KANT ON THE MATERIAL GROUND OF POSSIBILITY: FROM THE ONLY POSSIBLE ARGUMENT TO THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

FISHER, MARK ; WATKINS, ERIC

KANT ARGUES AT GREAT LENGTH in the Critique of Pure Reason that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated by means of theoretical reason. For after dividing all traditional theistic proofs into three different kinds--the ontological, the cosmological, and the physicotheological(1)--Kant argues first that the cosmological and physicotheological implicitly assume the ontological argument and then that the ontological argument is necessarily fallacious. By restricting knowledge in this manner Kant notoriously makes room for faith, that is, in this case, for a practical proof of the existence of God, which he develops in the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant's reasons for rejecting theoretical proofs(2) of the existence of God have received considerable attention. In particular, Kant's objection to the ontological argument, namely that existence is not a real predicate, still seems relevant in contemporary philosophy of religion.(3) What has not received much attention, however, is the relationship between Kant's rejection of theistic proofs in his critical period (that is, starting with the publication of the first Critique in 1781) and his views on the matter in his pre-critical period. For throughout his pre-critical period, but especially in his The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763), Kant believes that there is a theoretical proof of the existence of God. One would naturally expect Kant's criticisms of theistic proofs as developed in the "ideal of pure reason" (that is, the third chapter of the first Critique's transcendental dialectic) to apply in straightforward ways to his earlier attempts at a theistic proof. However, Kant rejects the three traditional arguments in The Only Possible Argument just as he does in the first Critique. Further, his reason for rejecting the ontological argument in particular is identical to the one presented in the first Critique: "Existence is not a predicate or a determination of a thing."(2) Accordingly, Kant understood himself to be developing a theistic proof in The Only Possible Argument that is distinct from the three traditional arguments and is also not subject to the objections he raises against them. Given that Kant rejects all theoretical proofs of God's existence in his critical period and given that he did not take his critical objections to the traditional proofs to apply to the theistic proof developed in The Only Possible Argument, what is his justification for rejecting his pre-critical argument for God's existence?(3)

In this paper, after first reconstructing in some detail Kant's precritical theistic proof as it is developed in The Only Possible Argument (1), we shall argue that standard answers to this question, which focus on general features of either transcendental idealism or the "critical turn," are inadequate (2). Instead, we maintain that an examination of several passages from the ideal of pure reason is crucial to discerning Kant's subtle position (3). For it reveals that Kant continues to endorse his pre-critical argument, though he weakens its conclusion by positing God as merely a regulative rather than a constitutive principle. By weakening the status of the argument's conclusion in this manner Kant hopes to avoid any conflict with his general claim that the existence of God cannot be proved while still being able to invoke God in certain epistemic contexts. However, the fact that Kant modifies his position in this delicate way does not obviate the original question. For it is still appropriate to ask what Kant's justification is for rejecting the original (or full-strength) conclusion of his pre-critical theistic argument. That is, why does Kant's argument not establish God's existence as a constitutive principle? Although it is tempting to think that Kant could apply his general strategy in the dialectic (as found, for example, in his resolution to the antinomies) to this theological context, we shall suggest that Kant's change of position is ultimately based on, and thus stands or falls with, his unique analysis of reason and the understanding.

Kant's argument for the existence of God in The Only Possible Argument is based on an analysis of the concept of possibility.(4) Its basic idea is that the existence of a necessary being is the only condition under which the possibility of objects in general can be made intelligible. For possibility requires not only that a concept contain no contradiction, but also that there be a content to the concept that would be available for thought. However, the content of the concepts of things can be provided only by something that exists necessarily, namely God. Accordingly, the argument proceeds in three stages. The first stage establishes the principle of contradiction as the formal ground of possibility, the second stage proves the existence of something that can supply the content of concepts, and the third stage shows that this something not only exists, but exists necessarily and in fact must be God.

The first stage of the argument establishes what Kant refers to as the formal element(5) of possibility. This element is the law of contradiction, according to which those things thought together in a concept are compared to determine the possibility of the thing to which this concept is thought to refer. As such, this law relates to the logical relations among predicates and the relationship of these predicates to their subjects. If a concept fails to meet this criterion, that is, contains a contradiction, the concept and the thing to which it is thought to refer are deemed internally impossible. Kant presents this stage of the argument accordingly:

P1) If x is both affirmed and denied of y, then y is self-contradictory.

P2) If y is self-contradictory, then y is internally impossible. C1) If x is both affirmed and denied of y, then y is internally impossible.(6)

In the above argument, x stands for any predicate which is thought in relation to a subject y. Since the law of contradiction is generally accepted as a criterion of possibility, establishing this conclusion is relatively unproblematic.

The status of the principle of contradiction is, however, somewhat different for Kant from what it is for many of his rationalist predecessors. According to Leibniz and Wolff, the law of contradiction is the fundamental principle of all truths and the sole criterion of possibility.(7) If the law of contradiction is in fact the sole criterion of possibility, P2 would be the definition of internal impossibility. For impossibility would occur in all and only those cases where a logical contradiction occurs. Although Kant does admit the truth of P2, he is not willing to grant that it defines impossibility.(8) Kant resists the conversion of this premise and therefore the idea that it would be a definition of impossibility because he holds that the law of contradiction is not the only means available for establishing impossibility.

Kant argues for this point by distinguishing (as Leibniz and Wolff do not) between the formal and material elements of possibility.(9) As mentioned above, the law of contradiction constitutes the formal, or logical, element of possibility. The material element, by contrast, is constituted by that which is compared according to the law of contradiction:

 A quadrangular triangle is absolutely impossible. Nonetheless, a triangle
 is something, and so is a quadrangle. The impossibility is based simply on
 the logical relations which exist between one thinkable thing and another,
 where the one cannot be a characteristic mark of the other. Likewise, in
 every possibility we must first distinguish the something which is thought,
 and then we must distinguish the agreement of what is thought in it with
 the law of contradiction.(10)

The "something which is thought" represents the material for thought, and thus for possibility. This material is a necessary condition for the absolute possibility of anything whatsoever. Accordingly, it must be given through something real. An explanation of the possibility of something through the positing of material elements which are themselves merely possible is not sufficient. Given that the issue concerns absolute possibility, the ground of this possibility cannot itself require a further ground, which would be the case if the material elements required by the absolute possibility of something were themselves merely possible. Kant's argument for the claim that impossibilities can arise in cases where no formal contradiction occurs can be reconstructed as follows:

P3) If nothing exists, then there is no material element for thinking y (or anything else).

P4) If there is no material element for thinking y (or anything else), then y (and everything else) is internally impossible.

