Protecting the homeland.

Murphy, David

MICHAEL KENNEDY AND VICTOR LAING, EDITORS, THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES, 1940-1949:

THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S REPORTS IRISH MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, DUBLIN, 2011.75.00 [euro].

AT THE OUTBREAK of World War II 1939, Ireland was woefully unprepared to defend its own shores. The 1930s had been characterized by a constant reduction in defence expenditure against a backdrop of wider economic problems. Despite the worsening political and strategic situation in Europe, the government had chosen not to expand the nation's defense forces and, at the outbreak of war in 1939, the regular army numbered just over 7,600 men with a little over 11,000 men in the reserve and volunteer forces. While a recruiting drive was initiated in 1939, concerns for budgetary resources and the lack of actual military action in Europe during the "Phoney War" period of September 1939 to May 1940, resulted in the cancellation of this recruitment program after just eight weeks. At the end of 1939, there were actually fewer men in the army than at the beginning of the year.

The German Blitzkrieg campaign that overran France, Belgium, and the Low Countries between May and June 1940 forced a major rethink of Ireland's strategic position and also all aspects of its defense. The summer of 1940 brought the war much closer to Ireland's shores and the government's avowed policy of neutrality offered little real protection in light of developments on the Continent. Apart from possible German action, the possibility also existed of a British move to retake the Treaty Ports, which had only been vacated in 1938. During the course of the next five years, Ireland's Defence Forces underwent a massive program of expansion, which was in itself a remarkable achievement considering the economic state of the country during the war. At their height, the Defence Forces eventually numbered over 40,000 in the regular army, with in excess of 100, 000 in the reserve forces.

This monumental volume, edited by Professor Michael Kennedy and Comdt. Victor Laing,, charts the immense expansion of the Irish Defence Forces between 1940 and 1949. This is achieved through the publication for the first time of all of the reports prepared during this period by the Chief of Staff's office. In the Irish military system, the Chief of Staff is the head of the Defence Forces. During the period covered by these reports, this office was held by two general officers: Lieutenant-General Daniel (Dan) McKenna (January 1940-January 1949) and Major-General William A. (Liam) Archer (January 1949-January 1952). Both men were veterans of the War of Independence and the Civil War, while Archer had fought in Dublin during the Rising in 1916.

The reports reveal a number of reoccurring themes, including concerns about troop numbers and also the necessity of obtaining further military supplies in the form of small arms, artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft. In the latter respect, Ireland was under-supplied in the weapons of modern warfare, and as the army expanded in size additional equipment was gradually obtained from abroad, principally from Britain. Yet, it was not merely a question of equipping land forces. This period also saw a gradual upgrade of the aircraft flown by Ireland's long-neglected Air Corps. The Marine and Coastwatching Service evolved into the Marine Service, forerunner of the modern Naval Service, with responsibility for patrolling Irish coastal waters and with a similar gradual acquisition of new equipment, although it would remain vastly under equipped until after 1945. This accelerated expansion of the country's armed fumes necessitated major reorganization and training. A measure of the success of these programs came in 1942, when two divisions were fielded for a major exercise maneuver --the "Blackwater Exercises."

This volume will become a key source for anyone studying the World War II period (or the "Emergency," as it was termed) in Ireland. The reports record in minute detail all aspects of the Defence Forces organization between 1940 and 1949. Alongside information on purely military aspects such as command, organization, structure, equipment, troop numbers and training, The Irish Defence Forces, 1940-1949, also provides a wealth of information on secondary issues. These include health, discipline, crime within the army, matters relating to the chaplaincy department, morale and military welfare issues. As such it serves as a source for those with an interest in the military history of this period and also for scholars researching wider issues within the war, society and culture remit. There is a selection of interesting photographs, some of which are published here for the first time.

