Aquinas on concord: "concord is a union of wills, not of opinions".

Porzecanski, Daniel Schwartz

IN AT LEAST SIX PLACES AQUINAS WRITES: "Concord is a union of wills, not of opinions." (1) This dictum is problematic because one would think that without some union of opinions, union of wills can not obtain. This article seeks to clarify the meaning of this dictum and to show that it does not imply that shared opinions are unnecessary for concord.

Before proceeding it is important to advert to a tempting but probably false lead: to read "opinion" against the background of the distinction between the different modes of cognition (opinion, science, understanding, and faith). (2) In his dictum, Aquinas does not seem to be using the term "opinion" in this specialized manner but rather as a general term to refer to beliefs. (3)

I

To examine concord as a feature of Aquinas's account of friendship one must start by looking at the dynamics of love. It was an accepted view, originating in Neoplatonism and influential in Christian mysticism, that love involves a certain movement toward a unity between the lover and the loved. When, in In III Sent, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, Aquinas introduces "concord" as the fourth characteristic of reciprocal well-wishing and equates it with "union of wills," this must be read in its proper context: as one of the sorts of union that is part of the dynamics of love. (4)

In ST I-II, q. 28, a. 1c, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of unions between lovers: real (physical closeness to each other) and affective. The affective union is love, and it puts in motion the process toward real union, which is an effect of love. (5) Affective union consists in some sort of apprehension and can take two shapes. In erotic love the lover apprehends the beloved as part of his own well-being. In love of friendship, unlike in erotic love, we do not have an expansion of the self such that it comes to encompass our friend's well-being. (6) Rather, what matters is that we perceive the friend as a like.

Earlier, in ST I-II, q. 27, a. 3c, Aquinas is busy explaining how likeness (similitudo) "causes" love. (7) There he argues that likeness consists in the "sharing of one form," so two persons alike "are in some way one in that form," just as two human beings "are one in their belonging to the human species." He then goes on to say that, in this manner, "the love of one goes to the other as toward himself, and wills him good as he wills to himself." (8) From this it follows that the union which is sought after in love of friendship consists in having certain alikeness (that is, sharing in one form or uniformity). (9)

Aquinas's discussions of concord are placed within discussion of two kinds of relationships: (1) the relationship between lover and beloved, and (2) the relationship between those who pursue a common end (or love the same person). (10)

I start by looking at (1) as discussed in In III Sent, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1c. A loves B. This apparently carries the consequence that the will of B becomes a sort of directing rule (regula operas) for A. (11) But what does it mean for the will of the beloved to become a directive rule for the lover? There Aquinas argues that when the appetite or affection (affectus) fixes itself on an object apprehended as good, the loved good impresses its form on the appetite or affect of the lover, not unlike the way intelligible forms impress their form on the intellect. The fact that the beloved impresses its form on the lover's appetite creates a kind of union: "the lover is one with the beloved, who is made into the form of the lover." (12) In this fashion, as Aquinas says, love can be said to be "transformative." (13)

Things move (and human beings act) in accordance with their form (unumquodque autem agit secundum exigentiam suae formae). In the case of human beings, this form--namely, the end we are after is both our principle of action and a rule of our works (principium agendi et regula operis). Thus, the lover whose affection is informed by the beloved becomes inclined by love to act according to what is required by (the form of) the beloved (exigentiam amanti). Acting in this way is pleasurable (delectabile) since it is not imposed from the outside on the lover but rather accords with his intrinsic principle of movement.

In what way should we understand Aquinas's saying that the beloved's will is the formal principle of the lover's will? It would be seriously wrong to think of the lover as a kind of robot who dumbly replicates the activity of the beloved's will. What Aquinas means is that the lover wishes as much as possible to be like the loved one, he wishes to possess this resemblance (14) in the way that suits his own nature. (15) In other terms, the lover wants to participate in the form of the loved one as much as his particular mode of being is open to it. (16) This desired resemblance extends to a desire for resemblance as to the activity of the beloved's will as well. The lover wills his acts of will to resemble those of the beloved. Accordingly, when Aquinas gets to the point of explaining how the goodness of our wills depends on their conformity to God's will, he treats this kind of resemblance and imitation as a sort of participation in divine goodness. (17) Aquinas rightly calls our sharing the form of the divine will a "conformity" rather than a "unity" of wills. "Unity" suggests (or at least admits of) the idea of two persons meeting at an intermediate point, whereas conformity entails one person living up to a standard which itself remains fLxed. (18)

So far little has been said of concord. What specific dimension of this movement toward unity of wills is brought to the fore by Aquinas's dictum that "concord is a union of wills, not of opinions"? One explanation that Aquinas gives for his view that concord is not a union of opinions is that opinions belong to the intellect and the activity of the intellect precedes the activity of the will. (19) But how can love (via concord) bind wills without binding opinions first? Does not Aquinas suggest that love somehow carries will away from intellect's rule?

