Anti-politics and the left.

Clarke, Nick ; Jennings, Will ; Moss, Jonathan 等

Introducing anti-politics

There are many kinds of politics, but if politics describes those institutions by which plural societies achieve collective and binding decisions, then antipolitics describes negative feeling towards those institutions--including politicians, parties, councils, parliaments, and governments. This negativity is targeted towards politicians and parties in general, as opposed to particular politicians or parties (which, of course, would not cause the same concern). It is targeted towards the institutions of representative democracy and the way they currently work, as opposed to the idea of democracy itself (for which there remains widespread support). Given that most theories of democracy assume a certain amount of scepticism among citizens regarding politicians and the organisations through which they operate, anti-politics describes a level of negativity beyond such a healthy scepticism: an unhealthy cynicism. It also describes a rather active negativity, often deeply felt, as opposed to the passive indifference often discussed under the heading of 'apathy'.

Where do we see such negativity? Most directly, we see it in focus-group research where citizens are asked relatively open questions and given the opportunity to speak in their own, often vitriolic terms about formal politics. (1) More indirectly, we see it in survey evidence of things like trust or approval regarding politicians, leaders, and government. (2)

Why should this matter? Why is anti-politics important? What are its consequences? In general terms, anti-politics is associated with non-participation (such as failing to vote), and non-compliance (such as failing to pay taxes). For these reasons, some commentators fear that anti-politics might lead to weak government and, ultimately, withdrawal of support for the idea of democracy itself.

A second reason for taking anti-politics seriously is that negativity about formal politics is associated with support for populism. Populism is based on the positioning of one politician or party as being different from politicians and parties in general; as representing 'the people' against 'elite' politicians and parties; as representing 'common sense' in a field otherwise characterised by 'vested interests' and 'grubby compromises'. Such a positioning is dishonest in so far as it denies what must be known: that democratic politics inevitably requires a tough process of squeezing collective decisions out of multiple and competing interests and opinions, and imposing those negotiated compromises on everyone. Nevertheless, in England this positioning is currently deployed most obviously by UKIP. Our analysis of data from surveys conducted by YouGov and Populus shows that political discontent predicts support for UKIP to an equal degree as social demographics. (3) Indeed, when social group is held constant, political discontent--measured by whether citizens think politicians are knowledgeable, can make a difference, possess leadership, are focused on the short-term chasing of headlines, and are self-seeking - increases the odds of supporting UKIP by more than a half.

A final reason anti-politics matters is that, currently, negativity towards formal politics is not being compensated for by positivity towards informal politics. This is the democratisation thesis: (4) the claim that we are not seeing a crisis of democracy but a reinvention of democracy; a shift from the old, traditional, elite-directed politics of liberal democracy to a new, post-industrial, post-modern, elite-challenging politics associated with new social movements, transnational political networks, internet activism, and so on. This claim is questionable from two perspectives. Empirically, alternative forms of political action such as protest do not seem to be on the rise. (5) They also appear to be minority forms of action compared to, say, voting. (6) They also seem to be practised mostly by citizens who vote and even join mainstream political parties, making them an extension of the repertoire of already engaged citizens, as opposed to part of some alternative repertoire for discontented citizens. (7) Finally, in functional terms, informal politics does not replace formal politics. For example, it performs interest articulation much better than interest aggregation--the latter being a function traditionally performed by parties and crucial for coherent public policy.

Taking the long view

Anti-politics matters and is the focus of our current research on 'Popular Understandings of Politics in Britain, 1937-2015' (see http://antipolitics.soton.ac.uk). The project aims to take the long view of negativity towards the institutions of formal politics, going back at least to the Second World War and the so-called 'golden age' of democratic engagement in Britain, when voter turnout reached eighty-four per cent. (8) It also aims to listen to citizens' voices; their understandings, expectations, and judgements regarding the institutions of formal politics. To do this, we draw on two bodies of evidence. First, we analyse survey data: especially Gallup and Ipsos-MORI data on approval or satisfaction regarding governments, prime ministers, and party leaders; and more recent data from the British Election Study, British Social Attitudes survey, YouGov, Populus, and the Hansard Society's Audit of Political Engagement.

