Incommensurability and the inability of firms to evolve: using science to explain firm failure.

Childers, J. Stephen, Jr. ; Hunt, Judith

INTRODUCTION

Firm survival has been called the ultimate goal of an organization (Barnard, 1938). While one may assume that survival is a simple target to reach, it is made more difficult as firms struggle to adapt to changing market demands (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995). While numerous prescriptive offerings are available from academic researchers, for the business practitioner, translating academic findings into actionable direction can be daunting.

The purpose of this paper is to more deeply explore one proposed cause of firm failure: the inability of firms to meet technological changes in their environment. Firm failure due to environmental change has been proposed to be a function of the timing of a firm's entry into technological cycles (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), the inability to escape previous commitments to customers and financial markets (Christensen & Bower, 1996), or an incapacity to understand new technology architectures (Henderson & Clark, 1990). While there is no shortage of conjectures as to how and why technological change causes firm failure, this paper searches for common ground among these approaches. Specifically, the authors suggest that the diverse stream of research into technological failure may be muddying the practitioner's water. Through a better understanding of the incommensurable nature of technological progress, as it applies to the firm, practitioners will be better equipped to survive.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, a review of the technological change literature is presented, pointing out the key elements of several research streams as they apply to firm survival. Second, the concept of incommensurability is introduced and developed. Of key importance to this research effort is how the concept of incommensurability helps clarify the technological change-survival connection. Finally, based upon classic incommensurability theoretical constructs, we provide practitioners with a prescriptive approach to surviving technological incommensurability.

This manuscript accomplishes two major goals. For the academic community, the thoughts outlined in this paper can help to redefine and refocus the technology change research stream. For the practitioner, the findings may aid in firm survival.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

According to Schumpeter (1942):

 The fundamental impulse, that sets and keeps the capitalist engine
 in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of
 production or transportation, the new markets ... [This process]
 incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within,
 incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.
 This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about
 capitalism. (p. 83)

Schumpeter's writing can be seen as a warning to firms that changes to their environment will occur and that firm management must be prepared for them. The danger of these environmental alterations to firms is the uncertainty created for management in determining when or how to adequately respond to technological changes as they occur. Predicting and responding effectively and efficiently to change is vital to firm survival as firms are capable of making investments in only a finite spectrum of resources (Barney, 1986). Therefore, firms must choose carefully which unique behaviors to engage in and when to engage in them (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000).

To aid firms in change-related decisions, researchers have generally investigated technological change as it relates to conditions within the firm and at the intersection of the firm and its environment. The theoretical paradigms created in such theories as technology and innovation management, evolutionary theory, the resource-based view of the firm, and the learning school analyze change from different perspectives. As such, a better understanding of each framework helps to uncover limitations each may possess (Kuhn, 1962).

Investigations into technology and innovation management (TIM) generally focus on the technological artifact as their unit of study. This field attempts to show, among other things, the nature of technological and innovation changes as technologies evolve over time. Examples of TIM literature include the works of Abernathy and Utterback (1978) and Gort and Klepper (1982). Due to the researchers' use of a technology as the unit of analysis, the sociological and political dimensions that may be present are often ignored. These shortcomings are often cited by critics who suggest that this perspective is too simplistic in evaluating the drivers of innovation change. As such, critics have called for more fine-grained analysis of the causes of organizational constraints and the impact technological changes have on industry conditions (McGahan, Argyres, & Baum, 2004).

Evolutionary economics may fill the gap created by the innovation and technology studies work regarding how technology impacts firms at an industry level. Stemming from natural science studies examining biological competition, evolutionary economics views industry through the lens of economic competition. The evolutionary economist views firms as unique in that each is the possessor of heterogeneous resources (nelson & Winter, 1982). In addition, each firm possesses elements of continuity and may only change within limits. These resources are deployed to create innovations which are imitated by competitors. Because each firm is unique, imitation is never precise and the market chooses and rewards the version most favored. Lacking in the evolutionary economist accounts, however, is a clear understanding of the impact made on change by firm resources.