C2) If nothing exists, then y (and everything else) is internally impossible.(11)

In the above argument, y stands for any object or state of affairs, both of which are captured by the phrase "things in general." Impossibility, in this case, cannot be established by the law of contradiction. A contradiction arises only in cases where the same thing is both affirmed and denied of a subject, and since in the case where nothing exists nothing is being affirmed, a contradiction cannot be generated. Hence, if there is no data for thinking anything whatsoever, there is no possibility, but there is likewise no contradiction.(12)

At this point in the argument, Kant has established that the absolute possibility of things in general presupposes both the law of contradiction (C 1) and the existence of something that provides the material element of thought (C2). The next stage of the argument concerns the inference from the necessary presupposition of some existence to the positing of the existence of an absolutely necessary being, which must be God. To this end, Kant first examines the possible ways in which such an indeterminate existence might provide the material element for thought:

 Now, this relation of all possibility to some existence or other can be of
 two kinds. Either the possible can only be thought insofar as it is itself
 real, and then the possibility is given as a determination existing within
 the real; or it is possible because something else is real; in other words,
 its internal possibility is given as a consequence through another
 existence ... the actuality, by means of which, as by means of a ground,
 the internal possibility of other realities is given, I shall call the
 first real ground of this absolute possibility, the law of contradiction
 being in like manner the first logical ground, for the formal element of
 possibility consists in agreement with it. In the same way, that which is
 real furnishes the data or material element of that which can be
 thought.(13)

In this way Kant argues that the formal and material elements of possibility require both logical and real grounds which establish the possibility of things.(14) From the necessity of these grounds, Kant then argues for the absolute necessity of some existence as follows:

 P5) If the logical ground of thought is canceled, then all possibility
 vanishes.

 P6) If the ultimate real ground of thought is canceled, then all
 possibility vanishes.

 C3) If either the logical or ultimate real ground of thought is canceled,
 then all possibility vanishes.

 P7) If all possibility vanishes then nothing can be thought.

 C4) If not-x cancels either the logical or ultimate real ground of thought,
 then not-x eliminates everything which can be thought.

 P8) If not-x eliminates everything which can be thought, then not-x is
 internally impossible.

 Def.) If not-x is internally impossible, then x exists absolutely
 necessarily.

 C5) If not-x cancels either the logical or ultimate real ground of thought,
 then x exists absolutely necessarily.

 P9) The cancellation of existence cancels the ultimate real ground of
 thought.

 C6) There is something that exists absolutely necessarily. 15

Once it is accepted that all possibility presupposes some existence, it is fairly easy to establish that this existence is necessary. For if the existence presupposed by all possibility did not exist, nothing would be possible. If nothing is possible, then nothing can be thought. Therefore, since the nonexistence of that which grounds thought cannot be possible, that which grounds thought must exist with absolute necessity.(16)

While this argument differs from Leibniz's explicit claims about possibility insofar as Leibniz does not specifically acknowledge any material element or ground of possibility,(17) Kant clearly thinks that the argument is based on considerations that Leibniz and his followers could not easily reject. For example, Kant's claim that the absolute possibility of all things whatsoever must be grounded in a necessary being is consistent with the Leibnizian view that possible worlds must exist in the divine understanding before God decides (via the divine will) which world to create. Similarly, Kant's account of the possibility of individuals is consistent with Leibniz's, that is, the possibility of an individual is represented through its complete concept. Finally, even Kant's use of the notion of the material element of possibility is not inconsistent with Leibniz's actual position. For Leibniz simply assumes that concepts and predicates are somehow given (so that the predicates can be contained in the complete concept of an individual) without explicitly raising the issue of what the source of the material element of the concepts and predicates are.

What Kant and Leibniz differ on is existence.(18) This difference can be seen most clearly by considering Kant's objection to the ontological argument in The Only Possible Argument:

 Existence is not a predicate or a determination of a thing. This
 proposition seems strange and absurd, but it is indubitably certain. Take
 any subject you please, for example, Julius Caesar. Draw up a list of all
 the predicates which may be thought to belong to him, not excepting those
 of space and time. You will quickly see that he can either exist with all
 these determinations, or not exist at all. The Being who gave existence to
 the world and to our hero within that world could know every single one of
 these predicates without exception, and yet still be able to regard him as
 a merely possible thing which, in the absence of that Being's decision to
 create him, would not exist.(19)

Kant is pointing to an inconsistency here between Leibniz's theory of complete concepts and his views on existence. Leibniz holds that existence is a perfection, or a positive simple predicate, and that since God contains all perfections he must likewise contain existence. Kant recognizes that this conception of existence is inconsistent with the Leibnizian position that God is in possession of complete concepts of possible things. If the concept of a possible thing is indeed complete, then whatever it is that is effected by God's choice to actualize that thing, it cannot be the case that any new predicates are added to this concept, since it is already complete. Thus, to say that a thing, x, exists cannot be, as Leibniz seems to indicate, to say that the predicate of existence is included in the concept of x.

Kant argues that existence is not a predicate. Thus, the complete concept of a thing is still indeterminate as to whether or not it applies to an actual or a merely possible thing. If this is the case, no amount of analysis of the concept will justify the claim that the object to which this concept refers is an actual object. If existence were a predicate and the complete concept of an actual thing contained existence, then we could not refer to a thing as possible and as actual by means of the same concept. Such a consequence is of course unacceptable, since we consider actual things to be possible as well. Thus, existence cannot be a predicate if the complete concept theory is to be maintained.(20)

Accordingly, Kant revises his conception of existence. Kant's general positive statement about existence is that it "is the absolute positing of a thing. Existence is thereby also distinguished from any predicate; the latter is, as such, always posited only relative to some other thing."(21) While Kant realizes that this explanation does not render the concept of existence much clearer than it otherwise was, he does not see this as a weakness of his characterization. Rather he sees this as an inevitable facet of the concept of existence. Since existence is a simple notion, not much can be said to render this notion distinct if one is not already familiar with it. Kant here makes an interesting point which is important for understanding his characterization of existence:

 Once it is appreciated that the whole of our cognition ultimately resolves
 itself into unanalysable concepts, it will also be understood that there
 will be some concepts which are almost unanalysable; in other words, there
 will be some concepts where the characteristic marks are only to a very
 small degree clearer and simpler than the thing itself. Such is the case
 with our definition of existence. I readily admit that it is only in a very
 small degree that our definition renders distinct the concept of that which
 is defined. But the nature of the object in relation to the faculty of our
 understanding does not admit of a higher degree of distinctness.(22)

While the concept of absolute positing is not much clearer and more distinct than is that of existence, it may be possible to elaborate on the latter by appealing to the former. Kant in effect does this when he contrasts absolute positing and relative positing. Relative positing consists in the relationship between a subject and its characteristic marks; for instance, three-sidedness is posited relative to a triangle. Yet nothing is posited absolutely by this relationship; we know that if a triangle is posited, three sides must be posited as well, but we do not know that a triangle must be or is posited. We can make no existence claims based solely on this relative positing. In order to make such claims we must have recourse to the positing of the thing along with all its characteristic marks, that is, to its absolute positing.

