A Brief History of Western Philosophy.
Taliaferro, Charles
KENNY, Anthony. A Brief History of Western Philosophy. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1998. xiii + 365 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper,
$24.95--A Brief History of Western Philosophy is a stimulating,
impressive work by one of Britain's leading philosophers. It is
valuable both as an introduction to the history of ideas as well as a
record of a distinguished philosopher's mature reflections. In the
Preface, Anthony Kenny aligns his book with Bertrand Russell's A
History of Western Philosophy for, like Russell, he seeks to reach
"the general educated reader, who has no special training, and who
wishes to learn the contribution that philosophy has made to the culture
we live in" (p. x). He succeeds admirably and improves on many of
the maladies of Russell's entertaining but notoriously partisan,
sometimes eccentric masterpiece. In part, Kenny's book may surpass
Russell's because of the fifty years of scholarship that separate
them, but more specifically it may do so because of Kenny's own
first-rate contributions to the study of the history of philosophy. To
put matters quite simply, Kenny is a better historian than Russell. From
the standpoint of studies in the history of philosophy, I would not
trade Kenny's Aquinas, Descartes, or Wycliff for Russell's
Leibniz.
Kenny begins his narrative with the Presocratics and ends with
Wittgenstein. He breaks with Russell and some other historians by giving
substantial, serious attention to the medieval period, one of
Kenny's areas of specialization. Given the enormous scope of this
brief history, the book has an unavoidable encyclopedic tenor. Readers
are introduced to distinct, freestanding chapters, as opposed to a
unified narrative as in Arthur Lovejoy's magisterial The Great
Chain of Being in which a single theme is the focus throughout, or the
more recent, superb The Mind of God and the Works of Man, in which
Edward Craig traces the tension between two philosophical projects. Yet
Kenny is also less confined than either Lovejoy or Craig. He takes on a
wider array of themes and explores the role of philosophy in the history
of politics, economics, and religion.
In the Preface, Kenny commends an argumentative, critical
engagement with the history of philosophy. "I mean no disrespect by
engaging thus in argument with the great minds of the past. That is the
way to take a philosopher seriously: not to parrot his text, but to
battle with it, and learn from its strengths and weaknesses" (p.
xi). Throughout the history, Kenny's battle with various texts is
very much in evidence. Here is a sampling from Chapter 14: "Where
Locke really goes astray is in thinking ..."; "Berkeley was
correct, against Locke in thinking ..."; "Hylas should have
replied ..."; "Hume is right that ..."; "Hume is
wrong to say...." The picture that comes into focus is that
philosophy can be a pretty combative, sometimes hostile business.
Wittgenstein was "hostile" about such and such philosophies
(p. 343), and he was hostile toward a specific branch of philosophy (p.
345). Wittgenstein made a "frontal attack" on such and such
(p. 344). Before him, Hume had "hostility" about X (p. 241),
whereas Descartes was "contemptuous" about something else (p.
308). "Philosophy of mind has often been a battlefield
between" X and Y (p. 343). At points this brief history is akin to
Carlyle's Great Man theory of history, though instead of Good Queen
Elizabeth and Bad King John, we have Good Wittgenstein and Bad
Descartes. Kenny's views are often well articulated, insightful,
and nuanced; even Descartes receives some support from Kenny against
Antoine Arnauld (p. 198). Yet there are also occasions when Kenny's
history seems in danger of the charge that John Wisdom leveled against
Russell's history: it contains some "provocative
dogmatism." Kenny writes that dualism has been "decisively
refuted in the twentieth century by Wittgenstein" (p. 201).
Challenged, yes, and maybe even shown to be profoundly implausible, but
decisively refuted? This is far from obvious. Unfortunately or
fortunately, it is difficult for philosophers to claim absolute,
uncompromising victory in such debate. There are, after all, credible
dualist replies to the private language argument. Dualism, Berkeleyan
idealism, the ontological argument and others, each have extraordinary
resilience in the history of our field and each has formidable,
skillful, contemporary advocates.
Kenny gives prominence to historical debates about free will and
the compatibility of free will and divine omniscience. He gives special
attention to the development of logic. "The most important event in
the history of philosophy in the nineteenth century was the invention of
mathematical logic" (p. 319). Perhaps to underscore the primacy of
logic, Kenny concludes his discussion of Socrates by noting that the
most frequent reference to Socrates by philosophers is simply as a
"dummy name" in the logical syllogism: All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man; Therefore Socrates is mortal (p. 34). Grammar and
conceptual analysis are highlighted in his history. "To explain
what ontology is, and what Parmenides' poem is about, it is
necessary to go into detail about points of grammar and translation. The
reader's patience with this pedantry will be rewarded, for between
Parmenides and the present-day, ontology was to have a vast and
luxuriant growth, and only a sure grasp of what Parmenides meant, and
what he failed to mean, enables one to see one's way clear over the
centuries through the ontological jungle" (p. 8).
There are some peculiarities in this brief history. In his
depiction of Christianity in the section titled "Jesus of
Nazareth" there is no mention that Christians believe in the
resurrection of Jesus Christ (pp. 91-4). Obviously this conviction has
been central to the religious tradition and it has been the focus of
extensive philosophical reflection. Perhaps Kenny assumes that most
readers are familiar with this central claim and its role in
philosophical theology, but regrettably Biblical literacy is not very
strong in the current English-speaking world. Later, Kenny refers to St.
Paul's doctrine of the resurrection of the body (p. 96) but this
reference will seem enigmatic to someone who is not theologically
literate. An offhand allusion to "Christian hell" will also
seem strange to readers who have no theological background (p. 2). Like
Russell in his history, Kenny is not an enthusiastic Hegelian.
"Hegel's writings are extremely difficult to read. They also
make a great immediate impression of profundity." Yet "[o]n
closer examination, some readers find that impression enhanced, others
find that it evaporates" (p. 274). Kenny is more or less among the
latter group of readers. Also, like Russell, Kenny is no friend of
Nietzsche. "It would be unphilosophical to regard Nietzsche's
final insanity as a reason for discounting his philosophy; but on the
other hand, it is not easy to feel much pity for one who regarded pity
as the most despicable of all emotions" (p. 303). Fans of Hegel and
Nietzsche, along with dualists, may pine for a more sympathetic hearing.
A Brief History of Western Philosophy is a richly detailed,
critical look at philosophy, displaying both Kenny's love for
philosophical engagement and for good history. The book is polemical; it
is certainly not a bland treatise on the pacific nature of philosophy.
Kenny's style is unpretentious, effective, and at times wonderfully
informal and amiable. "If you wanted to put Descartes's main
ideas on the back of a postcard you would need just two sentences: man
is a thinking mind; matter is extension in motion" (p. 191). In
all, one would do well "not to parrot [the] text, but to battle
with it, and learn from its strengths and weaknesses" (p. xi).
--Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College.