Smooth operators: recent collective bargaining in Major League Baseball.
Rascher, Daniel A. ; DeSchriver, Timothy D.
Smooth Operators: Recent Collective Bargaining in Major League
Baseball
In November of 2011, the ownership in Major League Baseball (MLB)
and the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) announced they
had agreed to a new five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that
would run through the end of the 2016 season. The announcement of this
deal was unique in several ways. First, unlike recent CBA negotiations
in other North American professional sports leagues such as the National
Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and
the National Hockey League (NHL), these appeared to be rather
harmonious. There was no war of words in the media between the two sides
and the deal was struck before the end of the existing CBA.
Second, the threat of a work stoppage never appeared to be a
possibility. This is in stark contrast to the other pro leagues
mentioned above, which have seen recent work stoppages as a result of
failed labor negotiations. For example, the NHL lost an entire season in
2004-05 due to the failure to agree on a new labor deal. More recently,
the much-publicized NFL labor talks dragged on throughout the spring and
summer of 2011 and resulted in lost out-of-season training activities
and a delay in the opening of training camps. In the fall and winter of
2011, the NBA's season opening was delayed over two months due to a
work stoppage. While a new CBA in the NBA was agreed upon after lengthy
negotiations and bickering in the press, the season had to be shortened
from 82 to 66 games with those games being played in a condensed 124-day
period.
Third, the MLB labor negotiations were unique in their failure to
attract media attention. The negotiations of other leagues seemed to
dominate the popular press in recent years. The MLB deal was done with
almost no controversy, negative statements, or in-fighting. Labor
harmony appears to be omnipresent in MLB. Not only is this distinct from
the other North American professional leagues, but it is a major
deviation from the history of the relationship between team owners and
the MLBPA. Between 1972 and 1994, no MLB collective bargaining agreement
was made without some type of work stoppage, whether it was an owner
lockout or player strike. While not all of these stoppages affected the
regular season, all of them led to some delay in team activities such as
training camp. Table 1 below shows the nature and extent of MLB's
work stoppages.
It appears that team owners and the MLBPA learned a valuable lesson
from their last work stoppage that occurred in 1994-95 and led to the
first cancellation of the World Series in over a century. The
cancellation of the Series and subsequent delay to the start of the 1995
season did significant short-term damage to MLB. The 1995 season saw a
decrease in attendance and TV ratings. The relationship between work
stoppages and spectator demand is somewhat unclear based on the current
body of knowledge, as will be discussed later in the article. But for
MLB in the post-World Series cancellation world of the mid-1990s, it
took, in part, the 1998 home run chase of Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa to
bring fans back to the ballparks. It appears that the MLB owners and
players have learned a valuable lesson from that work stoppage and do
not wish to repeat it.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the newest CBA that was
agreed on in 2011 between the MLB owners and MLBPA. Special attention
will also be given to the changes in the economic system in MLB that
will occur as a result of the new deal, along with a comparison of the
new deal with the prior agreement that had been in place. In addition,
the new CBA will be compared to the most recent labor agreements that
have been made by the three other major North American professional
sports leagues: the NFL, NBA, and NHL. Further, collective bargaining in
MLB will be compared with typical union negotiations in non-sports
industries in North America. Lastly, an analysis will be undertaken of
which side--players or owners--appears to have set themselves up for
future success as a result of this deal. To provide context, the article
begins with a description of the history of unionization in MLB and a
discussion of past CBA negotiations between the MLBPA and team owners.
History of MLB Unionization
Major League Baseball has the longest history of collective
bargaining in professional sports. A great deal of content in this
section has been adapted from Staudohar (2000) and Zimbalist (2003b).
The unionization of professional baseball players can be traced to 1885
when the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players was formed. This
union, along with many subsequent organizations such as the
Players' Protective Association, the Fraternity of Professional
Baseball Players of America, and the American Baseball Guild, eventually
failed, but they served as the groundwork for future players unions. The
primary economic topics of interest for these early unions were the
reserve clause that contractually tied players to their team for the
entirety of their playing career, the funding of player pensions, and
insurance issues. None of these organizations were successful in ending
the reserve clause that contractually tied players to a single team for
the entirety of their careers, and only modest gains were made in player
pensions and insurance ("History," 2012).
The current players union, the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA), was formed in 1954 with a player, Bob Feller,
serving as the first union president. As with earlier players unions,
most CBA negotiations in the 1950s and early 1960s dealt with relatively
minor issues, such as those mentioned earlier, along with topics such as
playing field/ballpark conditions and per diem allowances for traveling
teams. The union was strongly influenced by the team owners and
relatively ineffective and powerless until 1966 (Staudohar, 2000). For
example, in the early 1960s, the MLBPA's legal counsel, Judge
Robert Cannon, was in support of the reserve clause that greatly limited
player rights, and had career aspirations to be the commissioner of MLB
(Zimbalist, 2003b). However, the bargaining strategy and goals of the
MLBPA changed dramatically in 1966 with the hiring of Marvin Miller as
its executive director.