From these considerations, it is possible to understand Kant's conception of the distinction between concepts of things as possible and as actual and the extent to which these concepts refer to the same object. In answer to the question "[c]an it be said that there is more in existence than there is in mere possibility?" Kant draws another distinction in the concept of positing:

 In order to answer this question let me merely remark in advance that a
 distinction must be drawn between what is posited and how it is posited. As
 far as the former is concerned: no more is posited in a real thing than is
 posited in a merely possible thing, for all the determinations and
 predicates of the real thing are also to be found in the mere possibility
 of that same thing. However, as far as the latter is concerned: more is
 posited through actuality ... for positing through an existent thing
 involves the absolute positing of the thing itself as well.(23)

Thus, the complete determination of a thing can be expressed through the same concept whether this concept is taken to refer to an actual thing or to a possible thing, for the same determinations posited in the concept of the former are likewise posited in the latter. In the case where this concept refers to an existent thing, all these determinations are posited through the concept as actual and as inhering in the subject which is posited absolutely. However, if the concept refers to a thing which is merely possible, these same determinations are posited relative to the (possible) subject and would actually inhere in it only if the subject were to be posited absolutely.

In this way Kant is able to maintain the Leibnizian theory of complete concepts while removing the inconsistency which arises from treating existence as a predicate. As a result, Kant's proof for the existence of God differs significantly from the Leibnizian ontological proof. While Kant's proof is ontological, that is, it is carried out entirely a priori, it proceeds from the absolute possibility of all things in general, given as a consequence, to the existence of the only thing that could ground this possibility, namely the necessary being, or God. The Leibnizian ontological argument, by contrast, proceeds from the possibility of God, as expressed by his definition, to his existence as a necessary consequence. Whereas the latter argument cannot succeed if existence is not a predicate, Kant's argument is unaffected by this claim.

II

Obviously, the critical Kant cannot accept the argument of The Only Possible Argument without qualification. However, it is far from clear what it is about this argument that Kant rejects and, more importantly, what his reasons are for rejecting it. In light of the fact that Kant presents this basic argument form repeatedly throughout his pre-critical period (from the Nova dilucidatio in 1755 to the Inaugural Dissertation in 1770), it is unlikely that Kant has become aware of some simple mistake in the argument.(24) What might seem more probable is that Kant's change of perspective in transcendental idealism or the "critical turn" somehow invalidates the fundamental structure of the argument.(25) Not only does the emergence of transcendental idealism in its full form coincide with the rejection of his precritical theistic proof, but transcendental idealism is a doctrine that is central to Kant's entire project. Yet how exactly does transcendental idealism reveal the fallacy involved in Kant's pre-critical theistic proof?

Transcendental idealism might seem to be crucial to Kant's rejection of his pre-critical theistic proof in a number of ways. First, since it implies that we can have knowledge only of appearances and not of things in themselves and since God is not an appearance, it is clear that we cannot have knowledge of God's existence. Second, Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction, which establishes that applying the categories to sensible intuition establishes their objective reality (that is, can result in knowledge), might be taken to show that we cannot attain knowledge of God's existence. Since no intuition of God is possible, the concept by means of which we think of God cannot be shown to have objective reality and thus no knowledge of God is possible. Third, the synthetic a priori status of the claim that God exists might seem to be problematic for his pre-critical theistic proof insofar as any claim whose content is synthetic and whose justification is a priori cannot pertain to things in themselves, because synthetic a priori truths can be established only through recourse to possible experience (and things in themselves, by definition, cannot be given in possible experience).(26) Thus, for a number of reasons transcendental idealism might seem to show that and why Kant's pre-critical theistic proof must fail.

While transcendental idealism is certainly not irrelevant to Kant's pre-critical theistic proof, it is not sufficient to justify Kant's rejection of this argument. Most importantly, simply claiming that we cannot have knowledge of God's existence because God is not an appearance and transcendental idealism allows knowledge only of appearances simply begs the question insofar as it is supposed to provide a reason for rejecting this argument. For transcendental idealism is one of the first Critique's conclusions, not one of its assumptions; its various arguments must establish transcendental idealism, not vice versa.(27) More specifically, the transcendental dialectic plays the crucial role of establishing the negative thesis that we cannot have knowledge of things in themselves. For it purports to show that any argument attempting to establish knowledge claims about things in themselves--whether it be about the soul and its immortality, the world taken as an absolute whole (including freedom), or God--must somehow be fallacious. If one could develop an argument establishing the immortality of the soul, the ultimate extent and composition of the world, or the existence of God that could not be refuted, then transcendental idealism would be false. Kant even emphasizes such a consequence in his discussion of the status of rational psychology's argument for the simplicity of thinking things in the paralogisms: "Indeed it would be a great stumbling block or rather would be the one unanswerable objection to our whole critique, if it were possible to prove a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances."(28) Now, the transcendental analytic contributes in significant ways to establishing transcendental idealism. In particular, the transcendental deduction attempts to show that it is legitimate to apply the categories to sensible intuition (despite their radically different origins). However, taken by itself, it establishes only that the categories have objective reality (that is, knowledge is possible) if the categories are applied to sensible intuitions, not that they have objective reality (that is, knowledge is possible) only if the categories are applied to sensible intuitions.(29) While Kant does occasionally seem to assert the stronger claim,(30) ultimately such a claim can be supported only if the transcendental dialectic is successful. Accordingly, the assertion of transcendental idealism (to the extent that it has been argued for in the transcendental analytic) does not suffice to indicate what is fallacious about Kant's pre-critical theistic proof.

Nor can Kant's considerations based on the synthetic a priori status of the proposition asserting God's existence contain Kant's reason for rejecting the argument in question. The first difficulty with this argument is that it is purely methodological in character and is thus not based on the specific content of the argument. In other words, it argues against a certain claim merely because the claim seems to have a particular status, a status which in the case of other arguments of that type indicates that their conclusions cannot be accepted. In this case, the status in question is that of being synthetic a priori. Kant's general position (based solely on methodological considerations) is that if one knows a synthetic a priori proposition, then the proposition cannot be about things in themselves, since we have no intuition or possible experience of things in themselves and intuition or possible experience is alone what permits the synthetic status of such propositions.

