The peacemaking efforts of a reverse missionary: Toyohiko kagawa before Pearl Harbor.

Tao, Bo

Toyohiko Kagawa (1888-1960), notable Christian leader from Japan, has attracted much attention from scholars and the general public of late, partly because of the commemorative fervor that surrounded the centennial of his momentous entrance into the slums of Kobe in 1909, but also because of the renewed interest in the value of his social and economic teachings in light of recent global financial calamities.

Today, Kagawa's legacy in Japan remains a highly contested one: on the one hand, he was the best-selling author of the Taisho era (1912-26) and the forerunner of many prominent social and religious movements during his lifetime; on the other hand, his fame and recognition faded rapidly in the years following his death. (1) One explanation for this decline in public perception might be his simultaneous involvement in an incredibly diverse range of activities. Although Kagawa played a leading role in numerous religious, cooperative, and pacifist organizations, while also engaging in active literary production throughout his life, his contributions to each field have received limited recognition from posterity, stemming from a critical attitude toward his perceived lack of commitment to a single cause. (2)

In contrast, Kagawa's overseas image is fairly consistent: he has been viewed by Christians of the world as a representative non-Western evangelist who also preached widely on topics of concern to Christians--in short, a "reverse missionary" from Japan. (3) However, the extent of his social and political impact on the peoples and countries he visited has, in many cases, yet to be fully examined. The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to begin the process of historical contextualization and reevaluation of Kagawa's transnational impact by focusing on a specific episode in U.S.-Japanese diplomatic history prior to Pearl Harbor, with an eye toward how Kagawa, acting as a reverse missionary, contributed toward shaping the course of events. (4)

Kagawa's Letter and Gift

As a guidepost for discussion, the present study will examine the connections between Toyohiko Kagawa and Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945). Their relationship, to be sure, was not particularly direct or extensive; most of their contact came in the form of correspondence, often mediated through a mutual acquaintance. Nevertheless, the issues that brought them together were of central importance in the early twentieth-century world, highlighting fundamental themes that, fittingly encapsulated in Kagawa's preaching and speaking tours in America, remain relevant even today.

The nature of Kagawa's relationship with Roosevelt can be surmised from his January 20, 1941, letter to the president, typed on a letterhead marked with his name and office in Kami-Kitazawa, Tokyo, and dated on the occasion of the president's third inauguration.

Your Excellency:

As a token of my deepest appreciation of your great kindness accorded to me on my landing in your country a few years ago, and also as an expression of my congratulations to you upon your re-election for the third term as President of the United States, it gives me great pleasure to present you this portrait "Kake-mono" of your excellency drawn by a Japanese artist, Mr. Tobun Hayashi....

So please accept this with my best wishes and with my sincere and earnest prayer for ever-lasting international good-will between our countries and for world peace at this difficult time.

Toyohiko Kagawa (5)

Enclosed with the letter was a scroll portrait of the president, sitting at a table with his glasses in hand, along with the implements used to produce the painting (see following pages). The artist, Tobun Hayashi, drew the portrait based on a picture loaned by Joseph Grew, the American ambassador to Japan. The act of "great kindness" here refers to President Roosevelt's personal letter in December 1935 granting entry permission to Kagawa--who had come to the United States for a speaking tour but was detained on December 18 by San Francisco immigration authorities. The officials cited Kagawa's trachoma, a severe eye infection he had picked up during his years of work in the Kobe slums, as a potential health risk. Upon learning of the Japanese Christian leader's detention through the personal telegrams of Kagawa's many supporters around the country, Roosevelt promptly called attention to this matter at a regular cabinet meeting on December 20. (6) A press statement released by the White House said that the president had expressed "personal interest" in Kagawa and had "urged prompt action" for the resolution of his case. (7) Kagawa was soon given clearance, and went on to spend the first half of 1936 touring the United States, speaking to a nation ravaged by recession about the spiritual and economic benefits of cooperatives.

The receipt of Kagawa's letter, as well as the portrait, was acknowledged on April 25, 1941, by Roosevelt's private secretary, Marguerite LeHand. (8) While it is not clear whether the president was able to reply to Kagawa, the letter is nevertheless indicative of the shared concerns of the two at the time--namely, the repercussions of the Great Depression and the heightened tensions between Japan and the United States--which served as the focus of Kagawa's 1935-36 and 1941 American tours.

