Metaphysics.
Hartle, Ann
Van Inwagen, Peter. Dimensions of Philosophy Series. Boulder, San
Francisco: Westview Press, 1993. xiii + 216 pp. Cloth, $44.00; paper,
$16.95--This book is intended to be an introductory textbook or an
introduction for the general reader to the subject of metaphysics. Its
approach is systematic rather than historical. The author accepts the
definition of metaphysics as "the study of ultimate reality"
and structures the book roughly along the lines of the threefold
division of the subject-matter of metaphysics: the world, God, and man.
Part 1, "The Way the World Is," consists of three
chapters dealing with the issues of individuality, externality, and
objectivity. The discussion of individuality focuses on nihilism and
monism and makes reference especially to Spinoza and Bradley. The
common-sense belief in the existence of an external world is examined in
light of Berkeley's idealism, and the question of the possibility
of objective truth is discussed in terms of the debate between realism
and antirealism. Van Inwagen, then, accepts the terms and categories of
the contemporary discussion of metaphysical issues and limits any
detailed historical references to modem philosophy.
Part 2, "Why the World Is," consists of two chapters on
necessary being. The first deals with the ontological argument,
especially Descartes' formulation and Kant's criticisms. The
second deals with the cosmological argument, especially the principle of
sufficient reason. Thus, God as metaphysical subject-matter is treated
in terms of the question of why there is something rather than nothing,
that is, in relation to the world, as the necessary being without which
there could be no world.
Part 3, "The Inhabitants of the World," consists of five
chapters. The first deals with the question "What rational beings
are there?" and begins the discussion of why there are rational
beings at all. This is taken up in the second chapter, "The Place
of Rational Beings in the World: Design and Purpose," which focuses
on teleology and Darwinism. The two following chapters take up the
nature of rational beings in terms of the debate between dualism and
physicalism. Here there is detailed reference to Descartes. Van Inwagen
himself argues for the superiority of dualism, especially in its
relation to the issue of personal identity. The fifth chapter of Part 3
deals with the powers of rational beings, that is, freedom of the will.
The book concludes with a very brief meditation on the nature of
mystery. As Van Inwagen promised at the outset, the discussion of these
metaphysical questions has yielded little "information" and no
definitive answers. The rational being who is man is intelligent enough
to solve the problems of physics but not of metaphysics.
Van Inwagen's own metaphysical position is a version of the
Kantian position, at least with respect to the question of the
possibility of metaphysics. He begins from the definition of metaphysics
as the study of ultimate reality (the world, God, man). He then
immediately interprets this study to be the search for a reality that is
hidden behind appearances, appearances which are deceptive: "We
talk about reality only when there is a misleading appearance to be `got
behind' or `seen through'" (p. 3). The paradigm here is
the world of natural science. But science is successful at getting
behind the appearances while metaphysics is not.
There are two possible explanations for the failure of metaphysics.
The first is that of logical positivism: philosophical questions are
defective. The second is that the human mind is unfit for investigating
metaphysical questions. Van Inwagen favors a "modest" version
of this Kantian view: "Human metaphysicians . . . work by taking
human intellectual capacities that were designed for purposes quite
unrelated to questions about ultimate reality and pushing these
capacities to their limits" (p. 13). The human mind is suited for
physics but not for metaphysics.
Metaphysics must be distinguished from cosmology, but physical
cosmology is relevant to metaphysics, for instance, it might show us
that the world did have a beginning in time. Sacred theology, on the
other hand, cannot be allowed such relevance. There is only one physics
but there are many theologies; there is universal agreement about the
legitimacy of science, but there is a large and respectable body of
opinion that denies divine revelation and regards theology as entirely
illusory (pp. 6-8). The scientific criterion of validity, universal
communicability, is thus decisive for metaphysical truth.
It is in the discussion of human being that the Kantian standpoint
comes through most obviously. The question concerning human being is
posed first in terms of the presumably more inclusive category of
"rational beings." All five chapters of Part 3 deal with man
as rational being as distinguished, say, from man as rational animal.
Rationality is described as the capacity for a certain kind of
"abstract thought" (p. 120). It is this rational being that is
suited for physics but not for metaphysics.
Thus, in his concluding meditation on mystery, Van Inwagen
concludes that "nothing is a mystery in itself" (p. 200). From
what standpoint can this be said? It can be said from the standpoint of
the Kantian rational being. Van Inwagen is a fair-minded and engaging
expositor of the different sides of the debates he deals with. Had he
undertaken a historical study of metaphysics, beginning with Plato and
with Aristotle's "first philosophy," he might have
approached the search for ultimate reality with the goal of wisdom
rather than knowledge in the scientific sense.
