Phronesis: Vol. 53, No. 1.

The Place of Aporia in Plato's Charmides, VASILIS POLITIS

The aim of the paper is twofold: to examine the argument in response to Socrates' question whether or not reflexive knowledge is, first, possible, and, second, beneficial; and by doing so, to examine the method of Plato's argument. What is distinctive of the method of argument, Politis wants to show, is that Socrates argues on both sides of these questions (the question of possibility and the question of benefit). This, he argues, is why he describes these questions as a source of aporia. Socrates can argue, without contradiction, on both sides of these questions because the arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge are premised on the supposition, defended by Critias, that this knowledge is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, whereas the arguments for its possibility and benefit are not committed to this supposition.

Aristotle on Ontological Dependence, PHIL CORKUM

Aristotle holds that individual substances are ontologically independent from non-substances and universal substances but that non-substances and universal substances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between individual substances and other kinds of beings with respect to ontological dependence. Under what could plausibly be called the standard interpretation, the ontological independence ascribed to individual substances and denied of non-substances and universal substances is a capacity for independent existence. There is, however, a tension between this interpretation and the asymmetry between individual substances and the other kinds of entities with respect to ontological independence. Corkum will propose an alternative interpretation: to weaken the relevant notion of ontological independence from a capacity for independent existence to the independent possession of a certain ontological status.