The Japanese Christian Peace Delegation

The primary source of tension between Japan and the United States during this period stemmed from Japan's military expansion in East Asia and its perceived threat to American commercial and diplomatic interests. Such antagonisms were exacerbated when Japan, spurred by Hitler's successful campaigns in Europe, decided to side with Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact and began advancing southward toward French Indochina, under the name of constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. America became greatly alarmed by such maneuvers, and a war in the Pacific appeared imminent.

In anticipation of the turbulent international waters ahead, the government of Japan enacted the Religious Bodies Law in April 1940, forcibly consolidating Japan's forty or so Christian denominations over a year's time. These wartime religious policies--coupled with the nationalistic zeal that accompanied the celebration in late 1940 of the 2,600th anniversary of the enthronement of Japan's legendary first emperor, Jimmu--set in motion the final steps that led to the formation of a general governing body for native Christians, the United Church of Christ in Japan (Nihon Kirisutokyo dan).

From the Christians' perspective, this was not an unwelcome step; an ecumenical church union had been a long-term goal of their own. Japan's participation in the 1910 World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh marked its first step into world Christianity, resulting in a heightened desire for church unity and eventually leading to the founding of the National Christian Council of Japan (Nihon Kirisutokyo renmei) in 1923--with much encouragement and practical support from John R. Mott, the chairman of Edinburgh 1910. (9) In the wake of the 1928 conference of the International Missionary Council in Jerusalem, the momentum for church union in Japan culminated in the Kingdom of God movement (Kami no kuni undo), sponsored by the National Christian Council. The movement, originally proposed by Kagawa at a special meeting of the council in honor of Mott's 1929 visit to Japan, consisted of mass rallies and prayer meetings around the country from 1929 to 1935. It mobilized an audience of over one million and became the largest Christian evangelization campaign in Japanese history. (10)

Since the Religious Bodies Law also sought to restrict the role of foreign missionaries within the Japanese church establishment, certain adjustments had to be made with the American mission boards. Thus on February 15, 1941, the National Christian Council submitted a resolution to the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, proposing a meeting of church leaders from both countries to deliberate on the issues that had come between them in the preceding months. American church representatives responded positively, suggesting the historic Mission Inn at Riverside, California, as the venue, and the week following Easter as the time for the gathering. (11) Herein lay the origins of the 1941 Japanese Christian Peace Delegation to the United States (Nichibei Kirisutokyo heiwa shisetsudan).

Meanwhile, in late January 1941, two Tokyo officials had independently set out to influence the course of U.S.-Japan relations. Tokuyasu Fukuda, an officer from the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, confidentially consulted his older colleague Mitsuaki Kakehi, former director of YMCA Japan and at one time a leader in the Student Christian Movement, on the best way to achieve peace in the Pacific. Agreeing that normal diplomatic channels were no longer sufficient to attain their goal, they decided to call upon the services of a private citizen who could positively influence Japan's public image in America. To that end, Kakehi, who had seen Kagawa preach to an enthralled audience at the Twentieth World's Conference of the YMCA, held at Cleveland some ten years earlier, promptly recommended him as the only man suited for the job. While it took some amount of persuasion, Kagawa ultimately agreed to the plan. (12)

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

There was a problem, however: Kagawa had been arrested by the Japanese gendarmerie in August 1940 because of his apology to the people of China, in an overseas publication, for Japan's repeated acts of aggression. (13) Although he was released through the help of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, Kagawa was subsequently placed under constant surveillance, making it difficult for him to travel abroad. Fortunately for their plans, Fukuda and Kakehi soon found out that the National Christian Council had been independently planning a trip of their own--the Japanese Christian Peace Delegation to the United States--that could provide the perfect cover for Kagawa. Thus, necessary arrangements were made with the Foreign Ministry, and the Imperial Army and Navy were ordered not to interfere with the activities of the deputation, as it was deemed a purely religious mission. Kagawa, for his part, refused to take orders from the government and insisted that he go on his own accord, raising funds from private sources and arriving in the United States separately from the rest of the delegation. (14)

Kagawa and the John Doe Associates

Japan's leadership was sharply divided at this moment. Despite its aggressive military conduct, not all Japanese desired war, and Prince Fumimaro Konoe (1891-1945), Japan's prime minister during many of the critical months before the outbreak of the Pacific War, held out hope for a negotiated settlement with the United States. Facing opposition from the military clique in the government, Konoe sought to arrange a secret meeting with the American president, thereby avoiding any confrontation between him and the rest of his cabinet until final arrangements had been set.

