Phronesis: Vol. 53, No. 2, 2008.
False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic
Naturalism in Plato's Cratylus 427d1-431c3, IMOGEN SMITH
This paper offers an interpretation of Plato's Cratylus
427d1-431c3 that supports a reading of the dialogue as a whole as
concluding in favour of a conventionalist account of naming. While many
previous interpretations note the value of this passage as evidence for
Platonic investigations of false propositions, this paper argues that
its demonstration that there can be false (or incorrect) naming in turn
refutes the naturalist account of naming; that is, it shows that a
natural relation between name and nominatum is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for reference. Socrates secures this outcome by
using demonstratives and their concomitants to show how any putative
natural imitative link between name and object may be overridden.
Furthermore, Socrates' employment of demonstratives and
context-dependent statements in his case-studies of false naming speaks
in favour of a reading of this passage as primarily focussing on naming
rather than on propositions in general.
Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's Categories,
MARKUS KOHL
Kohl attempts to answer the question of what Aristotle's
criteria for 'being a substance' are in the Categories. On the
basis of close textual analysis, he argues that subjecthood, conceived
in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete
objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also
explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood
can only function as such a criterion if both the subjecthood of
concrete objects and the subjecthood of substance universals can be
understood as philosophically significant phenomena. By drawing on
Aristotle's essentialism, Kohl argues that such an understanding is
possible: the subjecthood of substance universals cannot simply be
reduced to that of primary substances. Primary and secondary substances
mutually depend on each other for exercising their capacities to
function as subjects. Thus, subjecthood can be regarded as a
philosophically informative criterion for substancehood in the
Categories.
The Place of I 7 in the Argument of Physics I, SEAN KELSEY
Aristotle introduces Physics I as an inquiry into principles; in
this paper Kelsey asks where he argues for the position he reaches in I
7. Many hold that his definitive argument is found in the first half of
I 7 itself; Kelsey argues that this view is mistaken: the considerations
raised there do not form the basis of any self-standing argument for
Aristotle's doctrine of principles, but rather play a subordinate
role in a larger argument begun in earnest in I 5. This larger argument
stalls in I 6, which ends in aporia; Ketsey argues that the problem lies
in the fact that Aristotle's reasoning in I 6 thoroughly undermines
his reasoning in I 5 (on which I 6 is ostensibly supposed to build). He
further argues that the materials necessary for resolving this problem,
and thereby allowing the argument begun in I 5 to reach its proper
conclusion, are supplied by the thesis that organizes the first half of
I 7. Along the way Kelsey offers some remarks about Aristotle's
doctrine of principles, arguing that it is about the principles of
natural substance (as opposed to coming to be or change). He also offers
some remarks about the thesis which organizes the first half of I 7.
Kelsey argues negatively that it is not anything like a preliminary
statement of Aristotle's doctrine of principles. He argue
positively that it reflects Aristotle's idea that there are two
distinct kinds of effect change has upon things (one constructive, the
other destructive). One of these effects lies behind Aristotle's
reasoning in I 5, the other comes to the fore in I 6; the achievement of
the first half of I 7 is to reconcile these seemingly competing
conceptions by finding a place for them both in a unified account of
coming to be and its subjects.
