographic aggregation by region. A company like Toyota, a global heavyweight, has pursued a very elaborate array of strategic initiatives at the regional level which has been explained in five evolution phases. Number of regional strategies has been indicated, such as, regional focus, regional portfolios, regional hubs, regional platforms, regional mandates, and regional networks. Other than the region as a basis for cross--border aggregation, other bases identified are, channels, client industries, global customers, and particularly important for diversified companies-global business units or product divisions.

Chapter 6 focuses on arbitrage strategies that exploit selected differences across countries instead of treating them all as constraints. The chapter reviews arbitrage strategies based on CAGE differences. An example of one of the arbitrages is cultural arbitrage and its favorable effects. For example, French Culture or, more specifically, its image overseas has long underpinned the international success of French Haute couture, perfumes, wines and foods. The Teva of Israel, had $ 5.3 billion in sales in 2005. Teva's success is rooted in administrative arbitrage: according to Hurvitz, who ran it for 26 years, it owes its existence to the Arab boycott of companies doing business with Israel. In response, Israel let local companies copy drugs patented overseas, if their owners did not market them locally--which is how Teva built up its process expertise. A similar administrative loophole underlies the success of a more recent wave of Indian challenges in generic drugs.

Chapter 7 examines the trade--offs among the AAA strategies and the extent to which it is possible and advisable to pursue more than one of the As at the same time, it addresses, in other words, the development of integrated strategies for playing the differences. This is also because the focus has shifted from globalization of markets to globalization of production. Ghemawat's recommendation for the companies is to nail down at least one of the As and with one in hand, possibly seek another, but be careful about pursuing the elusive 'trifecta'. The effective pursuit of combination of AAA strategies would require expanded conceptions of coordination and arrays of coordination mechanisms. Nobody has yet figured out the optimal way to organize a complex global company, but much can be learned from looking at leading-edge companies.

In Chapter 8 we find the conclusion of the book, which looks at the future of globalization about which both optimism and pessimism have been expressed. A step by step approach for companies to enhance global value creation has been discussed. The chapter starts on a note of caution where a beautiful quote, 'even if you are on the right track, you'll get run over if you just sit there' by Arthur Godfrey and Will Rogers, adorn the top head of the chapter. Discounting various predictions, Ghemawat at least is convinced of the state of semi globalization to be the order of the world at least for next 20 years. And, if future is uncertain which it is, he suggests periodic path making. One, by anticipating bumps and detours even if you do believe that the world will eventually become more and more integrate; second, paying attention to other predictable surprises, as well. Third, adding to predictive power by taking things down to the industry and company level. Fourth, recognize the importance of business in shaping broad outcomes--including those related to the future of globalization. Lastly, as the title of the text suggests Redefining the Global Strategies, it suggests a five step process for getting started. Step1, Performance Review; Step 2, Industry and Competitive Analysis; Step 3, Difference Analysis using CAGE Distance Framework; Step 4, Development of Strategic Options: AAA strategies; and Step 5, Evaluation: ADDING Value scorecard.

In a nutshell, what Ghemawat tells the world of business is not to rush into globalization, just because, everyone else seems to be doing so. Instead, it should see the value that such moves create and focus more on the 'differences in differences' in the industry and company context. A one-size-fits-all character strategy may not be the right prescription for the future of many under the globalization apocalypse around. Hence, suggesting a periodic review of the future and redefining of the future path.

Rajiv Ranjan Thakur

Associate Professor, IMT, Ghaziabad
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