A plausible solution to this query turns on the idea that the unitive effect of love takes place at a critical point in the process of deliberation toward action, namely, when we make a choice between attractive, intellect-approved "packages of means." (20) Unlike the conclusions derived from premises in speculative thinking, our choosing between packages of means assented to by the intellect (sententia vel iudicium) does not follow by necessity from the animating principle (principia) of (practical) reasoning, that is, from the end. (21) Thus, love's effect on choice-making does not cause a departure from the rule of reason.

There is some textual support for this solution: Aquinas points out that the will of the beloved is not just as a rule of operation but a rule of choice. (22) Notice in addition that in two opportunities, Aquinas points out that opinions are not included under concord because opinions on speculative matters do not fall "under the will" (whereas, for him, choices do). (23) These texts suggest that the purpose of the dictum is to state that, in our choice between packages of means to which intellect has already given its assent, will's inclination to pick one option rather another is in some way informed by love. Since the purpose of the lover is to imitate the beloved, he will choose in such a way that allows him to resemble the beloved. Because the proposals from which we pick count with the approval of intellect, the effect of love in our choice does not constitute a diversion from the rule of intellect.

It is important to keep in mind that this solution does not restrict the unitive implications of love on will to choice-making only, but rather--so I argue--it simply identifies the specific aspect of the union of wills that Aquinas wishes to highlight in his dictum.

The above solution does not account for all the uses of the dictum. For it is clear that in a number of instances there is a different purpose to "concord is a union of wills, not of opinions." I turn to these instances in the next section.

Can friendship between lovers of a common good or person survive disagreement? There is a series of texts both in the Sentences and in the Summa Theologiae that look at this question. (24)

In these texts the friends are bound by the friendship of charity, that friendship by which persons wish for their neighbor, as they wish for themselves, the ultimate good: union with God. They wish this for their neighbor because they believe that he shares with the other intellectual creatures the common quality of being capable of achieving such kind of union. At the same time, in the situation depicted by these texts, there is conflict. How, then, can we speak of charity's being present?

The key to understanding the meaning of the dictum in this context is the purpose it serves. The purpose is to warn against an unwarranted inference, namely, that from the fact that there is a conflict of wills it follows that there is no union of wills and therefore no concord, love, or charity.

Aquinas asks how it is possible for angels to disagree given that they have charity. (25) The first objection argues that angels cannot dispute or fight (impugnari) among themselves since they have the theological virtue of charity which is incompatible with fighting and discord.

In the corpus of the article Aquinas uses an example from the Scriptures: Daniel prays to God asking him to forgive the people of Israel and release them from captivity under the Persians. The angel Gabriel appears to him and reports on a discussion or fight taking place between angels. (26) Siding with the interpretation of Gregory the Great (27) and against that of Jerome, Aquinas explains that the angels were discussing the various merits and demerits of the Jewish people while awaiting God's decision to be made known to them. And this, Aquinas tells us, is perfectly compatible with the friendship of charity. Directly replying to the first objection, Aquinas quotes Aristotle to make the point that "friendship or concord is not incompatible with diversity of opinions but only diversity of wills: hence this fight, which is a fight about the judgments that follow from diverse merits, is not an obstacle to the unity of charity so long as their will is one: that the divine providence may be fulfilled." (28)

What unifies the angels' wills is their will that the divine providence may be fulfilled. (29) But the angels have different judgments on the merits of the people Israel. It is not clear whether these different judgments give rise to (or are a case of) conflicting wills or not. On this point one can think of two views: (1) the angels' assessments of Israel's merits cannot but produce in the angels various appetitive responses (wills) toward Israel's different possible fates, and (2) the angels' various judgments do not generate or imply conflicting wills.

View (2) seems wrong. It is clear from the text that the judgments in conflict are those that have been chosen by the angels based on their different views ("opinions") on the merits of Israel. That there is a conflict of wills is evident from the use of the word "fight" to describe the situation. However, each angel must regard what he wills as at least capable of being part of the divine providence, and--one may assume--must be ready to abandon his will and join that of God when His will is disclosed. It is not clear from the text whether this would require the angel to be ready to change the views on Israel's merits which led to the judgment that he chose. (To the extent that it does, these views come close to the more specialized sense of the word "opinion.")

The important thing is that in the case of the angels there is one union of wills (that the divine providence may be fulfilled) and one conflict of wills (they want different things to happen to Israel--they have diverse judgments). The point of the dictum in this context is to assert that as long as there is a union of wills, a conflict of wills which can be traced to blameless (30) diversity of opinions is no evidence of lack of the kind of concord which is an effect of love (because, in any case, love does not unite opinions).

