The economic impact of the Caribbean Basin Initiative: has it delivered its promise?

Potoker, Elaine ; Borgman, Richard H.

Abstract. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is generally regarded as a system of trade preferences enacted through the Caribbean Economic Recovery Act in 1983 to allow duty-free imports into the U.S. from eligible countries in Central America and the Caribbean. The CBI was primarily intended to be a catalyst that would foster political and economic stability through U.S. direct foreign investment (DFI) in eligible countries. DFI, in turn, would generate economic growth and export diversification in targeted countries, particularly in non-traditional products. This article examines whether the CBI and related agreements have had the desired effects on economic growth, diversification of exports, import dependence, alleviation of debt, and direct foreign investment by analyzing those independent countries that remained designates of the plan since its inception--in total, 12 countries. Although economic results vary by country, generally the region has experienced increases in targeted exports and direct foreign investment, reductions in export concentration, and some reduction in debt. We conclude that while the objectives of the CBI have been modestly realized for the region, the success has obviously not been evenly distributed. The article also offers recommendations for further study.

Resumen. La Iniciativa para la Cuenca del Caribe (ICC) es generalmente vista como un sistema de preferencias comerciales establecida a traves del Acta de Recuperacion Economica del Caribe en 1983 con el fin de permitir las importaciones libres de impuesto a los Estados Unidos desde ciertos paises de America Central y el Caribe. El ICC tenia el objetivo original de promover la estabilidad politica y economica por medio de inversiones directas de los Estados Unidos en esos paises. Esas inversiones, a su vez, generarian crecimiento economico y diversificacion de las exportaciones, particularmente con respecto a productos no tradicionales. Este articulo observa si la ICC y los acuerdos relacionados han provocado los efectos deseados en el crecimiento economico, la diversificacion de exportaciones, la dependencia de importaciones, la reduccion de la deuda y la inversion extranjera directa, analizando los doce paises independientes que fueron designados como destinatarios del plan desde su comienzo. A pesar de que los resultados economicos varian de un pais al otro, generalmente la region ha experimentado aumentos en ciertas exportaciones y en la inversion extranjera directa, reducciones en la concentracion de exportaciones y cierta reduccion de la deuda. Se concluye que a pesar de que los objetivos de la ICC han sido cumplidos modestamente en la region, el exito no ha sido distribuido equitativamente. Este articulo tambien hace recomendaciones para futuros estudios.

Introduction

 The answer to the region's development problems are complex and
 DR-CAFTA is no panacea. (Federico Sacasa, President, President of
 Caribbean-Central American Action [CCAA]) (1)

 Central America is an emerging region.... The region has 10 ports,
 6 international airports, and moves approximately 7.5 million TEU's
 per year. We are the third largest market in Latin America and the
 10th largest market worldwide for U.S. exports. (Ana Vilma de
 Escobar, Vice-President, El Salvador)

 It is on the creation of such a prosperous and stable neighbourhood
 that I wish to concentrate my remarks this evening.... four
 summits, and several hundred mandates later, it is timely for us to
 ask: what is there to show for our collective efforts to enhance
 the security and development of our hemisphere? (Owen Arthur, Prime
 Minister of Barbados) (2)

The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is generally regarded as a system of trade preferences enacted through the 1983 Caribbean Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) to allow duty-free imports into the U.S. from eligible countries in Central America and the Caribbean. At the time, U.S. government publications heralded President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative as an unprecedented program of trade, economic assistance and tax measures to generate economic growth in the region through private sector investment and trade. (3) Although the final legislation was somewhat watered down, it was anticipated by Washington that the CBI would be a catalyst to foster political and economic stability through U.S. direct foreign investment (DFI) in eligible countries. DFI, in turn, would generate economic growth and export diversification in targeted countries. The CBI is perhaps best understood as part of a process of regional and hemispheric economic reform which is ongoing.

An augmented and revised CBERA was enacted in 1990, followed by the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) in 2000. In addition, trade between the Caribbean basin and other countries was encouraged via separate pacts such as 1975's Lome Convention (and its 2000 replacement known as the Cotonou Agreement) allowing duty-free trade with the European Union and 1986's CARIBCAN allowing duty-free access to Canadian markets for most Commonwealth Caribbean exports.

Somewhat concurrently to the efforts being made to increase trade and economic development in the Caribbean Basin, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA; 1994) between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico arguably shifted trade away from these countries. The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000 provided CBI countries trade benefits similar to Mexico's under NAFTA, extending duty-free and quota-free treatment for certain textile and apparel goods and other products previously excluded from the CBERA legislation. Figure 1 details the major initiatives and accords that chronicle the process of trade liberalization and integration in the region, to include those that attempted to offset the impact of Asian- and Mexican-based manufacturers in the realm of apparel production. (4)

Given final ratification of the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (US-DR-CAFTA) in 2005, anticipated ratification by the DR in 2007, the ratification of the Caribbean Single Market (CSM) in 2006, initiatives toward creation of a Central American Customs Union, and the projected expiration of the CBTPA in 2008, it is timely to evaluate if the Caribbean Basin has benefited as intended from 20-plus years of trade agreements. (5) While the quotes opening this article suggest that the "jury may be out" regarding an answer to this question, the purpose of this article is to examine whether the CBI and its related agreements have realized the desired economic results: In other words,

* Has there been economic growth and a diversification of exports (especially into non-traditional and targeted products) in the region since 1983?

* Has there been a reduction of import dependence and an alleviation of debt?

* Has there been a marked improvement in DFI?

* In short, has the CBI delivered its promise?

While we examine the effects of the collective set of trade preferences generally referred to as CBI, we anchor the analysis in the original intent of the CBI initiative. We then examine changes in economic indicators over time for the following countries that remained designates of the CBI since enactment of the CBI in 1983, and only those countries that are not a protectorate or tied to a "mother country." Specifically, the countries examined are Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Each of these countries has remained a "designate" of CBI since 1983--allowing for longitudinal compilation of data without interruption (as available).

We conclude that the CBI has only been modestly realized for the region; the success has not been evenly distributed. Although the economic results vary by country, generally the region has experienced increases in targeted exports and direct foreign investment, reductions in export concentration, and some reduction in debt. Real GDP growth is less general in the region, and the quality of life, as measured by the Human Development Index, has not shown improvement. Finally, we point to other perspectives to development that merit consideration in the future.

Background of the Caribbean Basin Initiative

Originally 27 countries were eligible for what became known as the Caribbean Basin Initiative benefits (Caribbean Basin Initiative 1986). However, being "eligible" did not translate into being "designated" as a CBI beneficiary. That is, countries had to satisfy the eligibility requirements set forth in Section 212 of CBERA. In order to qualify, a country had to meet a long set of conditions. A country could not have a communist government, had to adhere to international trade laws, must not have expropriated or nationalized property owned by a U.S. firm or citizen, needed to show a positive workers' rights record, and was expected to protect U.S. copyrights, among other stipulations. In fact, it was the first time that the U.S. Congress explicitly stated that beneficiaries would only receive trade benefits if they satisfied the intellectual property rights standards. But even within this set of rules, according to Section 212, the President had wide latitude if "the President determines that such designation will be in the national economic or security interest of the United States." (6) By 1985, 21 countries received CBI designation: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. Guyana was added in 1988; Nicaragua in 1990; Panama lost eligibility in 1988 (during the Noriega political turmoil), and was reinstated in 1990. (7) Figure 2 illustrates the designates as of 2000 from the Caribbean, Central America, and South America.

The original CBERA legislation was passed in 1983, with benefits starting as of January 1984. The U.S. government promoted the Caribbean Basin Initiative as a catalyst to economic growth. Certainly that hope was echoed by some of the participants. Mario Carvajal, the minister of exports and investments for Costa Rica (among the initial 11 nations approved as designates), said: "The more we study it, the more we realize the Caribbean Basin Initiative offers us a real opportunity" and later called it a "window of opportunity" (Auerbach 1983a, 1983b). Eduardo Tester, executive director of the Dominican Republic Center for the Promotion of Export, commented: "With the CBI we have a comparative advantage over many countries in the world" (Auerbach 1983b).

But the legislation that ultimately passed was much less than originally envisioned by the Reagan administration. To some, the end result was more symbolic than effective. Senator Robert Dole, chair of the Senate Finance Committee at the time, said, "This legislation has little to do with creating new industries in the Caribbean or withholding or anything else. It is legislation that will show, purely and simply, that we are concerned about the countries to our south and realize their strategic importance to us" (Whittling Away at the Caribbean Initiative 1983). Emilio Pantojas-Garcia (2001) maintained that the framework for the CBI was not based "in the principles of market fundamentalism" (60), or free-market self-adjustments. Rather, it was based in what might be construed as preferential trade grants by a developed country to a developing country or countries--a characteristic that continues into the present.

The original proposed legislation contained a 10% tax credit for new investments in the region. That was removed, somewhat ludicrously and with less effect, in favor of allowing business write-offs for holding conventions in the region. (8) Other changes brought about by various interest groups that severely affected the legislation were restrictions on U.S. imports of frozen orange juice and steel, strong quotas on sugar and beef, and the removal of petroleum products from the duty-free list. Other items not on the duty-free list include textiles, footwear, luggage, leather goods, and tuna. The problem with not including textile and footwear products and the like was that these were among the most established industrial sectors in the Caribbean, and thus their exclusion dampened the potential effect of the initiative. (9) Prior to CBI, about 80% of the region's exports to the U.S. entered the country duty-free under the Generalized System of Preferences. Only about 15% more of the region's exports were expected to be entitled to duty-free entry due to CBERA (James 1984). The legislation also contained $350 million in aid, which was felt to be too little to markedly help the economies of the region. Of this, two-thirds went to Central America and only one-third to the Caribbean.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

There were many critics. Some took the planners at their word--that it was a plan for economic development--but found the model faulty or questioned whether the CBI was a viable strategy for the region based upon the economic realities of many of the beneficiary countries--single-crop economies and limited internal markets. Others considered it, at its most benign, a Reagan administration public relations ploy, or more critically a politically and militarily motivated plan to stabilize the region through "carrot and stick" economic assistance and/or a way to channel additional aid to problem spots such as El Salvador.

