Social capital and investment in R&D: new externalities.
Sequeira, Tiago Neves ; Ferreira-Lopes, Alexandra
1. Introduction
In this work we study the interaction effects between social
capital and R&D. This is an important topic to approach since social
capital, in the form of social networks, can help knowledge sharing
between researchers who work in close proximity to each other, in an
informal way, through "cheap talk" at lunch, etc. The presence
of social capital can introduce distortions in market allocations due
mainly to two of its features: the failure of a market for social
capital and the impact it can have on R&D due to research networks.
The first reason is justified, as firms do not pay for social capital
when they contract workers; they pay for hours of work and, at most, for
the level of qualifications. This may be because the features usually
included in social capital (confidence, truth, informal networks) are
more difficult to evaluate and monitor than academic degrees or years of
schooling. The second reason is based on the importance of social
networks between researchers in R&D productivity. An example often
given is the importance of networks of researchers in Silicon Valley.
Another is the proximity of research staff in universities. The notion
of clusters and the creation of a knowledge based economy in the
European Union, goals of the Lisbon Agenda, are also based on the idea
of networks, as discussed in Melnikas (2005).
Social capital is a sociological concept that has been introduced
recently in the economic growth literature. The definition of Putnam
(1993) refers to this concept as "features of social organization,
such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of
society by facilitating coordinated actions". Most of the empirical
literature has found a positive influence of social capital on economic
growth, although it varies considerably (examples include Knack, Keefer
(1997); Temple and Johnson (1998); Whiteley (2000), and Rupasingha et
al. (2000)). The introduction of social capital in growth models is
still uncommon, but a good example is Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2009),
who also test the model against empirical data using the European Values
Survey. Economic agents like to socialize (bonding), which they do by
losing consumption, since participation in social networks is
time-consuming and erodes time available for work. Hence, higher levels
of social capital may decrease economic growth. However, participation
in community networks (bridging) reduces the incentive for rent seeking
and cheating, and so through this channel, a higher level of social
capital produces positive effects on economic growth (1).
The positive connection between social capital and human capital
accumulation was first described in Coleman (1988) and in Teachman et
al. (1997) in sociological studies of high school dropouts. Grafton et
al. (2007) test a theoretical growth model against empirical data to
explain international country differences in productivity and find a
positive impact of people's knowledge connections on productivity.
Dinda (2008) uses an AK-type growth model to study the role of social
capital in the production of human capital and in economic growth and
compares theoretical results with empirical results finding a positive
effect of social capital. In an endogenous growth model framework
Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2011) also study the interactions between
human and social capital and document the decline in social capital
reported by Putnam (2000). Piazza-Giorgi (2002) gives a comprehensive
survey of empirical results on this topic.
Literature on the links amongst social capital, R&D, and
economic growth is also very recent, scarce, and empirical. For example,
Landry et al. (2002), De Clercq and Dakhli (2004), Lee et al. (2005),
and Doh and Acs (2010) test empirically if there is indeed a connection
and find positive effects of social capital in R&D and in innovation
activities, although estimates vary widely.
No previous attempt that we know of has brought the positive
connection between social capital and R&D to an endogenous growth
model. Our main contribution to the literature is to evaluate for the
first time the impact of externalities caused by the presence of social
capital in an endogenous growth model.
We also wish to contribute to the discussion on "Too Much of a
Good Thing?" i. e., the optimality of R&D investments (2).
Thus, this paper is also inserted in the literature on the macroeconomic
efficiency of R&D investments within endogenous growth models
without scale effects, whose first contributions were Jones (1995) and
Jones and Williams (2000). The most common finding reported in the
literature tends to indicate that underinvestment in R&D occurs in
the real world (Romer (1990), Grossman, Helpman (1991), and Aghion and
Howitt (1998) in endogenous growth models with scale effects, and also
Jones (1995) and Jones, Williams (2000) in models without scale effects,
and Jones, Williams (1998) in an empirical article). The exceptions are
Stokey (1995) and Benassy (1998) who, in models with scale effects,
found that for more general preferences or production, overinvestment in
R&D can occur. Most recently, Reis and Sequeira (2007) and Strulik
(2007) showed that overinvestment in R&D is more plausible than
earlier believed.
We build an increasing varieties model with different production
sectors, into which we introduce social capital. We argue that in this
type of model the presence of social capital decreases the scope for
underinvestment. Social capital brings utility to individuals and it is
also used in the accumulation of human capital and R&D, and in the
production of the final good. These features of the model are inspired
by the empirical results stated above.
Section two presents the model and Sections three and four present,
respectively, the social planner problem and the decentralized
equilibrium. Section 5 compares the shares of human capital allocation
in the social planner and in the decentralized equilibrium and discusses
distortions in the decentralized equilibrium. In Section 6 we implement
a calibration exercise to answer the question of how much social capital
influences the distortions between the efficient and the decentralized
solution. Section 7 concludes.