The first round of peacemaking efforts was initiated rather fortuitously by two American volunteers--Bishop James E. Walsh of the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America (also known as Maryknoll) and his enterprising vicar general, James M. Drought. Walsh and Drought went to Japan in November 1940 to oversee the withdrawal of their missionary establishment from Japan, necessitated by the enforcement of the aforementioned Religious Bodies Law. Possessing a vague yet optimistic sense of duty to serve their church and society, the two men quickly made the acquaintance of several influential Japanese. After returning to the United States in January 1941, the Maryknollers met with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull through the introduction of Drought's personal friend Postmaster General Walker, one of the most prominent Catholics in the administration, delivering the message that various elements in the Japanese government wished to achieve a settlement with America.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Throughout early 1941, the two Maryknoll priests along with their two Japanese associates--a group collectively dubbed the "John Doe Associates"--attempted to broker an agreement between Tokyo and Washington, acting as unofficial aides to the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador, Kichisaburo Nomura. (15) Their well-meaning interventions, however, did more to confuse than to facilitate, and they were, in any case, soon interrupted by Germany's commencement of hostilities against the Soviet Union, and Japan's decision to press southward into French Indochina. As a result of these developments, Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets within the United States and placed an embargo on oil and gasoline exports to Japan. (16) The prospect of a Konoe-Roosevelt meeting grew dim.

It was at this critical juncture that Kagawa entered the scene. Having finished his official obligations as a delegate to the Riverside meeting, held April 20-25, which proved unsuccessful in terms of producing concrete resolutions regarding U.S.-Japan relations, Kagawa parted ways with the rest of the junket to embark on his own tour, filling speaking engagements around the country until his departure in mid-August. Looking at his travel log, one is surprised to see the number of events to which this reverse missionary from Japan was invited, especially given the strong anti-Japanese sentiment that pervaded the American press and public opinion at the time. He spoke almost daily to crowds that numbered from the hundreds up to one or two thousand, filling churches and auditoriums wherever he went, from Boston to Des Moines to Salt Lake City. (17)

Newspaper accounts of Kagawa and his fellow peace envoys reveal an interesting difference in their attitude toward the press. Kagawa's outspokenness--he is said to have "expressed surprise during an interview [in New York] at apprehensions in this country of possible war between Japan," asserting that "there was not nearly as much talk of war among Japanese people as he found here [in America]'--stood in sharp contrast with the relative reticence of the rest of the "goodwill ambassadors" to speak on topics relating to future relations between the two countries. Tsunejiro Matsuyama, for example, allegedly "closed up tighter than a jammed door" when he was interviewed, and declined to make any comment on political matters. (18) While his colleagues may have been apprehensive about breaching the strict terms of their religious mission, Kagawa was not afraid to overstep that boundary in the name of reconciliation. He knew that religion can, under certain circumstances, serve to allay political differences, and he recognized that words from somebody in his position carried special weight.

During his whirlwind tour of the United States in 1941, Kagawa made two important stops: one in Washington, D.C., and the other in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin. On the morning of June 19 he arrived in the nation's capital, where he met and spoke with Ambassador Nomura. Although we do not know what they discussed, the meeting served as a point of conversation during his sub sequent visit with E. Stanley Jones (1884-1973), the illustrious Methodist missionary to India, from July 1 to 5 at Lake Geneva. Kagawa was there for a YMCA camp, and the two, being old friends, met frequently during his stay. Jones recalls one occasion in which "we rose at an early hour and went to the lakeside to wait on God, to see if we could see any light on the tremendous question as to whether China and Japan could be reconciled." Having witnessed firsthand the brutality of war in East Asia and eager to find some basis for peace, Jones asked Kagawa on what conditions Japan would agree to a settlement, to which the latter replied, "political and territorial integrity for China." (19) Kagawa went on to mention that what Japan really needed was "a place for her surplus population" in an area "warm enough for her to take off her coat," and suggested New Guinea as a possibility. (20)

