A Secular Age.
Marty, Martin E.
doi: 10.1017/S0009640708001480
A Secular Age. By Charles Taylor. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 2007. xii + 878 pp. $39.95 cloth.
Any scholar who is content to be seen as nur ein gewrhnlicher
Historiker, "only an ordinary historian"--Hegel's phrase
used to dismiss von Ranke-will have difficulty reviewing A Secular Age.
Those of us historians of Christianity who compare notes have
commiserated with each other through two or three seasons, as we
grappled with it. The problem need not be Taylor's, though I
believe this is less "intellectual history," as it is
sometimes billed, than "philosophy of history." The issue of
genre is there, though not as acute as the one posed by Jacob Burckhardt
about philosophies of history. The Basel historian said that
"philosophy of history is a centaur, a contradiction in terms, for
history co-ordinates, and hence is unphilosophical, while philosophy
subordinates, and hence is unhistorical." I would prefer to say
that the ordinary historian has very much to learn from Taylor's
use of history, but cannot transport that learning to the study and
writing of history without undertaking a significant act of translating
and organizing the material.
Historians today are not easily classified as
"coordinators," as they roam the methodological ranges from
"people's history" to "elite history," from
"cliometrics" to "ethnography." Not all professional
historians are charmed by linear, diachronic, narrative history, yet
most of them do resort to some version of storytelling. Linearity is
anything but what Taylor manifests. Instead of a narrative line, he
takes up topics, drops them, and comes back to them, treating them as it
were in ever-enlarging spirals. They appear and reappear, sometimes in a
main plot line and at other times allusively and almost elusively. One
sometimes wishes he would take up a subject, let time and pages march
and turn on, and then be done with it, the way most historians would.
Taylor does not, as he exercises philosopher's rights. He after
all, and first of all, is a philosopher--not a theologian, he
insists!--and as distinguished as any Christian philosopher in our day,
so he has the privilege of writing as one.
Why not just shelve the book, if he frustrates the historian who is
in any way a plot-seeker? Doing so would deprive such a historian of
many treasures. Taylor has taken up one of the most alluring and urgent
topics available to intellectual historians of the West, namely the
relation of so much of what gets labeled "secular" to so much
that is marked "religious." I was tempted to write
"everything" instead of "so much" twice in that
sentence. Doing so would be somewhat hyperbolic, but this is a very rich
and, let's face it, overlong book, which demanded some editorial
cutting and rearranging that it did not receive.
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy wrote that "one book is about one
thing, at least the good ones are." Here we have the problem of
being faced by a good book, but the reviewers with whom I compared notes
all had difficulty bringing to coherent statement what the one thing is
in A Secular Age about which Taylor writes. The first temptation, then,
is to damn the book with faint praise, or praise the book with faint
damns. That will not do; it merits too much praise. But suppose we
entertain the possibility that here the mode matches the theme, and
reckon that in the nature of the case and in support of Taylor's
theses, the writing about the juncture of "secular" and
"religious" events, ideas, artifacts, and phenomena has to be,
at least at this moment when Taylor is presenting his Summa, somewhat
messy, repetitive and, as noted, circular if not spiraling. Taylor
covers centuries and seems to have read and can draw on myriad
substantiating writings. He knows as much about these topics and authors
as does a specialist in any "sub-age" within the "secular
age." It is not a book to which one would turn in order to get a
systematic view of, say, Hegel or Kant. It is a book to which one
eagerly turns to get Taylor's spin on giants like those, and that
turning can be immensely rewarding.
To face the book itself, a reviewer has to learn from and then
bypass a book-length sheaf of printouts from blogs by noted academics,
some of them near-peers of the peerless Professor Taylor. One way of
condensing the theme of A Secular Age is to say that it deals with the
shaping of an ill-defined but all-pervasive secularity. Taylor faces the
problem of tracing how this secular age was shaped through several
centuries, not around the globe but in a province that can be labeled
"Latin Christendom." While he is an awesomely ecumenical
visionary, generous in his judgments of others and critical of his own
home base, it is clear that he views the changes from the perspective of
a (believing, he confesses) Catholic's worldview. Confessing that
in no way narrows his vision; for dealing mainly with that Catholic
province does not make him a provincial. Still, readers will have to
turn elsewhere to learn how secularity arrives and whether it thrives in
non-Christian or non-Western cultures.
Taylor knows and shows that the conventional secularization
theories of the twentieth century do not do justice to the tangle of
worldly-otherworldy and material-spiritual oppositions that were long
associated with them. Modernization did not evolve on the schedule
foreseen by Renaissance and, most of all, Enlightened thinkers, and it
did not mean the extinguishing of religion as the bearded God-killer
quartet of Darwin, Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud thought it would. The
religious impulse takes protean forms. Suppress it in one regime or
during the prevalence of one school of thought, and it turns up in
another or, better, many others. Taylor does take most seriously the
challenges of science but avers that he is not "without resources
on the issue whether what science has shown about the material world
denies the existence of God. Because," he adds, "I can also
[as a layperson in both science and religion] have a religious life, a
sense of God and how he impinges on my existence, against which I can
check the supposed claims to refutation" (567). Some critics have
seen the argument surrounding such claims to mean that he has written
subtle apologetics, but I think Taylor can legitimately defend himself
against that charge, if it is a charge. (Let's assume that writing
apologetics is a legitimate if chancy venture.)
He seems more ready to keep the questions open, to use his awesome
erudition and his allusive resources to keep the door open across
scientific and religious boundaries, to raise questions against glibly
stated ideologies, and to promote a conversation that will take
centuries to further, with no promise of a satisfactory solution. He
sees many representatives of both "sides," if one can reduce
the contenders to two camps, as mutually disdaining mystery, something
that aggressive scientific agnostics with some fight had set out to do,
but adds that "hostility on the part of the defenders of religion
is rather strange," to say the least.
If he is set to keep the doors between science and religion open,
he also wants to widen the window to transcendence, some sense of the
"beyond" that secular thinkers have tried for centuries to
close. He is what we might call a "Christian humanist" and is
therefore critical of what he calls "exclusive humanism."
Surprisingly, in a formal book like this, he draws on the classic
popular singer Peggy Lee and her song to summarize the world of
exclusive humanism and the unwillingness to deal with mystery and any
sense of a beyond: he questions the world of "Western
modernity" and "the malaise of immanence" by asking, as
Lee did in a song title, "Is that all there is?"
Among the delights along the Charles Taylor way are any number of
provocative designations to match "exclusive humanism." Among
these are "the closed immanent frame," "the narratives of
secularity," "the buffered identity," and
"fragilization," along with easier-to-grasp categories for
development, such as, simply, "loss" and
"disenchantment." If some of those terms suggest that
Taylor's is, overall, a pessimistic book, I have not done justice
to it, as full of realism and hope alike as it is. In a way, A Secular
Age has to be seen as being so rich, entangling, and full of loose ends
that the only way one could do justice to it is to write another book
based on his themes and addressing him. No doubt such books are under
way, as there is now a Taylor Industry that includes an agenda which
historians cannot overlook, even if they are not fully at home with it.
They are not likely to shelve A Secular Age, but will keep learning from
it and gaining inspiration for their own tasks.
Martin E. Marty
University of Chicago