Difference and Dissent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern Europe.
Massie, Pascal ; GUNN, ALBERT E.
NEDERMAN, Cary J. and LAURSEN, John Christian. Difference and
Dissent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern Europe.
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. ix + 240 pp. Cloth,
$62.50; paper, $23.95--Western liberal democracies praise themselves for
protecting a full range of differences among individuals and groups. The
origin of this ongoing process is thought to be Locke's Epistola de
Tolerantia. Before the Reformation, it is assumed, "a multiplicity
of beliefs was deemed to be dangerous, as well as evil; diversity was,
so to speak, the devil's work, and where it existed it was to be
stamped out" (p. 1). Yet, although flattering to liberalism, the
conceit of a modern liberal discovery of liberty of conscience is both
conceptually simplistic and historically misleading. The main virtue of
this volume is to challenge this tale of Western political history. The
essays presented seek (1) to demonstrate that premodern thinkers
generated alternative theories of toleration; and (2) to contribute to a
philosophical analysis of tolerance.
A number of contributors successfully challenge the claim according
to which the only valid point of departure for a strong theoretical
defense of legitimate differences must be some conception of subjective
human rights. Contrasting John of Salisbury and Marsiglio of Padua,
Nederman argues that "Medieval understanding of rights tended to be
subsumed under issues of group identity and functional status ...
Consequently, individual liberty was often filtered through intermediary
identities organized according to particular tasks and duties performed
within the context of the communal community" (p. 19). Thus,
toleration is not a "privilege" granted at the whim of some
superior authority but a "necessity" built into the very terms
of social interaction. Kate Forhan, in a convincing analysis of
Christine de Pizan, establishes that a "theory of toleration can be
based on primarily functional grounds" (p. 79). Gary Remer shows
that Bodin's theory of toleration is grounded on a positive
conception of divine truth rather than on the underlying skepticism of
modern liberal arguments. Stephen Lahey's essay on John Wyclift
shows how the demands of a theology of Grace and a metaphysical realism
can entail the promotion of systematic tolerance.
Yet beyond the question of historical accuracy, this book offers
important reformulations of tolerance. Several studies suggest that
Turchetti's opposition between "toleration" (which
implies the ineliminability of religious diversity) and
"concordance" (which implies temporary forbearance but never
approval of, or resignation to difference) needs to be revised.
One might wonder, however, whether functionalism can really account
for differences, or whether it reduces the other to its particular
function within the whole of the social body. Tolerance is limited to
those forms of actions and beliefs that do not impinge on the
intercommunication of functions among the parts of the community. As
Forhan puts it, the discourse of tolerance demonstrates a
"willingness to accept otherness in spite of itself rather than
because of difference" (p. 71). Glenn Burgess's essay
illustrates this point by showing that the narrow toleration allowed by
Hobbes concerns the "duty" of the sovereign rather than the
"right" of individuals. There lies a fundamental aporia. One
cannot call for unlimited toleration without contradiction. Should we
tolerate the intolerants? If one is to answer no, then one is not fully
tolerant, if one answers yes, then one's tolerance contributes to
intolerance. Thus, tolerance either requires or promotes intolerance.
Eventually, it is not clear whether a functionalist account has a better
answer to this riddle than a liberal one. Nevertheless, by demonstrating
the broad array of theories of tolerance, this book opens promising
paths of inquiry for political philosophy.
Pascal Massie, Vanderbilt University.