The Significance of Free Will.

Fleming, Ed ; GUNN, ALBERT E.

KANE, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 268 pp. Cloth, $45.00--This study is a careful and logical analysis of the concept "free will." Its aim is to retrieve and defend the idea that the agent has some genuine power of self-determination, that is, that "the agent, as free, is the ultimate creator of her own purposes" (p. 4). It carefully looks into the mystery of free will without an uncritical jump into speculation. It is logical in that it steadfastly raises arguments on both sides of the issue as it works its way to its thesis. It is a helpful summary of the debate of the last 25 years on free will. In addition to this, the book is a significant advancement.

The structure of the book follows the metaphor of an ascent and descent. The first half of the book (the ascent) deals with the question whether there might be a kind of freedom that is incompatible with complete determination. Examining compatibilist theories, Kane suggests that our experience would not make sense unless there is a kind of freedom required by "ultimate responsibility," that at least some of our choices are "up to us" (p. 4). He suggests there must be a freedom that is incompatible with determinism.

The second part of the first half deals with the Significance Question. Kane adopts an interesting pragmatic, even existential method. Given the possibility of ultimate responsibility, do we feel that it is necessary to our experiences? "Why do we, or should we, want to possess a kind of freedom that requires ultimate responsibility?" (p. 79). This freedom seems to be attested to in our desires, in who we think the self is, and in the experiences of creativity, morality, love, and so forth. Carefully, tentatively, Kane shows that free will makes sense and we want it.

The descent part of the question asks how such an idea of free will is intelligible and where it can be seen to exist in our scientifically understood idea of nature. If free will requires a kind of indeterminacy, is free will at bottom an irrational arbitrariness? Then again, what does it say that we choose for reasons, that is, that choices are motivated? How can light be shed on these questions? This task is less successfully accomplished than the ascent. The second half rather starts some discussions and only cautions against explaining the indeterminacy in terms of speculative mystifications. Kane's unexamined metaphysical presupposition (a rationalistically understood subject-object dichotomy) prevents him from shedding more light on these topics. Along the way there are places where this dichotomy seems forced and threatens to break into areas off-limits to Kane's design. (For example, maybe it makes little sense to look to Chaos theory to find a place for free will in nature, since free will might originate from beyond mathematized nature.)

Kane's conclusion to the book is refreshing and creative. Yet it is this creativity which carries us beyond the horizon of the book itself. Kane argues for "value pluralism" (that there are different principles upon which to make life choices), but also that there is a hierarchy of goods, or at least freedom requires that "some values must be believed to be more worthy" than others (p. 200). Kane has suggested that this idea of "objective worth" (p. 97) is presupposed by much of our valuing. He rightly sees that this question of the nature of the authority of value is "the great divide on [the question of] free will" (p. 98). Indeed it is crucial. I wonder if there isn't a hidden revelation giving authority to our valuing. Hidden, that is, in the sense of a showing that is different from that of objectivity or subjectivity. When we choose, we believe that we are choosing the better. Our freedom must "consult" some guide to this better. Kane in one part suggests that this is somehow tied (in my interpretation of him) to truth, the objective worth of some values: "I want to suggest that the notion of u[ltimate] r[esponsibility] is of a piece with this notion of objective worth ... we think that the objective worth of our acts or accomplishments is something valued over and above the felt satisfaction the acts have or bring ..." (p. 97). Yet here in the conclusion Kane sees the other side of this tension. He rightly recognizes the existential character of valuing--that values get confirmed through living. "The ultimate test of value experiments is happiness, but happiness ... is itself a contestable matter and may differ for different people" (p. 209). To bring these two issues together reveals the tension. Both points carry an authority, that is, they point toward truth. Maybe it is the case that valuing is neither objective nor subjective. Rather these different modes of being show without forcing (and so freedom is not determined), and yet give content and guidance (and so freedom is not ultimate). Values rather invite. Freedom then would be responsibility--the ability to respond to worth. Worth is the prime mover, but this does not devalue our free will as the second mover. As Kane so admirably uncovers, the worth that inclines us also awaits our creative response.

Ed Fleming, Westmoreland County Community College.