Religious fundamentalism and psychological well-being: an Italian study.
Carlucci, Leonardo ; Tommasi, Marco ; Balsamo, Michela 等
This study's aims were two-fold: to contribute to an
understanding of the relationship between religious fundamentalism and
psychological well-being and to test the psychometric properties of the
Italian adaptation of the revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale
(RFS-12; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004), one of the most important
instruments for assessing religious fundamentalism when it is
conceptualized as a cognitive process. Confirmative factor analysis and
reliability and correlational analyses were conducted on a sample of 319
Catholic undergraduate students. Findings indicate that the Italian
adaptation of the Religious Fundamentalism Scale, as a one-dimensional
construct, represents a valid and reliable measure of religious
fundamentalism. Furthermore, results highlight the positive role that
religious fundamentalism plays in promoting life satisfaction and
psychological well-being.
**********
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in religious
fundamentalism because of its many implications for historical events
and socio-political issues, such as social integration and identity in
multireligious societies (Herriot, 2007). The term "religious
fundamentalism" was initially used between 1910 and 1915 inside a
series of 80 pamphlets collectively called The Fundamentals: A Testimony
to the Truth (Sandeen, 1967), published in the United States. Religious
fundamentalism is a construct with different definitions given by
researchers interested in the psychology of religion. Altemeyer and
Hunsberger (1992) were the first to define religious fundamentalism as a
cognitive process, stating that religious fundamentalism corresponds to
The belief that there is one set of religious teaching that
clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential,
inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this
essential truth is fundamentally opposed by evil forces
which must be vigorously fought against ... and those who
believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a
special relationship with deity, (p. 118)
A number of researchers have focused on religious fundamentalism as
a personality trait or as a series of rigid beliefs (Costa, Zonderman,
McCrae, & Williams, 1985; Johnson, Butcher, Null, & Johnson,
1984; Saroglou, 2002). Individuals who hold fundamentalist beliefs or
attitudes tend to be conceptualized as closed-minded (Glock & Stark,
1966; McFarland, 1989) or viewed as having a closed, centralized belief
system in which orthodox beliefs are organized (Kirkpatrick, Hood, &
Hartz, 1991; Rokeach, 1960).
Indeed, Openness is the most negatively correlated personality
factor related to fundamentalism (Carlucci, Tommasi, & Saggino,
2011; Costa, Busch, Zonderman, & McCrae, 1986; Saroglou, 2002).
Specifically, fundamentalist subjects tended to score lower on the
Openness trait than non-fundamentalist subjects, both at domain and
facet levels of culturally-sensitive personality inventories (Krauss,
Streib, Keller, & Silver, 2006; Proctor & McCord, 2009;
Streyffeler & McNally, 1998). Other personality traits, like
Neuroticism (Costa et al., 1986) and Agreeableness (Costa et al., 1985;
Johnson et al., 1984), were not found to have clear relationships with
religious fundamentalism (Saroglou, 2002).
Psychologists have long been interested both in the ways that
religious attitudes and beliefs impact people's responses to life
events and in the extent to which these responses affect psychological
adjustment (Hackney & Sanders, 2003). Despite the growing interest
among researchers about the role of religion in mental/physical health
(Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001; Seybold & Hill, 2001),
little attention has been devoted to the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and mental health. Religious fundamentalism, like
religion, can fulfill an adaptive function by providing a sense of
security, meaning, and empowerment (Kinnvall, 2004). Research suggests
that people who adhere to fundamentalist religious beliefs are more
positive and hopeful than people who hold moderate religious beliefs
(Sethi & Seligman, 1993), are more inner-directed (Furnham, 1982),
and show higher life-satisfaction and self-actualization (Hackney &
Sanders, 2003).