2. Model
In this model we combine different types of capital: physical,
human, social, and technological. Physical capital is used in the
production of the final good. Human capital has different uses: it is
employed in the production of differentiated goods, in schools, where it
is the main input to new human capital; it is used in the accumulation
of social capital, as suggested by earlier literature, and is also used
in the innovation process. Social capital is used in the production of
the final good, in facilitating the accumulation of embodied knowledge
(human capital), in facilitating the research networks that increase
R&D productivity, and in its own accumulation. Technological capital
is used as an intermediated good, in the production of the final good.
A crucial feature in the model is that there is no market for
social capital. Social capital is produced because it makes families
happier. This follows the notion of bonding in Beugelsdijk and Smulders
(2009). However, firms (firms in the final good and those in the R&D
market) benefit from social capital, which follows the notion of
bridging in the same article. As firms benefit from social capital
without paying for it, this carries out externalities with less social
capital in the market than in the efficient solution. The distortions
caused by social capital act in the opposite direction as gains from
specialization and spillovers in the R&D process.
2.1. Production factors and final goods
2.1.1. Capital accumulation
The accumulation of physical capital ([K.sub.p]) arises through
production that is not consumed, and is subject to depreciation:
[[??].sub.P] = Y - C - [[delta].sub.P] [K.sub.P], (1)
where Y denotes production of final goods, C is consumption, and
[[delta].sub.P] represents depreciation.
As in the literature stream that began with Arnold (1998), in this
model human capital is the "ultimate" source of growth. We
follow Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2011) in considering that human
capital [K.sub.H] is produced using human capital allocated to schooling
as well as the total amount of social capital, [K.sub.S] according to:
[[??].sub.H] = [xi][H.sub.H] + [gamma][K.sub.S] -
[[delta].sub.H][K.sub.H], (2)
where [H.sub.H] are school hours, [xi] > 0 is a parameter that
measures productivity inside schools, [gamma] [greater than or equal to]
0 measures the sensitivity of human capital accumulation to the stock of
social capital, and [[delta].sub.H] [greater than or equal to] 0 is the
depreciation of human capital. This expression captures the idea of
Coleman (1988) and Teachman et al. (1997) according to which social
capital is important to the production of human capital. It also ensures
that human and social capital are substitutes in the production of human
capital.
Individual human capital can be divided into skills in final good
production ([H.sub.Y]), school attendance ([H.sub.H]), networking for
social capital accumulation ([H.sub.S]), and conducting R&D
([H.sub.R]), in a division similar to that of Lucas (1988), used to
differentiate between human capital allocated to the final good and to
schooling, and also used in Dinda (2008). Assuming that the different
human capital activities are not cumulative, we have:
[K.sub.H] = [H.sub.Y] + [H.sub.H] + [H.sub.S] + [H.sub.R]. (3)
We based the choice of the functional form for the dynamic
evolution of the stock of social capital on the literature that suggests
a strong link between human capital and social capital. Also, some
empirical literature on social capital has already reported an economic
payoff from it (e.g., Knack, Keefer (1997) and Temple, Johnson (1998)).
Hence, social capital accumulation requires that human capital be
allocated to its production, but at each point in time it will also
depend on the current stock of social capital, i.e.,:
[[??].sub.S] = [omega][H.sub.S] + [OMEGA][K.sub.S], (4)
where [omega] measures the productivity of human capital in the
production of social capital and [OMEGA] [??] 0 measures the dynamic
effect of social capital on its own production. If [OMEGA] > 0,
existing social networks are strong enough to keep growing without
additional human capital. Some types of social capital (such as cultural
norms or values) are given by the family, which mean that people do not
have to make efforts to acquire them. An alternative way of thinking
about a positive [OMEGA] is that people with stronger social networks
find it easier to continue improving networks than people with weaker.
If [OMEGA] < 0; on the other hand, there is a net depreciation effect
(3).
2.1.2. R&D technology
Technological capital, or new varieties of it, [K.sub.R], is
produced in an R&D sector with human capital employed in R&D
labs ([H.sub.R]), by the stock of disembodied knowledge ([K.sub.R]), and
is also influenced by the stock of social capital:
[[??].sub.H] = [epsilon][H.sup.[upsilon].sub.R][K.sup.[phi].sub.R][K.sub.[chi].sub.S], (5)
where [epsilon] > 0 measures the productivity in the production
of technological capital, [upsilon] measures duplication effects, 0 <
[phi] < 1 measures the degree of spillover externalities on R&D
across time, as in Jones (1995), and 0 < [chi] < 1 measures the
positive effect of social networks in R&D productivity (4). The
parameter x measures an externality from social capital to R&D,
representing the ideas and results found in the empirical work of Landry
et al. (2002), De Clercq and Dakhli (2004), Lee et al. (2005), and Doh
and Acs (2010). Since agents, when deciding how much to invest in social
capital, do not take into account the effect this has on the R&D
firms, they invest less in social capital than what would be socially
optimal. This externality acts in the same direction as the duplication
effects (the parameter u in the equation) and in the opposite direction
of spillovers (parameter (( in the equation), since it acts in favour of
overinvestment in R&D.
