The economics of crime and the criminal justice system.
Levitt, Steven D.
My recent empirical research focuses on crime and the criminal
justice system. Within this broad area, three primary themes emerge:
identifying the causal link between criminal justice policies and crime
rates; differentiating empirically between deterrence and
incapacitation; and using nonstandard data sources to test economic
theories. This synopsis of my research is organized around these themes.
Identifying the Causal Link Between Criminal Justice Policies and
Crime Rates
Differentiating between correlation and causality is critical when
analyzing the impact of crime policies. For instance, Newark has a
violent crime rate four times higher than that of Omaha, and it also has
twice as many police per capita. A likely explanation for this
relationship, however, is that high crime rates lead cities to hire more
police, not that police cause crime. Similarly, when crime is rising,
prison populations also tend to rise. This is not surprising: if
criminals continue to be caught and punished at a constant rate, then
the prison population should mechanically rise one-for-one with the
crime rate. From the perspective of ideal public policy, reliance on
such correlations provides no guidance. Identifying the causal link
between increases in police and the number of prisoners and crime is
necessary.
I have examined the impact of police on crime, using the timing of
mayoral and gubernatorial elections as "instruments" for
changes in the police force.(1) Indeed, the size of the police force
appears to be affected by election timing. Over a 25-year period, the
average increase in the size of the police force in large U.S. cities in
mayoral election years was 2 percent; in gubernatorial election years it
was 2.1 percent, and in nonelection years there was no change. It
appears that incumbent politicians attempt to bolster their re-election
prospects by appearing "tough on crime." If elections do not
otherwise affect crime rates (after controlling for other factors that
may be influenced by elections, such as changes in the local economy),
then electoral cycles may plausibly influence changes in the police
force. In one set of estimates, I find a positive relationship between
police and crime. But when I include elections in the analysis the sign
reverses, and police appear to significantly reduce crime.
In a related paper, I consider the relationship between the number
of prisoners and crime rates.2 In this paper, I use prison overcrowding lawsuits as an indicator of change in prison populations. These lawsuits
affect prison populations, but they may be otherwise unrelated to crime
rates (especially because the cases often take a decade or more to be
resolved). In 13 states, lawsuits brought by the American Civil
Liberties Union have affected a state's entire prison system. In
the three years after a final decision was handed down by the courts in
those cases, prison populations fell by 14.3 percent compared to the
population of the nation as a whole, whereas violent and property crime
rates increased 10.2 percent and 5.5 percent respectively. Using my
estimate of the elasticity of crime with respect to the prison
population and previous estimates of the costs of crime from Miller,
Cohen, and Rossman, I cannot reject the possibility that the marginal
social cost of imprisonment equals the marginal social benefit of the
reduction in crime.(3)
Deterrence, Incapacitation, and the Response of Criminals to
Incentives
Becker's well-known economic model of crime is based on
deterrence: potential criminals alter their behavior in response to
changing incentives.(4) Empirically, however, it is often difficult to
distinguish between deterrence (which is a behavioral response) and
incapacitation (in which reductions in crime are attributable solely to
criminals being unable to commit crimes because they are locked up).
Virtually all of the empirical work that purportedly supports the
economic model of crime is equally consistent with incapacitation. In
some cases, such as determining the impact of policies like "three
strikes and you're out" laws, the distinction is critical. If
deterrence is the operative force, then "three strikes" laws
are likely to be effective; if only incapacitation is at work, then
"three strikes" laws will lead to a geriatric,
cost-ineffective prison population. Three of my papers thus have
attempted to distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation.
In one, I note that both deterrence and incapacitation predict that
changes in the expected punishment for one crime (burglary, for example)
will lead to a decrease in that crime.(5) Thus, this prediction cannot
be used to distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation. In
contrast, the two theories of crime make different predictions as to
what will happen to a second crime (auto theft, for example) when the
expected punishment for burglary rises. Deterrence predicts that
criminals will substitute auto theft for burglary. Incapacitation, on
the other hand, suggests that levels of both crimes will fall.