Many argued that the plan was a faulty model for economic development in this region. CBI, on the surface, seemed to have precedent in the so-called "dependent development" of Brazil and Mexico in the 1970s and 1980s. Although both of those countries were dependent upon developed nations for DFI, they still managed to move along a developmental path from what Evans and Gereffi (1982) refer to as the periphery to the semi-periphery. (10) But the comparison to Mexico is informative. Mexico entered the 20th century as a classic peripheral country and as an exporter of primary products to the geographically close U.S. There had been significant U.S. DFI influence in the 1970s-1980s aimed to stimulate the same sectors targeted under subsequent CBI proposals--the tourist sector, the agricultural export sector, and the large assembly industry. Yet, the surface similarity ends there. CBI countries of the 1980s fell short of the Mexico of the 1970s in infrastructure development, trained labour force, and natural resources (Evans and Gereffi 1982, 114, 119). Unlike Mexico and Brazil, which had been able to diversify production and supply their internal market with finished goods, CBI countries were still heavily dependent upon single-crop economies and subject to economic hardships due to price fluctuations over which they had little control. Petras (1982) argued that there was no internal market in these countries, and maintained that even the price of farm machinery and farm inputs imported from the U.S. had increased faster than the price of primary products. Further, in Petras's view, the "pointed" exclusion of textiles from the agreement was crippling, because it was one of the few product areas that could have offered export potential for many of the countries involved (Petras 1982, 400-402).

To critics such as Petras, these circumstances meant that the CBI would fail. Unlike members of the Reagan administration, Petras and others saw heavy state involvement (as in South Korea or Brazil) as key to stimulation of market activity. They felt that the premise that direct foreign investment would "trickle down" to the local economy had already been proved wrong: for example, in the case of Operation Bootstrap, launched by the U.S. government in Puerto Rico in 1947. In that case, tax exemptions and duty-free access to U.S. markets in the long run did not translate into reduction of unemployment or a significant reduction of dependence upon imports, although it did discourage the exodus of some 50% of the island population to the U.S (Sunshine 1994, 43-57).

Another possible model, and one touted by the Reagan administration, was Taiwan. But Taiwan had an internal market--only 33% of industrial production was exported in 1980--unlike any of the CBI beneficiary countries. In addition, agrarian reform and import substitution preceded export growth (Vega 1985). Further, Taiwan had received aid from the U.S. for both physical and social infrastructures such as development of roads and health programs. Bernardo Vega argues that this capital was necessary not only for the establishment of export industries, but also for the government for improvement of the infrastructure. CBI offered no such infrastructure assistance and also failed to offer any debt relief, which would be an alternative way to provide capital for infrastructure improvements. Finally, the Asian example of export-led growth was substantively based upon textiles and leather goods, categories excluded in CBERA.

Another criticism of the CBI is that it was not actually a new economic stimulus plan at all; rather it was a means for political and perhaps military ends. Ramsaran (1982), for example, argued that nothing much was new under this so-called "initiative," pointing to the fact that 80% (or more by some estimates) of Caribbean Basin exports already were imported into the U.S. duty-free. A further element that made the "package" suspect, or as a way for the U.S. to assert its hegemony in the political life of the nations, was the fact that the plan showed no concern with regional integration that might improve the region's economy. Rather, in Ramsaran's view, the aid tied into the plan served to interfere with the process.

The region targeted by the CBI is (and was) hardly homogeneous. While Central America saw "entrenched rightest military and economic elites ... being battled by the left, the Caribbean by and large is a region of existing democratic governments ... dealing with economic problems" (DeYoung 1980). While that quotation from the Washington Post in 1980 may be overstating the case--the Bishop regime in Grenada, Baby Doc Duvalier in Haiti, and Castro in Cuba come to mind--it is true that the political situation in the Caribbean had improved markedly from the U.S. administration's viewpoint (vis-a-vis Central America) by the early 1980s--the socialist-leaning government of Michael Manley in Jamaica (1972-80) had been replaced by the capitalist-oriented Edward Seaga, and the Eric Gairy government in Grenada had been removed by the Bishop regime in 1979 (although the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 was still to come). A Barbadian official quoted in the Washington Post in 1980 said: "Sometimes we don't think the United States understands this trend in the region very deeply. We really aren't much interested in the rhetoric of the cold war. The basic problems are economic and social" (DeYoung 1980).

Clearly political considerations weighed heavily in the qualifications for eligibility. The term "Caribbean Basin" was created by President Reagan, and as a term it was somewhat of an oxymoron because El Salvador was a primary target for financial assistance, yet none of its shores were touched by the Caribbean. (11) In Ramsaran's view, it was a way to focus upon Central America and the Caribbean as a sub-region with special problems requiring "special" attention. This cold war attitude was clear in the text of the legislation. Section 212 of CBERA stated that the President might not designate a country for eligibility if it were a communist country, and the country also had to follow accepted rules of international trade (as discussed above).

Thus, the instability in El Salvador and other Central American states was undoubtedly a factor in the decision to launch the CBI. The "carrot and stick" approach was explicit in Reagan's political addresses of the time. Countries with policies acceptable to the U.S. (e.g., Jamaica under Seaga) would be rewarded, and those "others" (Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua) would be denied assistance.

Alessandro Barca's "Cronica de un fracaso anunciado" (1983) focused primarily on the political and military implications of the plan to the region. In Barca's view, it was clear from the beginning that the initiative was an instrument to cover up aid to El Salvador and isolate Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada politically and economically. Internal structural problems required concern with integration of the region, which the Reagan plan did not address. Barca was not alone in his perceptions of the plan. He points out that representatives of Canada felt the CBI was poorly organized and questionably motivated, and representatives of Mexico criticized the "selectiveness" and anti-Castro crusade inherent in the plan.

Thus, expectations for the success of the CBI (and its descendants) were mixed 20-something years ago. Some like Seaga of Jamaica saw the plan as a Marshall Plan for the region. (12) Others saw the plan as economically misguided or merely political. But even some of the critics held out hope. Despite the apparent weaknesses he saw in the initial plan, Vega felt the proximity of the region to the U.S. might provide the advantages that could offset the restraints of CBI (Vega 1985, 19).

Certainly when the CBI was introduced, it was needed. According to a report from the Inter-American Development Bank, in 1982 there was no economic growth in Latin America. Thirty percent of the Latin American labor force was unemployed, and per capita income declined in 24 of the region's 25 countries (Trinidad and Tobago had the gain). (13) Exports from the region to the U.S. had fallen from $10.3 billion in 1980 to $8 billion in 1982 (James 1984). The next section examines the economic results.

Analysis of Economic Outcomes

If CBI and the other agreements have had influence, we would expect to find positive economic outcomes. We examine the 12 countries identified earlier--Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. All of these countries have consistently been eligible for CBI benefits since inception. Data were gathered from Reports to the Congress on the Operation of CBERA, U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) Reports, "World Development Indicators" from the World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the United States International Trade Commission. The countries were first examined for general economic growth, export growth in targeted categories, imports of CBI categories into the U.S., concentration of exports, debt overhang, and direct foreign investment.

GDP Growth

Table 1 shows nominal GDP (gross domestic product) in 1980 and 2005, annualized real growth in GDP in five-year increments for the 12 countries, and an average real growth rate for the entire period. In nominal terms,

all the countries experienced growth (annualized nominal growth rates ranged from 3.51% in Trinidad and Tobago to 7.19% in Belize). In real terms, the growth results are mixed. Real GDP growth from year to year (not shown) has been volatile; however the five-year rates are much more stable. Average annualized real GDP has increased on average from 0.77% annually (Haiti) to 5.38% (Belize) for the 25-year period around CBI. In comparison to developed economies over this period (1980-2004 for these comparison countries), the performance was impressive for some of the countries in the Caribbean region. Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Grenada all grew faster than the U.S. (3.1%) and Australia (3.3%) (OECD 2006). Dominica, Guatemala, and Honduras grew as fast as or faster than the UK (2.5%) and the Euro area (2.2%). Barbados, El Salvador, Haiti (especially), Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago fared less well.

Of course, even for the top-performing countries, one has to be careful in interpreting GDP. Szekely (2001), for example, reports that inequality did not decline in any country in Latin America in the 1990s. That is, even as GDP increased, either the number of poor increased or the number did not increase but those that remained poor were even poorer than before. Thus, GDP growth does not necessarily represent economic development for all segments of society, a factor discussed further in the Human Development Index section later in the article.

Export Growth

If CBI has had the intended effect, we would expect to see an increase in the diversity of the economies including an increase in non-traditional and targeted exports. The U.S. Department of Commerce does feel that there has been the intended diversification, away from petroleum products (from nearly 50% of U.S. imports in 1984 from the region to 5.8% in 1998) and toward apparel (from 5.5% of CBI exports to the U.S. in 1984, to 48% in 1998). (14) But as noted earlier, apparel was excluded from duty-free status. Thus, these changes had little to do with the original legislation. However, the U.S. Department of Commerce also points out increases in areas like electrical machinery and parts and optical, photographic, and surgical instruments. There also has been some agricultural diversification into new products such as strawberries and cut flowers (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2005).

As a first step in determining any shift in exports, we examine the percentage of total exports comprising non-traditional exports for selected years between 1980 and 2003 (Table 2). "Non-traditional exports" in Table 2 refers to manufacturing exports plus tourism exports (upper panel) or just manufacturing (lower panel). Thus, "non-traditional" in Table 2 includes both targeted and non-targeted categories. Recall that the CBI initiative was directed toward non-traditional products. That is, prior to CBI, U.S. imports from the Caribbean Basin countries were primarily agricultural products and commodity raw materials (and derivatives from these raw materials). These are referred to as "traditional" imports from the area. One of the explicit goals of the CBI was to encourage countries to diversify their exports away from traditional exports in the hope of stabilizing their economies from the fluctuations in price and demand for the traditional products. Figure 3 lists the traditional and non-traditional products. "Non-traditional" products included manufactured items--electrical and electronic machinery; optical, photographic, and surgical instruments; nuclear reactor components; wood products; processed specialty foods; giftware and accessories; sporting goods; toys; ornamental horticulture; and tourism (Guide to the Caribbean Basin Initiative 2000, 8). Note that apparel is also listed as a non-traditional product, even though it was one of the more successful manufacturing sectors in the region. However, as noted earlier, apparel, although a major export item by CBI countries, was excluded from duty-free status. (In the case of apparel imports, initially CBI countries and Mexico enjoyed a relatively equal U.S. market share. However, the introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 shifted that balance away from CBI countries.)

