首页    期刊浏览 2025年08月06日 星期三
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent.
  • 作者:Mossoff, Adam
  • 期刊名称:The Review of Metaphysics
  • 印刷版ISSN:0034-6632
  • 出版年度:2000
  • 期号:March
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Philosophy Education Society, Inc.
  • 摘要:What is this "architecture of order" that McClure finds so illuminating? Quite simply, it is the "God-given order of nature" presumed by seventeenth century England to have set forth both an existential and a moral framework for understanding human society (p. 5). Thus, it is not only true that "[n]atural law and natural right ... define the objective moral boundaries of properly human action" in the state of nature, but also that these moral precepts are accessible by and obvious to anyone who uses their God-given capacity for right reason (p. 96). Within this decidedly theistic universe, Locke finds a self-sustaining purpose for humankind that unites practical living and the moral ideal, that is, judgments about how to live are necessarily linked with proper moral judgments. McClure thus concludes from her review of this metaphysical architecture of order that "the political problematic Locke addresses ... pivots crucially upon the question of judgment" (p. 100).
  • 关键词:Book reviews;Books

Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent.


Mossoff, Adam


MCCLURE, Kristie M. Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. x + 327 pp. Cloth, $30.00--As an Enlightenment philosopher and the father of liberalism, John Locke's explication of the natural right to property, of limited government, and of the right to rebellion constitute fascinating ideas that are often treated by scholars as deserving of attention in and of themselves. This is not the case for Kristie McClure. McClure is more interested in the "architecture of order" (p. 13) and how this metaphysical and epistemological metaphor ultimately shapes and defines Locke's political theory. From this perspective, McClure draws out some interesting insights into the nature of Locke's political philosophy.

What is this "architecture of order" that McClure finds so illuminating? Quite simply, it is the "God-given order of nature" presumed by seventeenth century England to have set forth both an existential and a moral framework for understanding human society (p. 5). Thus, it is not only true that "[n]atural law and natural right ... define the objective moral boundaries of properly human action" in the state of nature, but also that these moral precepts are accessible by and obvious to anyone who uses their God-given capacity for right reason (p. 96). Within this decidedly theistic universe, Locke finds a self-sustaining purpose for humankind that unites practical living and the moral ideal, that is, judgments about how to live are necessarily linked with proper moral judgments. McClure thus concludes from her review of this metaphysical architecture of order that "the political problematic Locke addresses ... pivots crucially upon the question of judgment" (p. 100).

This shift from the architecture of order to the problem of judgment--a shift from metaphysics to epistemology--is best illustrated in McClure's discussion of Locke's analysis of the development of money. It is undisputed that Locke views the development of money as the driving force for the creation of civil society. Scholars differ widely, however, on whether Locke considers money an immoral or moral device for creating civil society. McClure sidesteps this interpretive dispute by focusing on the function of money within the God-given order--discussing how it impacts human decisions based upon this order.

McClure maintains that in Locke's original state of nature humankind lives within the God-given moral framework of production for immediate use. Yet, "money introduces into human judgments of convenience a worldly consideration that knows no bounds, an estimation of value that recognizes no natural limits" (p. 182). As such, money dissolves a person's ability simply to observe and reason as to each other's moral obligations. The result is that "money removes Locke's natural agents from the original order of God's design and deposits them in new circumstances, new social relations, plagued by a moral chaos of their own making" (p. 185). The move toward civil society is thus not a response to immoral or moral usage of money, but rather is a response to the need for neutral agents to assist people in discerning what are the proper moral actions. Civil society arises out of an epistemological need; it is an answer to a human-created problem of how to reach a proper moral judgment.

In similarly interesting ways, McClure draws upon the architecture of order metaphor throughout her book and develops several, integrated themes concerning Locke's political theory. One of her more intriguing conclusions is that according to Locke the function of government is not to protect rights as such, but rather is to reorient its citizens back towards the God-given moral order of the cosmos; thus, "Locke can be seen here as simultaneously a proponent of limited government and a strong state theorist" (pp. 284-5). What makes this conclusion at least intriguing is that McClure derives it not from any preset ideological program, but rather from adopting the metaphysical and epistemological perspective of Locke and his contemporaries. In thus developing a new perspective on Locke's Treatises, McClure has produced a work of scholarship that is deserving of her subject.

--Adam Mossoff, University of Chicago Law School.
联系我们|关于我们|网站声明
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有