The strength of such a methodological argument is, however, rather weak. Consider an analogous case. The proposition 2 + 2 = 4 is, presumably, necessarily true. Now one might think (based solely on methodological considerations) that if one knows a necessary truth, such a truth cannot be about empirical objects, since we cannot perceive necessity through our senses and our only access to empirical objects is through the senses. This kind of argument is weak insofar as purely methodological considerations do not stand unopposed, but rather are pitted against one's justification for the claim in question. Whether the methodological considerations are ultimately stronger than the justification based on the content of the judgment cannot in principle be determined in advance. In the case of the mathematical example, I take it that our justification for 2 + 2 = 4 would override the methodological objection raised. In the case at hand, it is far from clear that the synthetic a priori status of the proposition that God exists carries sufficient weight to overthrow the argument presented in The Only Possible Argument.

The second difficulty for this kind of argument can be put as follows. Insofar as Kant's objection to his pre-critical theistic proof is simply a challenge for a defender of that argument to explain how one can come to know such a synthetic a priori proposition as is involved in the claim that God exists, it may be possible to provide the requisite explanation. The crucial issue in providing such an explanation lies in showing how one can connect the two concepts involved, given that the one is not simply included in the other. Kant's claim in the transcendental analytic is that possible experience (or pure intuition) alone will allow such a connection in the case of a priori propositions.(31) For it would seem that possible experience alone (or pure intuition) can provide evidence (beyond what can be garnered through the analysis of concepts) that the predicate in question can be legitimately attributed to the subject of the proposition. However, how can one connect "God" and "existence" given that God is not an object of possible experience (or intuition)? A defender of Kant's pre-critical theistic proof could attempt to answer this question and thereby satisfy Kant's requirement that every synthetic a priori proposition be based on possible experience by drawing an indirect connection between "God exists" and possible experience. Although God is not an object of possible experience, if, as Kant's pre-critical theistic proof suggests, God is a necessary condition for possibility (insofar as God provides the material element of possibility) and possibility is a necessary condition for possible experience (insofar as it is possible experience), then God is a necessary condition for possible experience. Obviously, such an explanation does not involve intuition in as direct a way as one might naturally expect, namely as providing direct evidence for a nonanalytic connection between concepts. However, Kant never specifies exactly how intuition must be involved in the justification of synthetic propositions (just as he never specifies exactly how empirical intuitions must be involved in the justification of empirical claims) and thus this explanation would not seem to violate; any of Kant's critical requirements.

Another way to put the issue is as follows. One might ask how the proposition "God exists" is supposed to be justified, given that it is a synthetic a priori claim. The answer that can be given based on Kant's pre-critical theistic proof is that God's existence follows analytically from the fact that experience is possible for us. The fact that God's existence follows analytically from the possibility of experience does not of course imply that "God exists" is an analytic proposition. It can still be synthetic as long as it follows (analytically) from another synthetic proposition. The fact that experience is possible for us would seem to be a synthetic proposition. Thus, it could be used to justify the synthetic claim that God exists and it could do so in a way that preserves a connection with possible experience.(32) If such an explanation is legitimate, his demand would be satisfied, and this reason for rejecting the pre-critical theistic proof would be eliminated. Thus, transcendental idealism in this form is unable to explain Kant's reason for rejecting his pre-critical theistic proof.

At this point, one might naturally think that not transcendental idealism, but rather what leads to it, namely the critical turn, could be used to explain Kant's reason for rejecting his pre-critical theistic proof. For Kant's increased interest in epistemological issues might reveal the limitations on what can and what cannot be proved. In particular, one might think (as do Allen Wood and Wolfgang Rod)(33) that Kant rejects the objective possibilities upon which his pre-critical argument depends in favor of purely subjective possibilities.(34) More specifically, Kant defines possibility, existence (actuality), and necessity in the first Critique's Postulates of Empirical Thought in terms of the relation of objects to the cognitive faculties of human beings (for example, the sensibly conditioned human understanding) as opposed to "absolute" and "relative positing."(35) Thus they are essentially subjective relations rather than objective entities contained in the divine intellect. Accordingly, one might argue that for this reason they cannot be used to establish the existence of God, but rather merely reflect the subjective constitution of human beings.

Once again, these general considerations, which pertain to the critical turn, do not explain Kant's reason for rejecting his pre-critical theistic proof. The main difficulty with this line of response is that the notions of possibility, existence (actuality), and necessity defined in the postulates of empirical thought are not the only notions of possibility, existence (actuality), and necessity Kant employs in the first Critique. In particular, Kant repeatedly considers the notion of the possibility of a thing in general, considered apart from its relation to experience. Such a notion of possibility can be explained only by the object's conforming to the conditions of the pure understanding, which involve noncontradictoriness and the givenness of those realities thought together in the thing. Since such a notion of possibility does not depend on our particular form of experience, it is not expressed by the notions defined in the postulates of empirical thought. However, because it still involves the material element of possibility, the aspect of possibility that Kant's pre-critical argument needs in order to establish its conclusion is present.

One can see the same point from a different perspective by considering Kant's claim that space and time, though they are the only possible forms of our intuition,(36) are not the only possible forms of intuition insofar as intellectual intuition is possible.(37) Such a claim clearly does not involve the notion of possibility as it is defined in the postulates of empirical thought (which involves the formal conditions of experience). The reason for this is obvious. The Postulates of Empirical Thought explain the notions of empirical possibility, existence (actuality), and necessity. Since Kant's own philosophical claims in the first Critique are not empirical claims (at least not in any standard sense of the term), he himself must be using notions of possibility, existence (actuality), and necessity that are nonempirical in nature.(38) Accordingly, even if some of Kant's notions of possibility, existence (actuality), and necessity are subjective, it is far from clear that all such notions are (much less must be) subjective. Further, because the nonempirical notions of possibility, existence (actuality), and necessity involve material elements (or content), the crucial element of Kant's pre-critical argument is present even in the critical Kant. Therefore, it is far from clear that features specific to the critical turn can ultimately provide an explanation of Kant's reason for rejecting his pre-critical theistic proof.

III

Accordingly, we must turn to specific passages in Kant's discussion of theistic arguments in the ideal of pure reason in order to determine what it is about the argument that might cause its failure and what the reason for its failure might be. Although Kant's criticisms of the three traditional theistic proofs do not apply to his pre-critical argument, his discussion in other sections of the ideal of pure reason contains several passages that are directly relevant to any attempt at isolating the fallacious feature of his pre-critical argument. First, Kant comments on the principle of complete determination as follows:

 This principle [of complete determination] does not rest merely on the law
 of contradiction; for, besides considering each thing in its relation to
 the two contradictory predicates, it also considers it in its relation to
 the sum-total of all possibilities, that is, to the sum-total of all
 predicates of things. Presupposing this sum as being an a priori condition,
 it proceeds to represent everything as deriving its own possibility from
 the share which it possesses in the sum of all possibilities. The principle
 of complete determination concerns, therefore, the content, and not merely
 the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates
 which are intended to constitute the complete concept of a thing, and not
 simply a principle of analytic representation in reference merely to one of
 two contradictory predicates. It contains a transcendental presupposition,
 namely, that of the material for all possibility, which in turn is regarded
 as containing a priori the data for the particular possibility of each and
 every thing.(39)

This passage is important because it shows clearly that Kant has not simply rejected the necessity of both formal and material grounds of possibility. For in addition to the principle of contradiction, Kant sees the need for a principle concerning the content or material of possibility, which contains a priori the data for each possible thing.(40) The clear implication here is that every possibility relies on the givenness of a certain content, which in turn must not violate the principle of contradiction. Of course, if Kant had rejected the necessity of the material ground of possibility, his reason for rejecting the pre-critical theistic proof would have been clear insofar as that argument depended precisely on God's role as a material ground for the possibility of the world.