As Table 2 indicates, when we include tourism, all of the countries except Barbados have shown a significant increase in non-traditional exports as a percentage of total exports. Barbados shows a slight decline. However, when tourism is removed from the figures, the results are much less encouraging (lower panel of Table 2). We chose to exclude tourism in the lower panel of Table 2 for several reasons. First, its exclusion isolates the manufacturing sector. Also, tourism itself is not generally regarded as an avenue of sustainable development. Clearly tourism has positive outcomes, including infusions of foreign currency and employment at all skill levels--particularly in unskilled and semi-skilled labour, which is generally plentiful in the region. But tourism is highly income-elastic and subject to volatility due to varying tourist tastes and natural disasters--e.g., hurricanes. (Such revenue volatility is also present, of course, with traditional agricultural and natural resources, which are subject to significant price fluctuations.) Furthermore, the sector "is highly transnationalized and depends on imports for food, beverages and equipment" (Pantojas-Garcia 2001, 67). Its negative externalities (e.g., crime and money-laundering) are well-documented in the CBI region, as it does not flourish without social consequences. (15)

Thus, it seems important to discover if the countries examined broadened their exports not just beyond agriculture, but also beyond tourism. Without tourism, Barbados and Belize show a significant decline in non-traditional exports. Although data are limited for Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica through to 2003, those available indicate a decline in non-traditional exports. The success stories are Costa Rica (23.5% in 1980 to 49.2% in 2003), El Salvador (28% to 44.5%), Trinidad and Tobago (6.5% 1980 to 31%), and Grenada (4.5% to 13.6%). The remaining countries (Guatemala and Honduras) have seen modest increases in non-traditional exports not including tourism. Obviously, those countries' economies that have been heavily dependent upon tourism (e.g., Barbados, Belize, and Jamaica in particular) continue to be so.

Did the areas targeted by the CBI show the growth hoped for? We examine this in several ways. Table 3 presents volume of CBI-manufactured/ commodity goods imported into the U.S. from the CBI countries as determined by the International Trade Commission. The growth rate of these imports is actually negative for several countries: Barbados, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, and Haiti. The more notable successes appear to be Trinidad and Tobago (23% annualized growth), Costa Rica (11%), Jamaica (8%), Dominican Republic (7%), and Belize (6%). Some of the categories captured in the data are shown in Table 4: Trinidad and Tobago has seen significant growth in the CBI category of electrical machinery; Costa Rica in electrical machinery, optical equipment, and machinery, reactors and boilers, and miscellaneous manufactured articles; and Dominican Republic in wood products, reactors and boilers, electrical machinery, optical equipment, and sports equipment. Belize has seen growth primarily in reactors and boilers, and wood products. Thus, it is clear that targeted segments did do very well for some of the countries. However, four countries--Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, and Haiti--did not share in the growth of any of these categories. (16)

This is reflected in the rankings of these countries as trading partners of the U.S. (based on imports into the U.S.), as shown in Table 5. Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, and Haiti have either declined in the ranking or shown a brief improvement and then declined. By this measure, the countries that have improved are Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Other service areas besides tourism were targeted by CBI. Table 6 shows that exports of services increased significantly as a percentage of total exports for Barbados, Dominica, and Guatemala, and increased less so for El Salvador, Grenada, and Honduras. Recall, however, that Table 2 shows a large percentage of these figures would include tourism. No country showed a distinct, sustained drop in services as a percentage of exports. Table 7 presents two service categories as a percentage of total exports: communications, computer, and information systems; and insurance and financial services. It is clear that several of the CBI countries have seen significant growth in these categories, most especially Barbados (both categories), Costa Rica (communications), Dominica (insurance and financial services), El Salvador (communications), Grenada (insurance and financial services), Haiti (communications), Honduras (communications), Jamaica (communications), and to some degree Trinidad and Tobago (insurance and financial services). (17)

Table 8 shows the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) Concentration measures for exports for each country analyzed. These measures were calculated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and provide a measure of export concentration. A number closer to 1 means higher concentration or less diversification ("1" would be complete concentration in a single export). (18) Barbados, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, and Trinidad and Tobago have reduced their export concentration--that is, they have achieved more diversification. On the other hand, Belize, Dominica, and Jamaica show no consistent trend toward improvement, and Haiti and Jamaica have shown significantly worsened export diversity.

It is not easy to generalize about these export data. But it is clear there are good signs: as examples, several countries have diversified their exports, increased non-traditional exports, and/or increased service exports not just via tourism, but also including insurance, finance, and communications.

Direct Foreign Investment and Debt

An increase in direct foreign investment was not only a desired outcome of CBI, but was to be the very catalyst for economic improvement. So an increase in DFI would be a necessary condition for the success of the CBI. DFI inflows have been volatile, but Tables 9A and 9B show that in most cases DFI inflows increased substantially from 1980 to 2000, whether looking at dollar equivalents or percentages of fixed capital formation. (DFI as a percentage of GDP, not shown, also increased.) The countries with the largest DFI increases are Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Barbados's performance pales in comparison to these countries. The results for Haiti are clearly poor. Guatemala has very volatile DFI flows and except for a few impressive years, can also be considered a poor performer.

Table 10 displays external debt as a percentage of GDP--a final economic indicator of success of the CBI addressed herein. Over the period shown, Costa Rica is clearly the country that shows the most notable decrease in external debt as a percentage of GDP. Conversely, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, and Honduras seem particularly worse off. Haiti's performance fluctuates; yet, data show this country's debt to be slightly higher (32%) than what it was during the pre-CBI period. El Salvador's fluctuates as well, but at 45.5%, it is still higher than the pre-CBI period (yet lower than when the CBI was enacted in 1984). (19) While there are fluctuations, the remaining countries--Barbados (25.1%), the Dominican Republic (37.7%), Guatemala (20.2%), and Trinidad and Tobago (23.8%)--still show higher percentages than those of the pre-CBI period. Jamaica's situation remains essentially unchanged; the country still carries a significant amount of external debt as a percentage of GDP (72.2%).

Import Dependence

A reduction in import dependence may be another result of success of the CBI, as a reduction may reflect a developing internal market. On the other hand, a growing economy may also lead to an increase in imports because imports may be needed to support increases in manufacturing and services including tourism.

Table 11 lists imports as a percentage of GDP for the 12 countries. We show five-year averages because annual percentages are very volatile. To reiterate, 1980-84 is the pre-CBI period. 1985-89 incorporates the initial few years after the agreement. If imports have been affected, we would expect to see the changes most clearly in the five-year periods from 1990 on. None of the countries show a significant reduction in imports from both initial periods, although Barbados, Belize, Dominica, and Grenada show somewhat lower import percentages versus the pre-CBI period. Nevertheless, several of the countries show a substantial increase in import percentage. These are Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Trinidad and Tobago. Except for Jamaica, the increases are are over 10%, and in some cases much more. Costa Rica's percentage grows from about 33% of GDP to almost 50% of GDP--quite substantial. But, as suggested above, interpretation of these increases must be done with care. Included in this list of countries with large import increases are some of the countries with the largest average increase in real GDP (e.g., Costa Rica at 3.78%, Dominican Republic at 3.9%, and Honduras at 3%). However, the country with the greatest increase in GDP--Belize at 5.38%--did not experience this increase in imports. Haiti, the only country with a negative growth in GNP over the entire study period, did show an increase in import percentage (but this might reflect the negative GDP growth rather than a substantial increase in imports). Similarly, any link to country debt (if the country was borrowing to increase imports) seems inconclusive. Costa Rica reduced debt, but increased imports; Belize increased debt, but did not increase imports. There is no clear pattern among the countries examined. What is clear is that there is no great reduction in imports as a percentage of GDP. This may suggest that during this period there was little or no development of a growing internal market, but it is very difficult to conclude this for certain.

Human Development Index

In addition to economic indicators, perhaps a more important measure of the gains made in these countries would be its trickle-down impact specific to the overall well-being of the populations. This, admittedly, is not an identified research objective of the article, but still a reasonable expectation stemming from the hoped-for economic development and political stability that was envisioned in the 1980s. A measure that attempts to capture this trickle-down effect is the Human Development Index (HDI) from the United Nations. According to the HDI (2006), the index provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human development--life expectancy, education, and standard of living. Table 12 presents the Human Development Index (and rankings where available) for the 12 CBI countries as well as Canada and the U.S. for comparison purposes. Clearly, the HDI indicates there has been little or no improvement in the CBI as a region. In fact, scores have actually dropped for Barbados (since 1990), Belize (since 1992), Costa Rica (since 1990), Dominica (since 1990), Grenada (since 1992), Jamaica (since 1990), and Trinidad and Tobago (since 1990). Rankings for these countries show a corresponding worsening. In fact, not one of the 12 countries in the region appears to have improved by this measure. These results corroborate the concerns of a number of regional leaders whose voices were heard at recent CCAA conferences, several of whom were quoted at the start of this article.

Conclusion: Has the CBI Delivered Its Promise?

U.S. government reports describe CBERA legislation as generally successful, citing increased U.S. investments in the region and increased demand for U.S. products. The region ranks among the top nine markets for U.S. exports. However, the success of CBERA legislation cannot be measured by increased U.S. exports to the region.

This may often be an implicit goal of U.S. action, but it was certainly not the most important goal of the legislation. The Fourth Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (2001) claims:

 CBTPA have helped countries in the region diversify exports and
 support income growth. At the inception of the CBI in 1984,
 traditional and primary products such as coffee, bananas, and
 mineral fuels accounted for a solid majority of U.S. imports from
 the region. In 2000, manufactured products such as apparel and
 electrical and non-electrical machinery amounted to over half of
 CBI exports to the U.S. (20)

Unfortunately, that same report mentions that the percentage of those exports that benefit from CBERA preference declined from 1998 to 2000.