2.1.3. Final good production
The final good is a differentiated one, produced with a
Cobb-Douglas technology (5):
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (6)
D is an index of intermediate capital goods and is produced using
the following Dixit-Stiglitz CES technology:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (7)
The elasticity of substitution between varieties is measured by 0
< [alpha] < 1. [x.sub.i] is the intermediate capital good i and is
produced in a differentiated goods sector using physical capital:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
This means that (6) can be re-written as:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (8)
In what follows we will see that a measures an externality from the
households' to the firms' choice of social capital. Although
households choose social capital comparing its marginal utility with its
opportunity cost in terms of human capital, firms do not choose social
capital. Instead, they face social capital as a "gift"
embodied in workers. This leads to another externality, which implies
less social capital in the decentralized equilibrium than in the optimum
and also tends to increase the scope for overinvestment in R&D.
2.2. Consumers
We assume that households benefit directly from socializing. This
follows the concept of bonding (as, for example, in Beugelsdijk,
Smulders 2009). A similar utility function, with a positive effect of
social capital on utility, can also be found in Roseta-Palma et al.
(2010):
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (9)
where [PSI] represents the preference for social capital and [rho]
is the utility discount rate (7).
3. Optimal growth
In this section we derive the conditions associated with the
maximization of (9) subject to the production function (6) as well as
the transition equations for the different types of capital (1), (2),
(4), and (5) (8).
The problem gives rise to the following Hamiltonian function:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (10)
where the [[lambda].sub.j] are the co-state variables for each
stock [K.sub.j]; with j = P, H, S, R. Considering choice variables C,
[H.sub.Y], [H.sub.S], and [H.sub.R] (and substituting [H.sub.H] for
[K.sub.H] - [H.sub.Y] - [H.sub.S] - [H.sub.R] using (3)), the
first-order conditions yield:
[partial derivative]U/[partial derivative]C = [[lambda].sub.P],
(11)
[[lambda].sub.H] = [[lambda].sub.P](1 - [beta] -
[sigma])Y/[xi][H.sub.Y], (12)
[[lambda].sub.H] = [[lambda].sub.S][omega]/[xi], (13)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (14)
as well as:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (15)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (16)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (17)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (18)
with [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
representing the marginal utilities of consumption and social capital,
respectively.
3.1. Optimal growth rates
By definition growth rates will be constant in the steady state, so
equation (1) tells us that [K.sub.P], Y, and C all grow at the same
rate. Furthermore, Ks and KH components will also be growing at that
same rate, respecting equations (2) to (4)9.
Denote the growth rate of technological capital as [MATHEMATICAL
EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and the growth rate of human
capital as [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]: From
equation (5) we can see that these two growth rates must respect this
relationship: [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]0. In
the steady state, we can obtain the human capital growth rate as
follows. From (12) we find [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII] and using equation (16) we can then replace the previous two
equations in [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which
we calculated from (11). Then, using equations (5) and (8) we obtain:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (19)
Using the fact that [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII], we solve for the growth rate of technological capital:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (20)
From (8) and [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] we
find [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. By
substituting (19) in the previous equality we find:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (21)
While the impact of the social capital share ([sigma]) is positive
in growth rates, the impact of preference for social capital ([psi]) is
negative, as it has a trade-off with consumption. This has a parallel
with the effects of bonding and bridging in growth rates in the article
from Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2009). Optimal growth rates depend on
parameters of the model as usual in non-scale models of endogenous
growth.
4. Decentralized equilibrium
In the decentralized equilibrium both consumers and firms make
choices that maximize, respectively, their own felicity or profits (10).
Consumers maximize their intertemporal utility function (9) subject to
the budget constraint:
[??] = (r - [[delta].sub.P]) a + [W.sub.H] ([K.sub.H] - [H.sub.H] -
[H.sub.S] - [H.sub.R]) - C, (22)
where a represents the family physical assets, r is the gross
return on physical capital, and [W.sub.H] is the market wage. The market
price for the consumption good is normalized to 1. Since it is making an
intertemporal choice, the family also takes into account equations (2)
and (4), which represent human and social capital accumulation,
respectively (11). The markets for purchased production factors are
assumed to be competitive. However, we assume that the firm cannot buy
social capital, as there is, in effect, no market for it. Social capital
is treated here as exogenous, although it affects the firm's
production. Hence, consumer decisions will carry social capital
externalities.
