Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics.

Copan, Paul

MORELAND, J. P. and RAE, Scott B. Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000. 384 pp. Paper, $22.99--What do Jerusalem and Athens have to do with the Mayo Clinic? Biola University professors Moreland (philosopher) and Rae (ethicist) show us the intrinsic connection between substance dualism and the ethics of personhood. Far too often, "science" or "medicine" makes pronouncements on the status of this or that individual's personhood, and it simply has no business doing so. This, Moreland and Rae argue, is the domain of theology and philosophy--however helpful science might be in giving insight to how physical systems (such as the human body) function. Scholar and student alike will profit from their insights, and this book would make an excellent textbook for classes in applied or medical ethics and certain metaphysics courses.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first part (one chapter of it), they begin by presenting biblical justification for a substance dualist position. In the remainder of part 1, they go on to offer an impressive array of sophisticated metaphysical arguments defending this view.

Perhaps contrary to expectations, Moreland and Rae are not Cartesian dualists, but Thomistic substance dualists. This more integrated dualism better supports the kind of functional holism familiar to us all--a deeply unified body-soul/mind interaction which eludes us in Descartes's argumentation. Yet such a formulation makes conceptual room for a temporary disembodied existence. The soul is the "individuated essence that makes the body a human body and that diffuses, informs, animates, develops, unifies, and grounds the biological functions of its body" (p. 202). At any rate, this book serves as an important corrective to the presumed materialism/physicalism in much of today's philosophical (and even theological) climate. After all, if God--a spiritual Being and Creator--exists, then the believer has good reason to think human souls can interact with physical bodies, the physical world, and other free agents and self-movers.

Throughout the bulk of part 1, materialist and complementarian views are examined and found wanting. Human persons are substances rather than property-things. Also, a truly robust understanding of personhood embraces free agency and significant personal identity.

By the admission of many naturalists or complementarians (who make theology and philosophy subservient to the hard sciences), libertarian free agency is simply impossible. However, Moreland and Rae argue that substance dualism rescues robust free agency from the grips of determinism and makes room for personal moral responsibility--in addition to first-person awareness and absolute personal identity. Naturalism-which denies any kind of essence or nature to humans--ultimately robs them of their dignity, freedom, and moral status. As Jaegwon Kim admits, naturalism is "imperialistic," demanding "full coverage," exacting "a terribly high ontological price."

In part 2, abortion and fetal research, reproductive technologies, genetic technologies and human cloning, and euthanasia/end-of-life issues are treated. Moreland and Rae are equally capable in dealing with ethical issues, applying the previously discussed metaphysical insights to the moral status of the fetus, clones, extracorporeal embryos, the comatose, and so forth. It is here we come to a unique feature of the book: Moreland and Rae rightly place importance on the ontological and ethical priority of essentialism as opposed to functionalism (defining human personhood according to the functioning of consciousness, mental abilities, goal-setting abilities, and so forth). Because human beings are substances with hierarchically ordered soulish capacities, even if certain capacities are not presently functioning in some human beings (just as they don't when the rest of us are sleeping!), such capacities continue to exist (latently) because the human whole is ontologically prior to its parts. Such a realization brings clarity to the ethical ramifications regarding personhood, which have been made fuzzy by physicalistic and naturalistic anthropologies. We have an obligation to care for all human beings--whether mentally and physically functioning in normal or abnormal states and at varying maturity levels--and to do harm to none. Moreland and Rae ably defend the rights and intrinsic value of the fetus, the personhood of human clones (as they, being more than identical genetic material, possess souls--although cloning them is ethically problematic), and the personhood of extracorporeal embryos (they possess the same internal essence as the rest of us, needing only the time and environment to mature).

It is no accident that the theistic worldview, which has biblically and historically been dualistic, is being challenged by naturalism and materialism. Substance dualism has important theological ramifications and we should not be surprised to see naturalists resisting them. However, such opposition is not due to the lack of solid philosophical or metaphysical arguments presented by substance dualists. Truly, such a book offers an important counterargument to the rampant pneumatophobia in academia.

Philosopher Richard Swinburne writes of this book: "It is very good to see a version of dualism (constant with the Christian tradition) not merely developed and defended but applied to most of the central issues of medical ethics which are pressing today.... The authors show convincingly how many of their views about medical ethics follow directly from their version of dualism."--Paul Copan, RZIM/Trinity International University.