Ratio: Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2007.

Alm, David ; Birondo, Noell ; Hodgson, David 等

An Argument for Agent-Neutral Value, DAVID ALM

This paper argues (a) that to any agent-relative value maker there will correspond an agent-neutral value maker, and the latter explains the former; and (b) that to each agent-relative constitutive ground there corresponds a neutral one, and the latter explains the former. It follows from (b), if not from (a), that agent-neutral value exists if agent-relative value does.

Kantian Reasons for Reasons, NOELL BIRONDO

Rudiger Bittner has recently argued against a Kantian 'maxims account' of reasons for action. In this paper Noell Birondo argues--against Bittner--that Kantian maxims are not to be understood as reasons for action, but rather as reasons for reasons. On the interpretation presented here, Kantian maxims are the reasons for an agent's being motivated by whatever more immediate reasons actually motivate her. This understanding of Kantian maxims suggests a recognizably realist Kantian position in ethics.

Making Our Own Luck, DAVID HODGSON

It has been contended that we can never be truly responsible for anything we do: we do what we do because of the way we are, so we cannot be responsible for what we do unless we are responsible for the way we are; and we cannot be responsible for the way we are when we first make decisions in life, so we can never become responsible for the way we are later in life. This article argues that in our consciously chosen actions we respond rationally to whole 'gestalt' experiences in ways that cannot be pre-determined by pre-choice circumstances and laws of nature and/or computational rules; and that this means we are partly responsible for what we do, even if we are not responsible for the way we are.

Nagel vs. Nagel on the Nature of Phenomenal Concepts, JANET LEVIN

In a footnote to his 'What is it Like to be a Bat?' Thomas Nagel sketches a promising account of phenomenal concepts that purports to explain why mind-body identity statements, even if necessary, will always seem contingent. Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have recently developed this sketch into a more robust theory. In Nagel's more recent work, however, he suggests that the only adequate theory of phenomenal concepts is one that makes the relation between phenomenal and physical states intelligible, or 'transparent.' Developing such a theory, however, appears to be no easy task. In this paper, Janet Levin argues that the Nagel-Hill-McLaughlin proposal is preferable--and that a serious problem with it, noticed by Stephen Yablo, can be avoided by revising the proposal according to some further suggestions made by Nagel himself.

Whimsical Desires, TONY MILLIGAN

To desire is to want, but not necessarily to be disposed to do anything. That is to say, desiring does not necessarily involve having any disposition to act. To lend plausibility to this view, Tony Milligan appeals to the example of whimsical desires that no action could help us to realise. What may lead us to view certain desires as whimsical is precisely the absence of any possibility of realizing them. While such desires might seem less than full-blooded, Milligan argues that we can have full-blooded desires concerning such matters because of our (non-whimsical) concern for others. That is to say, whimsical desires can have a borrowed seriousness. The article goes on to strengthen the separability of dispositions and desires by narrowing down the concept of triggering conditions for a disposition. If we allow the triggering conditions to be too broad then it will always make sense to say that someone with a desire simply must have a disposition because, all other things being equal, they would bring about what they desire if they were able to do so.

Political Liberalism without Scepticism, JONATHAN QUONG

Political liberalism famously requires that fundamental political matters should not be decided by reference to any controversial moral, religious or philosophical doctrines over which reasonable people disagree. This means we, as citizens, must abstain from relying on what we believe to be the whole truth when debating or voting on fundamental political matters. Many critics of political liberalism contend that this requirement to abstain from relying on our views about the good life commits political liberalism to a kind of scepticism: we should abstain from relying on our views about the good life because we should be uncertain about the truth of those views. But this kind of scepticism is itself a controversial epistemic position which many reasonable people reject, thus apparently making political liberalism internally incoherent. This is the sceptical critique of political liberalism. This paper shows the sceptical critique to be false. The paper argues that the epistemic restraint required of citizens in political liberalism does not assume or imply any version of scepticism about our ability to know the good life. Liberal neutrality is motivated not by scepticism about our own views, but rather by a desire to justify fundamental political principles to others.