Question 29 of the secunda secundae asks whether peace is an effect of the theological virtue of charity. In it, an imaginary objector (31) points out that persons who seem to have possessed charity were nonetheless deeply at odds with each other as far as opinions are concerned. Augustine disagreed profoundly with Jerome on doctrinal matters. (32) Barnabas sharply disagreed with Paul as to whether to take John Mark to inspect the results of a previous mission, so much so, that they parted company.

Aquinas's overall strategy, again, is to explain to the objector that the conflict of wills originates in blameless diversity of opinions. Since concord (an effect of love) does not unite those opinions which are not under the command of will, from the presence of conflict of wills one cannot infer lack of concord, love, or charity.

In his reply Aquinas first distinguishes between goods and opinions: friends must agree regarding goods. He divides goods into two kinds: primary and secondary goods. What friendship requires is that the friends' wills be united insofar as primary goods are concerned. To will the same secondary goods is not a condition of friendship. Aquinas concludes that "nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions." He justifies this by relying on the distinction between the mind's faculties that were alluded to earlier: "opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by peace." That he writes "appetite" instead of "will" and that he says "peace" instead of "concord" should not concern us for the will is one of the kinds of appetite we have (the rational appetite) and concord is one of the two dimensions of peace (the interpersonal aspect as opposed to the intrapersonal one). (33)

But would not one suppose that the disagreement between friends about secondary goods is caused by their conflicting opinions? Does not Aquinas sweep under the carpet the importance of opinions to concord?

In reply one may note that Aquinas does not deny that conflicting opinions are the cause of discord. Much to the contrary, he writes: "for such a dissension [as to secondary goods] proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that that which is the object of dissension belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not."

A further sign that Aquinas does not deny that the conflict of wills at the level of secondary goods is caused by a conflict of opinions is the fact that he argues that the conflict of wills will not persist once truth is fully known in the world to come. If lack of knowledge of the truth is (at least partly) responsible for our dispute about secondary goods, it follows that this dispute originates in a diversity of beliefs (beliefs about what is considered to be the case). So we do actually need shared beliefs to have a shared will.

As in the case of the disputing angels, what makes conflicting beliefs compatible with friendship is a cognitive limitation on the part of the friends. (34) There are matters in which we do not really know all the right answers. About these matters it is only natural that we will disagree and we will justifiably end up with conflicting wills.

Aquinas's allusion to the cognitive limitations of the present life does more than simply allow him to say that diversity of wills regarding secondary goods is compatible with friendship. By saying that perfect charity is not achievable in every respect in this world, he is also arguing that some measure of disagreement is unavoidable. (35) In other words, he is arguing that we should not expect total agreement as to beliefs, and consequently we should not expect total agreement as to the thing willed. What we can expect and achieve in this world is a formal union of wills. Material union of wills takes place when two persons will the same thing, while the formal union requires only that whatever is willed is willed "under the form" of being part of that good on which wills converge. (36)

This position manifests a good dose of realism and safeguards against thinking about disagreement as merely a contingent shortcoming or a removable state of affairs.

III

This section assesses the force of an objection to my reading of Aquinas. This objection arises from Aquinas's view that Christians should not maintain friendship with heretics. (37) He also thinks that the heretics, in choosing to believe propositions that are contrary to those taught by the Church, cease to be part of the Church. Since the Church is for Aquinas a society or community, (38) the case of the heretic would constitute a case in which difference of opinions is an obstacle not only to interpersonal friendship but also to membership in a social group.

The objection argues as follows: given that for Aquinas, Augustine and Jerome, Paul and Barnabas, and the disputing angels are friends, by the same account heretics and nonheretics should be considered friends also. After all, they present the formal unity of wills that friendship requires. (39)

The structure of the reply to this objection is as follows: For Aquinas:

(1) despite first appearances, when we discuss heresy we discuss union of wills;

(2) the situation of the heretic and nonheretic does not resemble that of two persons who have conflicting wills because they blamelessly have different opinions, but instead that of two students, one of whom rebels against the teacher;

(3) I then suggest three ways to depict the union of wills that exists between the two students.

The heretic is a Christian who pertinaciously maintains positions on matters of faith which either contradict or are not condoned by the Church. (40) To be a heretic you must also hold that these propositions are part of the truth communicated by Christ (the heretic believes himself to be a Christian).

It would seem that heresy does not at all concern disunion of wills: it is concerned solely with beliefs (albeit with beliefs about matters of faith). Closer inspection shows this assumption to be unfounded.