The title of this section raises a question that is challenging to answer: Has the CBI delivered its promise? Obviously, the results are not the same across the selected CBI countries that are analyzed. This is not surprising given the heterogeneity of the countries examined. For example, foreign aid is a factor influencing infrastructural development and DFI. Yet, as indicated earlier, foreign aid from the U.S. has been unequally distributed to designated countries. In addition, there are differences in literacy, education level of the work force, and child labor practices--all of which would be expected to affect economic development. (21) Regional averages are interesting, but have limited value in order to develop new models and/or paradigms for the future. As argued by Potoker (1992), each country should be measured in its own terms, which brings us to Table 13.

The summary Table 13 tabulates the results above into three categories--poor if the country's situation has worsened, good if their situation has improved, and blank if there has been little change. Admittedly, Table 13 is very subjective, but perhaps useful as a simple representation of relative success stories. Haiti and Barbados rate as "poor" in seven of the eleven categories represented. As measured by the HH, Barbados has improved only in export concentration (it has become less concentrated), a reduced debt load, and growth in financial services. On the other hand, Costa Rica has improved the most--rated "good" in eight categories, followed by the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Honduras--"good" in six categories. For these countries, it is possible to conclude that the CBI has delivered on its initial promise: All of these countries have seen an increase in targeted exports and a reduction in export concentration, an increase in non-traditional exports (not including tourism), an increase in DFI, a reduction in external debt (excepting Honduras, notably), and an increase in CBI imports by the U.S. Guatemala shows improvement in four categories--reduction of export concentration, improvement in targeted manufactured exports, and ranking and imports by the U.S. The rest (Belize, Grenada, and Jamaica) are somewhere in the middle or below. Yet, none of the countries has improved by the measure that may matter most--quality of life as measured by the HDI index.

Final Thoughts: What's Next?--A Regional Perspective

 The tremendous expansion in nontraditional exports from CBI
 beneficiary countries to the United States since the inauguration
 of the CBI program has greatly cushioned the severe declines in
 traditional exports, primarily petroleum, from the region. This
 export diversification has led to a more balanced production and
 export base, reducing the region's vulnerability to fluctuations in
 markets for traditional products. (Guide to the Caribbean Basin
 Initiative 2000)

 The wheel has turned full circle; the defeat of the Communist
 threat and the triumph of neo-liberalism have placed the Caribbean
 at the mercy of transnational capital. (Dietz & Pantojas-Garcia
 1994, 37)

The first quotation above generally represents U.S. government reports that portray the CBI as a great success. Our findings illustrate that this perspective is justified to a modest extent for the region in terms of the original intent of the plan, but certainly not for all countries analyzed. The expiration of the CBTPA in 2008 begs the following question--specifically, Is the CBI paradigm for development and framework that presented a model of import substitution for less developed (modestly industrialized periphery) countries appropriate any longer? The CBI paradigm still continues as what some have called "centerpiece of U.S. economic policy in the region" (Dietz & Pantojas-Garcia 1994). Exploration of this question is currently material for further research and well beyond the scope and intent of this article. Nevertheless, based on the discussion heretofore, there are reasons to believe the answer is "no." While there are many examples that illustrate shifts from commodity exports to services, innovations with commodity exports (e.g., ethanol refineries' use of sugar cane, organic and gourmet coffees), and infrastructural expansion (e.g., Panama Canal, infrastructure development relating to the International Cricket Council 2007 World Cup cricket event, the SIEPAC Electrical Interconnection Project for Central America, the Mesoamerican Information Highway Project, a [proposed] wet canal through Honduras, increased privatization in the telecommunications and energy sectors, the International Development Bank's "Building Opportunities for the Majority," port security development targeting Haiti, and agricultural biotechnology), the second quote above points to the need for a new paradigm and development model or models that address the persistent issues of the present and past--namely, worsening poverty.

Clearly, numerous leaders from the region echoed their views in December 2006 at the Miami Conference on the Caribbean. There was a call for a vision of development that achieves tangible benefits specific to human development and poverty reduction, access to technology and education, and self-reliance (www.c-caa.org/news_reports/conference_reports.html). The focus of many remarks was not just region-centric, but rather targeted hemispheric integration and sustainable development--that is, the social consequences of development. The Free Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA) was to be accomplished by 2005. While trade preferences are still considered important by many to the future, regional perspectives point to the imperative for any plan to address more than trade alone.

The efforts in the region to develop an economic union that aims to strengthen capital markets and harmonize monetary, fiscal, and workforce policies suggests that a development model may emerge that applies the subsidiarity principle to social reform and governance. The application of subsidiarity places countries in a region on even footage with central agencies such as the UN or IDB and the United States to define objectives and means to achieve them. (22) Owen Arthur of Barbados argues, "The future of a secure and successful neighborhood depends on an enlightened approach to the region, a new Good Neighbour Policy, which recognizes and respects the democratic right of the citizens of all countries to choose their own political and social path to development" (http//www.c-caa.org/conferences/2006/ speeches.html). Subsidiarity, applied, may indeed may be a basis for a new model, paradigm, or framework for hemispheric integration.

Works Cited

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Evans, Peter, and Gary Gereffi. 1982. Foreign investment and dependent development: Comparing Brazil and Mexico. In Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in late development, edited by Sylvia Anne Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert, 111-168. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.

Farnsworth, Clyde H. 1983. Setback for Latin economies. New York Times, 22 August: D1.

Fourth report to Congress on the operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. 31 December 2001. Office of the United States Trade Representative. <http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/ Press_Releases/2001/December/asset_upload_file385_2110.pdf>. Retrieved 30 October 2005.

Guide to the Caribbean Basin Initiative. 1994. U.S. Department of Commerce. <http://www.mac.doc.gov/CBI/webmain/guidebook.htm>. Retrieved 30 October 2005.

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Knight, W. Andy, and Randolph Persaud. 2001. Subsidiarity: Regional governance and Caribbean security. Latin American Policy and Society 43(1): 29-55.

Levantis, Theodore, and Azmat Gani. 2000. Tourism demand and the nuisance of crime. International Journal of Social Economics 27 (7-10): 959-967.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2006. OECD factbook 2006: Economic, environmental and social statistics. <http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/>. Retrieved 14 February 2007.

Pantojas-Garcia, Emilio. 2001. Trade liberalization and peripheral postindustrialization in the Caribbean. Latin American Politics and Society 43(1): 57-77.

Patterson, John. N.d. The global system: Understanding the development link. <http://facstaff.uww.edu/rambadtd/globalp/Wk1Read2.htm>. Retrieved 22 August 2005.

Petras, James. 1982. A military policy in search of an economic rationale: Reagan's Caribbean basin aid program. Comercio Exterior 28 (11): 400-402.

Potoker, Elaine. 1992. The Caribbean Basin Initiative: Reaction to the CBI I as an economic development model and of its impact to the region (ED347117). Available from Eric Resources Information Center (ERIC) at <http://www. eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/Home.portal?_nfpb=true&ERICExtSearch_ SearchValue_0=Potoker&searchtype=keyword&ERICExtSearch_Search Type_0=kw&_pageLabel=RecordDetails&objectId=0900000b80050460 &accno=ED347117&_nfls=false>.

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Vega, Bernardo. 1985. The CBI faces adversity: Lessons from the Asian export strategy. Caribbean Review 14 (2): 18-44.

Whittling away at the Caribbean initiative. 1983. Business Week, 11 July: 28.

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--. 2005. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/>. Retrieved 30 October 2005.

Notes

(1) Sacasa was speaking at the CCAA's 29th annual Miami Conference on the Caribbean Basin in December 2005. The conference was to address how trade and investment could "be extended to all segments of society and how a workable partnership can be created to more aggressively confront the twin challenges of worsening poverty and increased global competition" (Skuba 2005).

(2) De Escobar and Arthur were among the key speakers at the 30th Miami Conference on the Caribbean in December 2006, sponsored by CCAA, a non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting economic development through the private sector investment. See <http//www.c-caa.org/conferences/2006/speeches.html>.

(3) See the 1986 Guidebook: Caribbean Basin Initiative. These comments reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

(4) For further information on economic integration and bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements in force or under development by signatory countries that are CBI designates, refer to the Organization of American States (OAS) Trade Unit at <http://www.sice.oas.org> and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat at <http://www.caricom.org>.

(5) CBTPA benefits are in effect through 30 September 2008 or the date, if sooner, on which the Free Trade Area of the Americas or another free trade agreement as described in legislation enters into force between the United States and a CBTPA beneficiary country.

(6) See the specific U.S. Code at <http://www.washingtonwatchdog.org/documents/ use/ttl19/ch15/sec2702.html>, and Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (10th Report) (2001).

(7) From various CBI Annual Reports through September 1991. Note that not all eligible countries requested designation, including Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Suriname, and Turks and Caicos Islands (see Guide to the Caribbean Basin Initiative [1994]).

(8) A country was eligible for this only if they agreed to a tax information agreement with the U.S., and by 1987 only three countries were qualified for this benefit (Barbados, Grenada, and Jamaica). See "Appendix D--Caribbean Basin Initiative" (1989).

(9) For a more complete discussion see "Appendix D--Caribbean Basin Initiative" (1989). In 1986 the U.S. entered into bilateral textile agreements with four Caribbean countries (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica). These agreements were to guarantee access to U.S. markets for certain textiles and apparel.

(10) The core periphery model described by Evans and Gereffi(1982) is a useful way to conceptualize or categorize countries on a development continuum. On one end are the developed countries--the core countries--with most of the power, highly educated populations, diversified economies, high pay, and high standard of living. The other end is composed of the periphery countries--less developed countries with limited economic prospects, poorly educated populations, and low standard of living (at or near the subsistence level). In between, at various stages of development, are the semi-periphery countries, often newly industrialized countries such as many Asian countries. For a useful summary, see Patterson's note on the development link (n.d.). This model is still useful and applicable in the 21st century, but as Pantojas-Garcia (2001) argues, the core and periphery are better conceptualized in terms of transnational circuitry and networks of financial capital, technology, and managerial expertise vs. geography. Nevertheless, he readily admits that transnational corporations "continue to operate in a geographical framework," and in the context of trade preferences by developed countries to developing regions (59-60, 64). To that context we add the unequal distribution of digital capital.

(11) A major purpose of the CBI was to assist countries that were particularly hard-hit economically. Yet all of the Eastern Caribbean countries only received 3% of the total, while El Salvador received 36%, and Jamaica 14%. Of the military aid that went to the region, El Salvador received 70.3% of the total. See Ramsaran (1982, 431-433).

