Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Psychology.
Rourke, Nancy M.
Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and
Psychology. Edited by Nancy E. Snow. New York: Oxford University, 2015.
Pp. vii + 349. $35.
Books on virtue ethics often have misleading titles that imply that
growth of moral character is the topic at hand when in fact the book
addresses specific virtues or virtue theory in general. But Snow
actually does address the cultivation of virtue. This volume of mostly
new works appeared only a year after S. and Narvaez were chosen as
recipients of the Templeton Religion Trust grant in support of
interdisciplinary work on virtue theory. The beginning of the trajectory
of their work of considering virtue as "located" in the whole
self (rather than in the personality) is reflected here.
Because cultivation of virtue is the focus, much of the discussion
addresses the conditions and practices necessary for very young children
to become virtuous adults. Developmental psychology partners with
philosophy and theology here, and this partnership works well under
S.'s direction. The book offers multiple perspectives both from
virtue theory and psychology.
Readers in psychology might find the book insufficiently critical
of the approaches within which they work, and religious studies scholars
and theologians will find the religious cosmologies summarized here to
be introductory rather than groundbreaking. This is a characteristic of
good interdisciplinary work, however, and S. leans toward the side of
hospitality, preparing soil for fruitful interdisciplinary conversation.
The book avoids excessive jargon and deftly contextualizes concepts for
readers. It also considers important issues that are rarely well
examined in Western virtue theory (such as the potentially narcissistic
tendencies of virtue ethics). Interdisciplinarity here allows for new
development of these topics, breaking some new ground. The book
fortunately also avoids the fixation of many contemporary works on
redefining specific virtues and formulating various situation-specific
virtue ethics. Likewise S. addresses the struggles of virtue ethics
(with situationism, for example). Her work is successfully
interdisciplinary, thoughtful, thorough, and important for scholars
working in virtue ethics.
DOI: 10.1177/0040563915619978
Nancy M. Rourke
Canisius College, Buffalo