From this problem we know that returns on production are as
follows:
[W.sub.H] = (1 - [beta] - [sigma])Y/[H.sub.Y], (23)
[P.sub.D] = [beta]Y/D, (24)
where [p.sub.D] represents the price for the index of intermediate
capital goods.
Each firm in the intermediate goods sector owns an infinitely-lived
patent for selling its variety [x.sub.i]. Producers of differentiated
goods act under monopolistic competition in which they sell their own
variety of the intermediate capital good [x.sub.i] and maximize
operating profits, [[pi].sub.i]:
[[pi].sub.i] = ([p.sub.i] - r) [x.sub.i], (25)
where [p.sub.i] denotes the price of intermediate good i and r is
the gross unit cost of [x.sub.i]. The demand for each intermediate good
results from the maximization of profits in the final goods sector.
Profit maximization in this sector implies that each firm charges a
price of:
[p.sub.i] = p = r/a. (26)
With identical technologies and symmetric demand, the quantity
supplied is the same for all goods, [x.sub.i] = x. Hence, equation (7)
can be written as:
D = [K.sub.R]x. (27)
From [p.sub.D]D = [pxK.sub.R], together with (24) and (26), we
obtain:
[xK.sub.R] = [K.sub.P] = [alpha][beta]Y/r. (28)
After insertion of equations (26) and (28) into (25), profits can
be rewritten as:
[pi] = (1 - [alpha]) [beta]Y /[K.sub.R]. (29)
Let [upsilon] denote the value of an innovation, defined by:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (30)
Taking into account the cost of an innovation as determined by
equation (5), free-entry in R&D implies that,
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (31)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (32)
Finally, the no-arbitrage condition requires that investing in
patents has the same return as investing in bonds:
[??]/v = (r - [[delta].sub.P]) [pi]/v. (33)
5. Optimality of human capital allocations
Using the FOC obtained from the social planner solution (11) to
(18) and the equations that describe the evolution of the four capital
stocks (1), (2), (4), and (5), it is possible to obtain the shares of
human capital allocated to the different sectors in the economy (final
good, human capital, social capital, and R&D). The shares of human
capital allocated to the different sectors are: *
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (34)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (35)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (36)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (37)
Using the restriction that [u.sup.*.sub.Y] + [u.sup.*.sub.S] +
[u.sup.*.sub.H] + [u.sup.*.sub.R] = 1; we obtain the social to human
capital ratio:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (38)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (39)
Using the FOC obtained for the decentralized equilibrium solution,
the equations that describe the evolution of the four capital stocks
(1), (2), (4), and (5), and also equations (23), (29), (31) and (33), it
is possible to obtain the shares of human capital allocated to the
different sectors in the economy: final good, human capital, social
capital, and R&D. The shares of human capital allocated to the
different sectors in the decentralized equilibrium are:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (40)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (41)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (42)
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (43)
Using the restriction that [u.sup.DE.sub.Y] + [u.sup.DE.sub.S] +
[u.sup.DE.sub.H] + [u.sup.DE.sub.R] = 1; we obtain the social to human
capital ratio:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], (44)
where
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (45)
As growth rates and the consumption to output ratio are equal in
the social planner and decentralized equilibrium solutions, the
differences from the two solutions are spillovers in R&D,
duplication effect in R&D, the specialization gains, and the
externalities from social capital. As in Alvarez-Palaez and Groth
(2005), the social gains from specialization (n) compare with the
private gain from an innovation [beta](1 - [alpha]) (12). From the
comparison of (34)-(37) to (40)-(43) taking into account the comparison
between (45) and (39), it is possible to advance the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. The Decentralized Equilibrium yields a sub-optimal
or over-optimal social capital to human capital ratio and R&D
effort, depending on the opposite effects of the following
externalities:
(i) the social capital externalities ([sigma] and [chi]), which
increase the social to human capital ratio in the social planner
solution, increase the human capital allocated to social capital
production, and decrease human capital allocated to "schools",
final good, and R&D sectors;
(ii) the spillover externality ([phi]), which decreases human
capital allocated to R&D in the market, increases the social to
human capital ratio, and then increases allocations to the final good
and to social capital production, but decreases the allocation to the
education sector in the market;
(iii) the duplication externality ([upsilon]), which decreases
human capital allocated to R&D in the planner's solution,
increases the social to human capital ratio, and then increases
allocations to the final good and to the social capital production, but
decreases allocation to the education sector in the planner's
solution;
(iv) the difference between the social gain from specialization and
the private gain from specialization ([eta] [not equal to] ([beta]1 -
[alpha])), which decreases social to human capital ratio in the social
planner's solution, decreases human capital allocated to the final
good and to the social capital production, and increases allocation to
all the other sectors in the economy.
