Sorabji, Richard. Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values.

Thompson, Samantha E.

SORABJI, Richard. Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. xiv + 224 pp. Cloth $35.00--As Richard Sorabji points out in his Gandhi and the Stoics: Experiments on Ancient Values, both Gandhi and the Stoics have been "accused of having impractical and bizarre ethical ideals." He tries to show that they have more than just this in common--and that, intriguingly, "Gandhi ... provides a picture of what the Stoic sage might be like ... if he ever existed." Sorabji argues that what made Gandhi so politically influential were the very values the Stoics themselves never managed to inculcate to a similar degree.

The "experiments" of the book's subtitle are Gandhi's, but they could just as well be Sorabji's, as he juxtaposes thinkers from very different cultures and eras. His task is challenging because, as he notes, Gandhi was not directly influenced by the Stoics. Sorabji's project is not to trace influences (although he does outline Gandhi's eclectic variety of sources) but rather what he calls convergences, instances where Gandhian and Stoic thought find very similar expression. He revisits these themes from a variety of angles in order to demonstrate not only that both Gandhi and Stoics illuminate one another for the modern reader, but also that they could to some extent have served as mutual correctives: the Stoics provide a systematic account of ethics from which Gandhi could have benefited; and Gandhi shows how such values might (or might not) work in practice.

Sarobji particularly examines the thinkers' shared commitment to emotional detachment and to love for all human beings, concern with human duties rather than rights, relative indifference to codifying universal rules of conduct, acceptance of material poverty, and tendency to wrestle with applying rigorous ideals to flawed human beings. Of these commonalities the first two are clearly central, as the others are rendered in terms of them. Sorabji draws parallels between Stoic virtue and Gandhian detachment, and between Stoic oikeiosis (affinity, including the kinship of all humans) and Gandhian ahimsa (nonviolence). In his foundational first two chapters, Sorabji contrasts the two parallels before resolving them by asking how Gandhi and the Stoics could reconcile their eschewal of conventional emotional attachments with their obvious commitment to communal values: to the love of others (whether family members or the wider human family) and to the expression of that concern via political engagement. His approach in each case is to point out that it is not that nothing matters to these thinkers, but that "few things matter"--character being one of these--and that mattering (even love) need not entail emotion, an uncontrollable, misleading, and poor guide to right action.

There are many differences of course, and Sorabji conscientiously catalogues them. Unlike the Stoics who view virtue as living in accordance with their understanding of nature, Gandhi finds his ideal of detachment in the Bhagavadgita which advises relinquishing one's desires for specific outcomes. In general, Sorabji tends to credit the Stoics with more nuance, rooted in their paradoxical notion of preferred indifferents (objectives which it is reasonable to pursue vigorously even though one's happiness is independent of achieving them). These include naturally privileging the good of family members over acquaintances, something of which Gandhi did the opposite (inconsistently tending to disfavour his family). And while oikeiosis is regarded by the Stoics as an expression of nature, Gandhi's ahimsa was for him a faith supported by ideas borrowed from Tolstoy, Eastern traditions, and Christianity. Still, Sorabji reiterates that it is the emphasis on right attitude, rather than on adherence to external rules, which makes Gandhi and the Stoics able to agree on fundamentals while diverging on specifics (such as private property); it also explains how both could countenance extreme actions (such as killing or suicide) according to the unique circumstances of individuals.

Central to Sorabji's project is his insistence that Gandhi was indeed a philosopher. As evidence, he points to Gandhi's rigour both in subjecting his beliefs to constant analysis and revision and in living out those beliefs by a unique experimental method of engaging with the public.

It is worth noting that Sorabjii concentrates on ethical thought. Gandhi's ideals had a firm though idiosyncratic metaphysical foundation; it might therefore have been interesting if some comparison had been made with relevant elements of Stoic physics. Moreover, Sorabji has elsewhere argued that ideas are in some sense distinct from the historical contexts in which they arise, and that they can recur in similar forms in diverse milieus. Some may ask whether taking this notion too far reifies and over-simplifies ideas. Sorbaji is, however, careful to outline essential distinctions, including those between earlier and later Stoicism. Examining these thinkers in an unfamiliar light certainly helps the reader to appreciate them anew, as does Sorabji's endeavour to marry his expertise in ancient philosophy with a subject of obvious personal interest to him.--Samantha E. Thompson, Toronto