On the other hand, some fundamentalist attitudes, such as rightist
authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005),
dogmatism (Heiser, 2005), intolerance and prejudice (Badley 2005;
Rowatt, Johnson, LaBouff, & Gonzalez, 2013), child punitive
practices (Danso, Hunsberger, & Pratt, 1997), paranoid thinking
(Schneider, 2002), and low cognitive complexity and convergent thinking
(Hunsberger, Alisat, Pancer, & Pratt, 1996), have been found to be
associated with social anxiety. These attitudes could represent a
specific cognitive trait--a defensive source of compensatory control
(Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010)--in response to both
anxiety-generating social experiences (Altemeyer, 1996) and unfamiliar
experiences. Additional studies show how rigid beliefs and strong
religiosity are correlated with psychopathology, especially in
individuals with mental disorders (Kirkpatrick, Hood, & Hartz, 1991;
Stifoss-Hanssen, 1994). Likewise, higher scores on psychopathology have
been found among fundamentalists and ex-fundamentalists (Hartz &
Everett, 1989).
Thus far, the link between fundamentalism and mental/physical
health has not been clarified and has shown contradictory findings. Many
of these discrepancies are likely due to the use of different
definitions and scales of measurement to asses both religious
fundamentalism and psychological well-being. The main limitation of
these measures is that they do not specify how or why religious beliefs
and spirituality affect health (Hill & Pargament, 2003).
Many self-report questionnaires, based on different theoretical
domains, have been developed to assess religious fundamentalism (Hill
& Hood, 1999). The first version of the Religious Fundamentalism
Scale (RFS-20) was developed by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) and was
designed to measure attitudes about one's religious beliefs rather
than adherence to any particular set of beliefs. The RFS-20 is composed
of 20 balanced items, half of which are formulated in the negative
direction. In a sample of university students and parents, the RFS-20
showed good psychometric properties, including good mean interitem
correlation, excellent internal consistency, and high correlations with
a measure of right-wing authoritarianism. When the RFS-20 was used to
assess populations with different faiths (Christianity was the
predominant faith in these populations), results showed a strong
internal consistency and good associations with attitudes toward sexual
minorities (Altemeyer, 1996). Since its publication, the RFS-20 has been
considered a measure of "religious manifestations of right-wing
authoritarianism" (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 161) and has shown strong
correlations with prejudice toward racial/ethnic minorities, frequency
of church attendance, and zealotry.
Despite the widespread use of the scale, Altemeyer and Hunsberger
(2004) underlined the need to revise its construct validity for three
reasons: (a) half of the scale's items focus on the "one true
religion" (p. 50) theme and neglect other important aspects of
religious fundamentalism; (b) the scale over-measures the "one
special groups" (p. 50) aspects, and therefore, overrepresents
fundamentalists' racial ethnocentrism; and (c) some researchers
only use some of the items in an attempt to make the scale more
congruent with their personal hypotheses. Therefore, Altemeyer and
Hunsberger revised their original scale and developed a new scale
composed of 12 items: four of the original items remain unchanged, five
have been revised, and three are completely new. Half of the items are
formulated in a negative form. The new version (RFS-12; Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 2004) assesses each aspect of religious fundamentalism that
was identified in the construct's original definition (Altemeyer
& Hunsberger, 1992). Altemeyer and Hunsberger affirmed that the
RFS-12 is a unidimensional measure of religious fundamentalism that is
more valid than the previous version.
The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between
religious fundamentalism and psychological well-being in a sample of
Italian Catholics. Specifically, we were interested in testing the
impact that religious fundamentalism would have on experiences of
cognitive anxiety and depression. In addition, we tested the validity
and reliability of an Italian translation of the RFS-12 and investigated
its convergent and nomological validity by comparing it with other
measures of fundamentalism, religiousness, and personality.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 319 Italian undergraduate students (age: M
= 20.82, SD = 3.9; 280 female) recruited from the University of
Chieti-Pescara who participated in exchange for course credit. All
participants identified themselves as Christian Roman Catholics. In
order to perform a CFA analysis, 10 cases were excluded because of
missing values.