For Aquinas faith engages the will at two different levels. There is, on the one hand, the allocation of trust to a person: the trust that this person is saying the truth. (41) On the other hand, there is the giving assent to the propositions maintained by this person. The proper content of faith is those propositions the truth or untruth of which we cannot see by ourselves due to our intellectual limitations. (42) One does not need faith to believe that the sum of a triangle's angles equals 180 degrees. One does need faith to believe that one may rise from the dead in fulfillment of the Scriptures. (43) If belief in matters falling within the province of faith were not voluntary, the act of faith could not be meritorious, as it is certainly taken to be by Aquinas. (44)

Thus, we are dealing here with wills, not just with beliefs. We can now return to the initial question: does not the heretic share with the nonheretic a common good which would confer on them the formal union of wills characteristic of friendship? In other words, can it not be said of heretic and nonheretic that "while one deems a certain thing good, the other thinks contrariwise" and that "the discord is in this case incidentally contrary to the divine good or that of our neighbor"? (45)

Aquinas, in any case, agrees that heretics and nonheretics will something in common. He argues that:

 Haeresis means choice. Choice is about means, (46) the end being
 presupposed.

 In matters of belief, the will assents to some truth as its good.
 There are two kinds of truth. A "principal truth" is, as it were, a
 "last end," and "secondary truths" are "means" to this "last end."
 (47)

 The believer assents to a person's words. One can thus distinguish
 between the person and the things said by him (beliefs). The
 holding of the beliefs ("things said") has the character of means
 to an end, the end being the person himself. (48)

 Since choice is about means, the choice of the heretic is about
 those things by which he intends to assent with the person. (49)
 The heretic, while intending to assent to the things said by the
 person, chooses means (beliefs, "things said") that cannot yield
 such assent.

The heretic, in willing to assent to the things said by Christ, shares a last end with the nonheretic but differs as to the chosen means. Thus, apparently, what we have here is not different from what happens in incidental (that is morally indifferent) discord: two people have different opinions giving rise to different choice of means, but they share an end and so, accordingly, their wills are formally united.

Nevertheless, this picture is only superficially correct. A closer look reveals that the discord of the heretic is not innocent. This becomes clear in Aquinas's discussion on whether someone who chooses to believe only in some of the propositions in matters of faith taught by the Church has formed or unformed faith. (50)

Aquinas argues that if you pick only some of the propositions taught by the teacher (in this case the Church), you are, as it were, breaking away from your teacher. (51) It may even be the case, one may speculate, that you assent to all the propositions that a particular teacher holds and yet you do not do so "in the manner of faith"; you do not hold these propositions as a consequence of the trust appropriate to the teacher. The fact that the propositions assented to by two persons are identical does not mean that one has trust or faith in the other. (52) This view is epitomized by the following passage:

 [Conversely,] anyone who from among the many things taught by the
 Church holds those he likes and does not hold the ones he dislikes
 (quae vult tenet et quae non vult non tenet), no longer holds fast
 to Church teaching as an infallible rule (sicut infallibili
 regulae), but to his own will (propriae voluntate). (53)

There are two keys to this passage. First there is the expression "to hold fast to his own will." This "holding fast to one's will" is the typical effect of pride. In Aquinas's discussion pride features on heresy as one of its motivational sources (54) and is elsewhere identified by Aquinas as lying behind religious and political factionalism. The link between pride and the "holding fast to one's own will" is illustrated by this passage:

 [D]iscord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far, to wit,
 as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the other man's
 will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will holds fast
 to its own, this is due to the fact that he prefers things that are
 his to things that are others' and if he does this inordinately, it
 is due to pride and vainglory. (55)

The second key to the previous passage is that, in it, the Church occupies the position of a teacher. Thus, the situation of the heretic is not correctly represented by the picture of two persons converging in an end but disagreeing as to the choice of means. In Aquinas's mind the right representation of the situation of the heretic is this: we have a teacher (the Church) who teaches those things giving assent to which would yield actual assent to Christ. Suppose the teacher has two students, both willing to give assent to Christ, yet one of them "holds fast to his own will" rather than the will of the teacher. This means that he follows his own will in the choice of beliefs intended as means of giving assent to Christ. Notice that this picture is quite different from the one composed of two believers (say, Augustine and Jerome) disagreeing between them, for in the former case we have both the added figure of the teacher (who has made public his teaching), and the added event of rebellion against him by one of his students.

Is there a formal union of wills between the heretic and nonheretic such as suffices for friendship? And if there is, what kind of friendship does it yield? To examine this question it is important to keep in mind the right representation of the situation: a teacher with two students, one of whom chooses to believe what he deems best to believe.

Do the two students share in a common end? I sketch three replies that are not mutually exclusive:

(a) The students share an end in that they both intend to assent to Christ's word. They do not share an end in that one of the students wills to do this by adhering in his choice of means to the choice of the teacher, while the other adheres to his own will. Although both want to give assent to Christ's word, only the one who regulates his choice of means by the will of the teacher does so objectively. So, although they aim at the same end, they do not as a matter of fact share it.

(b) Assenting to what is taught by the teacher is not only a means to a further end but is in itself a (proximate) end, intended by one student and not by the other. The students do not share in the kind of friendship and concord that this common end can give rise to (presumably, this would be the friendship of charity).