Thus, relatively high social capital shares in the final good
production and R&D technology may contribute to decrease the
underinvestment in R&D. Spillovers and social gains from
specialization act in favour of underinvestment and duplication, and
social capital externalities act in favour of overinvestment.
As is usual in studies seeking to evaluate distortions between the
social planner and decentralized equilibrium solutions, this evaluation
is a quantitative issue. Thus, we now implement a calibration exercise
to evaluate the distortions.
6. Results and calibration
6.1. Calibration procedure
It is not easy to take a model with social capital to data, as
research dealing with social capital is still scarce. Some parameters in
our model are quite standard in the literature: the intertemporal
substitution parameter (t = 0.5), the intertemporal discount factor
([rho] = 0.02), the share of physical capital in income ([beta] = 0.36),
the markup (1/[alpha] = 1.33), and the productivity of R&D (s =
0.1), and we therefore do not discuss them (13). For others, there is a
range of plausible values: the depreciation rates ([[delta].sub.K],
[[delta].sub.H]), the productivity of human capital accumulation ([xi]),
the contribution of social capital to economic growth ([sigma]),
spillovers ([phi]), and duplication effects ([upsilon]). For these
values we discuss our options. For other parameters there is greater
uncertainty. For [gamma] and [omega], we conclude that changes in them
are not crucial for the distortion evaluation. We therefore fix their
values at 0.01. For the preference for social capital ([psi]) we test
different values and conclude that values greater than 0 and less than 1
(i.e., consumers prefer consumption to social capital, which seems
reasonable) do not change conclusions on distortions. Thus, we choose an
intermediate value of [psi] = 0.5. For the spillover and duplication
effects we choose [phi] = 0.4 and u = 0.5 as reasonable values suggested
in the literature (14). For the externality of social capital in the
R&D technology we choose one half of the spillover value, reasonably
assuming that the effect of research networks on R&D is much lower
than the "standing on shoulders" effect.
For the depreciation of physical capital, we set the realistic and
commonly used value SK = 0.05. In earlier research that considers human
and physical capital accumulation simultaneously, a zero depreciation is
considered. For the human capital depreciation, Heckman (1976) reports
that it lies between 0.7% and 4.7%. We consider either [[delta].sub.H] =
0, as in most earlier models with human capital accumulation or an
intermediate value between 0.007 and 0.047, [[delta].sub.H] = 0.02.
However, this value does not influence our main results. For the
parameter [OMEGA], which can measure a positive effect of social capital
in its accumulation or a depreciation of social capital, we use
alternatively -0.01 and 0.01. For each of these exercises, we set the
steady-state economic growth rate to 1.85%, which gives us a value for
E,. This procedure yields values in the range used in the human capital
literature (e.g., Funke, Strulik 2000). For the impact of social capital
on economic growth, we use a lower bound estimate for a of 0.08, as in
Knack and Keefer (1997), where in a 10% increase in trust implies a 0.8%
increase in the economic growth rate. We also use a high bound for
[sigma] = 1 - [beta] - [sigma] = 0.32, suggested by the evidence in
Whiteley (2000), which points to an effect of social capital as great as
the effect of human capital. Whiteley's findings also approximate
the evidence in World Bank (2006), reporting a share of 0.78 to
intangible capital, which includes both human and social capital. For
the consumption-output ratio (C/Y) we found a reasonable value around
0.8.
Table 1 below summarizes the calibration values, in which we use
two sets. The first, which we call "benchmark", shows the
distortion caused by social capital in the absence of any other
distortion (in this calibration there are no spillovers, duplication
effects, or specialization gains). In the second (designated
"Reasonable"), we set spillovers to 0.4 (see Reis, Sequeira
2007), duplication to 0.5 (see Pessoa 2005), specialization gains to
0.196 (see Jones and Williams 2000), and the social capital share to a
value between 0.08 and 0.32 (see above).
6.2. Distortions from social capital
We now present the differences between the decentralized
equilibrium and the optimal solution when there are distortions from
only social capital. Thus, we apply benchmark calibration values. Figure
1 shows the different values of the [K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] ratio through
different values for the share of social capital in production. Figure 2
shows the change of the allocation of human capital to the social
capital sector. Figure 3 shows the change in the allocation of human
capital to the R&D sector through different values of the same
share. We also present three figures showing the change in the ratio
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H], the share [u.sub.S], and the share [u.sub.R]
through different values for the externality of social capital in the
R&D technology.
From Figures 1 to 3 we can note that increasing the value of the
share of social capital in the final good production increases the
distortions in the decentralized economy, increasing the differences
between the socially desired ratio of social to human capital and the
ratio obtained by the decentralized action of different agents (Figure
1).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
This distortion clearly causes underallocation of human capital to
the social capital sector (Figure 2) and overinvestment in R&D, as
can be seen from Figure 3. While the ratio [K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] by nearly
four times until [sigma] = 0.43 in the optimal solution, it rises by
only half that in the decentralized economy. The difference between the
efficient allocation to the R&D sector and the market allocation can
rise up to 1.3%, while the difference between efficient allocation to
social capital and the market allocation can go up to 14%.