Further, not only does the critical Kant retain a principle of material possibility, he also continues to maintain a clear connection between the material ground of possibility and God. For Kant proceeds to link the principle of complete determination to God as an ens realissimum in the following passage:

 But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a
 thing in itself as completely determined; and since in all possible [pairs
 of] contradictory predicates one predicate, namely, that which belongs to
 being absolutely, is to be found in its determination, the concept of an
 ens realissimum is the concept of an individual being. It is therefore a
 transcendental ideal which serves as the basis for the complete
 determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists. This ideal is
 the supreme and complete material condition of the possibility of all that
 exists-the condition to which all thought of objects, so far as their
 content is concerned, has to be traced back.(41)

The idea of the ens realissimum is the idea of that which contains the whole of reality, in which other things share to a greater or lesser degree. Since the content of all other concepts is derived from limiting the concept of the ens realissimum, all other possibilities are derived from this original possibility, that is, all possibilities are grounded in God. So, not only does Kant link the material ground of possibility and God, but he does so in a way that is fundamentally the same as he does in The Only Possible Argument.

These two passages may seem rather puzzling. For in them Kant seems to be endorsing his pre-critical argument, but rejecting its conclusion. The solution to the puzzle that Kant seems to develop most consistently is first to distinguish between constitutive and regulative principles and then to maintain that the pre-critical argument establishes God merely as a regulative and not as a constitutive principle. Kant expresses this solution when he remarks that "the ideal of the supreme being is nothing but a regulative principle of reason, which directs us to look upon all connection in the world as if it originated from an all-sufficient necessary cause."(42)

The original question remains, however, albeit in modified form: What exactly is Kant's reason for relegating God to the status of a regulative principle? Recall that the structure of Kant's pre-critical argument is expressed by the claim that God is a necessary condition for possibility (insofar as God alone can function as the material ground of possibility). Accordingly, if God does not exist, then neither do any possibilities (for example, those possibilities that are actualized or thought by us). Since at least some possibilities must exist (for example, when they are actualized), God exists. Given that God is simply a necessary condition of something obvious, it is difficult to see why the conclusion that God exists must be merely regulative, that is, one must proceed only as if God exists. Rather, one would seem fully entitled to the claim that God does exist.

One might reply to this objection by noting a structural similarity between Kant's position here and his general resolution of the antinomies. Kant's diagnosis of the error committed in the arguments of the antinomies can be represented in the following fallacious syllogism. The first premise is: if the conditioned is given, then the entire series of all of its conditions is likewise given. The second premise is: objects of the senses are given as conditioned. Just as in the case of the theistic argument, the conclusion seems to follow immediately: therefore, the entire series of the conditions of such objects is likewise given. This type of argument is fallacious according to Kant because the premises are not true for the same set of objects (in the same relation). The first premise is true for things in themselves, but not for appearances, whereas the second premise is true for appearances, but not for things in themselves. The first premise is false for appearances because the mere fact that we know an object as conditioned does not imply that we thereby know the conditions under which it holds (even if we know that the object has some condition or other). More specifically; the mere fact that an object is given in intuition does not imply that all of the conditions for that object are also thereby given :in intuition. Accordingly, for appearances the first premise must be revised as follows: if the conditioned is given, then the entire series of all of its conditions is set as a task. In other words, for any appearance, one must search for its conditions and, because no appearance contains all of its conditions within itself, this task can never be completed. Because the task can never be completed and yet the objects are in fact given, the task cannot apply directly or be essential to the objects that are given, but rather must contain instructions for our cognitive faculties. In short, the search for the conditions of empirically given objects is a regulative principle.

This diagnosis might be thought to apply to Kant's pre-critical argument for the existence of God as follows. The mere fact that God is a necessary condition for the sensible world does not mean that the intuitions that help to constitute the sensible world will contain all of the world's conditions. (In fact, it is clear that they will not insofar as we have no intuition of God, who is one of the sensible world's conditions.) Accordingly, knowledge of the sensible world does not imply knowledge of God, even if God is a necessary condition of the sensible world. Further, because the sensible world is conditioned by conditions that we have not yet discovered in intuition, reason demands that we continue searching for the totality of conditions for the sensible world, that is, we must proceed as if God (who contains the material conditions of possibility) created the sensible world.(43)

However, one important dissimilarity blocks the application of the antinomies' resolution to the pre-critical theistic proof.(44) What generates contradiction in the case of the Antinomies is the conflict between two concepts of the world. Reason's concept of the (intelligible) world demands that the world be completely determined and thus that all of its conditions be given--a demand Kant sometimes expresses by qualifying the world "as a totality." Sensibility's concept of the (sensible) world depends on what is given in intuition and is thus always indeterminate in some respects and all of its conditions are never given. In short, reason requires whereas sensibility prohibits the totality of conditions being given.(45) The conflict can be resolved by distinguishing between the two worlds (or at least their two concepts) and by noting that the sensible world, which is subject-dependent, is grounded by the intelligible world, which exists independently of the subject.

What generates contradiction in the case of the antinomies, however, is not present in Kant's pre-critical theistic proof. For in asserting God's existence the argument does not advance an empirical claim, that is, it makes no claim about the sensible world as such.(46) Since no claim is being made about a sensible object, the fact that every sensible object must be conditioned is not inconsistent with the claim that God exists. Another way to put the point is to note that because Kant's pre-critical argument is not about empirical objects, it does not commit the antinomy's fallacy of assuming that the two premises that underlie the argumentative structure of the antinomies hold for the same set of objects, when they hold for different sets of objects. For in the case of Kant's pre-critical theistic proof these premises would be true of things in themselves. The first premise is true because the conditioned possibilities require God as their material ground or condition and the second premise is true because the possibility of things in general are given in thought as conditioned. Accordingly, the resolution of the antinomies cannot be applied to Kant's pre-critical theistic proof.

