Moral Evil.
Ely, Peter B.
Moral Evil. By Andrew Michael Flescher. Moral Traditions Series.
Washington: Georgetown University. Pp. vii + 280. $32.95.
Students of the problem of evil will find in Flescher's volume
a thoughtful and comprehensive overview of ancient and contemporary
theories about the nature of evil and human responses to it. F. claims
to be writing a "rational" rather than a
"historical" reconstruction (16). The difference lies in the
rational reconstruction's intention to connect historical ideas
with contemporary issues. Thus F. admirably introduces conversation
between classic theories like those of the Manichees, Aristotle,
Augustine, Nietzsche, and Taoist and Zen masters with novels like Cormac
McCarthy's No Country for Old Men--including its film version--and
Albert Camus's The Fall. Contemporary issues like Hurricane Katrina
and the Fukushima nuclear disaster also take their place in this
wide-ranging conversation.
F. specifies four models of the relation of good and evil, drawn
from long years of teaching and reflection; they form the heart of the
argument and provide a manageable and useful way of reviewing the
multiple theories that attempt to give a coherent account of good and
evil. The first model, based on the historical movement of Manichaeism,
presents evil as having a substantive existence over and against good--
and God. The second deals with theodicies, the classic religious
treatments in the West that vindicate the divine "in the light of
the terrible sufferings human beings experience" (12). The third
model develops the attempts of Nietzsche and others to move "beyond
good and evil" by showing the essentially subjective character of
"evil," that is, its dependence on perspective: depending on
perspective, one can see suicide bombers as terrorists or as heroes.
F.'s fourth model is Augustine's "evil as the privation
of good."
The first four chapters treat these four models, carefully
balancing description and critique. After taking the reader into a
sympathetic exploration of each model, F. shows their limitations,
following a helpful threefold analysis according to the models of
descriptive accuracy. Does the model fit the facts of human
experience?--its normative value. Does it provide a suitable guide for
action? And what of its spiritual depth-- does it have "the
wherewithal to console anguished sufferers"? (59)
Following this largely descriptive presentation of these four
models, chapter 5 develops a fifth model, F.'s own normative
position that combines Augustine's explanation of evil as
"privation" with Aristotle's virtue ethics. The twofold
purpose of this chapter is to argue "that the Augustinian account
is to be preferred over its alternatives" (16), and "to draw a
hitherto unexplored connection between Augustine and Aristotle, that is,
between the privation thesis and character development" (16).
The coupling of Augustine and Aristotle is a bold venture that
invites a rethinking of these two foundational authors. F. makes clear
his intentions. He does not claim that either Augustine or Aristotle
"needs" the other, as though each one's thought could not
stand on its own. He does argue that "the respective objectives
that emerge in their ethical writings turn out symbiotically to serve
one another in ways not previously considered" (237).
Augustine's emphasis on the universality of sin complements
Aristotle's more elitist emphasis on the relatively few people who
are really capable of living a virtuous life.
Toward the end of chapter 5, F. provides a welcome development of
his analysis by turning to the role of religion in moving individuals to
a virtuous life. The Jewish doctrine of yetzer ha-ra, for instance,
"the evil inclination to which all human beings are believed to be
subject" (240), leads to the doctrine of repentance (teshuva) that
opens up the possibility of reform of life. F.'s example of
Alcoholics Anonymous--he treats it in a Catholic context--provides
another practical application of the Augustinian theory of universal
privation and the need for grace to attain liberation of the will.
F. pivots between two interpretations of Augustine and Aristotle:
one sees them interested primarily in personal reform and development;
the other finds in them a promotion of personal responsibility for the
evils that happen in the world. The emphasis on personal responsibility
for the evils of the world takes F. into territory that seems more to
express his own aim in writing than the explicit teachings of Augustine
and Aristotle. To his credit, F. anticipates this critique (235) and
attempts to answer it, not entirely convincingly, in my opinion.
F. concludes by bringing us back to what has been the aim of his
exploration throughout, that we attend more to what we can do about evil
than to understanding it in a detached and theoretical way.
DOI: 10.1177/0040563914548658
Peter B. Ely, S.J.
Seattle University