Procedure
The English versions of the revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale
(RFS-12), the Intratextual Fundamentalism Scale (IFS), and the revised
Intrinsic/ Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scale (I/E-R) were translated
into Italian, according to standard procedures of forward and
back-translation (Van der Vijver & Leung, 1997). These measures were
subsequently administered to 15 graduate students in a pilot study, in
order to test the items' comprehensibility and verify final
translations. The RFS-12 and other self-report measures were then
administered anonymously to all participants included in this study.
Participants also completed an informed consent document. All testing
took approximately 20 minutes to complete.
Measures
Religious fundamentalism. The Religious Fundamentalism Scale
(RFS-12; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) consists of 12 items, half of
which are worded in co-trait direction to control for a response-set
bias. For each item, ratings are on a 9-point Likert scale starting from
-4 "you strongly disagree" to +4 "you strongly
agree." The RFS-12 scores start from 12 "low
fundamentalism" to 108 "high fundamentalism." This scale
was derived from the RFS-20. The length of this scale was reduced by
40%, and its resulting internal consistency value was high
(Cronbach's [alpha] = .91). The RFS-12 showed a strong mean
interitem correlation (ranging from .47 to .49). The explorative factor
analysis revealed a single factor that explained 53.5% and 51.3% of the
variance of scores obtained by the sample composed of parents and
students, respectively.
Intratextual fundamentalism. The Intratextual Fundamentalism Scale
(IFS; Williamson, Hood, Ahmad, Sadiq, & Hill, 2010) is composed of
12 items Ratings are on a 6-point Likert scale starting from 1 "you
strongly disagree" to 6 "you strongly agree." Items were
grouped into six dimensions: Divine, that is, "The sacred text is
considered to be of divine origin."; Inerrant, that is,
"Without question, the sacred text is held to be inerrant.";
Self-interpretive, that is, "The sacred text is sufficient in and
of itself for understanding the divine intent and meaning of the
author."; Privileged, that is, "The sacred text is given a
privileged status above all other texts."; Authoritative, that is,
"The sacred text is considered to be authoritative."; and
Unchanging, that is, "The sacred text is immutable and timeless;
thus, it never changes." (Williamson et al., 2010, pp. 723-725).
Intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity. The revised Intrinsic/Extrinsic
Religious Orientation Scale (I/E-R; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989) is
composed of 14 items. This scale measures the intrinsic (I),
extrinsic-personal (Ep), and extrinsic-social (Es) dimensions of
religious orientation. For each item, ratings are on a 5-point Likert
scale starting from 1 "Strongly Disagree" to 5 "Strongly
Agree."
Personality traits. The Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ; Caprara,
Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993) measures personality
traits on the basis of the five-factor model theory (FFM; McCrae &
Costa, 1987). It was shortened into the Big Five Questionnaire-Short
Form (BFQ-S; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli,
2006), composed of 60 items that measure five personality factors:
openness (O), conscientiousness (C), extraversion (E), agreeableness
(A), and emotional stability (ES). For each item, ratings were given
according to a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 "very false for
me" to 5 "very true for me."
Life satisfaction. The 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS;
Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Di Fabio & Ghizzani,
2006) measures global life satisfaction. Subjective responses to items
are on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 "strongly
disagree" to 7 "strongly agree."
Symptoms of anxiety. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck &
Steer, 1993; Sica, Coradeschi, Ghisi, & Sanavio, 2006) assesses 21
common symptoms of clinical anxiety (e.g., sweating, fear of losing
control, etc.). Respondents indicate the degree to which they have
recently been bothered by each symptom during the past week. Responses
are given on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 "not at
all" to 3 "severely." The BAI was designed to assess
anxiety symptoms independently from depression symptoms.
Symptoms of depression. The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II;
Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Sica, Ghisi, & Lange, 2007) is a
21-item self-report measure designed to assess the presence and severity
of depressive symptoms. Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert scale
ranging from 0 to 3, based on the severity of depressive symptoms over
the last two weeks. The total score ranges from 0 to 63, with higher
scores indicating more severe depressive symptoms.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and the Skewness and
Kurtosis indices of normality for all items of the RFS-12. LISREL test
of multivariate normality and Mardia's test (DeCarlo, 1997) were
significant (p < .000), suggesting that multivariate normal data
distribution was violated. Cronbach's [alpha] of the RFS-12 items
was high ([alpha] = .88). Reliability coefficients for all the variables
included in this study are displayed in Table 2.