Last Efforts for a Peaceful Settlement

Back in Japan, Emperor Hirohito was becoming wary of his nation's evident march toward war. At an Imperial Conference on September 6 with the cabinet and military executives, he reiterated the precedence of diplomacy, and Prince Konoe was given one month's time to reach a settlement with the United States. Konoe wasted no time on this duty, arranging a dinner on the same night with Ambassador Grew, asking him to make a final and direct appeal to President Roosevelt for a summit meeting. What is often omitted from these accounts of the final rounds of peace negotiations, however, is the role of Toyohiko Kagawa. Kagawa, who had just returned to Japan from his four-month trip in the United States, was called to meet with Konoe on the evening of September 5--the night before the fateful Imperial Conference (if we are to trust his memory of exact dates), during which he received direct instructions from the prime minister to contact his friends in America to bring about the coveted summit meeting. Kagawa immediately sent out telegrams to President Roosevelt, Vice President Henry Wallace, John Mott, E. Stanley Jones, and John Foster Dulles. (21)

Of this mixed group of statesmen and religious leaders, only Jones succeeded in negotiating with the high officials in Washington. On September 17, in a meeting with assistant secretary of state Dean Acheson and Maxwell Hamilton, chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Jones presented his suggestion to offer New Guinea to Japan in exchange for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Southeast Asia, specifically indicating that the idea originated from Kagawa. (22) This recommendation was eventually shaped into an official proposal by Hamilton and was forwarded to Secretary of State Hull on November 18. (23) That, however, appears to be as far as it went.

In addition to the New Guinea proposal, Jones was also granted a meeting with the president on December 3. Jones related to Roosevelt the news that several Japanese envoys, desperate in their desire to avoid a war with the United States, had requested the president to send a cable directly to the emperor of Japan in a final attempt to preserve peace. (24) Indeed, this was the only option left for stopping the war party that had taken over the Japanese state following Konoe's resignation on October 16.

Furthermore, Jones informed the president that he had organized a seven-day around-the-clock vigil of prayer at the Epiphany Episcopal Church in Washington, D.C., which had begun on December 1 and for which he had coordinated with friends in China, Australia, and Japan. Kagawa, in response, organized a similar session at the Tokyo YMCA. In a telegram on December 3, Kagawa reported to Jones the situation in Japan as follows: "Tokyo Church leaders having seven day Vigil of Prayer, throughout the twenty-four hours, for peace in the Pacific." (25) It is perhaps one of the great ironies of history that the first piece of news that came in after the end of the peace vigil in the early hours of December 8 (Japan time) was of the Japanese air strikes on the U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters in Hawaii. By the time Roosevelt's cable reached the emperor, the attack was already under way.

Kagawa and Roosevelt's Shared Concerns

Though Kagawa and his associates' efforts at reconciliation ultimately failed to avert the outbreak of war, he at least had mobilized the opinions of many for the cause of peace. This was made possible by his prewar social and religious preaching in the United States--the moral emphasis of which appealed to many Americans, including President Roosevelt. In fact, the two of them had much more in common in their spiritual outlook than one would initially suspect.

Roosevelt was certainly no stranger to religion. His early religious influences included his father, who served as a senior vestryman at the St. James Episcopal Church in Hyde Park, and Endicott Peabody, the founder and headmaster at Groton School, whose daily chapel talks on morality, character, and the virtue of public service found a keen audience in young Franklin. (26) As president, Roosevelt frequently included prayers in his addresses and organized special services on his inaugural anniversaries attended by family members as well as the cabinet. Starting in early 1940, in a move that drew criticism from some Protestants, Roosevelt sent the Episcopal industrialist Myron Taylor as his personal envoy to the Vatican. Throughout the course of the war, Roosevelt corresponded with Pope Pius XII on issues of peace and world order. (27)

Despite such spiritual appreciation, Roosevelt had little use for theology. He viewed religion more as a spiritual compass--a moral foundation upon which he could rest his sense of duty and optimism. He was, however, a champion of religious freedom and diversity, and pleaded with Protestants, Catholics, and Jews to transcend their sectarian creeds and "unite in good works" whenever they could "find common cause." (28) According to Frances Perkins, Roosevelt himself is responsible for including freedom of religion in the four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter. (29)

