Phronesis: Vol. 52, No. 3, July 2007.

Henry, Devin M. ; Nielsen, Karen M. ; Reydams-Schils, Gretchen J. 等

How Sexist Is Aristotle's Developmental Biology?, DEVIN M. HENRY

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the level of gender bias in Aristotle's Generation of Animals while exercising due care in the analysis of its arguments. The author argues that while the GA theory is clearly sexist, the traditional interpretation fails to diagnose the problem correctly. The traditional interpretation focuses on three main sources of evidence: (1) Aristotle's claim that the female is, as it were, a "disabled male"; (2) the claim at GA IV.3, 767b6-8 that females are a departure from the kind; and (3) Aristotle's supposed claim at GA 1V.3, 768a21-8 that the most ideal outcome of reproduction is a male offspring that perfectly resembles its father. He argues that each of these passages has either been misunderstood or misrepresented by commentators. In none of these places is Aristotle suggesting that females are imperfect members of the species or that they result from the failure to achieve some teleological goal. The author defends the view that the GA does not see reproduction as occurring for the sake of producing males; rather, what sex an embryo happens to become is determined entirely by non-teleological forces operating through material necessity. This interpretation is consistent with Aristotle's view in GA II.5 that females have the same soul as the male (741a7) as well as the argument in Metaphysics X.9 that sexual difference is not part of the species form but is an affection arising from the matter (1058b21-4). While the traditional interpretation has tended to exaggerate the level of sexism in Aristotle's developmental biology, the GA is by no means free of gender bias as some recent scholarship has claimed. In the final section of the paper the author points to one passage where Aristotle clearly fails back on sexist assumptions in order to answer the difficult question, "Why are animals divided into sexes?" He argues that this passage in particular poses a serious challenge to anyone attempting to absolve Aristotle's developmental biology of the charge of sexism.

Dirtying Aristotle's Hands? Aristotle's Analysis of 'Mixed Acts' in the Nicomachean Ethics III, 1, KAREN M. NIELSEN

The analysis of "mixed acts" in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 has led scholars to attribute a theory of "dirty hands" and "impossible oughts" to Aristotle. Michael Stocker argues that Aristotle recognizes particular acts that are simultaneously "right, even obligatory," but nevertheless "wrong, shameful and the like." And Martha Nussbaum commends Aristotle for not sympathizing "with those who, in politics or in private affairs, would so shrink from blame and from unacceptable action that they would be unable to take a necessary decision for the best." In this paper the author reexamines Aristotle's analysis of putatively "mixed acts" in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1, maintaining that Aristotle denies that there are acts that are (i) voluntary under the circumstances, (ii) right, all things considered, under the circumstances, but nevertheless (iii) shameful or wrong for moral or prudential reasons under the circumstances. The paper defends this interpretation with reference to Aristotle's discussion of shame in EN IV, 9 and Rhetoric II, 6, as well as his overall meta-ethical commitment to a position the author calls "mitigated circumstantial relativism." By focusing on Aristotle's analysis of putatively "mixed acts," we come closer to a true appreciation of Aristotle's ethical theory, even though "mixed act" is not, the author argues, a category in Aristotle's considered ontology of action.

Meta-Discourse: Plato's Timaeus according to Calcidius, GRETCHEN J. REYDAMS-SCHILS

This paper brings Calcidius' 4th century AD Latin commentary on Plato's Timaeus into the fold of research on the methodological assumptions and hermeneutical practices of the ancient commentary tradition. The first part deals with the question of how Calcidius sees his role as a commentator in relation to the original text, to his audience, and to the Platonist tradition. The second part examines the organizing principles and structuring devices of the commentary, and what these can tell us about connections between exegesis and worldview. As with many other commentaries, Calcidius' purpose becomes clearer if we approach him from a pedagogical angle. His practice, like most of the content of his commentary, appears to connect him to older layers of Platonism, pre-dating so-called Neoplatonism. It reveals a distinct authorial voice, of someone who is very conscious of his role as a cultural mediator and who has a philosophical line to pursue.