Craig, William Lane. God, Time, and Eternity: the Coherence of Theism II: Eternity.

Copan, Paul

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. xi + 321 pp. Cloth, $105.00--In his companion volumes by Kluwer, Thee Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination and The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, William Craig makes a persuasive case for the A- (tensed) theory of time and against the B- (tenseless) theory of time. In the present volume Craig addresses the relationship of God to time. He concludes his book: "given a tensed theory of time and the attendant reality of tense and temporal becoming, the most plausible construal of divine eternity is that God is timeless sans creation and temporal since creation" (p. 284).

To show this, Craig divides his book into two parts. In part 1, entitled "The Nature of Divine Eternity," he examines the arguments for divine timelessness. In chapter 1 ("The Case for Divine Timelessness"), he examines sixteen arguments (focusing chiefly on divine atemporalist Brian Leftow), and, frankly, there is not much left standing after Craig's demolition job. The divine timelessness position is fraught with misrepresentations, non sequiturs, and inept arguments. Chapters 2-4 deal with arguments for divine temporality. Craig focuses on three areas: personhood (chapter 2), divine action (chapter 3), and divine knowledge (chapter 4). In chapter 2, Craig, taking the position that God is temporal with the universe but timeless without it, seeks to show that a personal God (who is conscious, intentional, and interpersonal) can indeed exist in a timeless state. Personhood does not require temporal existence. In chapter 3, Craig argues that divine action in the world only makes sense if God is temporal with creation, which is a real relation into which God enters. God undergoes a relational change. In this chapter, Craig presents forceful arguments against the Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity and God as pure act--as well as recent variations of it (for example, Norris Clark's). It surely seems incredible to deny that God, upon creating, does not acquire the contingent property of being creator of the universe. To argue otherwise is to negate divine freedom. Chapter 4 reveals how God's knowing temporal indexicals (for example, "It is now raining") is required by divine omniscience, but, in light of this, God would have to be temporal with creation. Furthermore, God's cognitive perfection requires his knowledge of tensed facts; God's not knowing tensed facts would make him a less-than-maximally great Being. Again, with creation, God would have to be temporal.

Part 2 is entitled "God and Time," and is divided into two sections: "God, Time, and Its Measures" (chapters 5-7) and "God, Time, and Creation" (chapters 8-9). Craig looks at the Newtonian/classical concept of time (chapter 5) and contrasts it with the received view of relativity theory--namely, that there is no unambiguous simultaneity. However, given the slow-running nature of moving clocks and our inability to track time accurately, Einstein (because of his positivistic assumptions) made a fallacious inference that there is no absolute frame of reference. In light of this error, Newton's theological position of God as the objective observer of events was not at all overturned by Einstein's unjustified philosophical presupposition.

Instead of Einstein's position, one could opt for a neo-Lorentzian relativity which is observationally fruitful and accommodating to God as the absolute reference point for events (chapter 6). God is not dependent upon light signals to establish synchrony since all things are simultaneously present to him. Moreover, since creation, cosmic time coincides with God's metaphysical time. God's omnipresence means that he is aware of and causally active at every point in space (chapter 7).

The biblical affirmation of creation out of nothing (chapter 8) involves (a) God's bringing the universe out of nothing a finite time ago and (b) his subsequently sustaining it moment by moment. A tenseless view of time cannot affirm (a) and thus emasculates the doctrine of creation out of nothing. The biblical and philosophically sound position would be a tensed theory of time.

The final chapter of the book ("God and the Beginning of Time") examines two key questions: Why didn't God create the world sooner? and Why is it now? Craig seeks to show that there are not two phases of God's life ("before" and "after"); rather, we must distinguish between temporal and causal priority. Eternity is simply a boundary to time. Time simply does not exist without events.

Craig's scholarly work, which expertly integrates philosophy, science, and theology, deserves to be read widely.

Paul Copan, Trinity International University.