From Figures 4 to 6 we can see that increasing the effect of social
capital on R&D technology also increases distortions, but less so
than the rise in distortions caused by the final good social capital
share. In this case a change from [chi] = 0 to [chi] = 1 implies
distortion in [K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] of 0.004, a distortion in [u.sub.S] of
about 1%, and finally a distortion in [u.sub.R] of near 0.05%. We also
have a tendency for underinvestment in social capital and overinvestment
to R&D.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
6.3. Taking all distortions together
In this section we present results from quantitative exercises in
which we apply the calibration values depicted as "Reasonable"
in Table 1. Tables 2 to 4 compare the social planner allocations to the
decentralized equilibrium ones. We show three different exercises: the
first eliminates the distortions due to social capital and sets other
distortions at reasonable levels, given by parameter values discussed
above; the second considers a lower limit for the social capital share
in production and a reasonable value for the externality of social
capital in the R&D technology, and keeps values for other parameters
at the level used in the first exercise; the third exercise is equal to
the second, except for the share of social capital in production, which
increases to 0.32. The only difference in Table 3 (from Table 2) is that
it uses a depreciation for human capital of [[delta].sub.H] = 0.02. The
only difference in Table 4 (also from Table 2) is to consider a
depreciation of social capital ([OMEGA] = -0.01). In all these exercises
[g.sub.KH] oscillates from 1.36% to 1.47% and [g.sub.KR] from 1.23% to
1.59%.
Without the distortions introduced in this article ([sigma] = 0,
[chi] = 0), we note that the tendency for underinvestment in R&D is
high, as predicted in earlier literature (e.g., Jones, Williams 2000).
Human capital allocation in the decentralized economy is almost at the
optimal level and there are over-allocations to the final good
production and to the social capital sector. It is worth noting that due
to the distortions from social gains from specialization, spillovers,
and duplication, there is a relatively higher ratio of social capital to
human capital in the market economy when compared to the social planner
choice.
When we consider positive values for [sigma] and [chi] we note that
the social to human capital ratio is now higher in the efficient
solution than in the market economy, which is due to the distortions
introduced in this article. The absence of a market for social capital
is responsible for having relatively lower social capital in the market
than in the case in which social welfare would be taken into account.
This is reflected in the allocation of human capital to social capital
production, which should also be higher than it is in the market
economy. As a result, allocation of human capital to the human capital
accumulation sector is above the optimal level and the level of
underinvestment in R&D is reduced.
In the third exercise, the distortion in the social capital sector
is so high that the social planner would allocate to that sector nearly
twice the human capital allocated by the market economy (from 6.63% to
11.48% in Table 2; from 4.86% to 8.35% in Table 3, and from 16.98% to
24.92% in Table 4). Thus, in these scenarios the social planner would
reallocate human capital from final good production and schools to
social capital accumulation sectors and to R&D. This means that some
policies can be designed to enhance the production of social capital.
Considering a positive depreciation for human capital, as we do in
Table 3, introduces almost no differences in distortions from the social
planner allocations. However, such a high depreciation in human capital
predicts a share of human capital allocated to the human capital
accumulation sector that is at the highest limit of the reasonable
interval for that variable. Nevertheless, when we introduce a
depreciation in social capital accumulation, as in Table 4, we note some
important differences. The share of human capital allocated to the
social capital production sector is greater than in previous exercises
because human capital allocated to that sector must compensate the
depreciation effect, while in previous exercises this did not occur
because social capital could grow by itself (exogenously). The most
important implication is that underinvestment in R&D is much reduced
(from [u.sup.*.sub.R] / [u.sub.R] = 1.16 to [u.sup.*.sub.R] / [u.sub.R]
= 0.98), opening the possibility to overinvestment in R&D.
This means that the threshold level for the share of social capital
in production (a) above which there is overinvestment in R&D is
below 0.32, which is in the range of plausible values according to World
Bank (2006). The higher the depreciation for social capital, the lower
the threshold value for its share in production above which
overinvestment in R&D occurs. In fact, in the case of the third
exercise in Table 2, we can see that considering a 1% depreciation for
social capital, we can obtain overinvestment to R&D while
maintaining lower and perhaps more reasonable values for the allocations
through sectors in the economy, with the highest allocation to the final
good production.
7. Conclusion
The interaction between social capital and R&D has been pointed
out as an element of research networks. We build the production side of
the model taking into account the interactions between the different
types of capital that have been discussed in earlier (mainly) empirical
literature. In particular, we note the importance of the use of human
capital in social capital accumulation and the importance of this last
factor in the production of the final good, and also in the discovery of
new ideas, i.e., in the R&D sector.
