Alfano, Mark. Character as Moral Fiction.
Jost, John T.
ALFANO, Mark. Character as Moral Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013. ix + 226 pp. Cloth, $90.00--Thanks to Owen
Flanagan, Gilbert Harman, and John Doris (among others), a fruitful
discussion at the intersection of social psychology and moral
philosophy has unfolded over the past two decades about the viability of
a robust virtue theory in the Aristotelian tradition. In this important
book, Mark Alfano significantly advances the terms of debate about
whether certain individuals are more disposed than others to be morally
good and to behave ethically--as Aristotle understandably assumed--or,
alternatively, in the language of experimental social psychology,
whether our behavior is determined predominantly if not exclusively by
external, situational factors, in which case moral character may be said
to matter very little.
Alfano comes down fairly squarely on the side of situationist
critiques of virtue ethics, reviewing well-known experiments by Milgram,
Zimbardo, Darley, Batson, and many others suggesting that human behavior
is fickle and context dependent. To a virtue theorist it is
disconcerting, to say the least, to learn that most people suffer
airport frustrations far more graciously when they have been smelling
cinnamon buns, even if the scent barely registered in consciousness.
Situational nonreasons such as ambient odors should not, on purely
ethical or rational grounds, cause us to behave more altruistically, and
yet many accumulated studies suggest that they do.
Alfano is probably overly dismissive of person-situation
interactionism, which may well be the modal view in contemporary
psychology. It is also a view that is bolstered by research in
behavioral genetics, which highlights the joint contributions of
hereditary predispositions and environmental triggers (such as stress or
nutrition). Alfano refers, somewhat less than magnanimously, to partial
or limited defenses of virtue theory as "the dodge," "the
retreat," and "the counter-attack." These names may be
prejudicial, but the author otherwise represents the theoretical
positions reasonably well. An especially useful contribution is
Alfano's distillation of nine major tenets associated with the
"hard core of virtue ethics"--at least half of which he calls
into question on the basis of social psychological demonstrations of
cross-situational instability in behavior.
For some reason, the philosophical literature has been slow to
incorporate the scientific change of heart best exemplified by Walter
Mischel, one of the earliest and most outspoken critics of the study of
personality traits. Since the late 1990s, Mischel and Yuichi Shoda have
developed an if-then model of person-by-situation interactions that
reveals considerable stability and consistency at the level of
individual personality structure, even if the underlying structure (like
that of a musical piece) may be difficult to perceive in light of
dynamic behavioral patterns (such as changing musical notes). Their
research yielded evidence of traits (such as verbal aggression in
children's responses to adult interventions) that are quite a bit
more general (and therefore more psychologically meaningful) than the
hyper-specific "local" traits favored by Doris (and Alfano),
such as "honesty-toward-one's sisters" and
"physical-courage-in-the-face-of-artillery-fire." Near the end
of the book, Alfano suggests provocatively that philosophers "could
reconceptualize virtue as a triadic relation among an agent, a social
milieu, and an environment," but this idea is not fully developed,
nor is its connection to existing interactionist models.
The biggest strength of Alfano's book lies in the detailed,
thoughtful nature of its review of empirical research in social
psychology, its patient, open-minded consideration of many different
theoretical and metatheoretical proposals, and its expansion of the
situationist critique to epistemological as well as ethical questions.
Ultimately, Alfano concludes that belief in the stability, consistency,
and attainability of ethical and epistemic virtues (such as honesty and
rationality) is probably unwarranted, in light of scientific evidence.
At the same time, he argues that such a belief is a useful
fiction--especially when it comes to the moral education of children.
Alfano is on solid ground in proposing that, because of the power of
self-fulfilling prophecies, it is beneficial for society to cultivate
ideal notions that there are both good and evil (and rational and
irrational) persons and acts, but here he may be engaging in a bit of a
philosophical dodge (or side-step) of his own.
Neo-Aristotelians are not interested in the question of whether it
is expedient or pragmatically useful to subscribe to certain ideals of
moral development and the attainment of ethical and epistemic virtues.
Those who are naturalistically inclined would like to know whether such
virtues are in fact attainable, in light of evidence from social and
cognitive psychology suggesting that they might not be. Alfano has done
an admirable job of demonstrating why virtue theorists have been on the
proverbial ropes, given what we have learned from psychology over the
last few decades, but neither he nor the other situationists whose work
he champions have delivered the knockout punch. We await the next round
most eagerly, even if the fight (like the nature-nurture debate itself)
is destined to end in a draw.--John T. Jost, New York University, and
Lawrence J. Jost, University of Cincinnati
