Housing supply.
Glaeser, Edward L.
In 1981, Lawrence Summers noted the 35 percent increase in real
housing prices between 1965 and 1980 and argued that this increase could
be explained by inflation. Summers (1) and Poterba (2) persuasively
showed that higher levels of inflation increase the interest rate
subsidy on home mortgages and essentially shift out the demand curve for
housing. Ten years later, Mankiw and Weil (3) argued that demographics
drive housing demand and, because of failing demand, housing prices will
experience painfully slow growth by the year 2000.
The appropriate renown of these papers indicates the degree to
which demand-side analysis has dominated the housing literature, but an
increasing body of facts is beginning to challenge this orientation. It
is becoming increasingly obvious that we must understand housing supply
if we are to understand booms and busts in housing prices. Over the past
five years (1998-2003), despite low inflation and the baby bust, real
housing prices increased by 25 percent, according to the Freddie Mac Repeat Sales Index. During the 1975 to 1980 period, when inflation was
soaring and baby boom children were moving out of their parents'
homes, the same index showed real housing price increases of less than
20 percent.
Rising housing prices over the past ten years can always be
explained by another omitted shifter of demand. However, evidence on
construction suggests that demand alone cannot provide the answer. For
example, in Manhattan, before 1975, housing price growth was modest, and
there was abundant new construction. Since 1980, housing prices have
soared and there have been few new units. (4) The physical character of
Manhattan has not changed between 1960 and today: If the rise in housing
prices during the 1990s were the result of demand pushing along a stable
supply curve, then surely we would see an explosion in new construction
as we did in the past. The increasingly common combination of rising
prices and tiny amounts of construction pushes us to focus on housing
supply.
Differences across regions confirm the need for supply-side
analysis. High housing prices are not ubiquitous. The median housing
value in the median county in America in the 2000 census is $75,300.
More than 95 percent of countries have median housing values below
$160,000. Soaring home prices are primarily coastal phenomena that have
left the growing states of the American interior untouched.
If the heterogeneity in price growth with the United States were
the result of different patterns of demand, then we would expect to see
quantities and prices move together. Places with high price growth would
be places with new construction. Figure 1 graphs the rate of housing
price growth (again using to the Freddie Mac Repeat Sales Index) and
permits for new housing units (divided by the stock of housing units in
1990) between 1998 and 2003 across census divisions. There is a negative
50 percent correlation between price growth and new construction.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The places that are building have little housing price appreciation
and the places that have housing price appreciation are not building.
Demand alone can't explain the difference in housing price growth
between New England and the South Atlantic. Florida alone permitted
almost as many homes in 2002 as all of New England did over the entire
five-year period. If we want to understand why housing is so expensive,
then we must understand why housing supply in New England, the Middle
Atlantic States, and California has become so inelastic. Housing supply
research is also necessary because regional growth rates depend on the
rate at which these regions build homes.
Certain aspects of housing supply are straightforward. The
construction market is competitive. According to the 2001 County
Business Patterns, there are almost 215,000 establishments engaged in
building, developing, and general contracting and 146,000 engaged in
building single-family homes. Small contractors often thrive, so it is
hard to imagine meaningful technological barriers to entry.
The physical costs of building homes are better understood than the
costs of supplying most other commodities. Firms like R. S. Means have
long surveyed contractors and provide extensive data on the average
physical costs of building new units. While custom and high quality work
costs more, many coastal professionals are surprised to learn that most
single-family detached homes appear to cost around 80 dollars per square
foot to build. In much of the country, $160,000 would be a reasonable
price for a new 2,000 square foot home, so this shouldn't surprise
us too much. Building taller buildings costs more and can reach as high
as 250 dollars per square foot. (5) The time-series evidence suggests
that these physical construction costs don't vary much over space,
they don't vary much with short-term fluctuation in aggregate
construction, and they have been declining secularly since the 1970s.
Raw ingredients (for example, lumber) have been getting cheaper in real
terms and firms have become more efficient.