(c) Whatever the truth of (a) and (b), what makes friendship difficult is not the ineffectiveness of the means chosen by the heretic (as argued by [a]). Rather the difficulty is generated by the heretic's decision to break away from the directing rule of the teacher. The teacher is no longer a rule for choosing. This generates a difficulty for friendship not simply because (as [b] argues) the students cease sharing a proximate end. The absence of this participation in a common end is not incidental; instead it is intentionally brought about by the heretic. In breaking away from the teacher, the heretic declares himself self-sufficient as to the choice of the intermediate ends in matters of faith. In the same way that rebelling against the teacher (rather than incidentally disagreeing) involves rejecting friendship with him, so rebelling against the directing rule of a teaching consortium or group of which one is a member (once such directing rule has made explicit what we should choose after due deliberative process) involves rejecting membership in this body. This is the significance of "holding fast to one's will" in opposition to the expressed resolution of a group. (56) In this view, the reason why there is no friendship between heretics and nonheretics is that the heretic, in rebelling against the explicit teaching of the Church (of which he is a member), intentionally rejects (as opposed to incidentally lacks) that formal union of wills necessary for friendship of charity.

IV

Working behind Aquinas dictum that "concord is a union of wills, not of opinions" is his theory about love and what love does. The proper effect of love is to unite persons. Love unites them formally: the lover aims to resemble (participate in the form) of the beloved. The lover's movement toward resemblance involves a movement toward resemblance as to his acts of will. "Concord is a union of wills, not of opinions" emphasizes a particular aspect of this movement toward resemblance: the effect of love on choice-making.

Those who love one and the same person commonly participate in the form of the beloved, and they are "one" in that form. Formal union of wills leaves plenty of room for disagreement and the resulting conflicting wills. In fact, for Aquinas, we should not expect to achieve complete union of wills, both formal and material, in all subjects in this life. As long as our knowledge is incomplete, a level of conflict of wills will remain. "Concord is a union of wills, not of opinions," serves the purpose of asserting that as long as this conflict originates in blameless diversity of opinions, the presence of disunion of wills is no evidence of lack of charity, love, or concord.

Aquinas's theory of friendship gives rise to the objection that in Aquinas's own view heretics and nonheretics present the formal union of wills that would--so it has been argued--suffice for friendship. The reply is that although there is some formal union of wills uniting heretics and nonheretics, the problem here is that there is also an element of intentional rejection on the part of the heretic: rejection of the directing rule of the teacher as rule guiding the choice of beliefs. (57)

Correspondence to: Centro Latinoamericano de Economia Humana, Zelmar Michelini 1220, Montevideo, Uruguay.

(1) In II Sent, d. 11, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1; In III Sent, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1c (an early draft has been published by Pierre-M. J. Gils, "Textes inedits de S. Thomas: Les premieres redactions du Scriptum super Tertio Sententiarum," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques 46 (October 1962): 611-12); In IV Sent, d. 13, q. 2, a. 3, obj. 1., ad 1; ST II-II, q. 29, a. 1, obj. 2, ad 2; ST II-II, q. 37, a. 1c.

The following abbreviations will be used in this article: Car: Quaestiones Disputatae de Caritate; Div: Expositio super Dionysium De Divinis Nominibus; Eth: Sententia Libri Ethicorum; In Eph: Reportatio super Epistolam ad Ephesios; In Hebd: Expositio libri Boetii De hebdomadibus; In Sent: Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardiensis (I, II, III, IV); Meta: Sententia super Metaphysicam; ScG: Summa contra Gentiles; ST: Summa Theologiae (I-II, II-II, III, Suppl.); Ver: Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate.

Editions and line numbers as in Roberto Busa, Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia cum Hypertextibus in CD-ROM (Milan: Editoria Elettronica Editel, 1996). Paragraph numbers (in square brackets) as in Marietti editions, as follows: Raphael Cai, S. Thomae Aquinatis Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura (Turin: Marietti, 1953); Pierre Felix Mandonnet, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, bks. 1 and 2 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929); Maria Fabianus Moos, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, bk. 3 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1933) and bk. 4 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1947); Ceslas Pera, S. Thomae Aquinatis in Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio (Turin: Marietti, 1950). Raymundi M. Spiazzi, S. Thomae Aquinatis in Decem Libros Ethicorum: Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio (Turin: Marietti, 1949); idem., S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae, i (Turin: Marietti, 1953); idem., In Aristotelis Peri hermeneias et posteriorum analyticorum (Turin: Marietti, 1955); P. Bazzi, S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae, ii (Turin: Marietti, 1953); and M.-R. Cathala, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria (Turin: Marietti, 1964).

