Seeskin, Kenneth. Maimonides on the Origin of the World.

McLaughlin, Thomas J.

SEESKIN, Kenneth. Maimonides on the Origin of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. vii + 215 pp. Cloth, $55.00--This work, rich in arguments and scholarship, is so clearly written that one is tempted to quote from it at length. As Seeskin notes, questions about the world's origin are directly related to what the world is, what God is, and what human reason can know. Such questions also involve a fundamental principle of religious faith. Maimonides's discussion of the world's origin, one of his major contributions to philosophy, has been subject to considerable disagreement. Seeskin examines a variety of interpretations and argues that according to Maimonides, "the world was brought into existence out of nothing in the first instant of time. In short, motion and time are created together" (p. 2). Seeskin calls this view creation ex nihilo and de novo. It implies, according to Maimonides, that God need not have created the world at all, but did so by His own free choice and wisdom.

Following an introductory chapter discussing basic issues about God and the world's origin, a chapter each is dedicated to Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus respectively. The general strategy of these chapters is to examine each philosopher's understanding of the world's origin and then to consider Maimonides's view of them and the use he made of them. Thus, Seeskin offers interpretations not only of Maimonides but also of several other major figures in ancient and medieval philosophy. Each thinker is a kind of foil. Plato, on Maimonides's view, held that the order and structure of the world were created de novo, but not ex nihilo since the world was formed from preexistent matter that is eternal. Maimonides viewed Aristotle as having held that both the structure and matter of the world are eternal. The world, according to Aristotle, is not created either de novo or ex nihilo. Plotinus' View, which came to Maimonides through Affarabi and Avicenna, denies creation de novo since all things necessarily and eternally emanate from the One. Emanation does not deny creation ex nihilo in the sense that everything owes its existence to God, but does deny creation ex nihilo in the sense that emanation, especially of matter, proceeds through intermediaries. Although Maimonides praises emanation as a "type of causality that does not involve physical contact" (p. 119), emanation posed numerous difficulties for him. Fundamentally, however, emanation is a foil for Maimonides's claim that the world is contingent. Unlike Aquinas, Maimonides, held that an eternal world cannot be freely willed by its Creator but is created necessarily. Thus, if the world is eternal, God could not have chosen not to create it.

Maimonides argues that some basic features of this world are contingent and, therefore, are products of a free agent. Seeskin's discussion of this argument from particularity actually involves a number of arguments, including a valuable examination of Maimonides's view of science, especially astronomy. Maimonides accepted Aristotle's scientific account of the terrestrial realm but viewed his astronomy as deeply flawed. Drawing heavily upon the Mutakallimun, especially Alghazali, Maimonides argued that the celestial bodies have characteristics for which there is no necessary cause, such as the number and size of the celestial spheres, the direction in which they revolve, or the distribution of the fixed stars. Maimonides also argues that the incompatibility of Ptolemy's astronomy with Aristotle's shows that for many celestial phenomena necessary causes had not been discovered. One could maintain that necessary causes for these phenomena eventually would be discovered, and that the problems posed by the incompatibility of Ptolemaic and Aristotelian astronomy would be solved; however, Maimonides thought that the failure to discover necessary causes was most reasonably regarded as indicating the difficulties inherent in the subject matter of astronomy, the contingency of celestial phenomena, and the limits of human understanding. As Seeskin discusses in some detail, Maimonides regarded the failure to discover necessary causes of many celestial phenomena and the arguments for the contingency of such phenomena as seriously weakening the case for eternal emanation and strengthening the case for creation de novo.

Seeskin argues that although Maimonides claimed that many celestial phenomena are contingent, we must not think of him as maintaining that they do not have causes or that God created them arbitrarily. The spheres and their motions are ordered and purposeful. In this, Maimonides opposed Alghazali as well as Avicenna. He held that God acts for a reason, even if that reason is unknown to us; but that reason does not necessitate God's choice, and creation is a free act that God need not have willed.

Although Maimonides thought that the case for eternal creation was weak, he did not think it refuted, nor did he think that creation de novo, though the most reasonable view, could be demonstrated. As Seeskin points out, Maimonides, like Aquinas, argued that creation ex nihilo and de novo is intelligible and possible. However, unlike Aquinas, Maimonides argued that it need not be accepted as true on revealed grounds alone.

A further chapter examines Maimonides's view on miracles and the end of the world. Creation de novo is consistent with the possibility of miracles but raises the question as to whether or not the world must end. Maimonides's argument that it need not end crucially depends upon the claims that the existence of the world is from God and that creation is not a natural process.--Thomas J. McLaughlin, St. John Vianney Theological Seminary.