Housing requires both land and structure, but there is an
overwhelming quantity of cheap land in America. The Department of
Agriculture assesses land values throughout the United States and the
values of farmland range from about $200 per acre in New Mexico to
$7,000 per acre in New Jersey. The U.S. average is $1,000 per acre, and
even in California the average value of farmland is only $2,000 per
acre. Even at $7,000 per acre, the cost of supplying a half-acre lot is
quite small, both in absolute terms and relative to the physical costs
of building.
These simple facts explain why housing remains and will remain
inexpensive in most areas of the country. In the expanding cities of
most of America, the automobile and other changes in transportation
technologies have enabled firms and workers to decentralize and move
factories and homes together into one-time farmland. (6) When employment
was constrained to stay at the city center, housing with access to the
center became expensive as the city grew. But in decentralized cities,
there is no advantage to being in the center and as a result, rent
gradients within the city disappear. (7)
Because the development of edge cities involves endless conversion
of farmland into homes, the costs of construction remain tied to the
physical costs of construction. Housing supply in the growing edge
cities of the Sunbelt is almost perfectly elastic. It doesn't
really matter whether the demand for housing in Las Vegas rises even
more (it was America's fastest growing large city in the 1990s
(8)), housing prices will remain low because prices remain tied to
construction Costs.
Of course, even where housing supply is perfectly elastic with
respect to positive shocks, housing supply is inelastic with respect to
sufficiently negative shocks. Because housing is fixed and durable, a
major drop in housing demand can always cause prices to fall. This
explains why cities decline so slowly and why declines show up in
falling housing prices long before they show up in falling population
levels. (9) Indeed, the growth in housing prices in New England has been
so spectacular in part because 20 years ago New England was declining
and housing cost less than the physical costs of replacing the
buildings.
So, if America has so much land, and if the physical costs of
construction don't increase much with the amount of new
construction, why is so much housing so expensive? In Manhattan, the
average price for condominiums has topped 600 dollars per square foot.
In San Francisco suburbs like Marin or San Mateo counties, median
housing values hover around $500,000. The physical costs of new
construction do not explain these high prices. Something else must be
making supply inelastic.
There are two primary hypotheses about why housing supply has
become so inelastic in some areas. The first is that these places are
high density and they are simply running out of land. This suggests that
the heterogeneity in Figure 1 could be explained if we only controlled
for the initial density in the area (it can't). The second
hypothesis is that high housing prices are the result of land use
regulation, which deters new construction, not the absence of land. This
suggests that cross-space and cross-time variation in housing prices are
best understood as the result of increasingly tough regulation of
developers. This regulation of course may be a good thing. Developers do
not naturally internalize every externality. Still, according to this
hypothesis, regulation--not land shortage--lies at the roots of high
housing costs.
Joseph Gyourko and I have conducted a series of tests trying to
distinguish between these two hypotheses. We looked at whether home
prices are higher in metropolitan areas with less land per capita. This
is not the case. Many of the most expensive California areas are
actually quite low density. Conversely, measures of the regulatory
environment (such as the time it takes to get a building permit) do
correlate well with high housing costs across metropolitan areas. (10)
A second test of the land shortages hypothesis is whether a law of
one price for land holds in a given area. In the absence of regulation,
the price of a quarter acre of land should be the same whether it
increases the lot size of one homeowner from .25 to .5 acres or if
whether it provides the lot for a new home. In a free market, if the
land was worth more sitting under a new home, then the half acre lot
would be subdivided, but in a regulated market, a .25 acre lot (that
include the right to have one house on that lot) may be worth almost as
much as a .5 acre lot (that also includes that same right).
To test this hypothesis, we measure the value of land in two ways.
We use traditional hedonic regressions that compare the value of
supposedly otherwise identical homes with different size lots. These
regressions estimate the value of extra land surrounding a house. We
then measure the value of land by subtracting the construction costs of
a home from its value and then treating the residual as the value of
land. Other things, like site preparation, go into this residual, but we
can estimate these costs by looking at the residuals across the country.
If high costs of housing are driven by land shortages and
regulation is irrelevant, then these two different ways of estimating
land prices should yield the same result, and in the less regulated,
growing areas of the country, the estimates aren't far off.