(2) For definitions of the specialized meaning of opinion see In Posteriorum analyticorum, bk. 1, lect. 44, [399] (5) and [400] (6); ST II-II, q. 2, a. 9, obj. 2, ad 2.

(3) Note, for example, that heretics' views (by definition held pertinaciously) are treated as "opinions" (see n. 40) and that views on speculative matters and celestial bodies (that is, views on noncontingent matters) are referred to as "opinions" when Aquinas uses the dictum (see n. 19).

(4) On different types of union see: Meta, V [779]; ST III, q. 2, a. 1c. Compare A. Krempel, La Doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas: Expose historique et systematique (Paris: Vrin, 1952), 610-12.

(5) As is clear from ST I-II, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2.

(6) Nothing suggests that for Aquinas these two kinds of love cannot be present in one and the same relationship.

(7) Similitude as "cause" of love: It is clear from ST I-II, q. 27, a. 3c that Aquinas sees similitude not as an efficient cause of love but more like a final cause. Aquinas distinguishes between two sorts of similitude: (1) that of two things actually sharing the same quality, and (2) that of one thing being like the other only potentially or by way of inclination. Aquinas adds: "whatever is in potentiality, as seen, has the desire for its corresponding actuality; and it takes pleasure in its realisation, if it be sentient and cognitive being." In the voluntary pursuit of a desired similitude (2), similitude stands as a good which "moves" the will by way of attraction. Thanslated in Summa Theologiae (London: Blackfriars and Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964-80). See also In Hebd, lect. 2 [299-309] and [370-5], and Ver, q. 23, a. 7c [204-11]. Present (rather than desired) similitude (1) is a cause of love in a very different sense. Love of oneself propagates to those who are one with oneself in that they share in a form. So because in loving himself a human being loves his humanity, he comes also to love--contingencies aside--those who share the form of humanity. Here similitude is a cause of love not as a final cause but more as a formal cause.

(8) Also In III Sent, d. 29, q. un., a. 6c.

(9) Similitude and formal union: ST I-II, q. 27, a. 3c: "the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness" (duo sunt similes quasi habentes unam formam, sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa). Union per similitudinem: In III Sent, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, sc. 2; d. 5, q. 1, a. 1c (similitude produces union metaphorice speaking), d. 13, a. 3, a. 1, ad 2 (union of grace as similitude); ScG, bk. 4, chap. 41, n. 10; ST I-II, a. 28, a. 1, obj. 2, ad 2; Ver, q. 29, a. 1, obj. 2, ad 2.

(10) This distinction should not be confused with the distinction between love of friendship and erotic love. For Aquinas, both types of love involve a movement toward desired union, but they differ as to the kind of union that they seek.

(11) This picture seems aptly devised for the theological case of love and friendship with God (charity). Aquinas's discussion about love in In III Sent is inserted in the treatment of charity. ST has a different structure: love features there much before charity, under the heading of the passions. For the sharing in a form induced by grace see Ver, q. 22, a. 6, ad 2.

(12) In III Sent, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1c: "Et quia omne quod efficitur forma alicujus, efficitur unum cum illo; ideo per amorem amans fit unum cum amato, quod est factum forma amantis" (my translation).

(13) In III Sent, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4: "Ex hoc enim quod amor transformat amantem in amatum, facit amantem intrare ad interiora amati et e converso, ut nihil amati amanti remaneat non unitum; sicut forma pervenit ad intima formati et e converso." Compare ST I-II, q. 32, a. 5c.

(14) For more on resemblance and conformity see Jean-Pierre Torrell, "Imiter a Dieu comme des enfans bien-aimes: La conformite a Dieu et au Christ dans l' oeuvre de saint Thomas," in Novitas et veritas vitae, Melanges offerts au Professeur Servais Pinekaers a l'occasion de son [65.sup.e] anniversaire, ed. Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Cerf, 1991), 57-9.

(15) See In IV Sent, q. 1, a. 1, qu. 1, ad 4.

(16) "Regula et mensura" as measuring degrees of participation in a form: Something is a mensura of something else when a certain attribute, quality or form is perfectly present therein, so that the degree to which the attribute, quality, or form is present in other things is established with reference to what possesses it perfectly. ST I-II, q. 19, a. 9c: "That which is first in any genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus."

