Begriffne Geschichte: Das historische Substrat und die systematische Anordnung der Bewu[Beta]tseinsgestalten in Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes: Interpretation und Kommentar.

Pozzo, Riccardo ; GUNN, ALBERT E.

FALKE, Gustav-Hans H. Begriffne Geschichte: Das historische Substrat und die systematische Anordnung der Bewu[Beta]tseinsgestalten in Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes: Interpretation und Kommentar. Berlin: Lukas, 1996. 360 pp. Cloth, DM 68.00--This volume is the revised version of a Ph.D. dissertation at the Technische Universitat Braunschweig under the direction of Claus-Heinrich Scheier. Like the one by Scheier (Analytischer Kommentar zu Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes [Freiburg: Alber, 1980]), but not quite as large, this volume purports to provide a section to section commentary of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. It follows another path, though. This path is already made clear by Falke in the title of his book, which is a famous quotation, "conceived history." In fact, this interpretation relies on the following three premises. First, "in all experiences of consciousness Hegel refers himself to determinate historical positions" (p. 7). Second, "the criticism of the form of consciousness implies at the same time an exposition of the whole system" (p. 7). Third, "the Phenomenology is a work in progress" (p. 8). These premises may appear at first sight puzzling. Nevertheless, they show coherence. Falke does not maintain that the Phenomenology refers to a set of historical events or positions, he rather says that it should be read "as a systematic reconstruction of historical positions" (p. 7). That a criticism by Hegel implies a positive account of his own system is something every reader of the Phenomenology knows too well. What one tends to ignore is, as suggested by Falke, that the arguments of the Phenomenology grew to their final shape while Hegel was at work. The evidence for this assumption is to be found in the oftentimes irritating ruptures in the historical or material development (why does Stoicism, for instance, come immediately after the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage?), which evidently point to systematic reinterpretations of already composed text parts (p. 8).

Generally, the aim of this commentary is to make clear that Hegel reacted against the destruction of traditional society around 1800, that is, the destruction of metaphysics and religion in the Standestaat. The autonomy of consciousness and of conscience, as well as the citizen's private life and the freedom of subjectivity are seen by Hegel as a necessary result of world history. Yet at the same time, this subjectivity, says Falke, is experienced as a destructive self-referred atom, so that pluralism of opinion and private property tend to render human order impossible. Having noticed this, Hegel proposes dialectic as a method for criticizing the forms of consciousness in their isolation and at the same time for legitimizing them as parts of a whole. Subjectivity must come to terms with collective reason. This means that, if subjectivity gives expression to philosophy, then Hegelian philosophy is a metaphilosophy of that philosophy (p. 10). Falke exemplifies this main argument in a section for section commentary. One such analysis is dedicated to chapter 7, "Religion." According to Falke, religion and spirit relate to each other as consciousness and self-consciousness because spirit considers ethnicity "from the standpoint of consciousness" (Phenomenology, #672) and religion considers it "from the standpoint of self-consciousness" (#678). The objects of religion are the symbolic forms in which spirit becomes certain of its essence by means of that consciousness which spirit conceives within world history (p. 331). This explains why Hegel deals with natural religion (light, plants and animals, the artisan), with the religion of art (abstract, vital, and spiritual works of art), and with revealed religion (that is with the Judeo-Christian tradition). On the whole, this is a rather stimulating and instructive book. An index rerum, had it been provided, would have helped.

Riccardo Pozzo, The Catholic University of America.