Ultimately, Kant's justification for claiming that God can be established only as a regulative principle is based on his distinction between reason and the understanding.(47) Both faculties are principles of unity. However, they apply to different objects and the resulting unity is different in each case. The understanding applies to objects that are given in intuition, uniting its manifold under concepts in a judgment, whereas reason considers judgments, uniting them (as major and minor premises) in a syllogism. However, reason is not restricted to syllogisms. Most generally, it is a faculty that searches for the absolute totality of conditions for the conditioned. Given this account of the distinction between the understanding and reason, Kant's view is that this distinction corresponds to the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles. For the understanding's concepts are necessary for the unity of any object given in intuition in such a way that one can say that the understanding is constitutive of such an object, whereas reason's unification of judgments (for example, in the form of syllogisms) does not pertain to the objects per se, but rather to judgments about objects. In this sense one can say that reason does not constitute the object, but rather regulates the understanding (and the relations between its judgments) and it does so by directing the understanding to act as if the world were constituted in a particular way despite the fact that the understanding may not have been given intuitions that would warrant constituting objects in this way.

Given this explanation of the connection between constitutive and regulative principles, on the one hand, and the understanding and reason, on the other hand, it is not especially problematic to claim that our idea of God would function merely as a regulative principle.(48) Since God cannot be given in intuition, God cannot be an object of the understanding.(49) However, because God does contain the material ground or condition for possibility (which is contemplated in our understanding's concepts of objects), God would seem to be crucial for the operation of the understanding.(50) Further, insofar as reason demands conditions of the sort that God can satisfy, it is natural to think that our idea of God would be an idea of reason. Since reason is the source only of regulative principles,(51) it is clear that our representation of God (which stems from reason alone) can function only as a regulative, not as a constitutive principle.(52)

The status of Kant's justification here is rather uncommon. On the one hand, it does not obviously beg the question as transcendental idealism or the critical turn seem to. For it is based on his account of our cognitive capacities, an account which enjoys some degree of plausibility. On the other hand, it is not a deductive argument of the typical sort. For it claims that our idea of God can function merely as a regulative principle because only reason is in a position to represent God and reason does not constitute objects. The strength of this justification is also somewhat unusual. Since it ultimately rests on Kant's analysis of reason and the understanding, its strength is directly related to the strength of this analysis. Obviously, other accounts of the nature of reason and the understanding are possible (for example, Hegel's in The Science of Logic) and one would naturally have to evaluate the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the available accounts in order to determine the most defensible position. However, the most worrisome kind of alternative is not the externalist one, but rather one that is internal to Kant's own account. Of course, objections to the unity of theoretical and practical reason represent an important challenge to his overall analysis of reason, but this kind of internalist objection would not be the most troublesome. For one might even object to the unity of theoretical reason. In particular, one might accept Kant's idea that reason seeks the unconditioned for any conditioned object, but reject his claim that the object of reason is always the understanding's judgments. Granted, sometimes it may be appropriate to say that reason creates unity by drawing inferences in syllogisms, but it is far from clear that it must always do so. For it might be the case that reason seeks the conditions for conditioned objects and not just the judgments about objects. Thus, in some instances reason might act on judgments and in other instances it could act on objects directly. If theoretical reason lacked unity in this way, it would allow Kant (or the defender of such a position) to reestablish the existence of God insofar as his pre-critical theistic proof, along with this slightly modified account of reason, could establish that our idea of God must function as a constitutive principle.(53)

Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, Emory University, Bowden Hall, Room 214, Atlanta, GA 30322-0241, or Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126.

(1) The physico-theological argument is now commonly referred to as the teleological argument or the argument from design.

(2) In the remainder of this paper, we shall exclude consideration of practical proofs of the existence of God.

(3) See, for example, Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1974).

(2) All references to Kant's works other than the Critique of Pure Reason will be to the standard volume number and pagination of Kants Gesammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der koniglich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Translations from Kant's pre-critical works are from Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, trans, and ed. David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Translations from the Critique of Pure Reason are from Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). As is standard, references to the Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter "CPR") are to the pages of the first (A) and second (B) edition. The reference for the above quotation is 2:72.

(3) Josef Schmucker in Die Ontotheologie des vorkritischen Kant (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 7, raises this question, but, rather than providing an answer, he promises to answer it in a future work after Kant's attitude towards rational theology has been explicated in detail.

(4) Kant presents fundamentally the same argument in both the Nova Dilucidatio (1763) and his Inaugural Dissertation (1770).

(5) The Only Possible Argument, 2:77.

(6) The Only Possible Argument, 2:77-8.

(7) Leibniz similarly holds that the principle of contradiction is a fundamental principle of all truth. In contrast to Wolff, he seems to think the principle of sufficient reason is a fundamental principle of all truth as well. However, Leibniz does not think that the principle of sufficient reason is a principle of possibility.

(8) The Only Possible Argument, 2:77.

(9) The Only Possible Argument, 2:77.

(10) The Only Possible Argument, 2:77.

(11) The Only Possible Argument, 2:78.

(12) It may be objected at this point that there is one possible state of affairs, namely the state of affairs in which nothing exists, which serves as a counter-example to Kant's claims about the necessity of a material ground for possibility. If the state of affairs in which nothing exists is really possible, then there is at least one possibility which does not require anything real as its ground. Of course, Kant's pre-critical account of possibility, which involves the positing and logical comparison of predicates thought to apply to a thing or state of affairs, would not allow that the state of affairs in which nothing exists or is posited is in fact possible. While this may or may not adequately diffuse the objection, as we will see below Kant continues to employ this account of possiblity in the first Critique. Consequently, this objection is not central to the question we are addressing concerning Kant's own reasons for rejecting the argument of The Only Possible Argument.

(13) The Only Possible Argument, 2:79.

(14) The "first real ground of possibility" is characterized in terms which indicate that it is the antecedently determining ground of the possibility of all other things. (For Kant's distinction between antecedently and consequentially determining grounds, see Nova Dilucidatio 1:391-2.) It is, therefore, by reference to this ground that the possibility of things in general becomes intelligible, and as a result of this ground that things in general are really possible. This is in contrast to the law of contradiction, or the "first logical ground" of possibility, by which we consequentially determine the possibility of things whose material elements are antecedently given.

(15) It may be difficult to see why Kant cannot accept the possibility that contingent beings are sufficient to provide the material element for possibility. In other words, one may agree with Kant that each possibility requires a material ground, but reject his claim that there is one being which serves to ground all possibilities. The problem with rejecting this latter claim while maintaining the former seems to be that while a contingent being can ground some possibilities, that is, those that arise from the material elements given through it, it cannot ground its own possibility or the absolute possibility of anything else. Being contingent, such a being itself requires a ground which would, presumably, have to be invoked in an attempt to explain the subsequent possibility of those things which it grounds. Therefore, contingent beings are not adequate to explain the absolute possibility of anything whatsoever. While these remarks are certainly not a sufficient defense of Kant's precritical views on necessity and possibility, they are not intended to be. Our aim is to reconstruct as accurately as possible the line of argument put forth in The Only Possible Argument, and not to provide a defense of this line of argument. (It is far from clear that one cannot simply reject Kant's claim that possibilities require a ground, since such a claim would seem to be based on a rather strong version of the principle of sufficient reason.) This aim is consistent with our intention of considering Kant's own critical attitude towards this argument. Since Kant does not seem to reject his theistic proof on these grounds, we need not address this point further here.