A convert to Christianity, Kagawa first traveled to America in 1914, realizing, after five years of service among the residents of the infamous Shinkawa slums of Kobe, that charity work could go only so far in the emancipation of the poor. Thus, he resolved to explore other options in the halls of Princeton Theological Seminary, from which he graduated in 1916. In a later recollection he claims to have encountered on the Princeton campus lawn a young Franklin Roosevelt, whom Kagawa described as "gentle-looking." (30) Kagawa subsequently visited the United States in 1924-25 and 1931, the former a three-month speaking tour hosted by the Association of American Colleges, and the latter coming through an invitation to attend the YMCA World Conference in Toronto and Cleveland, followed by a four-month lecture tour across the country.

Kagawa's best-known trip as a reverse missionary came in 1935-36 in a tour officially sponsored by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the Co-operative League of the United States of America. This was the occasion in which Roosevelt intervened personally to clear Kagawa from his medical detention for his eye infection.

In understanding the reasons behind Roosevelt's interest in Kagawa at this time, it is perhaps helpful to know that in implementing his New Deal policies, Roosevelt argued that moral and spiritual problems underlay the nation's material suffering. The federal government's social planning, he contended, was "wholly in accord with the social teachings of Christianity" and would provide all Americans with a reasonable level of physical comfort so that they could focus on achieving "the more abundant life" that Christ had come to bring. (31) The social emphasis of the religion of Kagawa--who knew all too well the spiritual depravity that is born of material deprivation--must have seemed to be the perfect message for Roosevelt's depression-era America.

Kagawa considered cooperative organizations as the natural expression of his Christian principles. He believed they provided a solid framework for stable sustenance, the humanization of economic life, and even a viable alternative to what he saw as the defunct ideologies of capitalism, state socialism, and fascism. (32) Cooperatives became the centerpiece of his 1935-36 lecture tour, which saw him speak across the United States on more than 500 occasions over the course of six months. The highlight of his itinerary came in his appearance at the Rochester Divinity School, Rochester, New York, where he gave the prestigious Rauschenbusch Lectures, named in honor of the noted leader of the Social Gospel movement, Walter Rauschenbusch. The lectures were published under the title Brotherhood Economics, which has subsequently been translated into seventeen languages and sold in twenty-five countries. (33)

Like Roosevelt, Kagawa did not see much value in denominational separation. His vision of the church's mission was internationalist; for him, the construction of the kingdom of God on earth was a moral goal that transcended all religious factions as well as nationalities. Once, standing before an audience in Detroit, he quipped to great effect: "You [Americans] have too many denominations. Last time I checked there were 266. That's too many. Do you intend to live in individual rooms even in Heaven?" (34) The most telling anecdote indicating his influence, however, may be found in the spontaneous creation and distribution of anti-Immigration Act "decision cards" by his local supporters, which were signed and delivered to Kagawa in support of repealing the discriminatory Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, a law that had placed a major strain on U.S.-Japanese relations in the lead-up to the war. (35)

Conclusion

Kagawa's impact as an unofficial mediator between Japan and the United States before Pearl Harbor was, in the grand scheme of things, a limited one. Nevertheless, his case is evidence that religious actors can play a unique role in international negotiations: by creating access to statesmen, mobilizing public opinion, and acting as an agent of last resort--a final ray of hope when all other options have been exhausted.

As a non-Western evangelist, Kagawa attained a status well beyond that of a purely religious missionary. His lecture tours in the United States were as much a reflection of his own desire to spread his vision of a peaceful and prosperous society as they were a result of American demand to hear him speak on those issues. One of his associates offered the following insight into the significance of Kagawa's 1935-36 trip:

 Although there are many Asians--Chinese, Japanese, etc.--who
 are invited to America, most of them are invited out of an
 American curiosity toward the Orient. However, in Kagawa's
 case, this was quite different. It was because Americans had
 reached a social, economic, and spiritual impasse that they had
 to look around and find somebody who could give them guidance
 .... It is quite unheard of that the Americans had invited
 someone from the Orient in order to find a solution to their own
 problems. (36)

Although his diplomatic maneuvering proved unsuccessful, Kagawa's peacemaking efforts were ultimately made possible because he, as a clergyman, understood the potential of religion in social reform and political reconciliation, while Roosevelt, the statesman, shared in this view and reciprocated with sympathy within the confines of his power. As a youth, Kagawa was baptized by American Presbyterian missionaries to Japan. In a sense, his return to the homeland of his spiritual mentors marks a full circle in the work of American missions. As a Christian leader respected by even the president of the country of his religious origin, we can say that Kagawa was a reverse missionary in the fullest sense of the words.