In the model we also consider the most important distortions
present in previous models: the social benefit from specialization,
spillovers, and duplication in R&D. We implement a calibration
exercise in order to evaluate the strength of the new distortions from
social capital. First we show that new distortions lead to
underinvestment in social capital, when we examine the social to human
capital ratio and when we compare allocations of human capital to the
social capital accumulation sector. Second, we also show that the
presence of these distortions decreases the tendency to underinvestment
in R&D. However, quantitatively these distortions are not strong
enough to cause overinvestment in R&D when social capital has a
positive effect on its own accumulation. The opposite result is obtained
when social capital depreciates. In fact, in this case, the social
capital externalities introduced in this article are able to generate
overinvestment in R&D. This complements the recent literature
(Strulik 2007; Reis, Sequeira 2007) that present more arguments in
favour of overinvestment. Moreover, our results point out a share of
human capital in social capital accumulation that oscillates in the
decentralized equilibrium from 3% to near 17%, which is an additional
quantitative reason to integrate social capital in an endogenous growth
model with R&D and human capital accumulation, as we do in this
article.
We devise an endogenous growth model with social capital that
contributes to production and utility simultaneously, and evaluate both
analytically and quantitatively the distortions that are present in its
market equilibrium. This shows the importance of considering social
capital in the endogenous growth theory.
doi:10.3846/16111699.2011.638667
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank participants at the CEFAGE Seminar
in Evora, at the 4th Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal in Faro,
at the ASSET 2011 meeting in Evora, and three anonymous referees for
helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. The authors acknowledge
support from FCT, Project PTDC/EGE-ECO/102238/2008.
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(1) Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) provide an extensive survey of
this literature.
(2) When applied to the economics of investment in R&D this
expression was first used by Jones and Williams (2000) as part of the
article's title.
(3) We choose to model social capital based on the still scarce
literature about it, i.e., we do not consider higher bounds for the
stock of social capital. This is the same assumption we make for human
capital, following the recent literature on human capital. There is no
reason to consider that human capital grows without bounds, at a
constant long-run rate, and to consider the opposite for social capital.
This functional form is also used in Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2011).
(4) Theoretically, one could generally assume that [chi] might have
negative values and values greater than unity. However, for
simplification we assume that it varies between 0 (no effect of
researchers' networks) and 1 (proportional effect of
researchers' networks). In fact, in the calibration exercise we
reasonably assume that the effect of researchers' networks is less
than the effect of past technological knowledge ([chi] < [phi])). If
[chi] = 0, we would obtain the formulation for R&D technology used
in Jones (1995).
(5) Using [sigma] > 1 instead does not change our main results.
(6) We modeled taste for variety in this specific manner in order
to isolate the gains of specialization ([eta]) from the mark-up
(1/[alpha]) and from the share of physical capital in the final good
production (P). This specification follows Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth
(2005) and allows us to separate important externalities in comparison
to what happens in the standard specification.
(7) The t subscripts are dropped hereinafter for ease of notation.
(8) In this section we are dealing with aggregated variables. (9)
In this work we did not analyse the transitional dynamics of the model.
We analyse the unique inner steady-state solution of the model.
(10) In this section we are working with individual variables.
(11) FOC and growth rates for the decentralized equilibrium are
available upon request. They are derived in the same way than the ones
for the social planner problem.
(12) This proof is available upon request.
(13) For the markup value we use a median value from Norrbin
(1993).
(14) See Reis and Sequeira (2007) for a discussion about the value
of [section] in models with human capital accumulation and Pessoa (2005)
for estimations of [section] and u.
Tiago Neves Sequeira [1], Alexandra Ferreira-Lopes [2]
[1] Management and Economics Department, CEFAGE-UBI and INOVA,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Universidade da Beira Interior (UBI),
Estrada do Sineiro, 6200-209 Covilha, Portugal [2] ISCTE Business School
Economics Department, UNIDE and CEFAGE-UBI, University Institute of
Lisbon, Avenida das Forcas Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, Portugal
E-mail: [1] sequeira@ubi.pt; [2] alexandra.ferreira.lopes@iscte.pt
(corresponding author)
Received 15 February 2011; accepted 24 October 2011
Tiago Neves SEQUEIRA is Associate Professor at Universidade da
Beira Interior--UBI (Portugal), where he teaches Macroeconomics and
Economic Growth. He earned the Ph.D. in Economics from Nova School of
Business and Economics (Lisbon, Portugal). He is member of CEFAGE-UBI
and INOVA (Nova School of Business and Economics) research centres, both
graded as Excellent by the international evaluation led by the National
Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT). He is author of a number of
articles in the Endogenous Growth Theory and in Empirical Economics,
published in international journals such as Macroeconomic Dynamics,
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, Ecological Economics,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Regional Studies, Empirical
Economics, and Applied Economics.