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
We conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using the
statistical package LISREL 8.7 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2004). All
analyses were conducted using asymptotic covariance matrices and robust
maximum-likelihood (RML) estimation methods because the distributions of
some model variables deviated from normality (Joreskog, Sorbom, Du Toit,
& Du Toit, 2001). We compared the one- and two-factor solutions of
the RFS-12 by means of the CFA. The one-factor solution replicated
Altemeyer and Hunsberger's (2004) fundamentalism dimension; the
two-factor solution (positively and negatively worded items) controlled
for the presence of two distinct factors due to the presence of positive
and negative item effects (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004; Bagozzi,
1993; Carlucci & Saggino, 2013; Marsh, 1996).
As suggested by Byrne (1998) and Kline (2005), the fit model was
evaluated with multiple indicators, including the Satorra-Bentler
chi-squared (SB [chi square]) statistic and its degree of freedom,
goodness of fit index (GFI), comparative fit index (CFI), non-normed fit
index (NNFI), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), root mean
square error of approximation and its 90% confidence interval (RMSEA;
90% CI). SRMR [less than or equal to] .08 and RMSEA [less than or equal
to] .05 indicate an acceptable fit of the model (Browne & Cudeck,
1993; Kline, 2005). CFI and GFI between the range of .95 and 1.00
indicate a good fit of the model (Hu & Bender, 1995). Finally, a
NNFI between .95 and .97 denote an adequate fit of the model
(Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Muller, 2003). Further, in order
to compare the alternative models, a chi-square model-difference test
([DELTA]SB[chi square]; Bryant & Satorra, 2012; 2013) was conducted.
A statistically significant difference in the chi-square values
indicates that the null hypothesis of equal fit for both solutions can
be rejected and the less restrictive solutions should be retained
(Bender, 1990; Bollen, 1989).
Results of the CFAs showed from acceptable to good fit of both
models--for the one-factor solution: SB[chi square] (54) = 141.14 (p =
.001), GFI = .92, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .07,90% CI [.05, .08], SRMR = .05,
NNFI = .96; and for the two-factor solution: SB[chi square] (53) =
111.52 (p = .001), GFI = .93, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06,90% Cl [.04, .08],
SRMR = .05, NNFI = .98. The chi-squared difference test ([DELTA]SB[chi
square] = 27.61, df = 1, p = 1.486) showed that the one- and two-factor
solutions did not significantly differ from each other; thus, the more
restrictive solution should be retained. Figure 1 shows the path diagram
of the one-factor model tested.
Validity
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to test the
validity of the RFS-12 in relation to other religious, personality, and
psychological well-being scales. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics,
reliability, and the correlations between the RFS-12 and all other
psychological tests involved in the study.
We found significant correlations between the RFS-12 and the other
measures of religious attitudes and religious fundamentalism. The RFS-12
correlated positively with both the IFS (r = .807, p < .05) and with
all domains of the I/E-R scale (I, r = .718, p < .05; Es, r = .243,p
< .05; Ep, r = .542, p < .05). In addition, a significantly
negative correlation was found between the RFS-12 and the Big Five
personality domain trait of Openness (r= -.112, p < .01).
Non-significant associations of the RFS12 were found with the
personality domain traits of Extraversion (r = -.100, p = ns),
Conscientiousness (r = .09, p = ns), Emotional Stability (r = .01, p =
ns), and Agreeableness (r = .103, p = ns). Finally, the RFS-12
correlated slightly positively with the Satisfaction with Life Scale
(SWLS, r = . 119, p < .01). Non-significant correlations were found
between the RFS-12 and both the BAI (r = -.033,p = ns) and the BDI (r =
-.038,p = ns).