In hindsight, it is interesting to note that Miller was not even
the MLBPA's first choice for the job. Some players did not feel
that Miller was the proper selection because he had no background in
baseball. But unlike prior union chiefs, Miller had a wealth of
experience in the unionization and organization of workers. He had
previously been an economist with the United Steelworkers of America
(Staudohar, 2000).
Miller's negotiating style was different from that of early
union leaders. His predecessors had a much more cooperative style in
dealing with the owners. Miller used a more traditional approach toward
labor negotiations that was common in other non-sport industries. His
belief was that confrontation and conflict were the only methods that
would be successful for the MLBPA to achieve its goals, with the
elimination of the reserve clause being the primary goal (Staudohar,
2000). The importance of the reserve clause to the owners is noted by
Krautmann, von Allmen, and Berri (2009), who found that the average
apprentice, a player under the reserve clause without access to
arbitration, was paid about 19% of the marginal revenue product (MRP)
that he produced. The model assumed that free agents were paid 100% of
their MRP. In fact, this is the lowest pay as a percentage of MRP across
MLB, the NBA, and the NFL, according to Krautmann et al. (2009).
The owners did not perhaps fully understand the effect that Miller
would have on the business of MLB until 1968, the first year in which
Miller represented the players in CBA negotiations. In 1968, a two-year
deal was reached with the most significant facet of the agreement being
an increase in the minimum player salary from $6,000 to $10,000. While
this gain may seem small by today's standards, this was a major
step for many players who had not seen the minimum salary rise for over
a decade; let alone a 67% increase (Staudohar, 2000). Table 2 provides
data on the growth of the minimum and average player salaries over the
last 40 years.
The 1970s was a decade that saw the MLBPA make its most significant
gains at the bargaining table. The three most important changes to the
economic system in MLB were the establishment of a grievance arbitration
panel, the institution of free agency, and the start of salary
arbitration. The 1970 CBA established a three-member grievance
arbitration panel that handled disagreements between the two sides;
historically, the commissioner was the final arbitrator on all
decisions, and he tended to side with the owners in almost every
instance. The establishment of the grievance panel had significant
future ramifications. For example, in 1974, Jim "Catfish"
Hunter of the Oakland Athletics had a conflict with team owner Charles
Finley over payments that were to be made by the team into an insurance
policy for Hunter; those payments were never made by Finley. The case
was sent to the grievance panel, which ruled in Hunter's favor and
declared him a free agent, thus making him the first free agent in
modern MLB (Staudohar, 2000).
A year later, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally were also ruled
free agents after they challenged the reserve clause. Both men played
the previous season without a contract and thus stated that they should
be free to negotiate with any team because one interpretation of the
reserve clause was that a player had to play one year without a
contract. The grievance panel ruled in the players' favor, and this
led to full free agency being agreed upon as part of the 1976 CBA. That
agreement stipulated that players with six or more years of MLB
experience had the right to unrestricted free agency, with some
compensation to the team losing the player, upon expiration of their
contract (Zimbalist, 2003b). Despite the plethora of changes that have
occurred in the CBA over the past four decades, the six-year waiting
period for free agency has never been altered and is still in existence
today. Hakes and Turner (2011) showed that the biggest impact on player
pay is free agency, but high-quality players without free agency rights
also have the ability to reach into the future and obtain some of the
higher pay associated with free agency by signing multi-year contracts.
Another important gain made by players at the bargaining table
occurred in 1973 with the adoption of salary arbitration. The 1974
season was the first in which players had the right to file for binding
salary arbitration. If a player and owner could not agree on a contract,
the case could be heard by an impartial arbitrator. The arbitrator would
rule on the appropriate salary for the player in the upcoming season.
All contracts decided upon through arbitration were one year in length.
The arbitration process was final-offer, such that the arbitrator was
forced to select the salary offer given by either the player or the
owner, with no compromise. Since 1990, players with three to five years
of MLB experience and the top 17% of players with two years of
experience, had the ability to file for salary arbitration if they could
not agree on a contract with their team (Staudohar, 2000). The new CBA
that goes into effect for the 2012 season allows for the top 20% of
players with two years of experience to be eligible for arbitration
("Summary," 2011). Table 3 provides a summary of the CBA
highlights from 1973 to 2012.
Another aspect of CBA negotiations in the 1970s was the prevalence
of work stoppages. For example, in 1972 the season was delayed 10 days
and 86 games were lost due to a player strike. Four years later, the
team owners locked players out of spring training camp for 17 days when
the two sides failed to agree on a new deal. This was an occurrence that
would be repeated over the next two decades (Zimbalist, 2003b).
