Journal of the History of Philosophy: Vol. 46, No. 1, January 2008.

Foley, Richard ; Hye-Kyung Kim ; De Groot, Jean 等

Plato's Undividable Line: Contradiction and Method in Republic VI, RICHARD FOLEY

Plato's instructions entail that the line of Republic VI is divided so that the middle two segments are of equal length. In this paper, however, Richard Foley argues that Plato's elaboration of the significance of this analogy shows he believes that these segments are of unequal length because the domains they represent are not of equally clear mental states, nor perhaps of objects of equal reality. Foley labels this inconsistency between Plato's instructions and his explanation the "overdetermination problem." The overdetermination problem has been a perennial concern, and a substantial amount of work has been produced which attempts to deal with it. Foley offers a classification of approaches to the overdetermination problem as a way of documenting the problem's significance, and show why these approaches are all inadequate as solutions. His novel resolution of the overdetermination problem rests upon a demonstration that the contradiction is intentional. The later recapitulation of the ratio at 534a reveals that Plato was himself aware that the middle two segments are equal. Foley argues that this contradiction is a sophisticated device designed to lead the reader of the Republic through the four epistemic stages represented by the line itself. Most significantly, recognition of this mathematical contradiction acts as a goad, spurring independent philosophical reflection just in the way that Plato advocates in the Republic more generally.

Metaphysics H 6 and the Problem of Unit, HYE-KYUNG KIM

What Aristotle's main concern is in Metaphysics H 6 has long puzzled commentators. In this paper Hye-Kyung Kim argues for a novel, deflationary interpretation of that chapter: Aristotle's main concern is to argue for the causeless unity of the definitions of form and of composite substance. The problem he is grappling with arises from a combination of (a) speaking about the parts of form and the parts of composite substances, and (b) the principle that parts of a whole need a unifying cause in order to be one and not many. If both form and composite particulars need a unifying cause, form cannot be primary substance, and composite substances, as composites of form and matter, cannot be true unities, but must be mere heaps of material parts which need a third unifying cause. Aristotle argues that although (a) and (b) seemingly threaten his theory of substance with incoherence, the problem can be easily solved if the unity of definitions of form and of composite substance are properly seen as causeless. In the course of clarifying and defending this reading of H6, a number of alternative interpretations are exposed and criticized.

Dunamis and the Science of Mechanics: Aristotle on Animal Motion, JEAN DE GROOT

It is shown that Aristotle's references to automata in his biological treatises are meant to invoke the principle behind the ancient conception of the lever, that is, that points on the rotating radius of a circle all move at different speeds proportional to their distances from the center. This principle is mathematical and explains a phenomenon taken as whole. Automata do not signify for him primarily a succession of material movers in contact, the modern model for mechanism. For animal locomotion and embryological development, Aristotle models his dunamis concept on the idea of mechanical potential that the lever principle displays.

Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance, GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREVRA

Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Perevra argues that Descartes' independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from an important objection.

The Spatial Presence of Spirits Among the Cartesians, JASPER REID

The Cartesians have often been read as if they denied spatial presence to incorporeal substances, reserving it for extended things alone. This article explores whether this common interpretation is accurate, examining the cases of both created minds and the divine substance of God Himself. Through scrutiny of the relevant texts of both Descartes himself and his followers, it demonstrates that, in the divine case, this common interpretation is incorrect, and that the Cartesians did believe that God's own substance really was omnipresent in a literal sense. In the case of created minds, by contrast, the article suggests that the standard reading is probably correct after all, and that these substances were indeed excluded from the spatial world: but it also suggests that, in the hands of at least some of the Cartesians, this position caused certain philosophical tensions and potential inconsistencies within their systems.

Being, Knowledge, and Nature in Novalis, ALISON STONE

This paper reconstructs the evolution of Novalis' thought concerning being, nature, and knowledge. In his earlier writings (above all the Fichte-Studies) he argues that unitary being underlies finite phenomena and that we can never know, but only strive towards knowledge of, being. In contrast, his later writings, principally the Allgemeine Brouillon, maintain that the unitary reality underlying finite things can be known, because it is an organic whole which develops and organises itself according to an intelligible pattern. Novalis equates this whole with nature. However, because this organic whole exercises spontaneity in assuming particular forms of organization, we can never know why it assumes just these particular forms; nature therefore remains partly unintelligible to us. Here, Alison Stone argues that Novalis' intellectual shift towards the idea that the whole can be known is motivated by his concern to explain how the modern, "disenchanted," view of nature could be overcome. She also argues that by recognizing this shift, we can resolve the dispute between Frank and Beiser as to whether Novalis thinks that the absolute can be known.