Alexandra Ferreira-LOPES is Assistant Professor at the ISCTE--IUL
(University Institute of Lisbon) and she is affiliated with UNIDE and
CEFAGE-UBI research centres. She earned the Ph.D. in Economics from
ISEG--Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao da Universidade Tecnica de
Lisboa (ISEG--UTL, Lisbon, Portugal). She is author of a number of
articles about Open Macroeconomics, Business Cycles, Endogenous Growth
Theory, and Empirical Economics, published in international journals
such as Open Economies Review, Economic Modelling, Ecological Economics,
Regional Studies, and Public Finance Review.
Table 1. Calibration values
Basic Parameters
Parameter Benchmark/Reasonable
[tau] 0.5
[beta] 0.36
[rho] 0.02
[alpha] 0.75
[[delta].sub.H] 0 / 0.02
[[delta].sub.K] 0.05
[gamma], [omega] 0.01
[OMEGA] -0.01 / 0.01
Parameters for Externalities
Parameter Benchmark Reasonable
[chi] varies 0.2
[sigma] varies 0.08 or 0.32
[phi] 0 0.4
[upsilon] 1 0.5
[eta] [beta](1 - [alpha]) 0.196
Calibrated Variables
[xi] depends on [g.sub.Y]; [0.05; 0.1]
[g.sub.Y] 0.0185
Table 2. Results from reasonable calibrations ([[delta].sub.H] =
0, [OMEGA] = 0.01)
[sigma] [sigma] = 0
[chi] [chi] = 0
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.090 0.090 0.99
[u.sub.Y] 70.41% 70.78% 0.99
[u.sub.S] 4.38% 4.30% 0.99
[u.sub.H] 22.83% 22.82% 1.00
[u.sub.R] 2.49% 2.10% 1.18
[sigma] [sigma] = 0.08
[chi] [chi] = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.132 0.110 1.21
[u.sub.Y] 70.73% 71.76% 0.99
[u.sub.S] 4.81% 3.98% 1.21
[u.sub.H] 20.88% 21.26% 0.98
[u.sub.R] 3.59% 3.00% 1.20
[sigma] [sigma] = 0.32
[chi] [chi] = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.316 0.183 1.73
[u.sub.Y] 64.99% 68.35% 0.95
[u.sub.S] 11.48% 6.63% 1.73
[u.sub.H] 17.76% 20.02% 0.89
[u.sub.R] 5.77% 4.99% 1.16
Table 3. Results from reasonable calibrations ([[delta].sub.H] =
0.02, [OMEGA] = 0.01)
[sigma] [sigma] = 0
[chi] [chi] = 0
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.067 0.067 0.99
[u.sub.Y] 52.97% 52.97% 0.99
[u.sub.S] 3.17% 3.19% 0.99
[u.sub.H] 42.26% 42.26% 1.00
[u.sub.R] 1.86% 1.57% 1.18
[sigma] [sigma] = 0.08
[chi] [chi] = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.097 0.081 1.21
[u.sub.Y] 52.44% 53.27% 0.98
[u.sub.S] 3.53% 2.93% 1.21
[u.sub.H] 41.37% 41.58% 0.99
[u.sub.R] 2.66% 2.22% 1.20
[sigma] [sigma] = 0.32
[chi] [chi] = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.230 0.134 1.72
[u.sub.Y] 47.73% 50.54% 0.94
[u.sub.S] 8.35% 4.86% 1.72
[u.sub.H] 39.69% 40.90% 0.97
[u.sub.R] 4.24% 3.69% 1.15
Table 4. Results from reasonable calibrations ([[delta].sub.H] =
0.02, [OMEGA] = -0.01)
[sigma] [sigma] = 0
[chi] [chi] = 0
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.041 0.041 0.99
[u.sub.Y] 45.60% 45.80% 0.99
[u.sub.S] 10.21% 10.25% 0.99
[u.sub.H] 42.58% 42.58% 1.00
[u.sub.R] 1.61% 1.36% 1.18
[sigma] [sigma] = 0.08
[chi] [chi] = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.056 0.048 1.17
[u.sub.Y] 42.74% 44.84% 0.95
[u.sub.S] 13.20% 11.30% 1.17
[u.sub.H] 41.89% 41.99% 1.00
[u.sub.R] 2.17% 1.87% 1.16
[sigma] [sigma] = 0.32
[chi] [chi] = 0.2
SP DE SP/DE
[K.sub.S]/[K.sub.H] 0.105 0.072 1.47
[u.sub.Y] 31.06% 38.51% 0.82
[u.sub.S] 24.92% 16.98% 1.47
[u.sub.H] 41.26% 41.69% 0.99
[u.sub.R] 2.76% 2.81% 0.98