(16) Kant devotes Reflections 3 and 4 of the The Only Possible Argument to establishing that this necessary being is God. Kant gives a similar line of argument in the Inaugural Dissertation.

(17) However, in, for example, the Monadology Leibniz seems to develop a line of argument that is quite similar to Kant's. Leibniz puts the argument as follows: "43. It is also true that God is not only the source of existences, but also that of essences insofar as they are real, that is, the source of what is real in possibility. This is because God's understanding is the realm of eternal truths or that of the ideas on which they depend; without him there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only would nothing exist, but also nothing would be possible (Theod. sec. 20).

"#44. For if there is reality in essences or possibles, or indeed, in eternal truths, this reality must be grounded in something existent and actual, and consequently, it must be grounded in the existence of the necessary being, in whom essence involves existence, that is, in whom possible being is sufficient for actual being (secs. 184, 189, 335).

"#45. Thus God alone (or the necessary being) has this privilege, that he must exist if he is possible. Since nothing can prevent the possibility of what is without limits, without negation, and consequently without contradiction, this by itself is sufficient for us to know the existence of God a priori. We have also proved this by the reality of the eternal truths. But we have also just proved it a posteriori since there are contingent beings"; G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 218.

What is important to note here is that Leibniz does seem to think that the existence of possibles requires the actuality of God. However, he stops short of identifying the reality of possibles with what Kant calls the material element of possibility.

(18) While Leibniz does not always explicitly assert that existence is a predicate (especially when he is considering the complete concepts of finite individuals), it is clear from his discussions of the ontological argument (for example, his letter to Elisabeth) that he does in fact think of it in this way. Thus, the fact that Leibniz does not always explicitly treat existence as a predicate in certain contexts does not relieve the tension that Kant points out concerning the use of existence as a predicate in trying to prove absolutely necessary existence.

(19) The Only Possible Argument, 2:72.

(20) Kant posits a distinction between real predicates, or determinations of things, and predicates that attach merely to our thoughts of things which anticipates the distinction made in the first Critique between determining predicates and logical predicates (The Only Possible Argument, 2:72; CPR, A598/B626). According to this distinction, statements of the form "x exists," which appear to predicate existence of the subject x, really express the claim that there exists an object which exhibits the properties we think together in the concept x. Existence is, thus, the subject of predication, or that which is determined, and is not itself a predicate or determination. Accordingly, statements of the form "x exists" are more properly reformulated to read "something existent is x."

(21) The Only Possible Argument, 2:73.

(22) The Only Possible Argument, 2:73-4.

(23) The Only Possible Argument, 2:75.

(24) It would at least be rather uninteresting if such a mistake were the basis for his later rejection. The argument may contain numerous errors, but they are of interest only insofar as only the mature Kant noticed them and viewed them as the basis for rejecting his earlier argument. See Allen Wood, Kant's Rational Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 67-71. In fact, Kant seems to recognize that the argument may suffer from some defects, but he nonetheless argues that "this argument continues to have a certain importance and to be endowed with an authority of which we cannot, simply on the ground of this objective insufficiency, at once proceed to divest it"; CPR, A588/B616.

(25) Schmucker (Ontotheologie, 6) puts the same point as follows: "Man ist, hierin einig mit der Kantforschung im allgemeinen, immer davon ausgegangen, die Kantische Kritik der Metaphysik und speziell der rationalen Theologie in der transzendentalen Dialektik sei eine logische Konsequenz aus der Revolutionierung `der Denkungsart,' wie sie in der Analytik durch die Subjektivierung von Raum und Zeit und der Kategorien vollzogen wurde."

(26) Kant applies his general considerations pertaining to synthetic a priori propositions to the specific issue of God in the following passage: "the question under consideration is obviously synthetic, calling for an extension of our knowledge beyond all limits of experience, namely to the existence of a being that is to correspond to a mere idea of ours, an idea that cannot be paralleled in any experience. Now as we have already proved, synthetic a priori knowledge is possible only in so far as it expresses the formal conditions of a possible experience; and all principles are therefore only of immanent validity, that is, they are applicable only to objects of empirical knowledge, to appearances. Thus all attempts to construct a theology through purely speculative reason, by means of a transcendental procedure, are without result.

"But even if anyone prefers to call into question all those proofs which have been given, ... he still cannot refuse to meet my demand that he should at least give a satisfactory account how, and by what kind of inner illumination, he believes himself capable of soaring so far above all possible experience, on the wings of mere ideas.... I therefore confine myself to the moderate demand that they give, in terms which are universal and which are based on the nature of the human understanding and all our other sources of knowledge, a satisfactory answer to this one question: how can we so much as make a beginning in the proposed task of extending our knowledge entirely a priori, and of carrying it into a realm where no experience is possible to us, and in which there is therefore no means of establishing the objective reality of any concept that we have ourselves invented"; CPR, A637-9/B665-7.

(27) Though Kant does present transcendental idealism as a hypothesis in the second edition preface (CPR, Bxii fn.), he emphasizes that this hypothesis must be established with apodictic certainty in the course of the first Critique's argument.

(28) CPR, B409.

(29) An alternative way of stating the point is to say that Kant may at times seem to suggest that he has established the stronger claim, since he cannot see how the objective reality of our concepts can be established otherwise. However, his considered position in the analytic does not amount to more than the weaker conclusion.

(30) See, for example, the famous quotation at CPR, A51/B75.

(31) A further problem for this kind of argument lies in the fact that Kant himself recognizes synthetic a priori propositions that are not justified by means of sensible intuition, namely those involved in his practical philosophy. So even if Kant were to specify exactly how possible experience (or pure intuition) must be involved in some synthetic a priori propositions, it does not follow that such a specification would have to apply to all synthetic a priori propositions.

(32) One might think that Kant's reason for rejecting his pre-critical argument is based on the claim that the material element of possibility in the critical period is intuition, not reality as given in something existent. However, since realities present in God cannot be given in intuition (since an ens realissimum is an idea of reason to which no intuition can ever correspond), the material element of possibility could not be given through positing an ens realissimum. In order to be clear about this objection, it is important to distinguish between epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the question concerning the material element of possibility. The metaphysical question is what can ground, or be the source of, the material element of possibility, while the epistemological question concerns our epistemic access to these possibilities (that is, how can we come to represent these possibilities). Presumably, Kant's pre-critical argument is supposed to provide an answer to the former question (despite the fact that Kant does often seem to equate metaphysical and epistemological considerations in the pre-critical period), while the objection to the argument described above seems directed at the latter. Further, it is far from clear that the material element of possibility in the critical period is solely intuition. In particular, it would seem that the categories might be of considerable help in representing possibility. For example, the category of substance would seem to be crucial for understanding possible objects (insofar as objects are substances for Kant). Similarly, the category of reality would seem to be an important means for representing properties of objects. Thus, even if the objection can be formulated in such a way that it can incorporate the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the question about the material element of possibility, it would still seem to rest on a mistaken premise.

