Marriage and Divorce in the Thought of Martin Bucer.

Pitkin, Barbara

Marriage and Divorce in the Thought of Martin Bucer. By H. J. Selderhuis. Trans. John Vriend and Lyle D. Bierma. Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies, Vol. 48. Kirksville, Mo.: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999. 406 pp. $45.00 cloth.

This study explores the background for repeated allegations that Bucer's views on divorce were, in the words of one of his contemporaries, "worse than permissive." First published in Dutch in 1994, Selderhuis's investigation confirms that the notoriety of Bucer's views was not without justification. However, Selderhuis also seeks to disperse the cloud of judgment that has overshadowed Bucer's reputation since the sixteenth century by tracing the evolution of his ideas and setting them in a richer historical and theological context. He thus begins with a sketch of medieval and sixteenth-century understandings of marriage. Next he traces Bucer's journey from Dominican monk to twice-married Protestant minister and father and discusses his pastoral involvement in the marital questions of his contemporaries. The third section surveys thematically Bucer's views on marriage, divorce, and celibacy.

Against canon law tradition, Protestant reformers agreed that marriage was not a sacrament and that a valid marital bond could be broken when warranted, for example, by adultery (see Matt. 19), impotence, or desertion. Indeed, they saw divorce as necessary in order to render one or sometimes both parties eligible to remarry. Remarriage was entirely impossible according to canon law, for even in cases in which spouses were permitted to live apart, the spiritual and sacramental bond still remained. For many Protestants the possibility of it new marriage was essential because they held marriage to be the divinely appointed remedy for human concupiscence. Selderhuis says that most scholastic theologians held that lust even within marriage was sinful (172); Protestants, in contrast, thought sexuality made marriage necessary. They never tired of pointing out in their critiques of clerical celibacy that those who were unable to fulfill their sexual urges legitimately were bound to seek illicit outlets. Certainly widows and widowers (such as Bucer), but also those in existing marriages where the fulfillment of conjugal duties was no longer possible, needed the opportunity to form godly marriages and avoid sin. Protestants disagreed somewhat over the exact grounds that warranted divorce, and in practice most (including Bucer) were quite conservative in recommending it. They also insisted on public exchanging of vows and parental consent in attempts to ensure that marriages got off to a good start.

Selderhuis argues that despite these departures from traditional views, most reformers really just adjusted canon law "in the spirit of the Reformation" (48), whereas Bucer "partially frees himself from it" (179). Like the views of marriage they inherited, most Protestants emphasized procreation as the primary goal of marriage and saw marriage, following Paul (1 Cor. 7), as a means of avoiding fornication. Also, both Catholics and Protestants valued companionship between spouses, although Protestants rejected one of the bases for this in the medieval notion that free consent between a man and a woman apart from witnesses was sufficient to constitute a valid marriage.

The distinction of Bucer's views lies in his heightened emphasis on companionship as the essence of marriage and his idea that its first purpose is not procreation but mutual service. Furthermore, marriage is not primarily a means of avoiding sin but more positively an arena for the process of sanctification. God "who is himself love, also bestows love on two people, so that they in turn can put this love into practice toward each other, their children, and their friends" (172). Procreation and avoiding fornication are of secondary importance. Sexual relations sustain a good marriage but do not constitute one. Hence, in theory, Bucer is willing to permit divorce (and remarriage) in almost any instance in which spousal companionship has been undermined: not just for adultery, impotence, and abandonment but also when one partner is chronically insane, ill with a life-threatening or incurable contagious disease (such as leprosy), imprisoned, banished for heresy, or is overly abusive. In such cases, divorce frees the "innocent" party to form a new union that aims toward mutual love and service, although in the case of illness the healthy partner is still responsible for the care of his or her former spouse. Bucer thus has high standards for the marital relationship as a bond of love, fellowship, and, above all, service. Far from recommending divorce for frivolous reasons, he insists that each case of marital difficulty be considered individually and that whenever possible divorce be avoided. But in situations in which God in principle has broken up a marriage by, for example, allowing one partner to become chronically ill, it is essential for the magistrates to dissolve the union. Bucer derives further guidance for his policies from the Old Testament and from the legal codes of Christian emperors, such as Justinian.

The strength of Selderhuis's presentation lies in the careful examination of relevant texts and situations that bear on the question of marriage and divorce. This detailed attention to sources not only gives weight to long-standing judgments about Bucer's latitudinarianism but also fleshes these out. Moreover, this study demonstrates that the characteristic complexity of his thought is just as evident here as elsewhere. For example, the difficult discussion of Bucer's complicated and changing attitudes toward the martial situations of Henry VIII and Philip of Hesse reveals well his reluctance to recommend divorce. In both cases, Selderhuis argues, Bucer's concern for the women involved was but one factor in shaping his views, but elsewhere Selderhuis underscores Bucer's traditional assessment of gender roles. Another complex issue is the question of the relationship of Bucer's views to the idea among some Anabaptists of "spiritual marriage." Though Bucer clearly did not endorse the practice of leaving a spouse to form a new union with a fellow (Anabaptist) believer (see 307-8), one wonders how exactly his focus on the quality of marital relationship differs. Interesting in this connection as well is the fact that Bucer was married to two remarkable women, but one wonders when reading the correspondence excerpted by Selderhuis whether he had not found his true soulmate in Margaret Blaurer (d. 1541). Had she not died in the same year as Bucer's first wife, Elisabeth, might he have sought to marry her? Or did his understanding of the nature of marriage as love combined with service entail that he follow the dying wishes of his first wife, Elisabeth, and his colleague Wolfgang Capito and marry, as he did, Wibrandis Rosenblatt (widow of both Oecolampadius and Capito)? This informative and balanced study invites the investigation of further questions, and the smooth English translation makes this task immeasurably easier for most English-speaking scholars.

Barbara Pitkin Stanford University