Defending Human Dignity: John Paul II and Political Realism.
McDermott, John M.
DEFENDING HUMAN DIGNITY: JOHN PAUL II AND POLITICAL REALISM. By
Derek S. Jeffreys. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2004. Pp. 235. $19.95.
Arguing that Pope John Paul II used many of Max Scheler's
insights, Jeffreys defends the pope's political vision against both
political realists and idealists. John Paul's personalistic
hierarchy of values, supported by moral norms, allowed him to recognize
with "realists" mankind's fallen state, without
abandoning normative morality in international relations. The intuitive
recognition of a value hierarchy let John Paul overcome the impasse
between proportionalist (consequentialist) thinkers (whose insistence on
a common measure of value justifies the performance of "evil"
to realize a greater good) and basic goods theorists (with their
incommensurability of goods). Not only is an "ought" given in
immediate experience (not dependent upon a previous "is"), but
also spiritual values, as indivisible, surpass material values and are
not commensurate with them in a calculation of consequences. The value
of the free human person has to be acknowledged and respected in all
moral political decisions. J. perceptively notes in the pope's own
thought the tension between metaphysical (Thomistic) and
phenomenological strands, seeing them as complementary.
P.'s first chapter lays the groundwork in the pope's
understanding of the human person, emphasizing the individual knowing
subject whose freedom is realized in self-gift. Yet he does not
adequately recognize the relationality of personhood. The person is
originally both "in-himself" (metaphysical emphasis) and
"relation" (phenomenological emphasis). This would both ground
better "structures of sin" and "rights of nations"
through an analogous application of responsibility, and explain the
balance between "liberal" interventionist (universal human
rights) and "realist" non-interventionist (sovereignty of
particular nations) emphases in the pope's thought. Beyond the
papal criteria regarding intervention (174), one senses the contemporary
need for greater reflection on how respect for personal values
influences the final judgment for or against intervention in
international politics. J.'s rejection of traditional
proportionalism in just war theories (139-45) only complicates the
matter. Quantity (matter) and quality (spirit) may be irreducible for
human intelligence, but they form the human person; more reflection on
universal norms and their individual applications as well as on formal
and final causes is required. J.'s is a very fine book on a complex
topic.
JOHN M. MCDERMOTT, S.J.
Pontifical College Josephinum, Columbus, Ohio