Niederbacher, Bruno. Glaube als Tugend bei Thomas von Aquin: Erkenntnistheoretische und religionsphilosophische Interpretationen.

Meconi, David Vincent

NIEDERBACHER, Bruno. Glaube als Tugend bei Thomas von Aquin: Erkenntnistheoretische und religionsphilosophische Interpretationen. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004. 194 pp. Cloth, $36.00--Echoing much of the neo-Thomistic revival of the twentieth century, Fides et Ratio [section] 76 sketches the two main characteristics of a Christian philosophy: it is a type of thinking which simultaneously employs yet always seeks to purify reason and, secondly, it does not close itself off to the concerns and content of revelation. In this way, Pope John Paul II calls for a contemporary understanding of faith which is seen as a virtue freeing human reason from presumption, "the typical temptation of the philosopher." In his latest, Bruno Niederbacher likewise calls for such learned docility in both the human soul as well as in the modern Academy. Divided into six main sections, this work concentrates on two main arguments. First, he shows why Thomas held that faith enables assent to what is and thus proves to be a necessary virtue for correct thinking and action and, secondly, what significance such a claim has for us today.

After a brief introduction (pp. 9-16) defining terms and mapping out this project, chapter 2 (pp. 17-42) takes up the initial question of what Thomas means by credibile. Here Niederbacher first dissects the Thomistic concept of goal-oriented action, primarily as it is develops throughout the earlier questions of ST I-II and only then takes up the question of absolute happiness and the role of faith in obtaining such beatitude. A nice job is done in juxtaposing the philosophical understanding of the human person's attainment of an uncreated good with the answer given by theologians and their insistence on the need for revelation. Chapter 3 (pp. 43-89) analyzes the act of faith by means of standard epistemological categories, concentrating mainly on Thomas's use of the classical Augustinian credere Deo, credere Deum, and credere in Deum. As Niederbacher progresses he cleverly shows how Thomas maneuvers his understanding of faith between an irrational decision and a necessary rationalism; rather, it emerges as a free and reasonable act of both intellect, and will ordered toward the end for which the human person was made in principio. More should have been said here of the divinely granted life which begins such a process but Niederbacher has unfortunately, albeit understandably, decided to bracket any detailed discussion of the mechanics of grace.

The fourth chapter (pp. 90-150) treats the virtue of faith and proves to be the most welcomed section. Here both the role of faith in a well-integrated human life as well as why the gifts of the Holy Spirit are an essential part of Thomas's understanding of the beata vito are taken up in turn. In ninny significant ways, Niederbacher mirrors Paul Wadell's The Primacy of Love (Paulist, 1992) in showing Thomas's genius in uniting the virtues and all the qualities one desires for himself and finds attractive in another. It was refreshing to read how Niederbacher incorporated two otherwise forgotten aspects of Thomas thought: the human emotions as worthy of philosophical speculation as well as the importance of the community in which one finds himself, as that which models and transmits the virtues. There are also insightful parallels in this section between Alvin Plantinga's recent account of Warranted Christian Belief and Thomas's account.

The fifth (pp. 151-65) and the sixth (pp. 166-75) chapters conclude this work by respectively taking up the questions of epistemological and religious relevance of Niederbacher's analysis thus far. Bringing such virtue epistemology into the contemporary discussion of how one justifies cognitive and religious convictions (Rechtfertigung von Uberzeugungen), Niederbacher chooses to focus on two current debates: Foundationalism versus Coherentism and Internalism versus Externalism. Within this discussion, he successfully shows how Thomas's understanding of faith can contribute to modern virtue epistemology, especially as it is developed by Linda Zagzebski. To end this work by treating questions of epistemic justification in today's struggle to understand the human person as both homo sapiens as well as homo odorants shows how Thomas's confidence in rational assent is able to engage the many concerns left in modernity's wake.

No doubt the past few years have brought an increase in philosophical works on the relationship between faith and reason, but not many in the academy, especially philosophers, have taken up the question of why faith should be considered a virtue. Niederbacher, of the Department of Christian Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, has thus produced a very welcomed text for those interested in engaging Thomas's account of virtue and knowledge with the modern world. Niederbacher's German prose is accessible, writing clearly and with many examples directed toward those not well-versed in the discussion at hand. This volume is the most recent addition to the celebrated Munich Philosophical Studies series.--David Vincent Meconi, S.J., University of Oxford.