Second, we analyse volunteer writing for Mass Observation (MO). Between 1939 and 1955, MO ran a panel of between 400 and 1000 volunteer writers (depending on the year). In 1981, it revived this panel, which is still running today. In both periods, MO asked panellists to write about formal politics on several occasions. We sampled thirteen of these 'directives' across the two periods, and sixty responses to each directive (spread across different age groups, genders, regions, and occupational categories). When sampled carefully, and read carefully for categories, storylines, and folk theories that are shared between panellists--and, plausibly, between panellists and citizens in wider society--these responses allow a comparison between how citizens understood formal politics in the so-called golden age of democratic engagement after the Second World War, and the so-called 'crisis' period of recent decades (when voter turnout fell as low as fifty-nine per cent. (9) We now turn to some of the findings of this research.

Anti-politics on the rise

Historical accounts describe a golden age of democratic engagement followed by decline, (10) or a relatively permanent culture of apathy, (11) or just trendless fluctuation of political support. (12) Focusing on the case of Britain, and analysing survey data alongside volunteer writing for MO, our project has reached two main findings on the historical development of anti-politics.

First, there never was a golden age of democratic engagement in Britain. Gallup collected data on things like approval and satisfaction during the 1940s and 50s. It found that on average only about forty per cent of citizens approved of the record of the Government during this period, and roughly fifty per cent were satisfied with the Prime Minister (with only a little fluctuation around these figures depending on the particular Government or Prime Minister in question). In 1944, Gallup asked citizens: do you think that British politicians are out merely for themselves, for their party, or to do the best for their country? As many as thirty-five per cent of respondents chose 'out merely for themselves', with another twenty-two per cent selecting 'for their party'. After the General Election of 1945, Gallup asked: in general, did you approve or disapprove of the way the election campaign was conducted by the various parties? As many as forty-two per cent of respondents disapproved, giving reasons including 'too many vote-catching stunts', 'too much mud-slinging', 'too little stress laid on policy', and 'too much Churchill, too little policy'. Finally, also in 1945, MO asked its panel to write about their 'normal conversational attitude when talk gets round to politicians'. Two clear storylines are repeated across the writing of a wide range of panellists. Politicians were viewed as self-serving, with prototypical categories here being the 'self-seeker' and the 'place-seeker'. They were also viewed as being not straight-talking; as being 'gas-bags' and 'gift-of-the-gabbers'.

So there never was a golden age of democratic engagement in Britain. However, and this is our second main finding, things have got worse. Since the 1940s and 50s, government approval has dropped by about ten per cent to thirty per cent, and prime ministerial satisfaction has dropped by roughly fifteen per cent to thirty-five per cent (again, with some fluctuation for things like the honeymoon periods of new governments, but with a falling line of best fit that is very clear). In 2014, we partnered with YouGov to ask the same question asked by Gallup in 1944. This time, forty-eight per cent of respondents judged politicians to be 'out merely for themselves' (up from thirty-five per cent), and thirty per cent selected 'for their party' (up from twenty-two per cent). Only ten per cent of respondents judged politicians to be out 'to do their best for their country'!

In 2014, we also partnered with MO to ask the same question asked by MO in 1945: 'What would you say is your normal conversational attitude when talk gets round to politicians, clergy, doctors, lawyers, and advertising agents?'. The number of negative storylines about politicians has grown since 1945. Put differently, the number of distinct grievances citizens hold against politicians has grown. Politicians are still described as self-interested and not straight-talking. But now they are also described as out of touch, with prototypical categories in this storyline being the 'toff' (who went from public school to Oxbridge to Parliament) and the 'career politician' (with little experience of life beyond politics). They are also thought to be 'all the same' (just focused on swing voters in marginal seats), a joke (like schoolboys or students who make gaffes), and beneficiaries of a system that has long been broken and unfair (with too many safe seats and wasted votes).