Firm resources are best understood from the perspective of the resource-based view of the firm. To the resource-based theorist, it is firm resources, whether financial, human, or organizational, obtained through acquisition or nurture, which makes each firm unique (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). These heterogeneous attributes lead to above average firm profitability (Wernerfelt, 1984). The resource-based view complements evolutionary theory as evolutionary theory states that firms are heterogeneous but never provides details about the factors that create these differences. The resource-based view of the firm, as it has evolved from the works of Penrose, explains heterogeneity through idiosyncratic resource deployments (Penrose, 1959). However, the resource-based view suffers by not providing explicit instructions to managers as to what resources to stockpile in order to be successful. Managers are left wondering how the acquisition of one resource over another makes a difference?

Technology and innovation management, evolutionary economics, and the resource-based view all apply an economic-based root discipline (Baum & Rau, 1998) to the technology firm failure debate. As such, the paradigms are limited in their approach to the technology/firm failure problem. The learning school, however, supplements these frameworks by helping firm management determine how to create and deploy resources for future successes. Therefore, the learning school, through its borrowing from psychological literature, provides the prescriptive power missing in the economic based theories. The learning school of thought suggests that firms are capable of change. Further, it views the firm as a collection of individuals, who, in turn, are repositories of knowledge. It is this collective knowledge that is shared and focused towards the solving of problems and firm growth (Dosi, Winter, & Teece, 1992). Quinn (1978) suggests that decisions made by firm members targeting overall firm improvements create a type of "logical incrementalism." As such, organizational repositories of knowledge allow, within a bounded pathway, firm adaptation to change. This logical incrementalism fits nicely with Nelson and Winter's (1982) evolutionary account of the ability of firms to evolve routines to meet challenges created by changes in the environment.

Barnett and Burgelman have called for a synthesizing of theory in order to gain greater insight into "dynamic, path dependent models that allow for possibly random variation and selection within and among organizations" (1996, p.7). In fact, management research has been described as a fish-scale science, in that multiple perspectives from various base disciplines such as economics and psychology, have been employed to seek answers to phenomena under study (Baum & Rao, 1998). As an evolving field, management researchers have blended various theoretical perspectives in an attempt to come closer to the "truth" of science of management (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998). Many researchers search for this "truth" by synthesizing the base theoretical paradigms presented above. For example, Henderson and Clark (1990) posit that knowledge of an innovation means firms have both an understanding of the pieces of a technology (the components) and also how those pieces or components fit together (the architecture). According to the authors, firms can withstand changes to component concepts; however, any disruption in the architectural knowledge of the firm can disrupt the embedded processes and knowledge of the firm and can be extremely difficult to overcome. Therefore, to Henderson and Clark, the decisive factor of whether or not a firm survives innovation changes is determined by whether or not the firm's architectural knowledge is enhanced or compromised with the new technological trajectories. This perspective ties in well with that of the technology and management literature, the evolutionary ecology literature, the resource-based view of the firm, and Quinn's view of logical incrementalism.

Christensen and Bower (1996), investigating further the intersection of environment and firm, suggest that firms competing in a previous cycle may not have the same economic incentives to explore innovations. The authors posit, through the blending of economic and sociological frameworks, that the firm's current customers may not initially want the successive innovation as it may not fit with their current product architecture of customer wants and needs. As such, the established customer base will have little reason to want the existing producer firm to switch to a new innovation in its early form. This argument by Christensen and Bower suggests a resource dependence view to explain why incumbents have a difficult time adjusting to disruptive innovations. Over time, "disruptive technologies" will match previous technologies in terms of basic product attributes and excel on tangent dimensions which will make their use even more attractive to customers using the previous technology. When this happens, customers will switch to the new technology, leaving the supplier still specializing on the previous technology in a diminishing market space. Furthermore, from an internal political perspective, insecurities and power plays within the firm can quickly derail development efforts for the new innovation. As a result, incumbent firms supplying incumbent technologies ignore or fail to develop new technologies.

Many of these investigations into blended theory support the notion set forth by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that firms can be viewed as operating in an iron cage caused by social arrangement. This iron cage leaves the firm constrained in terms of both strategy and imagination (Dobbin & Baum, 2000). As a fish-scale of science, can the management study of technological change and failure learn from another existing area of science, or are organizational researchers stuck in our own "iron cage"? We suggest that an overlooked and important perspective ignored to this point is the application of incommensurability to the technology and firm failure debate.