Notes

(1.) Among other accolades, Toyohiko Kagawa was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1947 and 1948, and the Nobel Peace Prize in 1954, 1955, and 1956. See "Nomination Database--Literature" and "Nomination Database--Peace," www.nobelprize.org.

(2.) Tetsuo Yamaori, "The Return of Kagawa's Suppressed Ideas" (in Japanese), Kikan atto [Quarterly at] 15 (2009): 27-29.

(3.) It is said that, after Emperor Hirohito, Kagawa was the most widely known Japanese figure in prewar America, and, alongside Gandhi in India and Schweitzer in Africa, he was commonly cited as one of three "modern saints." See, for example, Allan A. Hunter, Three Trumpets Sound: Kagawa, Gandhi, Schweitzer (New York: Association Press, 1939).

(4.) Recent research in this direction includes Mark R. Mullins, "Christianity as a Transnational Social Movement: Kagawa Toyohiko and the Friends of Jesus," Japanese Religions 32 (2007): 69-87.

(5.) Toyohiko Kagawa to President Roosevelt, January 20,1941 (Official File 1881: Kagawa, Dr. Toyohiko, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, New York [hereafter FDRL]).

(6.) C. E. Peeles to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 20, 1935; Charles R. Crane to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 24, 1935; Franklin D. Roosevelt to Charles R. Crane, February 25, 1936 (Official File 1881: Kagawa, Dr. Toyohiko, FDRL).

(7.) "Roosevelt Hint Permits Visit to U.S. by Kagawa," Chicago Daily Tribune, December 21,1935, p. 16; "Bars Down to Japanese," Los Angeles Times, December 21, 1935, p. 2; "U.S. Gates Open to Kagawa on Insistence of Roosevelt," Washington Post, December 21, 1935, p. 24.

(8.) U.S. Department of State to the Private Secretary to the President, April 25, 1941 (Official File 1881: Kagawa, Dr. Toyohiko, FDRL).

(9.) Incidentally, this path was nearly identical to the one followed by Chinese Christians. Their attendance at the Edinburgh conference culminated in the establishment, similarly through the guidance of John Mott, of the National Christian Council of China in 1922--just a year before the birth of its Japanese counterpart. The leaders of the Christian churches of the two nations maintained a close relationship throughout the 1920s, frequently exchanging delegations to their respective annual general assemblies. See Tsunetar6 Miyakoda, Nihon Kirisutokyo Godo Shiko [A survey of the history of Japanese Christian ecumenism] (Tokyo: Ky6bunkan, 1967), 93-95.

(10.) Nihon Kirisutokyo Rekishi Daijiten Henshu Iinkai, ed., Nihon Kirisutokyd Rekishi Daijiten [Historical dictionary of Japanese Christianity] (Tokyo: Ky6bunkan, 1988), 322-23.

(11.) Ibid., 252-68.

(12.) "Telling the Truth behind the Secret Kagawa Mission" (in Japanese), Nippon Shuho [Japan weekly] 468 (December 25, 1958): 4-14; Kanji Koshio, "Toyohiko Kagawa and the World Federation" (in Japanese), Seren Kenkyu [World federation studies] 9, no. 1 (1968): 24-35.

(13.) Robert D. Schildgen, Toyohiko Kagawa: An Apostle of Love and Social Justice, trans. Kagawa Archives and Resource Center (Tokyo: Shinkyo Press, 2007), 265.

(14.) Sekai Renpo Kensetsu Domei, ed., Sekai Renpo Undo 20 Nen Shi [Twenty-year history of the world federalist movement] (Tokyo: Sekai Renpo Kensetsu Domei, 1969), 82.