In summary, we might say that anti-politics is on the rise in terms of its social scope. More and more citizens disapprove of governments and prime ministers. More and more citizens judge politicians to be out for themselves and their party (as opposed to their country). We might also say that anti-politics is on the rise in terms of its political scope. Citizens hold more and more grievances with formal politics. They judge politicians to be self-serving and not straight-talking, but also to be out of touch, all the same, a joke, and part of a broken and unfair system. Finally, we might say that anti-politics is on the rise in terms of its intensity. We see this in the language used by MO panellists. In 1945, respondents wrote about politicians in relatively measured terms. This did not just reflect a generalised culture of deference at the time. In the same responses, they wrote about clergy as 'intellectually dishonest' and 'spoil-sports', doctors as 'uncaring' and 'protective of their own interests', lawyers as 'tricksters' and 'money-grabbers', and advertising agents as 'frauds' and 'social parasites'. By 2014, the terms used for these other professionals had not really strengthened in the writing of MO panellists. But the terms used for politicians had certainly strengthened. Citizens now described their 'hatred' for politicians who made them 'angry', 'incensed', 'outraged', 'disgusted', and 'sickened'. They described politicians as arrogant, boorish, cheating, contemptable, corrupt, creepy, deceitful, devious, disgraceful, fake, feeble, loathsome, lying, money-grabbing, parasitical, patronising, pompous, privileged, shameful, sleazy, slimy, slippery, smarmy, smooth, smug, spineless, timid, traitorous, weak, and wet.

Explaining the rise of anti-politics

In the academic literature, explanations are often categorised into demand-side, supply-side, and political-communication explanations. On the demand-side, it is argued that citizens have changed. They have become wealthier and better educated, (13) less aligned to the main parties, (14) and more consumerist in their approach to politics. (15) On the supply-side, it is argued that politics has changed (that politics is to blame). Governments perform less well against an expanded set of criteria. (16) Depoliticisation, in so far as it distributes power to other actors, means that politicians are now viewed as less powerful and less worthy of engagement by citizens.

Depoliticisation, in so far as it makes politicians and parties look indistinguishable in ideological terms, means that citizens fail to see how engaging with formal politics could substantially change their lives. (17) Finally, some scholars argue that political communication has changed. Politics has become increasingly mediated and journalists have increasingly framed politics in negative terms. (18) Political campaigning has become professionalised and focused on controlled rallies, photo opportunities, and soundbites; agenda-setting; the personalities of party leaders; and floating voters in marginal seats (to the exclusion of other citizens).

We can add something to these explanations by drawing on the General Election diaries of MO panellists (kept on seven occasions between 1945 and 2015). In the immediate post-war period, citizens encountered politicians most prominently in long radio speeches and rowdy political meetings. Politicians spoke on the radio for a testing length of time without interruption. They spoke at meetings where citizens could react, heckle, and ask their own questions. As a result of this political interaction, citizens could listen to, hear, and judge politicians as good or bad speakers, and better or worse candidates. In the current period, citizens encounter politicians most prominently in televised debates and associated news reporting. Interaction is heavily mediated. Citizens find televised debates to be stage-managed, with topics avoided and questions not answered. They find news reporting to favour soundbites, photo opportunities, gaffes, polling results, and expert analysis. As a result, citizens delegate their judgements to pollsters and experts, or else judge politicians to be frauds (who stick to the salesperson's script) or buffoons (who mistakenly go 'off script' and make gaffes). Lacking opportunities to calibrate judgements of politicians themselves, citizens fall back on the suspicion and negativity that have seemingly always been one part of popular responses to formal politics in Britain.