(12) Barca (1983, 111). The CBI is acknowledged as Seaga's "brainchild."

(13) These data are from the Inter-American Development Bank as reported in Farnsworth (1983).

(14) This is a case where a country-by-country analysis presents a better picture since petroleum exports have driven the government's regional data, but are not a factor in many of the CBI economies.

(15) See Knight and Persaud (2001, 40) and Levantis and Gani (2000, 960) for more on this subject specific to crime, money laundering, and insurance cost increases.

(16) Note that in 1990 the Tariff Schedule of the United States (TSUS) was replaced by the Harmonized Tariff System (HTS)--the universal commodity classification system used to assess tariffs and collect trade data on exports and imports. This should have no more than a minor effect on our data. This change will not affect measures such as GDP, trade partner ranking with the U.S., concentration indexes, DFI, and debt load. It may affect some of the export statistics, but our time series runs well into the current decade so trends after 1990 should be apparent and unaffected.

(17) Complete data on services are still difficult to come by, but are currently being compiled. Luis Alberto Moreno, president of the Inter-American Development Bank, reported at the 6 December 2006 Miami Conference on the Caribbean that "market analysts estimate that the number of people employed in Caribbean call centers will nearly double between 2006 and 2007 ... This so-called 'near-shoring' industry barely existed a few years ago, and now it is growing at 40% per year." See <http//www.c-caa.org/ conferences/2006/speeches.html>.

(18) The HH Index is calculated as follows: HH = [square root of [summation][([(x.sub.i]/X).sup.2])] - [square root of 1/239] / [1 - [square root of 1/239]]

where:

HH = the country index.

[x.sub.i] = the value of exports for product i.

X = [summation over (i = 1)] [x.sub.i]

and 239 = number of products at the three-digit SITC, Revision 2 level.

See <http://stats.unctad.org> for the data.

(19) Recall, however, that El Salvador was a primary target for financial assistance under the CBI. See earlier discussion in this article, and note 11.

(20) Fourth Report to the Congress (2001, 3). Also see "Background of the New CBI Legislation" (n.d.).

(21) For example, according to the United Nations, the literacy rate among our five sample countries (in 2002) ranges from 80.1% (El Salvador) to 99.7% (Barbados), and secondary education ranges from 46% (El Salvador) to 87% (Barbados). The results for the other countries in our sample are Belize: 94.1% literacy and 60% secondary education; Costa Rica: 96% and 51%; Jamaica: 88% and 75% (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2005).

(22) "Only when action or measures from the lowest possible level of government appear inadequate to attain a given goal would the higher level of authority intervene. Conversely, in the top-down approach, the benefits of subsidiarity accrue to the central institutions" (Knight and Persaud 2001, 43). For further discussion of this principle, its history and application, refer to Knight and Persaud.

ELAINE POTOKER

Maine Maritime Academy

RICHARD H. BORGMAN

University of Maine

TABLE 1
GDP (Current US$ Millions) and Real GDP Growth

 Costa
 Barbados Belize Rica Dominica

GDP 1980
Current US$ 860 195 4,831 59

GDP 2005
Current US$ 2,976 1,105 19,432 279

Annualized
real growth
rates
 1980-85 -0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 5.1%
 1985-90 3.3% 9.7% 4.6% 5.6%
 1990-95 -0.3% 5.9% 5.5% 1.5%
 1995-2000 3.7% 5.9% 4.9% 2.1%
 2000-05 * na 5.2% 3.7% -0.8%

Annualized
rate increase
 1980-2005 * 1.30% 5.38% 3.78% 2.67%

 Dominican El
 Republic Salvador Grenada Guatemala

GDP 1980
Current US$ 6,631 3,574 84 7,879

GDP 2005
Current US$ 28,303 16,974 454 31,683

Annualized
real growth
rates
 1980-85 2.3% -2.8% 4.3% -1.1%
 1985-90 2.8% 2.1% 6.8% 2.9%
 1990-95 4.2% 6.2% 0.9% 4.3%
 1995-2000 7.8% 3.1% 6.4% 4.0%
 2000-05 * 2.5% 2.2% -0.3% 2.5%

Annualized
rate increase
 1980-2005 * 3.90% 2.10% 3.59% 2.49%

 Trinidad/
 Haiti Honduras Jamaica Tobago

GDP 1980
Current US$ 1,462 2,566 2,679 6,236

GDP 2005
Current US$ 4,245 7,976 9,696 14,762

Annualized
real growth
rates
 1980-85 -1.0% 1.7% 0.4% -2.2%
 1985-90 0.2% 3.1% 5.0% -2.2%
 1990-95 -4.9% 3.5% 2.4% 1.4%
 1995-2000 2.4% 3.0% -0.1% 5.0%
 2000-05 * -0.4% 3.6% 1.5% 7.7%

Annualized
rate increase
 1980-2005 * -0.77% 3.00% 1.83% 1.83%

* real growth rates

Source: World Bank (2007). Real growth rates
for Barbados through 1999 only.

TABLE 2

Non-Traditional Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports

Non-traditional exports including tourism as a percentage
of total exports
 Costa
 Barbados Belize Rica Dominica

1980 64.6% 8.6% 30.8% na
1990 67.0% 25.6% 33.9% na
1996 66.1% 39.2% 36.3% na
2000 62.7% na 68.9% na
2003 61.9% na 66.2% na

Non-traditional exports excluding tourism as a percentage
of total exports

 Costa
 Barbados Belize Rica Dominica

1980 18.9% na 23.5% 35.7%
1990 10.6% 8.2% 19.9% 21.5%
1996 11.1% 8.2% 19.3% 20.9%
2000 9.7% 7.4% 49.9% 21.3%
2003 7.9% 5.4% 49.2% na

Non-traditional exports including tourism as a percentage
of total exports

 Dominican El
 Republic Salvador Grenada Guatemala

1980 36.2% 28.5% na 31.7%
1990 na 24.5% na 29.6%
1996 49.8% 40.3% na 30.5%
2000 na 50.6% na 35.3%
2003 na 58.5% na 41.6%

Non-traditional exports excluding tourism as a percentage
of total exports

 Dominican El
 Republic Salvador Grenada Guatemala

1980 23.0% 27.9% 4.5% 21.1%
1990 na 22.7% 9.9% 17.8%
1996 5.2% 33.3% 2.9% 22.5%
2000 na 38.6% 13.6% 22.3%
2003 na 44.5% na 25.6%

Non-traditional exports including tourism as a percentage
of total exports

 Trinidad/
 Haiti Honduras Jamaica Tobago

1980 na 13.5% 62.2% 11.3%
1990 57.3% 10.0% 70.0% 41.3%
1996 78.5% 22.4% 66.1% 45.4%
2000 na 21.5% 70.9% 33.6%
2003 na 26.2% na 37.8%

Non-traditional exports excluding tourism as a percentage
of total exports

 Trinidad/
 Haiti Honduras Jamaica Tobago

1980 na 10.6% 44.5% 6.5%
1990 42.8% 7.2% 36.6% 23.1%
1996 36.2% 16.4% 29.1% 36.4%
2000 na 10.5% 26.9% 25.6%
2003 na 13.2% na 30.8%

Non-traditional exports are defined here as manufacturing
exports plus tourism exports (top panel) or just
manufacturing (bottom panel). Total exports are exports of
goods and services. Source: World Bank (2007) and World
Development Indicators (paper copy), various years.

TABLE 3
CBI to U.S. Imports by Country

Country 1989 1995 2000

Barbados $18,217,997 $23,056,380 $10,573,261

Belize 14,157,930 16,675,788 34,600,055

Costa Rica 187,839,750 527,715,635 583,961,744

Dominica Is 843,686 2,200,515 196,448

Dominican Rep 308,150,870 847,389,249 800,414,984

El Salvador 27,625,507 68,562,998 45,586,642

Grenada 2,213,131 724,418 16,701,695

Guatemala 115,974,806 168,414,746 245,717,930

Haiti 70,578,156 26,533,577 20,564,530

Honduras 53,400,965 157,168,455 204,863,213

Jamaica 52,885,871 88,116,132 85,928,208

Trinidad & 32,463,841 144,294,643 328,053,971
Tobago

 Annualized
Country 2006 Growth

Barbados $4,908,373 -0.07

Belize 40,061,190 0.06

Costa Rica 1,032,498,864 0.11

Dominica Is 65,911 -0.14

Dominican Rep 988,426,845 0.07

El Salvador 14,584,274 -0.04

Grenada 56,223 -0.19

Guatemala 185,247,183 0.03

Haiti 14,891,036 -0.09

Honduras 82,107,591 0.03

Jamaica 199,164,596 0.08

Trinidad & 1,102,266,898 0.23
Tobago

Imports into the U.S. categorized as CBI commodity imports
by the United States International Trade Commission (2007).

TABLE 4
Growth Rates in Selected Non-Traditional Exports to the U.S. 1989-2005
(annualized)

 Photographic Wood and
 Total growth or articles of
 all exports to cinematographic wood; wood
 the U.S. goods charcoal

Barbados -2% na na
Belize 5% na 9%
Costa Rica 8% -2% 6%
Dominica -5% na na
Dominican 7% na 15%
Republic
El Salvador 14% na 16%
Grenada -2% na na
Guatemala 11% na 8%
Haiti 1% na -13%
Honduras 14% na 5%
Jamaica -2% 7% 15%
Trinidad and 16% na -1%
Tobago

 Nuclear Electric
 reactors; machinery,
 boilers; etc; sound
 machinery, equip; TV
 etc.; parts equip; pts

Barbados 2% -6%
Belize 27% -2%
Costa Rica 31% 16%
Dominica -20% -4%
Dominican 23% 11%
Republic
El Salvador 31% -2%
Grenada -18% -4%
Guatemala 20% 36%
Haiti 2% -14%
Honduras 15% 71%
Jamaica 7% 0%
Trinidad and 6% 13%
Tobago

 Optical; photo,
 etc; medical
 or surgical Miscellaneous
 instruments, manufactured
 etc. articles

Barbados 0% na
Belize na na
Costa Rica 33% 30%
Dominica -21% na
Dominican 13% -2%
Republic
El Salvador -3% -5%
Grenada -12% na
Guatemala 45% 9%
Haiti -24% -14%
Honduras 30% 19%
Jamaica 20% -27%
Trinidad and 2% na
Tobago

Source: United States International Trade Commission (2007).