Discussion
The first aim of our study was to investigate the psychometric
properties of the Italian version of the RFS12. The RFS-12 was
translated from English to Italian using translation and backtranslation
techniques to ensure linguistic equivalence. The CFA's results
revealed that the one-dimensional factor structure of the RFS-12 best
fit our data and the two-factor structure did not significantly improve
the model. These findings are consistent with Altemeyer and
Hunsberger's (1992; 2004) previous findings. Factor analyses of
item responses on psychological rating scales that contain
balanced/unbalanced worded items generally reveal distinct factors that
reflect both a positive and negative response set or bias (Altemeyer
& Hunsberger, 2004; Bagozzi, 1993; Marsh, 1996). Correspondingly,
when the RFS-12 item responses were gathered from a large sample of
students and analyzed using a Correlated Traits Correlated Methods
framework (CTCM), the responses were found to be impacted by a worded
items effect (Carlucci & Saggino, 2013).
The convergent validity of the RFS-12 was analyzed by computing the
correlations between the scale and other religious measures. The
significant associations between the RFS-12 and the IFS are consistent
with the findings of other recent literature (Streib, Silver, Csoffi
Keller, & Hood, 2011; Williamson et al., 2010) and suggest that
these scales measure the same construct of fundamentalism. However, the
fundamentalism that Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) describe focuses on
militancy, literalness, specific beliefs, and anti-modernism contents;
whereas, those who conceive of fundamentalism from an intratextual
perspective focus on the interpretive process and the emphasis given to
a sacred text (Williamson et al., 2010).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
In accordance with recent studies, the results from our analysis
revealed that individuals who scored high in fundamentalism were
intrinsically motivated and moderately extrinsic-personally oriented
toward religion. Findings indicate that those who score high on measures
of fundamentalism tend to use religion to gain comfort, security, and/or
protection; to view religion as the master motive of their lives; and to
be less inclined to use religion for social purposes (Flood, Hill, &
Williamson, 2005; Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2003;
Williamson et al., 2010).
Although previous research has shown conflicting results, our
analysis revealed a weak negative relationship between the scores on the
RFS-12 and scores on the personality trait of Openness. The magnitude of
this relationship may be attributable to the characteristics of our
sample (e.g., college students and a homogenous religious affiliation)
and to the measures we used, as previous research has found varied and
conflicting evidence regarding the relationship between fundamentalism
and the trait of Openness (see Saroglou, 2002; Streib et al., 2011;
Williamson et al., 2010). Individuals with religious fundamentalist
beliefs tend to show more conservative attitudes and behaviors and find
greater meaning and purpose in life and within their religious
tradition. In the literature, Openness is the personality trait that
most distinguishes individuals who hold religious fundamentalist beliefs
from those with other religious attitudes. General religiosity is
correlated mainly with the personality traits of Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness; whereas, mature religiosity and spirituality are
correlated to a greater extent with Extraversion and to a lesser extent
with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (Saroglou, 2002).
The second aim of our study was to evaluate the associations
between the RFS-12 and measures of psychological well-being. We found
that religious fundamentalism was associated with high perceived
satisfaction with life but not with anxiety and depression. It appears
that those who hold religious beliefs in a fundamentalist way are
intrinsically oriented toward religion and are more disposed to use
their beliefs to cope with stressful life events, which seems to
facilitate subjective satisfaction with life. Fundamentalism also
appears to be associated with elevated levels of optimism, religious
hope, religious involvement, and religious influence in daily life
(Sethi & Seligman, 1993). These religious traditions and beliefs
seem to serve an adaptive function by providing fundamentalists with a
sense of meaning, security, and empowerment and by minimizing social
anxiety, doubts, and illness (Kinnvall, 2004).