Challenges and opportunities for Labour and the left

What all this means for the left depends on what is meant by the left. There are some on the left who believe the state is always captured by the capitalist class (because, in a capitalist system, even social democratic governments rely on the material resources provided by capitalist economic actors). For these people, formal politics is fatally compromised in a capitalist system anyway and hardly worth worrying about. There are others on the left who welcome the turbulence brought by a rise of anti-political sentiment. The SNP and the Green Party provide their own interpretations of this phenomenon. For them, it should be interpreted as negativity towards the main parties and not formal politics in general. As such, it provides an opportunity for the SNP to position itself as 'not Westminster', and the Green Party to position itself as 'not one of the compromised main parties'. Our view is that such interpretations strategically overplay supply-side explanations for anti-politics ('the main parties are to blame'), while underplaying demand-side and political-communication explanations (for what is a generalised withdrawal of political support, and not just a shift of support from one set of parties to another).

In the rest of this section, we focus on the implications of growth in anti-political sentiment for the Labour Party--which, despite recent political turbulence, remains the primary institutional vehicle for left politics in the UK taken as a whole. As we have shown elsewhere, (19) a climate of anti-politics makes it harder for Labour to win a majority under the current system. For anti-political reasons--among other reasons, of course--voters are abandoning Labour for the SNP, the Green Party, and UKIP (positioned under Nigel Farage as with 'the people' and against 'the north-London metropolitan elite'). It is important, then, for Labour to find ways of responding to this anti-political climate. But what can it do? It can't deny its history and adopt its own anti-political position. Nor can it do much about long-term sociological processes like postmodernisation and partisan dealignment. In the rest of this paper, we suggest three ways forward.

First, Labour could respond to some of those particular grievances commonly raised by a wide range of citizens. If politicians are thought to be self-serving--or serving on behalf of their cronies--it could take up distinctive positions on MPs' pay and expenses, MPs' second jobs, the so-called 'revolving door' between Westminster and certain highly-rewarded parts of the private sector, campaign finance, lobbying, and so on. If politicians are thought to be out of touch and all the same, Labour could look again at how candidates and leaders are selected. If the system is thought to be broken and unfair, with too many safe seats and wasted votes, how long before Labour must reconsider its (apparently self-serving) opposition to constitutional reform in this area?

Connected to this, a long-standing component of anti-political sentiment, going back at least to the Second World War, is a belief in the singular public interest, anti-party feeling, an aversion to mud-slinging, and a preference for independents, statesmen, coalitions, and national governments (working on behalf of that singular public interest). Such beliefs and preferences demand a united Labour Party but also invite serious consideration of a 'progressive alliance' involving Labour, the Greens, maybe the SNP and Plaid Cymru, and maybe the Liberal Democrats.

A second response by Labour could specifically address depoliticisation as one explanation for the rise of anti-politics. Labour could talk up fundamental ideological differences between itself and the Tories. It could talk up the power of politicians, councils, parliaments, and governments to make a difference. When in office, it could actually give some of these institutions more power (instead of taking it away, as was often the case during the late 1990s and early 2000s).

Third, Labour could address citizens as they wish to be addressed. The diaries kept by MO panellists during the General Election campaign of 2015 provide some guidance here. Politicians should avoid the petty, the tedious, and the trivial. They should avoid accusations, bickering, mud-slinging, slagging off, slanging, trading of insults, tribalism. They should avoid constant announcements, photo opportunities, promises, slogans, sound-bites. They should avoid gimmicks, tweaks, and bribes that are back-of-the-fag-packet, knee-jerk, and safety-first in character. Put more positively, politicians should address the important issues of the day. They should provide vision and inspiration. They should campaign on principles, speaking directly and frankly about such things. They should put themselves forward for testing by audiences that are not vetted and in situations that are not overly time-constrained and stage-managed.