(17) Similitude and imitation as participation: In Ver, q. 23, a. 7c, in discussing the goodness of human wills, Aquinas relies on the general principle that all goodness and being are participated and are diffused by gradation. "[I]n every genus there is some one thing which is primary and the measure of all the other things which are in that genus, for in it the nature of the genus is most perfectly found. This is verified of the nature of colour, for example, in whiteness, which is called the measure of all colours because the extent to which each colour participates in the nature of the genus is known from its nearness to whiteness or its remoteness from it, as said in Metaphysics 1053 b 28 (X). In this way God Himself is the measure of all beings, as can be gathered from the words of Averroes [Meta X comm. 7] (VIII, 254a). Every being has esse in the proportion in which it approaches God by likeness (quantum ei per similitudinem appropinquat). But according as it is found to be unlike Him it approximates nonexistence. And the same must be said of all the attributes which we found in God and in creatures. Hence His intellect is the measure of all knowledge; His goodness, of all goodness; and, to speak more to the point, His good will of every good will"; The Disputed Questions on Truth, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1954). We are speaking here of the similitude of the act of will, not of the faculty of will. See also ST I-II, q. 27, a. 3c; In III Sent, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 9; In Eph [267] lc. 1 (in v. 5:1), quoted in Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas d'Aquin, maitre spirituel (Fribourg: Cerf, Editions Universitaries de Fribourg, 1996), 150. Conformity as imitation: ST I-II, q. 19, a. 9, ad 1: "The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equality (per aequiparantiam), but only by way of imitation (per imitationem). In like manner human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth, and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming to the agent: and this is by way of imitation, not by way of equality." We can imitate God through imitating Christ and conforming our will to his. See Torrell, "Imiter a Dieu," 59-63.

(18) Conformatio as nonreciprocal motion: Ver, q. 23, a. 7, obj. 11 argues that, just as relationships between those who share in one form as friends and brothers do are reciprocal (each has the form of the other), so conformity with God would involve the same kind of reciprocity. Aquinas replies (ad 11) that there is reciprocity only between alikes (in the case of two white men, each conforms in the form of the other). "But when the form is in one principally and in the other in a secondary way, reciprocity of the likeness is not had. But since conformation is a motion towards conformity, it does not imply a reciprocal relation but presupposes one of the related members and denotes that something else is moving toward conformity with it." See also Vet, q. 23, a. 7, obj. 10, ad 10. Conformity is the end state of the process of conformatio, as unity is of unio. Another term that Aquinas sometimes uses to refer to successful imitation is configuratio.

(19) "Oportet etiam ut amatum efficiatur regula appetitivi in his quae eligit, sicut forma rei naturali, et ex hac parte includitur concordia in amore, secundum quam aliquis vult et operatur eadem quae amicus in his quae voluntati subiacent, qua amor ligat, non in opinionibus quae voluntatem preaecedunt, cure sint in intellectu; unde opiniones [-diversae-] (+eadem+) de caelestibus et speculativis non pertinent ad amicitiam, ut dicitur in IX Ethicorum"; In III Sent, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1c (autographi deleta), in Gils, 611-12. See also ST II-II, q. 29, a. 3c. Both texts are reminiscent of Aquinas's treatment of the order between opinions and choices in Eth, bk. 3, lect. 6 [456]: "Sciendum tamen, quod opinio, quum pertineat ad vim cognoscitivam, per se loquendo praecedit electionem quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam, quae movetur a cognoscitiva."

(20) I borrow the expression "packages of means" from John M. Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 67. One should keep in mind that, for Aquinas, opinions themselves can in certain situations be objects of choice inasmuch as choosing to hold a particular opinion can be a means to an end. (I may choose to agree with Peter so as to gain his approval). See section 3.

(21) ST I-II, q 13, a. 6, obj. 1, ad 1; obj. 2, ad 2. See also Eth [1831].

(22) In III Sent, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1c. Choice is particularly important in friendship because, for Aquinas, friendship with companions is a result of choice: "consentire enim sibi invicem in ipsis {that is, speculative matters} non pertinet ad rationem amicitiae, quia amicitia ex electione est, iudicium autem de rebus speculativis est ex necessitate conclusionis"; Eth [1831]. Also ST II-II, q. 26, a. 8, ad 1: "amicitia sociorum propria electione contrahitur in his quae sub nostra electione cadunt, puta in agendis."

(23) In III Sent, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1c.

(24) ST I-II, q. 29, a. 3, obj. 2, ad 2; ST II-II, q. 37, a 1c.

(25) In II Sent, d. 11, q. 2, a. 5.

(26) Daniel 10:13.

(27) PL, 76, 19, [section] 17.

(28) "ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum in IX Ethic cap. VI, amicitiae vel concordiae non repugnat diversitas opinionum, sed solum diversitas voluntatum: unde talis pugna quae est secundum judicia ex diversis meritis sumpta, not obstat unitati caritatis, cum voluntas eorum sit una, ut divina scilicet providentia expleatur."

(29) As in ST I-II, q. 19, a. 10c.

(30) Since, as Aquinas thinks, opinions can sometimes be chosen, and these choices fall under the command of will, choices of opinions are susceptible of moral praise and censure also. See section 3.

(31) ST II-II, q. 29, a. 3, obj. 2.

(32) See also ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 3.

(33) ST II-II, q. 29, a. 1c.