TABLE 5
Import Rank with U.S.

Country 1984 1994 2002

Barbados 71 123 136
Belize 99 115 121
Costa Rica 58 42 43
Dominica 178 153 172
Dominican Republic 40 31 33
El Salvador 63 59 54
Grenada 159 152 164
Guatemala 60 47 45
Haiti 64 107 93
Honduras 62 50 40
Jamaica 65 57 78
Trinidad and Tobago 34 49 47

Rank of country as U.S. trading partner for imports into the U.S.,
from United States International Trade Commission (2007).

TABLE 6
Export Services as a Percentage of Total Exports

 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004

Barbados 60% 55% 75% 78% 79% 81%
Belize na 30% 47% 45% 36% 39%
Costa Rica 16% 23% 31% 22% 25% 26%
Dominica 36% 26% 37% 55% 62% na
Dominican Republic 24% 44% 60% 34% 36% 38%
El Salvador 11% 25% 34% 19% 19% 23%
Grenada 54% 58% 69% 80% 65% na
Guatemala 12% 9% 23% 24% 20% 26%
Haiti 29% 34% 16% 54% 34% na
Honduras 9% 11% 13% 16% 19% 21%
Jamaica 29% 52% 46% 47% 56% 59%
Trinidad and Tobago 13% 11% 14% 12% 11% na

Source: World Development Indicators Online (2007).

TABLE 7
Exports in Targeted Service Categories as a Percentage of Exports

 1980 1985 1990

Barbados Communications, computer, 1.4% 1.9% 2.6%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 2.5% 4.3% 6.6%

Belize Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Costa Rica Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%

Dominica Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.0% 0.0% 4.1%

Dominican Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Republic and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%

El Salvador Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%

Grenada Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.0% 0.0% 0.8%

Guatemala Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.7% 0.1% 0.4%

Haiti Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.3% 0.6% 0.1%

Honduras Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 1.3% 1.7% 1.4%

Jamaica Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 1.2% 1.0% 0.6%

Trinidad Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
and Tobago and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

 1995 2000 2002

Barbados Communications, computer, 4.1% 3.5% 3.9%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 8.7% 12.0% 12.8%

Belize Communications, computer, 3.0% 1.5% 1.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%

Costa Rica Communications, computer, 1.3% 2.0% 2.6%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%

Dominica Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 1.8% 3.0% 1.8%

Dominican Communications, computer, 4.3% 1.6% 1.5%
Republic and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

El Salvador Communications, computer, 3.4% 2.5% 2.5%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 1.3% 1.9% 0.9%

Grenada Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.9% 5.2% 4.1%

Guatemala Communications, computer, 2.4% 0.1% 1.3%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.9% 0.6% 1.4%

Haiti Communications, computer, 0.0% 6.5% 5.2%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%

Honduras Communications, computer, 3.9% 3.7% 3.3%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.3% 0.6% 0.7%

Jamaica Communications, computer, 6.9% 7.3% 6.7%
 and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 0.6% 0.7% 1.2%

Trinidad Communications, computer, 0.0% 0.8% 0.7%
and Tobago and information systems
 Insurance and Financial Service 1.1% 0.9% 2.2%

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2007,
Handbook of Statistics 2005.

TABLE 8
Herfindahl-Hirschman Concentration Index of Exports

 Barbados Belize Rica Costa Dominica

1980 0.30 0.34 0.40 0.41
1981 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.62
1982 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.41
1983 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.51
1984 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.40
1985 0.46 0.29 0.32 0.54
1986 0.37 0.32 0.39 0.61
1987 0.29 0.39 0.35 0.69
1988 0.24 0.35 0.33 0.72
1989 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.61
1990 0.29 0.38 0.28 0.61
1991 0.29 0.36 0.31 0.63
1992 0.22 0.36 0.30 0.61
1993 0.20 0.39 0.32 0.61
1994 0.21 0.35 0.29 0.57
1995 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.53
1996 0.20 0.38 0.28 0.54
1997 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.52
1998 0.19 0.37 0.19 0.46
1999 0.18 0.65 0.39 0.46
2000 0.23 0.39 0.30 0.41
2001 0.21 0.65 0.20 0.41
2002 0.17 0.61 0.21 0.40
2003 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.41
2004 0.19 na na 0.40

 Dominican El
 Republic Salvador Grenada Guatemala

1980 0.17 0.33 0.51 0.27
1981 0.17 0.40 0.40 0.26
1982 0.16 0.36 0.41 0.33
1983 0.16 0.38 0.44 0.32
1984 0.17 0.37 0.52 0.27
1985 0.18 0.31 0.52 0.33
1986 0.15 0.71 0.52 0.47
1987 0.20 0.59 0.58 0.34
1988 0.19 0.56 0.47 0.31
1989 0.20 0.44 0.46 0.31
1990 0.18 0.42 0.35 0.28
1991 0.18 0.34 0.32 0.25
1992 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.22
1993 0.17 0.29 0.25 0.21
1994 0.17 0.30 0.29 0.22
1995 0.18 0.35 0.30 0.28
1996 0.79 0.31 0.32 0.24
1997 0.79 0.36 0.34 0.25
1998 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.24
1999 0.23 0.20 0.47 0.22
2000 0.22 0.21 0.33 0.21
2001 0.23 0.13 0.32 0.16
2002 0.22 0.13 0.36 0.19
2003 0.21 0.12 0.30 0.15
2004 na na na na

 Trinidad/
 Haiti Honduras Jamaica Tobago

1980 0.14 0.31 0.75 0.64
1981 0.26 0.31 0.76 0.61
1982 0.15 0.33 0.63 0.60
1983 0.18 0.31 0.57 0.57
1984 0.15 0.31 0.64 0.55
1985 0.13 0.29 0.49 0.54
1986 0.16 0.50 0.48 0.48
1987 0.18 0.51 0.46 0.48
1988 0.26 0.45 0.49 0.41
1989 0.27 0.44 0.57 0.41
1990 0.29 0.42 0.62 0.45
1991 0.27 0.42 0.55 0.43
1992 0.21 0.46 0.52 0.42
1993 0.27 0.42 0.49 0.37
1994 0.25 0.38 0.48 0.32
1995 0.33 0.54 0.47 0.31
1996 0.25 0.33 0.50 0.35
1997 0.27 0.30 0.52 0.31
1998 0.43 0.33 0.51 0.32
1999 0.50 0.26 0.54 0.34
2000 0.49 0.30 0.55 0.41
2001 0.46 0.30 0.59 0.33
2002 0.43 0.20 0.63 0.35
2003 0.47 0.23 0.63 0.36
2004 na na na na

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007),
Handbook of Statistics (2005).

TABLE 9A
Direct Foreign Investment Inflows ($ million)

 Barbados Belize Costa Rica Dominica

1980 $2.8 na $52.6 na
1981 $8.4 -$2.0 $69.6 $4.8
1982 $4.6 na $28.9 $0.2
1983 $3.7 na $60.7 $0.2
1984 $0.1 $3.2 $55.9 $2.3
1985 $4.9 $6.0 $69.9 $3.0
1986 $7.8 $8.3 $61.0 $5.2
1987 $7.1 $8.0 $80.3 $13.5
1988 $11.6 $14.0 $122.3 $11.9
1989 $8.4 $20.2 $101.2 $17.2
1990 $11.2 $19.0 $162.4 $7.6
1991 $7.4 $15.1 $178.4 $15.2
1992 $14.5 $17.8 $226.0 $20.5
1993 $9.4 $13.6 $246.7 $13.2
1994 $13.0 $18.8 $297.6 $22.6
1995 $11.8 $20.8 $336.9 $54.9
1996 $13.3 $16.6 $427.0 $18.7
1997 $14.8 $12.0 $406.9 $22.0
1998 $15.8 $19.0 $611.7 $9.0
1999 $17.4 $49.8 $619.5 $19.1
2000 $19.4 $23.4 $408.6 $13.6
2001 $18.6 $119.8 $458.5 $15.4
2002 $17.4 $49.6 $658.4 $12.0
2003 $57.8 $57.6 $574.2 $20.3
2004 $50.0 $169.9 $617.6 $18.5

 Republic El
 Dominican Salvador Grenada Guatemala

1980 $92.7 $5.9 na $110.7
1981 $79.7 -$5.7 na $127.1
1982 -$1.4 -$1.0 $1.9 $77.1
1983 $48.2 $28.1 $2.5 $45.0
1984 $68.5 $12.4 $2.8 $38.0
1985 $36.2 $12.4 $4.1 $61.8
1986 $50.0 $24.1 $4.5 $68.8
1987 $89.0 $18.3 $14.7 $150.2
1988 $106.1 $17.0 $15.0 $329.7
1989 $110.0 $14.4 $10.5 $76.2
1990 $132.8 $1.9 $13.1 $59.3
1991 $145.0 $25.2 $16.5 $90.4
1992 $179.7 $15.3 $23.9 $94.1
1993 $189.3 $16.4 $21.6 $142.5
1994 $206.8 $2.2 $21.4 $65.1
1995 $414.3 $38.0 $23.4 $75.3
1996 $96.5 -$4.8 $18.9 $76.8
1997 $420.6 $59.0 $36.0 $84.5
1998 $699.8 $1,103.7 $49.9 $672.8
1999 $1,337.8 $215.8 $43.0 $154.6
2000 $952.9 $173.4 $39.4 $229.6
2001 $1,079.1 $279.0 $60.8 $455.5
2002 $916.8 $470.2 $60.5 $110.6
2003 $613.0 $172.9 $84.6 $131.0
2004 $645.1 $465.9 $42.4 $154.7

 Trinidad/
 Haiti Honduras Jamaica Tobago

1980 $13.0 $5.8 $27.7 $184.5
1981 $8.3 -$3.6 -$11.5 $258.1
1982 $7.1 $13.8 -$15.8 $203.5
1983 $8.4 $21.0 -$18.7 $117.7
1984 $4.5 $20.5 $12.2 $113.2
1985 $4.9 $27.5 -$9.0 $1.2
1986 $4.8 $30.0 -$4.6 -$14.5
1987 $4.7 $38.7 $53.4 $33.1
1988 $10.1 $48.3 -$12.0 $62.9
1989 $9.4 $51.0 $57.1 $148.9
1990 $8.0 $43.5 $174.9 $109.4
1991 $13.6 $52.1 $171.2 $144.1
1992 -$1.8 $47.6 $190.4 $171.0
1993 -$2.2 $52.1 $139.2 $372.6
1994 -$2.8 $41.5 $129.7 $521.0
1995 -$2.2 $69.4 $147.4 $295.7
1996 $4.1 $90.0 $183.7 $356.3
1997 $4.0 $127.7 $203.3 $999.6
1998 $10.8 $99.0 $369.1 $731.9
1999 $30.0 $237.3 $523.7 $643.3
2000 $13.3 $282.0 $468.8 $679.5
2001 $4.4 $193.0 $613.9 $834.9
2002 $5.7 $175.5 $481.1 $790.7
2003 $7.8 $247.2 $720.7 $808.3
2004 $6.5 $293.0 $650.0 $1,001.4

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007),
Handbook of Statistics (2005).