The reports are preceded by a comprehensive introduction written by the editors. Kennedy is already a recognized historian of Ireland during the Emergency, while Laing was previously the commanding officer of the Military Archives and, as such, has an encyclopedic knowledge of the available sources. Their introduction offers a useful summary of the events of the period and essential contextualization of the reports. The editors have also indicated some of the other major research on this subject in their footnotes, as well as further archival sources. The importance of this introduction cannot be overly stressed; the reports themselves are sometimes curiously lacking in specific references to the wider strategic context. There are, for example, few references to the threat of German or British invasion or, indeed, references to the progress of the war in general. One would expect that each report would include some form of summary of the progress of the war at that time, based on available intelligence, and perhaps referring to possible for ramifications for Ireland. In this respect, the reports were originally compiled in a manner that is somewhat disappointing, without sections on the wider strategic situation, assessments of possible threats to Ireland or outline contingency plans outlining possible responses to such threats. Equally, while the army was being upgraded in size and also in the sophistication of its equipment, there is little suggestion that senior command within the army was considering developing a new war-fighting doctrine to apply to the available resources and men in order to conduct a form of war suitable to the Irish situation. The early reports suggest that officers, many of whom had experience in the War of Independence, felt confident that the army could oppose any invader through a campaign of guerrilla warfare and urban fighting. It is likely that these attitudes were modified to take lessons learned from the European campaigns into account. In general, however, there is a lack of a sense of the dynamics and the strategic and operational culture that informed these reports.

It is unlikely that security concerns were the reason for such omissions as the reports had a very limited and controlled circulation. It is also certain that such issues were discussed and planned for but this information was unfortunately not deemed suitable for explicit reference in these reports. This might suggest further avenues for research and later publication. Surviving records of meetings at departmental or cabinet level might reveal more, as would records of planning sessions within the general staff, if such still exist. It would be interesting to make a comparative analysis of similar reports (chief of staff or commander-in-chief's reports) for the armed forces of other neutral sates during this period, most particularly Sweden and Switzerland.

In the final post-Emergency reports, we can trace the reduction in the extent of the Irish army, Air Corps and Naval Service. There is a curious anomaly visible here as the quality and supply of equipment improved just as the immediate threat to Ireland passed. The reorganized Naval Service, for example, did not take delivery of newer vessels until 1946 and 1947. There is, however, recognition of the changing nature of the European strategic situation in the post-war era. In his introductory remarks to the 1945-46 report (438-39), General McKenna noted the disturbed state of postwar Europe, which was indicated by political and social unrest, with all of the former allies maintaining large forces due to the tense situation. He similarly referred to the foundation of the United Nations and noted that an international military force would be part of this new organization although he cast some doubt as to "whether the United Nations Organisation will survive as an effective instrument to organise world peace and prevent war." On Ireland's strategic position, McKerma wrote, "The fact that this country was not invaded or involved in recent hostilities when protected by a small force, which was inadequately trained and inadequately equipped, is no guarantee or assurance of immunity of attack in a future war".

This is an invaluable publication and it will serve as a major source on this subject and as such it complements other publications by scholars, such as Eunan O'Halpin, John P. Duggan, Clair Wills, and Michael Kennedy himself, among others. Since the early twentieth century, it has been increasingly common for military officers and archival staff to cooperate with civilian academics to produce official histories of specific campaigns. Both Britain and the U.S. produced multivolume histories of their campaigns in World War I and World War II, and such projects are now common, usually with associated witness testimony programs. Ireland must be one of the few, if not the only, country in Europe that has not initiated some such process to record the history of its armed forces. As we approach a decade of important commemorations, this could be an appropriate time to begin such as a program. Volumes could be compiled to cover the history of the Defence Forces from their inception as the Irish Volunteers in 1913 up to the present, covering the War of Independence, the Civil War, the Emergency, and UN service as part of this process. I suspect, however, that this comprehensive volume is the closest that we will ever come to an official history of the Irish Defence Forces during the 1940-49 period, or during any period for that matter.

--Centre for Military History & Strategic Studies, History Department, National University of Ireland, Maynooth