INCOMMENSURABILITY

To the Greeks the term incommensurability meant "no common measure." For example, when trying to compare the sides of a square to its diagonal, the lengths of the sides are not the same ratio as the diagonal of the square. "Two lengths have a common measure if you can lay m of the first lengths against exactly n of the second" (Hacking, 1983, p. 67). Care must be made not to confuse incommensurability with incompatibility. With incompatibility you can measure two items with the same scale to determine if one is indeed different from the other; whereas, one cannot do this with incommensurability because there is no common scale (for example, how would you compare a liquid measure to minutes?). Kuhn (1962, p. 99) provides a good example of incommensurability when he compares the outcomes of newtonian dynamics with that of relativistic dynamics. According to Kuhn, you cannot directly compare the two. Relativistic theory has allowed scientists to move along much further in knowledge than we would be if constrained to newtonian physics. However, newtonian physics is still in use and can arrive at close approximations of solutions for a number of instances. Why? Because, for example, Newtonian mass does not apply the same meaning to "mass" as does relativity theory to "mass." The two are, therefore, incommensurable. Each theory may be in use by some problem solver, and may arrive at some unique outcome. However, those outcomes may not be equal in terms of answer specificity.

 The concept of incommensurability is ubiquitous in the philosophy
 of science literature, as philosophers and researchers use it to
 debate the place and role of paradigms in the search of knowledge
 and to compare scientific theories (paradigm in this case is meant
 to refer to those definitions used by Kuhn, 1962). Hacking (1983,
 p. 67) defines three types of incommensurability:
 topic-incommensurability, dissociation, and
 meaning-incommensurability. This paper suggests that items, and in
 turn the meaning applied to them, are a result of the sense that we
 apply to them, and these meanings have consequences in regards to
 our actions upon them. We are applying an anti-realism type, what
 Hacking defined as meaning incommensurability, in this paper. As
 such, we are focusing on the meaning applied to unobservable
 constructs, for which terms used to describe paradigms are,
 themselves, meaning-laden. While we can all point to a tree and
 define it as "tree" because we can sense what the term is referring
 to, we cannot do that for unobservable constructs.

Scherer (1998) points out that the concept of incommensurability always refers to an association or relationship among entities, "A is incommensurable with B relative to a system of reference C, which defines the rules of comparison or measurement. A and B can be regarded as opinions, theses, assertions, paradigms, world views, etc." (p. 149). Scherer (1998) asserts that incommensurability may be present when three conditions are met.

 First, there have to be at least two (radically) different systems
 of orientation. Second, these systems of orientation must be
 competing with each other concerning a way of acting or using
 language, e.g. the definition or solution of a concrete problem so
 that coexistence of the different perspectives is not possible.
 Third, an accepted system of reference to objectively evaluate the
 competing perspectives must be lacking. (p. 150)

Arrow viewed the firm as a collection of individuals creating learned activities and behaviors (1962). Pitt (1998) writes, "A technological infrastructure is a complex set of mutually supporting individuals, artifacts, networks, and structures, physical and social, which enable human activity and which foster inquiry and action" (p. 37). As such, the firm can be seen as a type of technology in and of itself. Kogut and Zander (1992) posit, "the capabilities of the firm in general are argued to rest in the organizing principles by which relationships among individuals, within and between groups, and among organizations are structured" (p. 384). These capabilities stem from the past knowledge collected and how it is arranged and assimilated into the organization (Cohen & Levinthall, 1990). Therefore, the structure of the firm does impact the way it creates and responds to technological changes. Further, when a situation arises where two firms are creating two competing technologies, based upon different technological underpinnings, competing against each other in a marketplace for dominance, incommensurability may be present. This point is acknowledged by Scherer (1998), "one can imagine a situation in which managers do not agree about the interpretation of an organization problem or strategic issue.... creating a situation of incommensurability" (p. 150).

INCOMMENSURABILITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

The findings presented in this paper suggest incommensurability may be a significant cause of firm failure in response to technological change. Just as "a successor theory may attack different problems, use new concepts and have implications different from old theories" (Hacking, 1983, p.68), new technological trajectories can do the same (Dosi, 1982). According to Kuhn (1962), the following conditions may lead competing firms into an incommensurable morass:

* Proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree about the list of problems of competing paradigms any candidate for paradigm must resolve;

* New paradigms "borrow" the language of the old, but mean different things;

* Proponents practice their trade in different world-- one fast, one slow. (pp 148-150)

An example of this can be seen in the computer memory storage devices (an example employed by Burgleman, 1994). Firm A currently manufactures 5.25 inch floppy discs. These discs have the ability to store a certain amount of information. By changing the way the disc stores this information, firm A is able to increase the storage capacity of the 5.25 inch floppy by 25%. The manufacture of the floppy and the basic architecture utilized in its manufacture is essentially the same in both processes. No new internal technologies are thus required for the production of this improved disc. This would be an example of a firm creating a sustaining technology. These technologies are predominantly created by industry incumbents (those firms already operating in an existing market) and are generally well accepted by consumers, as there is little need to change their preferences or methods of usage for the new technology (Bower & Christensen, 1995). In this situation the firm's current "gestalt," including the language and knowledge of both the technology as artifact and technology as system, remains intact. no disruption to the firm is predicted.

However, a second type of technological change is described by Christensen (1992). Using our floppy storage devices again as an example, if firm B were to create a new storage device that uses a fundamentally different type of architecture in its creation (Henderson & Clark, 1990), and required a change in the way consumers use this technology (e.g. the need for a new disc drive and technological system); then, firm B would have created a potentially disruptive technology if it grows in market share and surpasses the market share of the previous technology produced by firm A (Bower & Christensen, 1995). When this event happens, firm A will be in a situation of playing catch-up to firm B. This may not be an easy task, however, as firm B will be viewed by customers and investors as more innovative than A. This leads us to our first assertion. Specifically, we suggest:

Proposition 1: Firms will find it difficult to make architectural technological changes to their existing technological knowledge base.

Why is it that industry incumbents usually create sustaining technologies while the disruptive technologies are left to new entrants? We argue that the theorized reasons of firm inertia or architectural incompetence are all symptoms of the firm's inability to change its gestalt. Following Kuhn's account, firm A does not understand the new standards during a paradigm shift, in this case a disruptive technological change. Further, the incumbent may not even understand what they do not know. Lindsay and Norman (1977) have suggested that in organization settings it is not enough for the firm to simply be exposed to new ideas because firm memory may not be in place through which understanding is possible. To fully integrate new knowledge the firm will need to screen the new knowledge through previous assimilated knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The firm, in essence, is unable to change the internal technologies, the way work is done, and its learned behaviors and activities it has come accustomed to employing (Arrow, 1962). These inabilities can be seen at all levels of technologies: the firm will find it difficult to change fundamental production processes, the firm will find it difficult to serve new product innovations, and the firm will have difficulty adjusting structural dimensions. The very rigidities that ensured controls and thus success in the old paradigm have become dysfunctional. The architectural means employed for such a long period of time become its "iron cage" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In the end, the incumbent firm will be on the outside looking in as others find favor of key constituencies, such as consumers and investor markets. Therefore, we suggest:

Proposition 2: The reason for the inability to change stems from the application or development of incommensurable theories of innovation.

At this point, firm A may have become aware of firm B's advances and firm A will search for ways to adjust to its environment. If firm B's newly created cycle is incommensurable to the cycle in which Firm A was competing, firm A would need a gestalt change in order to survive. At times, firm A may believe it understands the new cycle and management feels confident of succeeding. But, can it? Firm knowledge consists of different dimensions of knowledge: tacit versus explicit; observable versus unobservable; complex versus simple; and system bound versus independent (Winter, 1987). Much of the knowledge needed for new technological cycles is difficult to transfer as these knowledge structures play at the intersection of the explicit and the tacit (nonaka, 1991, 1994). As a result, firms may not understand or be able to properly interpret what they are observing as one cycle is incommensurable to the other. The language employed by firm A is not the language and understanding held by the current environment (customers and investors).

Proposition 3: Even though a firm may become aware of technological changes, the tacit nature of knowledge, and the incommensurable meanings associated with them, may make it impossible for the firm to properly integrate the new knowledge.