(33) Both Wolfgang Rod in "Existenz als Absolute Position" in Proceedings: The Sixth International Kant Congress, ed. Gerhard Funke and Thomas Seebohm (Washington D.C.: The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and the University Press of America, 1989), 67-81, and Allen Wood in Kant's Rational Theology, 71-9, discuss this line of response. While Rod thinks that it does explain Kant's rejection of his pre-critical argument, Wood seems ultimately to reject this response as being inconsistent with both Kant's lectures on theology and the considerations that can be raised in defense of the argument.

(34) Such an interpretation might naturally be suggested by the following passage: "The possibility of the objects of the senses is a relation of these objects to our thought, in which something (namely, the empirical form) can be thought a priori, while that which constitutes the matter, reality in the [field of] appearance (that which corresponds to sensation), must be given, since otherwise it could not even be thought, nor its possibility represented. Now an object of the senses can be completely determined only when it is compared with all the predicates that are possible in the [field of] appearance, and by means of them is represented either affirmatively or negatively. But since that which constitutes the thing itself, namely, the real in the [field of] appearance, must be given--otherwise the thing could not be conceived at all--and since that wherein the real of all appearances is given is experience, considered as single and all-embracing, the material for the possibility of all objects of the senses must be presupposed as given in one whole; and it is upon the limitation of this whole that all possibility of empirical objects, their distinction from each other and their complete determination, can alone be based. No other objects, besides those of the senses, can, as a matter of fact, be given to us, and nowhere save in the context of a possible experience; and consequently nothing is an object for us, unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical reality as the condition of its possibility. Now owing to a natural illusion we regard this principle, which applies only to those things which are given as objects of our senses, as being a principle which must be valid of things in general. Accordingly, omitting this limitation, we treat the empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things, viewed as appearances, as being a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general"; CPR, A581-2/B609-10.

(35) See CPR, A218-19/B265-6.

(36) CPR, B146.

(37) CPR, B72. Kant also seems to suggest that space and time may not be the only possible forms of sensible intuition. That is, there could be sensible intuition that is not spatio-temporal.

(38) Kant thinks that ultimately the categories prior to their schematization contain a non-empirical content. The modal categories in particular contain Kant's non-empirical notions of possibility, actuality (existence), and necessity. See CPR, A232/B285.

(39) CPR, A572-3/B600-1.

(40) In the course of his further explanation of the principle of complete determination Kant explains that every predicate pair consists of one positive and one negative predicate. The positive predicate indicates being, the negative predicate non-being or privation. Clearly, the positive predicate indicating being would naturally be understood as representing the material element of a thing and requires some kind of explanation or grounding, which the principle of complete determination provides.

(41) CPR, A576/B604.

(42) CPR, A619/B647, emphasis added.

(43) Kant might seem to be suggesting such an analogy in the following passage: "Thus, while I may indeed be obliged to assume something necessary as a condition of the existent in general, I cannot think any particular thing as in itself necessary. In other words, I can never complete the regress to the conditions of existence save by assuming a necessary being, and yet am never in a position to begin with such a being"; CPR, A615-6/B643-4.

(44) Of course, Kant presents a theistic proof that is affected by the general resolution of the antinomies, namely the fourth antinomy. According to Kant's resolution of that antinomy: "Both of the conflicting propositions may be true, if taken in different connections. All things in the world of sense may be contingent, and so have only an empirically conditioned existence, while yet there may be a non-empirical condition of the whole series"; CPR, A560/B588. Two points are of note here. First, Kant's argument in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy does not resemble his pre-critical argument in significant ways insofar as the former is essentially causal, whereas the latter is primarily modal in character. Second, this analysis seems to support the analysis that we develop in the following paragraphs, because it emphasizes the fact that the claim that God exists is not an empirical claim.

(45) This conflict results from the fact that reason's concept of the world will always be either "too large" or "too small" for the sensible world.

(46) Insofar as the possibilities that the argument assumes are thought through the understanding, the sensible world is not even presupposed in that step of the argument. Of course, Kant may believe that the sensible world depends on God (for example, insofar as God creates the sensible world), but such a belief is not implied in the mere assertion that God exists.

(47) Kant's distinction between reason and the understanding originates at the start of the critical period. Accordingly, this distinction is drawn at the right time in order to be relevant to Kant's reason for rejecting his pre-critical argument.

(48) At CPR, A579/B607 Kant suggests such an interpretation: "These terms lens originarium, ens summum, and ens entium] are not, however, to be taken as signifying the objective relation of an actual object to other things, but of an idea to concepts."

(49) This interpretation allows a non-question begging sense to Kant's claim that God cannot be known, since God cannot be given in intuition. The point is not that one must have an intuition for knowledge. Rather, it is that the lack of an appropriate intuition shows that the representation of God is an idea of reason rather than of the understanding.

(50) This interpretation is also consistent with Kant's remarks about the argument in question at the beginning of his discussion of the ontological argument: "It is evident, from what has been said, that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a concept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea the objective reality of which is very far from being proved by the fact that reason requires it. For the idea instructs us only in regard to a certain unattainable completeness, and so serves rather to limit the understanding than to extend it to new objects"; CPR, A592/B620.

(51) Of course, reason is not regulative when it concerns syllogisms that pertain to objects of experience, but it is clear that our idea of God is not simply a formal syllogism.

(52) Kant explains the regulative status of God in some detail in the following passage: "in the domain of theology, we must view everything that can belong to the context of possible experience as if this experience formed an absolute but at the same time completely dependent and sensibly conditioned unity, and yet also at the same time as if the sum of all appearances (the sensible world itself) had a single, highest and all-sufficient ground beyond itself, namely a self-subsistent, original, creative reason. For it is in light of this idea of a creative reason that we so guide the empirical employment of our reason as to secure its greatest possible extension--that is, by viewing all objects as if they drew their origin from such an archetype"; CPR, A672-3/B700-1.

(53) We would like to thank Karl Ameriks, Roger Ariew, Robert Greenberg, Rudolf Makkreel, Donald Rutherford, Tad Schmaltz, and Allen Wood for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We would also like to thank the audience members of the Southeastern Seminar in the History of Early Modern Philosophy in Kentucky (Fall 1997) for their instructive discussion of this paper.