TABLE 9B

Direct Foreign Investment Inflows (Percentage of GFCF *)

 Barbados Belize Costa Rica Dominica

1980 1.4% na 4.0% na
1981 3.2% -4.2% 9.6% 21.4%
1982 2.0% na 4.8% 0.9%
1983 1.8% na 9.3% 0.9%
1984 0.0% 7.5% 6.6% 6.9%
1985 2.7% 16.5% 8.0% 10.7%
1986 3.6% 20.9% 6.5% 20.8%
1987 3.1% 13.5% 7.8% 46.0%
1988 4.3% 17.3% 12.2% 26.7%
1989 2.6% 20.3% 8.2% 28.3%
1990 3.4% 18.0% 11.1% 11.4%
1991 2.7% 11.9% 14.0% 21.3%
1992 8.3% 12.8% 13.4% 39.3%
1993 4.6% 8.6% 12.5% 25.9%
1994 5.4% 15.5% 14.4% 41.2%
1995 4.3% 15.4% 15.1% 79.5%
1996 4.2% 12.4% 21.0% 27.4%
1997 3.7% 8.8% 17.6% 28.6%
1998 3.6% 14.2% 21.3% 12.8%
1999 3.7% 27.3% 21.8% 25.8%
2000 4.1% 9.9% 14.4% 18.2%
2001 4.4% 49.9% 15.3% 23.2%
2002 4.1% 18.4% 20.7% 21.5%
2003 na na 16.3% na

 Dominican El
 Republic Salvador Grenada Guatemala

1980 5.2% 1.2% na 8.5%
1981 4.3% -1.2% na 8.8%
1982 -0.1% -0.2% 4.8% 5.9%
1983 2.4% 5.9% 6.3% 4.7%
1984 2.8% 2.3% 9.4% 4.2%
1985 3.7% 1.8% 11.4% 5.0%
1986 3.7% 4.5% 10.3% 8.1%
1987 5.7% 2.9% 28.1% 17.2%
1988 7.2% 2.5% 25.2% 31.4%
1989 5.4% 1.7% 15.6% 6.6%
1990 7.6% 0.3% 16.9% 6.0%
1991 9.7% 3.1% 19.7% 7.9%
1992 8.6% 1.5% 34.4% 5.8%
1993 8.4% 1.3% 29.5% 7.8%
1994 8.5% 0.1% 24.1% 3.5%
1995 16.7% 2.1% 27.8% 3.5%
1996 3.3% -0.3% 18.2% 3.7%
1997 11.2% 3.3% 31.3% 3.2%
1998 15.0% 55.2% 39.1% 22.5%
1999 25.3% 10.8% 28.4% 5.1%
2000 16.1% 7.8% 22.8% 8.0%
2001 17.4% 12.3% 47.7% 15.2%
2002 14.8% 20.0% 43.2% 3.3%
2003 12.8% 7.1% 56.8% na

 Trinidad/
 Haiti Honduras Jamaica Tobago

1980 5.3% 0.9% 7.2% 10.5%
1981 3.3% -0.7% -2.1% 14.5%
1982 2.9% 2.7% -2.4% 9.7%
1983 3.2% 4.1% -2.5% 5.9%
1984 1.5% 3.3% 2.4% 6.2%
1985 1.5% 4.5% -1.9% 0.1%
1986 1.5% 5.7% -1.0% -1.5%
1987 1.5% 6.8% 8.3% 3.7%
1988 3.4% 6.8% -1.4% 11.1%
1989 2.6% 5.4% 5.0% 23.3%
1990 2.1% 7.1% 15.0% 15.7%
1991 3.7% 8.9% 17.5% 17.2%
1992 -1.3% 6.2% 18.3% 23.1%
1993 -1.9% 5.2% 10.3% 58.5%
1994 -2.3% 4.3% 9.9% 53.2%
1995 -0.7% 7.3% 8.9% 29.6%
1996 1.0% 9.2% 9.7% 26.8%
1997 1.0% 10.6% 9.4% 59.6%
1998 2.4% 6.7% 18.6% 38.6%
1999 5.8% 14.7% 27.8% 45.9%
2000 2.9% 17.6% 22.2% 42.3%
2001 1.1% 12.5% 26.4% 41.7%
2002 0.9% 11.8% 20.0% 37.2%
2003 na 13.7% na na

* GFCF = gross fixed capital formation. Source: United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (2007), Handbook of
Statistics (2005).

TABLE 10
External Debt as a Percentage of GDP

 Barbados Belize Costa Rica Dominica

1980 19.3% 32.3% 56.8% na
1981 24.5% 31.2% 126.0% 21.7%
1982 33.7% 38.9% 139.8% 28.5%
1983 54.8% 53.2% 133.1% 42.8%
1984 34.2% 46.8% 109.3% 52.1%
1985 38.2% 56.5% 112.3% 55.1%
1986 44.1% 53.5% 103.6% 51.2%
1987 39.8% 49.6% 104.2% 56.7%
1988 45.6% 42.0% 98.2% 50.9%
1989 37.8% 37.8% 87.4% 50.5%
1990 39.9% 34.5% 65.7% 52.9%
1991 38.7% 36.1% 56.1% 53.0%
1992 38.4% 34.8% 45.9% 49.8%
1993 34.7% 34.7% 40.1% 48.1%
1994 35.7% 34.1% 37.0% 45.6%
1995 25.5% 41.2% 32.4% 47.8%
1996 21.9% 43.7% 29.5% 50.1%
1997 18.2% 68.6% 27.1% 43.8%
1998 16.4% 48.7% 28.1% 44.7%
1999 18.0% 53.9% 26.7% 44.0%
2000 21.3% 73.9% 27.9% 61.5%
2001 27.4% 79.9% 28.3% 82.3%
2002 27.6% 92.6% 28.7% 90.7%
2003 26.9% 107.9% 31.0% 109.9%
2004 25.1% 92.6% 30.8% 83.3%

 Dominican El
 Republic Salvador Grenada Guatemala

1980 30.2% 25.5% 23.4% 15.0%
1981 31.6% 32.9% 36.5% 14.9%
1982 31.6% 42.4% 45.8% 17.8%
1983 34.0% 49.8% 56.0% 20.2%
1984 30.1% 50.0% 49.0% 25.1%
1985 69.4% 48.7% 45.3% 23.9%
1986 60.2% 49.4% 43.3% 33.3%
1987 67.3% 50.2% 46.0% 39.4%
1988 73.9% 47.7% 47.2% 33.3%
1989 60.4% 47.6% 41.8% 31.0%
1990 61.8% 44.8% 50.1% 37.2%
1991 59.2% 41.1% 50.7% 29.9%
1992 52.3% 38.0% 46.1% 26.5%
1993 49.9% 29.3% 59.1% 25.3%
1994 39.1% 27.3% 49.3% 23.9%
1995 35.3% 27.5% 46.0% 22.4%
1996 30.4% 28.3% 47.4% 21.2%
1997 28.1% 29.2% 37.9% 19.4%
1998 27.8% 28.1% 50.3% 18.8%
1999 27.0% 30.4% 36.0% 20.6%
2000 23.0% 34.5% 49.1% 20.0%
2001 23.8% 38.5% 60.7% 20.4%
2002 28.9% 42.0% 89.8% 19.0%
2003 38.6% 47.0% 84.9% 20.4%
2004 37.7% 45.8% 99.0% 20.2%

 Trinidad/
 Haiti Honduras Jamaica Tobago

1980 23.9% 57.4% 71.4% 13.3%
1981 31.7% 60.5% 77.7% 15.3%
1982 38.8% 63.5% 86.8% 15.1%
1983 37.5% 69.1% 95.9% 18.4%
1984 38.4% 68.9% 152.4% 15.8%
1985 37.3% 75.0% 196.6% 19.6%
1986 33.1% 78.1% 154.2% 39.2%
1987 40.4% 79.5% 144.6% 38.5%
1988 37.9% 83.3% 120.4% 46.7%
1989 33.0% 95.0% 105.2% 49.5%
1990 31.8% 121.9% 103.5% 49.6%
1991 25.7% 110.7% 111.5% 46.7%
1992 43.8% 113.8% 130.0% 44.6%
1993 46.9% 125.2% 89.5% 49.1%
1994 28.9% 136.8% 93.2% 47.6%
1995 26.9% 121.0% 78.6% 48.7%
1996 30.4% 115.5% 62.1% 39.0%
1997 32.6% 102.9% 50.4% 37.7%
1998 27.8% 97.0% 49.7% 36.0%
1999 28.3% 101.7% 50.0% 36.2%
2000 31.5% 93.4% 58.7% 31.2%
2001 35.0% 78.9% 65.4% 28.4%
2002 37.1% 82.6% 63.8% 27.9%
2003 44.4% 81.8% 67.7% 24.2%
2004 32.0% 85.9% 72.2% 23.8%

Source: World Development Indicators Online, World Bank (2007).

Note: Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents repayable in
foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum
of public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term
debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes
all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest
in arrears on long-term debt.