Lauden contends that theories can be compared and discussed if one goes back to some "joint problem" from which both pathways were derived (1977, p. 144). Perhaps the same can be said for the firm: go back to the basics of the technological system and rethink the value added proposition. As stated by Kuhn (1962, p. 112) "At times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the scientist's perception of his environment must be re-educated--in some familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt." This brings us to the fourth proposition:

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Proposition 4: During architectural changes incumbents may lag as they strive to understand evolving competitive priorities.

Incumbents can be in a situation where the new technology exists beyond their realm of understanding. That is, the incumbents are technologically so far behind they cannot catch up with this new round of technology. According to Spender and Scherer, "we cannot recognize uncertainty as knowledge-absence from a context we know enough about to notice the absence, which is then an aspect of situated experience of puzzling sense-data or unresolved questions. We cannot discover a knowledge absence in a knowledge vacuum" (2007, p. 16).

Kuhn (1962) suggests that when new paradigms, or technological cycles, are encountered, firms should apply new theories, or gestalts, as they will fit the facts of the new environment better than the old gestalt. This situation is detailed in Figure 1. The figure shows that a firm in current technological cycle X uses language X. When encountering a new technological cycle, X+1, a new language, X+1, must also be used. If a firm does not "learn" a new language, it will be attempting to compete with an old gestalt, X-1. This language may not be appropriate in the new technological cycle. As a result, firms will lose ground relative to competitors. To combat this, a firm may be able to use its antiquated gestalt to make advances at a component level of a technology.

These observations lead us to the following proposition:

Proposition 5: During architectural changes incumbents will need to "learn" a new language or drop to component level.

Finally, firm A, left behind in the gestalt switch, may need help understanding the language of the new technological cycle. Absent the ability to understand what it is the firm needs to learn and understand, the firm will need to seek the help of others, perhaps best accomplished through networking. According to von Hippel (1988), "trading of know-how often requires the establishment of long-term relationships in which the exchange occurs within a learned and shared code" (p. 118). The exchange of this code may aid firm A in changing its gestalt to match the new environment in which it operates. The networking in this instance may come in the form of attending conferences and shows, collaborating with "knowledgeable" firms in new product development, or through the acquisition of skills through purchase. Through these techniques, firm A will be able to better understand the new gestalt, and signal to outside investors and customers its growth and development as a firm. This brings us to the final proposition:

Proposition 6: During architectural changes incumbents will need to network in order to assimilate to different constituency perceptions.

DISCUSSION

Based upon the findings of this research, Figure 2 presents prescriptive offerings to firm management as to how to adjust to changes in technological cycles.

The 3x2 matrix in figure 2 is a function of the current firm language or gestalt (found on the vertical axis) and the technological language or gestalt embraced by the environment (found on the horizontal axis). Three scenarios for firm language are suggested, ranging from language that languishes behind that currently accepted by the environment (X-1), one in which the firm's language matches that currently in favor (X), and a final situation in which the firm is ahead of the language currently accepted (X+1). In terms of change experienced, a change may be incremental in nature (Y) or disruptive in nature (Y+1).

When a firm's language is behind that currently in favor and it faces an incremental change (X-1, Y), our findings suggest that the firm in question may be experiencing rigidities in its organization stemming from past inabilities to evolve. In this case, the firm will need to partner and learn new language. If, however, the firm is facing a disruptive change (X-1, Y+1), the firm is two cycles behind and may find it extremely difficult to catch up to its new environment. Its best option may be to harvest its current operations.

A firm current in its language (X) is expected to have little trouble from incommensurability should it face incremental changes (X, Y). However, should it face a disruptive change (X, Y+1), the firm's current gestalt may be incommensurable and it will need to partner and learn the new embraced language.

A third set of scenarios is uncovered from firms possessing a mindset ahead of its environment (X+1). Little researched by management theorists to this point, this stage is predicted to face similar perils as that of the language laggards (X-1). Specifically, the firm in this situation (X+1, Y), has a choice: it can wait for the environment to catch up with its mindset, or it can attempt to educate those to its new worldview or gestalt. Either proposition requires resources and it is expected that this drain may be equivalent to that of the laggard. The final scenario is when the advanced firm finds itself in a situation where its gestalt is being favored in a disruptive change (X+1, Y+1). This is an ideal situation and the firm can be expected to reap the rewards from it investments.