However, in the high cost areas--California and the Northeast--the
hedonic price of land is about one-tenth of the value of land estimated
by subtracting construction costs from housing values. As any developer
knows, you could make a fortune buying homes in suburban Boston or San
Francisco, subdividing the lots, and building new homes. These results
support the regulation hypothesis.
In a recent paper (11), we turn to Manhattan. Manhattan certainly
lacks land and historically, its high costs have come from the high cost
of building up. However, without regulation, the cost of an apartment
should not be much more than the cost of building up. Manhattan had many
15 and 20 story apartment buildings erected during the 1990s. In the
absence of regulation, these buildings could have had 30 or 40 stories
instead and if construction costs and apartment prices diverge,
developers would want to build up. Without regulation, the price of an
apartment in Manhattan should stay close to the marginal cost of supply,
which is always the cost of building one more story. The fixed costs of
an apartment building, including land, do not increase as you raise the
building another story.
Using a variety of different sources, we measure the costs of
building up. We look at the R.S. Means data and data from their
competitors. We look at costs for high rise apartments outside of New
York, which can't be below construction costs in those cities, and
then try to adjust these costs to reflect higher labor and material
costs in New York. We talked to developers. All in all, most estimates
of the marginal cost of building up are below 200 dollars per square
foot. Yet Manhattan apartments are selling for more than 600 dollars a
square foot. There is no technological barrier to making Manhattan even
taller. We are driven to believe that high housing costs in Manhattan
are not the result of lack of land but rather the result of regulatory
barriers to new construction. This conclusion is buttressed by the
time-series evidence discussed earlier. Before 1980, despite high
density, levels, there was a lot of new building in Manhattan. During
that era, apartment costs were close to the price of new construction.
Since 1980, new construction has fallen and prices have soared.
Increasingly inelastic housing helps to explain high housing prices
on the American coasts. This inelasticity is itself the result of an
increasingly tough regulatory environment that deters new construction.
The big question that remains is: what are the causes of these
regulatory changes? Why is San Francisco so toughly regulated, but not
Las Vegas? Why was Los Angeles a developer's dream in the 1960s,
but not today? To understand the rise in housing prices, we must
understand how local homeowners have become increasingly interested in
blocking new construction and increasingly able to do so.
(1) L. H. Summers, "Inflation, The Stock Market and
Owner-Occupied Housing," NBER Working Paper No. 606, August 1981.
(2) J. M. Poterba, "Inflation, Income Taxes and Owner-Occupied
Housing," NBER Working Paper No. 553, May 1985; and S. Rosen and K
H. Topel, "A Time-Series Model of Housing Investment in the
U.S.," NBER Working Paper No. 1818, January 1986.
(3) N. G. Mankiw and D. N. Weil, "The Baby Boom, The Baby Bust
and the Housing Market," NBER Working Paper No. 2794, March 1990.
(4) E. L. Glaeser, J. Gyourko, and R. Saks, "Why is Manhattan
So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in House Prices," NBER
Working Paper No. 10124, November 2003.
(5) See E. L. Glaeser, J. Gyourko, and R. Saks, "Why is
Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in House Prices."
(6) E. L. Glaeser and M. E. Kahn, "Sprawl and Urban
Growth," NBER Working Paper No. 9733, May 2003.
(7) E. L. Glaeser and M. E. Kahn, "Decentralized Employment
and the Transformation of the American City," NBER Working Paper
No. 8117, February 2001.
(8) E. L. Glaeser and J. Shapiro, "Is There a New Urbanism?
The Growth of U.S. Cities in the 1990s," NBER Working Paper No.
8357, July 2001.
(9) E. L. Glaeser and J. Gyourko, "Urban Decline and Durable
Housing," NBER Working Paper No. 8598, November 2001.
(10) E. L. Glaeser and J. Gyourko, "The impact of Zoning on
Housing Affordability" NBER Working Paper No. 8835, March 2002.
(11) See E. L. Glaeser, J. Gyourko, and R. Saks, "Why is
Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in House Prices."
Edward L. Glaeser *
* Glaeser is a Research Associate in the NBER's Programs on
Economic Fluctuations and Growth, Law and Economics, and Aging. He is
also a Professor of Economics at Harvard University.