Some literature highlights the negative features (e.g., aggression
and punitiveness) that tend to be associated with fundamentalism
(Bornstein & Miller, 2009; Danso et al., 1997). Our results
supported the hypothesis that fundamentalism has both a positive and a
negative side (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011; 2013; Newberg &
Waldman, 2009; Williamson & Hood, 2013). In our study, this may be
partially explained by our sample characteristics, specifically the
interactions between religious affiliation and socio-demographic
variables (e.g., gender and ethnic background).
For instance, Catholics differed from other religious groups both
in the degree to which social aspects of religion were a part of their
religious identity and in the extent to which they valued religious
components, such as religious community, religious commitment, and
religious symbols (Cohen & Hall, 2009). It appears that the Catholic
faith serves as a controllable stress buffer that allows individuals to
directly and actively expiate guilt associated with self-induced life
stress (Park, Cohen, & Herb, 1990). This may be one of the reasons
that those affiliated with Roman Catholicism are less likely to have
attempted suicide (Dervic et al., 2004). Whether the presence of
fundamentalism can be identified among Roman Catholics has long been
debated (Introvigne, 2004). Marty and Appleby (1991) contend that this
may be partially due to the absence of many of the ideological
components of fundamentalism (e.g., literalism, inerrancy, and the
intratextual approach to the Bible) within Roman Catholicism and the
mediating role played by the Roman Catholic Church.
With regard to the gender, females appear to be more likely to seek
the psychological support offered by religion, compared to males (Argyle
& Beit-Hallahmi, 1997). Empirical studies have also shown how
females who endorse fundamentalist beliefs tend to be extrinsically
motivated, feel less estranged from society, and show increased
dependency on externalized structures; whereas, males who endorse
fundamentalist beliefs tend to have higher standards of performance for
themselves than for others (Helm, Berecz, & Nelson, 2001; Saroglou,
2014).
Limitations
Altemeyer and Hunsberger's (1992; 2004) measure of
fundamentalism has been tested on both student and parent samples, and
its reliability has been confirmed cross-culturally and across different
religious denominations (Baum, 2009). Nonetheless, the generalizability
of our results may be limited due to a sample composed primarily of
female college students with a moderate level of religious
fundamentalism (RFS-12, M = 54). Additionally, differences in religious
attitudes may be less pronounced in college students than in adults, who
tend to exhibit a more mature and crystallized faith (Paloutzian &
Park, 2005; Rozin, 2003). Furthermore, age and education level have been
shown to have direct and indirect effects in predicting religious
fundamentalism (Carlucci et al., 2011). Although a Catholic sample was
chosen to reflect the dominant religion within the Italian population,
the use of a Catholic sample may be questionable and restricted, since
the RFS-12 was developed to be neutral with respect to religious
affiliation.
Conclusion
Our findings showed that the Italian adaptation of the Religious
Fundamentalism Scale, as one-dimensional construct, represents a valid
and reliable measure of religious fundamentalism in a Catholic Italian
sample. Moreover, this study provides a further contribution to
understanding the impact that religious fundamentalism has on
psychological well-being. Further research should be oriented to test if
fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes affect well-being, using more
diverse and clinical samples and measuring different clinical constructs
(e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorders).
Author Note: 1110 authors would like to thank Bob Altemeyer, for
his permission to use and to translate the Religious Fundamentalism
Scale into Italian.
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Leonardo Carlucci, Marco Tommasi, and Michela Balsamo
University of "G. d'Annunzio" Chieti-Pescara
Adrian Furnham
University College London
Aristide Saggino
University of "G. d'Annunzio" Chieti-Pescara
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Leonardo Carlucci, Department of Psychological Sciences, Laboratory di
Psicometria, via dei Vestini, 31, 66100 Chieti, Italy. Email:
l.carlucd@unich.it
Author Information
CARLUCCI, LEONARDO. PhD. Address: Psychometric Laboratory, "G.
d'Annunzio" University, via dei Vestini 31, 66100, Chieti
--ITALY. Title: Post-Doc student at "G. d'Annunzio
University", Chieti. Degree: MSc-Psychology and Ph.D. in
Neuroscience and Imaging at G. d'Annunzio University.