CONCLUSIONS

The inability of some firms to adapt to new technological demands has been well documented in the strategic management literature. Some have argued that this inability to meet competitive pressures stems from the development of core rigidities leading to the failure to identify and make strategic changes as needed (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Other researchers have focused on the inability to accurately understand what customers want; or even the fact that the firm listens too closely to its customers (Christensen & Bower, 1996).

This paper does not counter these arguments; instead, our purpose is to provide order to the various explanations. We argue that the above mentioned explanations are merely symptoms of a much larger issue for the failing firm. The technologies utilized by a firm, in terms of its processes, products, and structure, are its theories of the world: its gestalt. We suggest that the main reason for the inability of firms to adjust as needed during disruptive technological changes is due to technological incommensurability. Put simply, the laggard firm does not understand the language of the new environment. Its gestalt is inappropriate to the new gestalt and language embraced by investors and customers. The two are incommensurable.

For the management researcher, the findings presented here provide new avenues to aid in understanding firm failure during architectural changes, along with new ideas for firm prescriptions. Further, this research presents several propositions for testing. Through the confirmation or refutation of our conjectures, gains in knowledge of the firm and how it responds to changes are possible (Popper, 1963). In addition, this research may create a common ground among the diversity of technological failure literature. In this way, this work may serve as an integrationist, unifying isolationist paradigms (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Integrating academic works will aid organizational researchers in better serving practitioner needs. Failure to do so may place academics "in danger of becoming irrelevant" (Scherer, 1998, p. 151).

For practitioners this research serves as a guide to survival during technological changes. Scherer suggests that incommensurability arises in the practice of businesses when "managers do not agree about the interpretation about an organization problem or strategic issue" (Scherer, 1998, p. 150). Because of many different potential factors such as personal experiences, orientations (such as finance or marketing), values or even potential personal outcomes, one set of managers may not be able to comprehend the need for radical change while another set of managers is certain the lack of change will result either in an inferior competitive position or death of the firm. Architectural changes in technology require a major new commitment in both capital and knowledge to the firm. Those managers associated with the old technology will see the potential for their power diminishing. This denigrates the value of their experience and their usefulness to the organization.

While rationality is believed to prevail in for-profit firms, the reality is human beings will often sub-optimize the goals of the organization to optimize their own personal outcomes. By better understanding the way through which technological incommensurability hinders firms from making strategic adjustments as needed, firm management can take steps to counter the problem. Making the proper changes will help achieve main goal of the firm: survival (Barnard, 1938).

REFERENCES

Abernathy, W.J., & Utterback, J.M. (1978). Patterns of industrial innovation. Technology Review, 80(7), 40-47.

Arrow, K.J. (1962). The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies, 29(3), 155-173.

Barnard, C.I. (1938). Functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Barnett, W.P., & Burgelman, R.A. (1996). Evolutionary perspectives on strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Special Issue: Evolutionary Perspectives on Strategy), 5-19.

Barney, J.B. (1986). Strategic factor markets--expectations, luck, and business strategy. Management Science, 32(10), 1230-1241.

Barney, J.B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17(1), 99-120.

Baum, J.A.C., & Rao, H. (1998). Strategic management as a fish-scale multiscience. In J.A.C. Baum (Ed.), Disciplinary roots of strategic management: Vol. 15. Advances in strategic management (pp. 1-16). Stamford: JAI Press Inc.

Bower, J.L., & Christensen, C.M. (1995). Disruptive technologies--catching the wave. Harvard Business Review, 73(1), 43-53.

Brown, S., & Eisenhardt, K. (1995). Product development: Past research, present findings, and future directions. Academy of Management Review, 20 (2), 343-378.

Burgelman, R.A. (1994). Fading memories: A process theory of strategic business exit in dynamic environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(1), 24-45.

Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis. London: Heinemann Educational Books.

Christensen, C.M. (1992). Exploring the limits of the technology s-curve. Part i: Component technologies; part ii: Architectural technologies. Production and Operations Management, 1(4), 334-366.