Exploiting this insight empirically seems to show that deterrence is
more important than incapacitation, particularly for property crime.
Daniel Kessler and I exploit a unique feature of sentence
enhancements to isolate deterrence.(6) We look at the passage of
Proposition 8 in California, which selectively institutes sentence
enhancements for some crimes. Sentence enhancements are additional
penalties tacked on to a base sentence (as a result of, for instance,
past criminal history or use of a weapon). Since the enhancement
increases the expected punishment, it will increase deterrence. Because
it is added on to an existing punishment, however, it will not affect
incapacitation until the base sentence expires. Thus, any immediate
effect of a newly instituted sentence enhancement law must result from
deterrence. We find an immediate, sharp decline in eligible crimes
relative to those that are unaffected by the law, again suggesting the
importance of deterrence.
Finally, I study the relationship between crime and punishment for
juveniles.(7) Over the last two decades, juvenile crime has grown at a
much faster rate than adult crime. During that same period, the adult
prison population has grown dramatically, but the number of juveniles in
custody has not. I estimate that changes in relative punishment can
explain 60 percent of the differential growth rates in juvenile and
adult crime over the period I examine. Moreover, sharp changes in
criminal involvement with the transition from the juvenile to the adult
court suggest that deterrence, rather than simply incapacitation, plays
an important role.
Using Nonstandard Data Sources to Test Economic Theories
The study of crime offers many opportunities to test microeconomic models of behavior. Often, however, standard data sources are not
appropriate for such tasks. Consequently, a number of projects with
which I have been involved in recent years have relied on unusual data
sources.
Ian Ayres and I consider what externalities are associated with
potential victims taking precautions.(8) In particular, we look at
Lojack, a radio transmitter device hidden inside automobiles (the Lojack
company provided proprietary market share data). There is no external
indication on the vehicle that Lojack is installed. Thus, Lojack
provides general deterrence, even to vehicles without it. This is in
stark contrast to observable devices, such as "The Club," that
presumably cause crimes to shift from one vehicle to another. We find
sharp decreases in auto theft in cities where Lojack becomes available.
Further, car owners who install Lojack internalize only 10 percent of
the total social benefit, leading to underprovision of Lojack by the
market, we conclude.
Sudir Venkatesh and I use an even more unusual data source:
financial records kept over a four-year period by a drug-selling street
gang.(9) These include information on the price and quantity of drugs
sold; wages at various levels of the organization; and expenses such as
tribute, weapons, and so on. We supplement the financial information
with ethnographic observations and data on arrests, deaths, and
injuries. Wages appear to be surprisingly low - not much above the
federal minimum wage for street-level sellers. The distribution of wages
within the gang is extremely skewed, though, and there is some evidence
of compensating differentials in wages. During the time period we study,
the gang expands its territory, providing a number of tests of market
power and pricing. Among other results, we find that gangs price below
marginal cost during gang wars.
1 S.D. Levitt, "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to
Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review,
87(3), (June 1997), pp. 270-90.
2 S.D. Levitt, "The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime
Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 111, (May 1996), pp. 319-52.
3 T. Miller, M. Cohen, and S. Rossman, "Victim Costs of
Violent Crime and Resulting Injuries," Health Affairs, 12, (Winter
1993), pp. 186-97.
4 G. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 76, (March/April 1968),
pp. 169-217.
5 S.D. Levitt, "Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce
Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?" Economic
Inquiry, forthcoming.
6 D. Kessler and S.D. Levitt, "Using Sentence Enhancements to
Distinguish Deterrence from Incapacitation," NBER Working Paper No.
6484, March 1998.
7 S.D. Levitt, "Juvenile Crime and Punishment."Journal of
Political Economy, forthcoming.
8 I Ayres and S.D. Levitt, "Measuring the Positive
Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis
of Lojack," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), (February
1998), pp. 43- 77. 9 S.D. Levitt and S. Venkatesh, "An Economic
Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances," NBER Working
Paper No. 6592, June 1998.
Levitt is a Research Associate in the NBER's Program on Public
Economics and an assistant professor of economics at the University of
Chicago. His "Profile" appears later in this issue.