Specialization: Religious Fundamentalism, Cognitive Psychology,
Personality Assessment, Psychometric Testing.
TOMMASI, MARCO. PhD. Address: Psychometric Laboratory, "G.
d'Annunzio" University, via dei Vestini 31, 66100,
Chieti--ITALY. Title: Researcher of Psychometrics at Department of
Psychological Sciences, "G. d'Annunzio" University,
Chieti. Degree: MSc-Psychology and Ph.D. in Psychology at Padua
University. Specialization: Methodology and Psychophysiology,
Psychometric Testing.
BALSAMO, MICHELA. PhD. Address: Psychometric Laboratory, "G.
d'Annunzio" University, via dei Vestini 31, 66100,
Chieti--ITALY. Title: Researcher of Psychometrics at Department of
Psychological Sciences, "G. d'Annunzio" University,
Chieti. Degree: MSc-Psychology at SUN University of Naples and Ph.D. in
Psychology "G. d'Annunzio" University. Specialization:
Clinical Psychology, Depression and Anxiety, Research in Psychotherapy,
Psychometric Testing.
FURNHAM, ADRIAN. PhD. Address: Research Department of Clinical,
Educational and Health Psychology, University College London, BW432
London WC1 0AP, UK. Title: Professor of Psychology, Div of Psychology
& Lang Science at University College London. Degree: MSc-Economics
at London School of Economics and Ph.D at Oxford University.
Specialization: Psychiatry literacy Personality Disorders, Leadership,
Psychology of Theft and Fraud, Psychology of Money.
SAGGINO, ARISTIDE. PhD. Address: Psychometric Laboratory, G.
d'Annunzio University, via dei Vestini 31, 66100, Chieti
--ITALY. Title: Full Professor of Psychometrics at Department of
Psychological Sciences, "G. d'Annunzio" University,
Chieti. Degree: MSc-Psychology at Sapienza University of Rome and Ph.D
in Psychology at UPS of Rome. Specialization: Methodology, Depression,
Research in Psychotherapy, Psychometric Testing.
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for the RFS-12 Item
ITEM M SD Skewness Kurtosis
RFS1 5.26 2.26 -0.32 -1.06
RFS2 4.04 2.28 0.54 -0.81
RFS3 4.64 2.56 0.09 -1.27
RFS4 4.20 2.37 0.28 -0.99
RFS5 5.41 2.00 -0.23 -0.60
RFS6 4.32 2.43 0.27 -1.04
RFS7 3.94 2.22 0.65 -0.51
RFS8 4.16 2.22 0.26 -0.85
RFS9 4.70 2.54 0.17 -1.25
RFS10 4.99 2.12 0.04 -0.75
RFS11 5.32 2.23 -0.05 -0.96
RFS12 3.76 2.38 0.78 -0.39
Note. N=319.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities and Correlations for
Religious, Personality and Psychological Well-Being Measure
with RFS-12
Religious Measures
RFS IFS I Es Ep
RFS .807 ** .718 ** .243 ** .542 **
M 54.61 40.72 25.25 4.55 9.94
SD 17.91 10.42 7.82 2.26 3.05
CL .88 .87 .86 .80 .71
Personality
O C E A ES
RFS -.112 * .092 -.100 .103 .013
M 43.50 44.23 39.06 40.55 31.37
SD 6.19 6.12 5.80 5.23 8.37
CL .74 .76 .70 .64 .86
Psychological Well-Being
SWLS BAI BDI-II
RFS .119 * -.033 -.038
M 24.48 35.39 10.49
SD 5.07 10.42 8.50
CL .78 .91 .90
Note. N = 319. RJFS = Religious Fundamentalism Scale; IFS =
Intratextual Fundamentalism Scale; I = Intrinsic Religious
Orientation; Es = Extrinsic-social Religious Orientation; Ep
= Extrinsic-personal Religious Orientation; O = Openness; C
= Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; ES
= Emotional Stability; SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale;
BAI = Beck Anxiety Scale; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory
2.
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
