Johnson, Wayne G. Morality: Does "God" Make a Difference?

Taliaferro, Charles

JOHNSON, Wayne G. Morality; Does "God" Make a Difference? Lanham: University Press of America, 2005. ix + 238 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $35.00--In some philosophical circles, ontology (or metaphysics) is considered public enemy number one when it comes to ethics. Hilary Putnam, for example, argues that ontology is as extraneous to ethics as it is to mathematics. In his recent book, Wayne Johnson takes the opposite position, arguing persuasively that ethics requires an ontology, a broad metaphysical framework that accounts for the normative force of ethics. Morality; Does "God" Make a Difference? is written with clarity and would make an accessible guide to classical and contemporary moral theory.

Chapter 1, "A Theory About Moral Theories," sets forth Johnson's central theme: "Normative ethical systems are best understood as attempts to seek out and justify ways of living a fulfilled human life in terms of the kind of fulfillment one believes to be possible given one's beliefs about human nature and the ultimate nature of all things. Furthermore, any normative ethical system must also indicate just how one's own quest for fulfillment is related to the experiences of other people and sentient beings, given, again, one's view of human nature and the ultimate nature of all things" (p. 8). Chapter 2, "The Point of Morality," makes the case that morality is an unavoidable enterprise as persons seek to adjudicate competing wants, needs, and desires. The search for fulfillment inevitably raises concern for fair-minded reflection on appropriate and inappropriate modes of fulfillment.

Chapter 3 provides a useful, reliable guide to major moral theories and worldviews. This would be highly useful for undergraduates in their first or second course in philosophy. Chapter 4 offers a balanced overview of religion-based ethics. While chapters 3 and 4 are largely descriptive, chapter 5 argues that theism does make a difference ethically. Here and elsewhere, Johnson remains neutral in arguing for or against theism. His principle aim is to argue for the relevance of a theistic, naturalistic, or some other type of ontology. I find this section entirely successful. As Johnson points out, ethics comes to be profoundly shaped by whether or not you believe that the cosmos has a loving, good creator, or that there is an afterlife, or that there is a unity between God (Brahman) and nature, and so on.

Chapter 6 considers how different ontologies offer competing accounts of moral obligations and rights. This chapter and the next are especially concerned with the relationship between persons and their communities, and then the relationship between different communities. Johnson opposes ethical relativism. In chapter 8, Johnson exhibits the way in which different ontologies give rise to different accounts of moral psychology. In chapter 9, Johnson offers a subtle analysis of the virtues and vices of grounding ethics in evolutionary biology. True to the spirit of this remarkable book, Johnson's principle aim is to elucidate the connection between ontology and ethics while remaining neutral in terms of his declared ontological preference. The final chapter invites readers to the broader field of philosophy of religion, where one may weigh the reasons and values behind religion-based moralities.

This is a fine book that would work well for an introduction to ethics. Lest that seem like a faint praise, I must add that I believe this book also mounts a powerful case against books like Ethics without Ontology by Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). Although Johnson does not mention Putnam (who is widely considered one of the most distinguished living American philosophers), I believe Johnson's arguments and exposition of the philosophical landscape present a formidable challenge to Putnam and his followers.--Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College.