(34) Heresy can only exist when one chooses beliefs on matters of faith that contradict the teaching of the Church (and obstinately maintains these) after these matters have been defined by the Church. ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 3.

(35) A further reason for which concord is necessarily incomplete in this world can be found in Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle asserts that concord can only exist between decent or virtuous men (epieikes) because (among other reasons) their views are stable. Aquinas, taking on Aristotle's use of the expression "so to speak," adds: " 'so to speak' because it is impossible for men to have absolute immutability in this life"; Eth [1839]; Commentary of the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1964).

(36) Ver, q. 23, a. 7c [69-74]: "But in the object of the will two aspects are to be taken into account: one which is, as it were, material--the thing willed; another which is, as it were, formal--the reason for willing, which is the end. It is like the case of the object of sight, in which colour is in effect material, and light is formal, because by light the colour is made actually visible." See also In I Sent, d. 48, q. 1, a. 2c.

(37) In III Sent, d. 23, q. 3, a. 3, qu. 2, obj. 2, sol. 2, ad 2.

(38) For this theme see Yves Congar's "'Ecclesia' et populus (fidelis) dans l'ecclesiologie de S. Thomas," in his Thomas d'Aquin: sa vision de theologie et de l'Eglise (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), 159-73, from Armand Maurer et al., St Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974, Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974).

(39) This objection is vaguely hinted by In IV Sent, d. 13, q. 2, a. 3, obj. 1: "Nihil enim debet impugnari, nisi quod est contra amicitiam, sed diversitas opinionum non est contra concordiam amicitiae, ut Philosophus in IX Eth. dicit. Ergo non sunt impugnandi." And ad 1 "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de opinionibus speculativis tantum. Sed consensus in unitate fidei est principium communionis in caritate. Et ideo dissensus in fide excludit amicitiam familiaritatis."

(40) Hence only a very special type of disagreement makes you a heretic. Aquinas makes Augustine's words his own, saying "[B]y no means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervour, and seek the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth." He adds: "because, to wit, they do not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church"; ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 3.

(41) Ver, q. 14, a. 8c: "[However], faith cannot thus stand as a virtue, deriving from the evidence of things, since it deals with things which do not appear. Consequently, it must derive this infallibility from its adherence to some testimony in which the truth is infallibly found." ST II-II, q. 11, a. 1c: "Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words." In ST II-II, q. 2, a. 2c Aquinas distinguishes between the material object and the formal object of faith. The formal object of faith is "the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith." That medium is God. Hence we not only believe in a God and in God but also quite simply we believe God. Aquinas adds in the next article: "in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him."

(42) On limitation of intellectual capacity as requirement for belief see Ver, q. 14, a. 9c.

(43) ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2c.

(44) ST II-II, q. 2, a. 9c.

(45) ST II-II, q. 37, a. 1c.

(46) For Aquinas means are not simply instruments but also intermediate or "nestled" ends. See Finnis, Aquinas, 35, 64 n. 20, and his "Object and Intention in Moral Judgments according to St. Thomas Aquinas," Thomist 55 (January 1991): 10-14.

(47) ST II-II, q. 11, a. 1c: "Now, in matters of belief, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was shown above: wherefore that which is the chief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end."

(48) "Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place."

(49) "Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to assent to Christ: and such a man has a bad will, so to say, in respect of the very end. This concerns the species of unbelief in pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of his own mind."

(50) The act of faith receives its form from the end. The act of faith is "formed" when its end is that characteristic of charity, namely, love of God. ST II-II, q. 4, aa. 3-4.

(51) See ST II-II, q. 5, a. 3.

(52) Compare with ST II-II, q. 2, 3. 10c and Vet, q. 14, a. 1c (toward the end).

(53) ST II-II, q. 5, a. 3c. Compare Ver, q. 14, a. 10, ad 10 [305-11]; Car, q. un. 13, ad 6; In IIISent, d. 23, q. 3, a. 3., qu. 2., obj. 2; sol. 2, ad 2.

(54) ST II-II, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2, ad 3.

(55) ST II-II, q. 37, a. 2c: "discordia importat quandam disgregationem voluntatum: inquantum scilicet voluntas unius stat in uno et voluntas alterius stat in altero. Quod autem voluntas alicuius in proprio sistat, provenit ex hoc quod aliquis ea quae sunt sua praefert his quae sint aliorum. Quod cum inordinate fit, pertinet ad superbiam et inanem gloriam. Et ideo discordia, per quam unusquisque sequitur quod suum est et recedit ab eo quod est alterius, ponitur filia inanis gloriae."

(56) In like manner Aristotle's homonoia requires the members of the polis to "act on their common resolution." See Nicomachean Ethics 9.6.1167a29-30.

(57) I would like to thank Prof. John Finnis for helpful comments and corrections on an earlier version of this paper.

Centro Latinoamericano de Economia Humana, Montevideo, Uruguay