TABLE 11
Imports as a Percentage of GDP (Five-year Averages)

 Barbados Belize Costa Rica Dominica

1980-84 68.6% 70.0% 39.6% 74.2%
1985-89 51.4% 63.8% 34.8% 65.4%
1990-94 50.0% 60.0% 40.2% 68.0%
1995-99 56.8% 55.6% 44.8% 64.6%
2000-04 54.0% 67.0% 47.2% 63.6%

 Dominican El
 Republic Salvador Grenada Guatemala

1980-84 24.8% 30.8% 77.6% 19.6%
1985-89 38.8% 26.2% 67.2% 18.8%
1990-94 38.4% 32.6% 62.0% 25.0%
1995-99 46.2% 36.8% 67.2% 25.0%
2000-04 50.2% 42.4% 66.5% 29.4%

 Trinidad/
 Haiti Honduras Jamaica Tobago

1980-84 29.6% 34.2% 52.2% 38.4%
1985-89 24.8% 29.4% 51.6% 33.4%
1990-94 21.4% 40.8% 55.8% 33.4%
1995-99 27.4% 52.4% 53.4% 47.0%
2000-04 36.3% 53.4% 55.8% 44.4%

Source: World Development Indicators Online, World Bank (2007). Annual
percentages are very volatile, so five-year averages were used to
reduce volatility.

TABLE 12
Human Development Index

 Index 2004 (a) Index 1998 (b) Index 1992 (c)
 (rank in (rank in (rank in
 parens) parens) parens)

Barbados 0.879 (31) 0.858 (30) 0.900 (25)
Belize 0.751 (95) 0.777 (58) 0.884 (29)
Costa Rica 0.841 (48) 0.797 (48) 0.884 (28)
Dominica 0.793 (68) 0.793 (51) 0.775 (69)
Dominica Republic 0.751 (94) 0.729 (87) 0.705 (96)
El Salvadore 0.729 (101) 0.696 (104) 0.579 (115)
Grenada 0.762 (85) 0.785 (54) 0.786 (67)
Guatemala 0.673 (118) 0.619 (120) 0.591 (112)
Haiti 0.482 (154) 0.440 (150) 0.362 (148)
Honduras 0.683 (117) 0.653 (113) 0.578 (116)
Jamaica 0.724 (104) 0.735 (83) 0.721 (88)
Trinidad and Tobago 0.809 (57) 0.793 (50) 0.872 (39)

United States 0.948 (8) 0.929 (3) 0.938 (2)
Canada 0.950 (6) 0.935 (1) 0.950 (1)

 Index 1990 (d) Index 1985 (e) Index 1980 (e)
 (rank in (no rank) (no rank)
 parens)

Barbados 0.945 (22) na na
Belize 0.700 (67) 0.719 0.709
Costa Rica 0.876 (40) 0.776 0.772
Dominica 0.800 (53) na na
Dominica Republic 0.622 (80) 0.674 0.652
El Salvadore 0.524 (94) 0.610 0.589
Grenada 0.751 (64) na na
Guatemala 0.488 (103) 0.561 0.546
Haiti 0.296 (125) 0.458 0.451
Honduras 0.492 (100) 0.602 0.570
Jamaica 0.761 (59) 0.699 0.695
Trinidad and Tobago 0.876 (39) 0.790 0.783

United States 0.976 (7) 0.902 0.889
Canada 0.983 (2) 0.909 0.886

Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (a) UNDP (2006).
(b) UNDP (2000). (c) UNDP (1995). (d) UNDP (1990). (e) UNDP (2006).

TABLE 13
Country Performance Matrix

 Non-
 traditional
 Exports Targeted
 without Manufactured Export
 GDP Tourism Exports Concentration

Barbados Poor Poor Poor Good
Belize Good Poor Good
Costa Rica Good Good Good Good
Dominica Poor Poor
Dominican Good Poor Good
Republic
El Salvador Good Good Good
Grenada Good Good Poor Good
Guatemala Good Good
Haiti Poor Poor Poor
Honduras Good Good
Jamaica Poor Good Poor
Trinidad and Poor Good Good Good
Tobago

 Fin'l
 Services/
 CBI Communication
 Imports Growth in & Info
 by U.S. Import Rank Services Systems

Barbados Poor Poor Good Good
Belize Good Poor
Costa Rica Good Good
Dominica Poor Good
Dominican Good Good
Republic
El Salvador Poor Good
Grenada Poor Good
Guatemala Good Good
Haiti Poor Poor Good
Honduras Good Good Good
Jamaica Good Poor Good
Trinidad and Good Poor
Tobago

 DFI Debt HDI

Barbados Poor Good Poor
Belize Good Poor Poor
Costa Rica Good Good Poor
Dominica Poor Poor
Dominican Good Good
Republic
El Salvador Good
Grenada Good Poor Poor
Guatemala
Haiti Poor Poor
Honduras Good Poor Poor
Jamaica Good Good Poor
Trinidad and Good Good Poor
Tobago

The table ranks each country according to improvements
or deterioration on the criteria examined in the article,
not on the level of those criteria. The labels "good" or "bad"
are the subjective judgements of the authors. Blank cells indicate
performance judged neither good nor poor. Import dependence is not
listed here because an increase (decrease) in economic activity
may result in an increase or decrease in imports. There are
insufficient data on Haiti's non-traditional exports to categorize
it as poor, although it appears that way given limited data.

FIGURE 1

Caribbean Basin Trade Agreements (a)

LOME (1975-2000) The Lome Convention extended preferential
 treatment to many products from African,
 Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) nations, allowing
 them to enter the European community duty free and
 without quota restrictions.
 <http://www.caribbeantiger.com/trc-lome.htm>

CBERA (1983) Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. Provides
 beneficiary countries duty-free access to the U.S.
 market for eligible products. (b)

CARIBCAN (1986) Canadian Government program that provides
 duty-free access to the Canadian market for most
 Commonwealth Caribbean exports. (c)
 <http://www.tradetnt.com/caribcan.shtml>

GAL (1986) GAL (Guaranteed Access Level Program) or Section
 807a in the U.S. Customs Code. Guaranteed no
 restrictions to the U.S. market for apparel
 assembled in the Caribbean Basin whose origin was
 from fabric made and cut in the U.S. Positive
 effects were short-lived as NAFTA was enacted in
 1994, giving geographically close Mexico a
 comparative advantage against Caribbean locations
 as a platform for maquiladora operations.

CBERA (1990) Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBI II)
 eliminated the expiration date for CBERA benefits
 and added duty-free benefits, with continuing
 exceptions: textiles and apparel subject to
 textile agreements, footwear ineligible for the
 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as of
 January 1, 1984, canned tuna, petroleum and its
 products, and watches and watch parts containing
 any material originating in countries denied the
 most-favored-nation (MFN) status.
 <http://www.elsalvador.org/home.nsf/economy>

1993 Caribbean Basin Free Trade Agreements Act (HR1403)
 was to ensure that CBI nations not be adversely
 affected by NAFTA. However, the impact of NAFTA on
 the textile and apparel industry was significant.

ACS (1994) Association of Caribbean States.
 <http://www.acs-aec.org/about.htm>

CBTPA (2000) Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, October
 2000 to September 2008, or before, if the Free
 Trade of the Americas (FTAA) goes into effect
 first. It expands previous CBI programs by
 extending preferential tariff treatment to textile
 and apparel products assembled from U.S. fabric
 that were excluded previously. Likened to
 NAFTA equivalent-type treatment.
 <http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov>
 <http://www.ustr.gov/html/chapter2.html>
 Note that the 2000 Trade and Development Act
 includes CBTPA and the Africa Growth and
 Opportunity Act of 2000 (AGOA). It expands two-way
 trade and creates incentives for CBI counties and
 sub-Saharan countries to continue reforming their
 economies.
 <http://www.mac.doc.gov/CBI/webmain/guide3.htm>

COTONOU (2000) The Cotonou Agreement replaced LOME, and is named
 after the city in Benin where the agreement was
 signed in June 2000. It provides the 77 ACP
 countries with an extension of existing
 non-reciprocal preferential access for certain ACP
 agricultural and other goods to the EU market.
 <http://www.namibian.com.na/2002/may/marketplace/
 025E7B3B82>

US-DR-CAFTA (2005) The U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free
 Trade Agreement: Costa Rica, El Salvador,
 Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Dominican
 Republic, and the U.S. Aims to eliminate barriers
 to trade in investment, farm products, goods and
 services. Rules for textile and apparel are
 improved although not entirely duty-free.
 <http://www.ecattrade.com/> (d)

CSM (2006) Caribbean Single Market aims to eliminate barriers
 to trade, services, and certain categories of
 labour. Plan is to implement the CARICOM Market
 and Economy (CSME) by the end of 2008. The CSME
 will involve a single currency and the
 harmonization of economic policy.

Notes to Figure 1

(a) Please refer to the links provided for further information.

(b) Articles not eligible for duty-free treatment: textile and apparel
subject to the Multifiber Agreement; canned tuna, petroleum products,
footwear, luggage, handbags, and flat goods, and certain leather
wearing apparel. Watches and watch parts were excluded if any material
used in their manufacture originated in a communist country. Rules also
place restrictions on sugar for duty-free treatment so as to not
interfere with the U.S. price support system for sugar mandated by
Congress. Section 212 of CBERA set forth special measures involving
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and other insular possessions.

(c) Exceptions include textiles and apparel, footwear, luggage and
handbags, leather garments, lubricating oils, and methanol. Eligible
goods must be certified as being manufactured in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, defined as having minimum input of 60% of the ex-factory
price of the goods (including overhead and reasonable profits)
originating in any of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries or in
Canada.

(d) The Emergency Committee on American Trade provides updates on
CAFTA. Also refer to Business Coalition for U.S.-Central American Trade
(2003).

FIGURE 3

Traditional and Non-Traditional Products

Traditional products: agricultural, raw materials and derivatives
 Include: bananas *, aluminum ores, petroleum products (mineral
 fuels*), sugar cane, coffee*, cocoa, edible fruits and nuts, tea
 and spices, fish and shellfish, tobacco.

Non-traditional products
 Include: manufactured items such as electrical and non-electrical
 machinery *, optical, photographic and surgical instruments, nuclear
 reactor components, apparel *, wood products, processed specialty
 foods, giftware and accessories, sporting goods, toys, ornamental
 horticulture, services such as financial, insurance, and tourism.

* Represents majority of imports to U.S. from region in 1984.

Source: Guide to the Caribbean Basin Initiative (2000).