Christensen, C.M., & Bower, J.L. (1996). Customer power, strategic investment, and the failure of leading firms. Strategic Management Journal, 17(3), 197-218.

Cohen, W.M., & Levinthal, D.A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective in learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 178-184.

DiMaggio, P.J., & Powell, W.W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160.

Dobbin, F., & Baum, J.A.C. (2000). Introduction: Economics meets sociology in strategic management. In J.A.C. Baum & F. Dobbin (Eds.), Economics meets sociology in strategic management: Vol. 17. Advances in Strategic Management (pp. 1-26). Stamford: JAI Press Inc.

Dosi, G. (1982). Technological paradigms and technological trajectories--a suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change. Research Policy, 11(3), 147-162.

Dosi, G., Nelson, R.R., & Winter, S.G. (2000). The nature and dynamics of organizational capabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dosi, G., Winter, S.G., & Teece, D.J. (1992). Towards a theory of corporate coherence: Preliminary remarks, in G. Dosi, R. Giannetti, & P.A. Toninelli, (Eds.), Technology and Enterprise in a Historical Perspective (pp. 185-211). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gort, M., & Klepper, S. (1982). Time paths in the diffusion of product innovations. The Economic Journal, 92(367), 630-653.

Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Henderson, R.M., & Clark, K.B. (1990). Architectural innovation--the reconfiguration of existing product technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 9-30.

Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(3), 383-397.

Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Lauden, L. (1977). Progress and its problems. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Leonard-Barton, D. (1992). Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing new product development. Strategic Management Journal, 13 (Special Issue: Strategy Process: Managing Corporate Self-Renewal), 111-125.

Lieberman, M.B., & Montgomery, D.B. (1988). First-mover advantages. Strategic Management Journal, 9 (Special Issue: Strategy Content Research), 41-58.

Lindsay, P.H., & Norman, D.A. (1977). Human information processing. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

McGahan, A.M., Argyres, N.S., & Baum, J.A.C. (2004). Context, technology and strategy: Forging new perspectives on the industry life cycle. In J.A.C. Baum & A.M. McGahan (Eds.), Business strategy over the industry lifecycle: Vol. 21. Advances in strategic management (pp. 1-21). Stamford: JAI Press, Inc.

Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., & Lampel, J. (1998). Strategy safari: A guided tour through the wilds of strategic management. New York: Free Press.

Nelson, R.R., & Winter, s.G. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Nonaka, I. (1991, November-December). The knowledge-creating company. Harvard Business Review, 96-104.

Nonaka, I. (1994). A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organization Science, 5(1), 14-37.

Penrose, E.T. (1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. New York: John Wiley.

Pitt, J.C. (1998). Explaining change in science. Techne: Journal of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, 3(3), 36-45.

Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Quinn, J.B. (1978). Strategic change: Logical incrementalism. Sloan Management Review, 20(1), 7-21.

Scherer, A.G. (1998). Pluralism and incommensurability in strategic management: A problem in search of a solution. Organization, 5(2), 147-168.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York: Harper.

Spender, J.C., & Scherer, A.G. (2007). The philosophical foundation of knowledge management: Editor's introduction. Organization, 14(1), 5-28.

von Hippel, E. (1988). The sources of innovation. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5(2), 171-180.

Winter, S.G. (1987). Knowledge and competence as strategic assets. In D. Teece (Ed.) The competitive challenge-strategies for industrial innovation and renewal (pp. 159-184). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

J. Stephen Childers, Jr.

Assistant Professor

Department of Management

Radford University

jchilders2@radford.edu

Judith Hunt

Associate Professor

Department of Management

East Carolina University

Figure 2: Prescriptive Accounts of Technological Incommensurability

Technological Language Accepted by Environment

 Firm Y (Incremental) Y+1 (Disruptor)
Language
 Poor Innovation Results
 X-1 from Rigidities. Need Harvesting strategy: firm
 internal learning decay
 dissemination

 Gap in understanding
 Possible Positive Results- technological futures.
 X Incremental improvements External learning needed
 or drop to component
 level.

 X+1 Ahead of the curve. Do we Strong results possible
 wait or teach our as the firm is industry
 language? trendsetter.