What is required is a new willingness to interact with citizens in fora that are not tightly manipulated and controlled. Throughout the post-war period, our research suggests that citizens have always seen politicians as potential chancers, liars, and cheats. So the suspicion driving anti-politics is not new, but what have been lost are the contexts in which members of the public can come to an unvarnished and direct judgement for themselves, that sets aside these suspicions, and concludes that this politician and this party are more honest than dishonest, and more interested in the public interest than being self-serving. What is required is not the false authenticity of a populist--a Nigel or a Boris--but instead the willingness for elected representatives at all levels to place themselves in a position to be judged. Some of that could be face-to-face but much of it could be through the internet. Talking, engaging, explaining--and not just at election time--will defeat anti-politics and enable Labour politicians to be respected, if not to be loved, for trying to do a decent job for their country and locality. Many are already delivering that kind of engagement so there is good practice on which to build.

Finally, anti-political sentiment should not be confused with a demand from citizens for more opportunities to participate. We are not opposed to democratic innovations and new forms of engagement, but we think the main message of citizens to politicians is: do your own jobs better! We have found no evidence of a widespread desire among ordinary citizens for more participation in decision-making. Instead, we have found a long-standing preference for what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call 'stealth democracy'. (20) Citizens want government to operate well and in the background, while they get on with living their own lives. They want an improved liberal democracy, as opposed to a more participatory democracy. They want a better system for selecting and electing politicians, and then for politicians to behave better once in office. (21) Labour can't exploit anti-politics or manipulate it through promises set in stone. Rather it needs to address anti-politics head-on by giving citizens the opportunity to see Labour consistently behaving differently, and talking and campaigning on issues that matter. It needs to give citizens opportunities to judge the performance of Labour politicians through forms of interaction and exchange that are less message-oriented and managed, and more open and continuous.

Nick Clarke is Associate Professor of Human Geography at the University of Southampton; Will Jennings is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton; Jonathan Moss is Senior Research Assistant in Geography at the University of Southampton; Gerry Stoker is Professor of Politics and Governance at the University of Southampton and the University of Canberra. Their project on 'Popular Understandings of Politics in Britain' was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/L007185/1).

Notes

(1.) G.Stoker, C.Hay, and M.Barr, 'Fast thinking: Implications for democratic politics', European Journal of Political Research 55(1), 2016, pp3-21.

(2.) W.Jennings, G.Stoker, and J.Twyman, 'The dimensions and impact of political discontent in Britain', Parliamentary Affairs, 2016, volume pending.

(3.) Ibid.

(4.) P.Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999.

(5.) G.Stoker et al, Prospects for Citizenship, Bloomsbury, London 2011.

(6.) P.Whiteley, Political Participation in Britain: The Decline and Revival of Civic Culture, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2011.

(7.) C.Saunders, 'Anti-politics in action? Measurement dilemmas in the study of unconventional political participation', Political Research Quarterly 67(3), 2014, pp574-588.

(8.) D.Denver, C.Carman, and R.Johns, Elections and Voters in Britain, Third Edition, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke 2012.

(9.) Ibid.

(10.) R.D.Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon and Schuster, London 2000.

(11.) K.Jefferys, Politics and the People: A History of British Democracy since 1918, Atlantic Books, London 2007.

(12.) P.Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 20ii.

(13.) R.Inglehart, Modernisation and Postmodernisation: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1997.

(14.) R.J.Dalton and M.P.Wattenberg (eds), Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000.

(15.) G.Stoker, Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2006.

(16.) G.J.Mulgan, Politics in an Antipolitical Age, Polity, Cambridge 1994.

(17.) C.Hay, Why We Hate Politics, Polity, Cambridge 2007.

(18.) J.N.Cappella and K.Hall Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997.

(19.) W.Jennings and G.Stoker, 'Two polarities of anti-politics', LSE: British Politics and Policy, 2015,http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/two-polarities-of-anti-politics/.

(20.) J.R.Hibbing and E.Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs about How Government Should Work, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002.

(21.) G.Stoker and C.Hay, 'Understanding and challenging populist negativity towards politics: The perspectives of British citizens', Political Studies, 2016, volume pending.