(15.) For a comprehensive examination of the John Doe Associates, see R. J. C. Butow, The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1974).

(16.) Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (New York: Atheneum, 1962), 174-260.

(17.) Toyohiko Kagawa, "Record of My Pilgrimage in America" (in Japanese), Hi no Hashira [Pillar of tire], September 15, 1941, pp. 2-6.

(18.) "Japan's Christians Discount U.S. War," New York Times, May 15, 1941, p. 7. "Japan's Envoys of Christianity Visit Atlanta," Atlanta Constitution, May 6, 1941, p. 5.

(19.) Jones posed the same question to Chester Miao (Miao Qiusheng), secretary of the Chinese National Christian Council, who also happened to be at Lake Geneva at the time. Miao similarly emphasized the importance of the political and territorial integrity of China. See E. Stanley Jones, "An Adventure in Failure: Behind the Scenes before Pearl Harbor," Asia and the Americas 45, no. 12 (1945): 610.

(20.) Ibid.

(21.) Toyohiko Kagawa, "Dreams of Negotiations with the United States" (in Japanese), Yomiuri Shimbun [Yomiuri newspaper], November 9, 1953, p. 8; "Telling the Truth behind the Secret Kagawa Mission," 13. Although Dulles held no public office at the time, he served from 1940 to 1946 as chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, a group created by the Federal Council of Churches to channel Protestant thinking on the postwar world. See Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: Free Press, 1982), 190.

(22.) "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)," September 17,1941, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 4:455-57.

(23.) "Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs," November 17, 1941, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, 4:613-14; "Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State," November 18, 1941, in ibid., 614-16.

(24.) Kagawa was not the only party who had tried to reach Roosevelt via Jones. Hidenari "Terry" Terasaki, counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, made a similar overture to Jones in late November. See Gwen Terasaki, Taiyo ni Kakeru Hashi [Bridge to the sun], trans. Mariko Nitta (Tokyo: Koyama Shoten, 1958), 81-92; Jones, "An Adventure in Failure," 613-14.

(25.) Jones, "An Adventure in Failure," 615.

(26.) James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, FDR: A Son's Story of a Lonely Man (New York: Hearst, 1958), 87-89; Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 67-68.

(27.) Gary Scott Smith, Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington to George W. Bush (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), 196-206; Myron C. Taylor, Wartime Correspondence between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII (New York: Da Capo Press, 1975).

(28.) Smith, Faith and the Presidency, 194.

(29.) Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), 142.

(30.) Toyohiko Kagawa, "An Itinerant Pilgrim (Travelogue)" (in Japanese), Kagawa Toyohiko Zenshu [The complete works of Toyohiko Kagawa] (Tokyo: Kirisuto Shinbunsha, 1963), 23:69.

(31.) Smith, Faith and the Presidency, 211-12.

(32.) Kagawa's cooperative vision had a strong transnational appeal as is demonstrated in the case of Presbyterian missionary Sam H. Franklin, who founded an interracial cooperative in the rural South after receiving inspiration from working with Kagawa in Kobe. See Robert Hunt Ferguson, "Race and the Remaking of the Rural South: Delta Cooperative Farm and Providence Farm in Jim Crow-Era Mississippi," Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012.

(33.) Taketoshi Nojiri, "Toyohiko Kagawa's Brotherhood Economics and Its Modem-Day Significance" (in Japanese), in Yuai no seiji keizai gaku [Brotherhood economics], trans. Hisao Kayama and Kimio Ishibe (Tokyo: Japanese Consumers' Co-operative Union, 2009); Toyohiko Kagawa, Brotherhood Economics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936).

(34.) Schildgen, Toyohiko Kagawa, 224.

(35.) Tanetsugu Fukada, "A Gre at Contribution to Mankind" (in Japanese), Kumo no Hashira [Pillar of cloud], October 1936, p. 27. According to Fukada, 3,000 signed decision cards were sent to Kagawa from California.

(36.) Masaki Nakayama, "Some Thoughts on My Euro-American Trip" (in Japanese), Kumo no Hashira [Pillar of cloud], September 1936, pp. 9-12.

Bo Tao is a graduate of Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island (B.A., anthropology) and Fudan University, Shanghai (M.A., international relations). He is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in modern Japanese history at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.--bo.tao@yale.edu