The 1980s saw more tumultuous CBA negotiations between the team
owners and MLBPA. In 1981, a lengthy player strike lasted 50 days and
712 games were lost. The 1981 season became known as the split season
because the strike occurred in the middle of the season; from June 12
until August 1. The central issue of conflict was the amount of
compensation a team received if it lost a free agent. The owners wanted
to increase the compensation, while the players believed that increased
compensation would deter teams from signing free agents and, in turn,
keep salaries low. A new deal was eventually signed with the owners
making small gains in compensation for lost free agents. But the strike
angered some fans as evidenced by decreases in both attendance and
television ratings. However, both bounced back fairly quickly in 1982.
But both sides suffered financially from the work stoppage. It was
estimated that the owners lost a combined $72 million in revenues and
the players lost about $34 million in wages (Zimbalist, 2003b).
Another facet of those negotiations was the volatile relationship
between Marvin Miller and the owners' chief negotiator, Ray Grebey.
Both men had reputations as tough negotiators, Grebey with the General
Electric Company and Miller with the MLBPA and United Steelworkers of
America. To say the two men did not like each other would be an
understatement. Instead of negotiating, both men spent a large amount of
time airing their differences in the media. This hindered advancement of
the negotiations. In 1982, Miller announced his retirement as the MLBPA
Executive Director. After having Ken Moffett serve in that role for a
short period of time, the MLBPA selected Donald Fehr to lead it. Fehr,
who held that role until 2009, was much like Miller in his negotiating
style and philosophy. He believed in a confrontational style and had
very little, if any, trust in the team owners. In short, similar to his
predecessor Miller, he often viewed the owners as an adversary, not a
partner (Staudohar, 2000).
Fehr's first round of CBA negotiations began in 1984. By then,
long-time commissioner Bowie Kuhn had been replaced by Peter Ueberroth.
Negotiations began about two months before the expiration of the CBA on
December 31, 1984. A unique aspect of this round of negotiations
occurred in February 1985, when, after pleading financial hardship, the
owners were forced by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to open
their books to the MLBPA; this had not occurred in prior negotiations.
The primary area of negotiation dealt with the funding of the
players' pension by the owners. Traditionally, one-third of the
revenue from the MLB's national TV contract went into the pension
fund. However, as the revenues from TV grew in the 1980s, the owners
believed that the amount going into the pension fund was too high
(Staudohar, 2000). A conflict arose as the owners' accounting firm,
Ernst & Whitney, concluded that the owners had an operating loss of
$42 million in 1984 and projected a $58 million loss for 1985.
Simultaneously, Stanford economist Roger Noll was hired by the MLBPA,
and he reported that the owners had operated at a $9 million profit
level in 1984 (Zimbalist, 2003b). Thus, the two sides could not even
agree on the level of profits/losses that were occurring in the game.
By August 1985, no agreement had yet been reached and the players
initiated a strike. The walkout only lasted two days, and both sides
quickly agreed on a new CBA. The agreement made minor changes to the
pension funding, but the larger issue that was agreed upon was the
initiation of a revenue sharing plan among owners. Traditionally, all
revenue from the national TV deals was split equally among all teams.
The 1985 agreement took $20 million annually from the TV contract and
used it to financially aid small-market teams. This opened the door for
greater future revenue sharing and greatly changed the way in which
revenues are shared among MLB teams (Staudohar, 2000). This deal was in
existence until 1990.
In 1990, the owners planned to win major concessions from the MLBPA
at the bargaining table. This stance was most likely affected by the
players' being awarded $280 million in damages from the owners due
to the 1987 collusion case. In that case, the MLBPA proved that the
owners had colluded in the off-seasons of 1985 and 1986 to reduce the
signing of free agents in an effort to curb the growth of player
salaries. Evidence of this was that 29 of the 33 free agents in 1985
returned to their original teams in 1986 and the salaries for free
agents grew by only five percent; a much smaller increase than in
previous years without collusion. While the case was settled, the
long-term damage from it lasted for years. The distrust from players
toward owners was heightened as a result of the collusion case and it
adversely affected future CBA negotiations (Zimbalist, 2003b).
Within the 1990 CBA negotiations, the owners sought a hard salary
cap that would be equal to 48% of the total ticket sales and media
revenues. The owners also pushed for a "pay to play" salary
model for players with less than six years of experience as an
alternative to salary arbitration. Under this model, a player's
salary would be based on previous on-field performance. The players were
seeking a doubling of the minimum salary along with extending salary
arbitration to all players with two years of MLB experience. This time,
the owners acted first by locking the players out of spring training.
The lockout lasted 32 days before an agreement was reached. The owners
dropped all of their primary demands and the players agreed to small
changes in the salary arbitration system. The number of players eligible
for arbitration increased to 17% of the players with two years of
experience, sorted by experience, but not yet three years of experience.
The roster size was also increased from 24 to 25, a win for the MLBPA.
There were no changes to pension funding or free agency, and the minimum
salary increased to $100,000 (Zimbalist, 2003b).
The CBA negotiations that were most contentious and perhaps
received the most media and public attention occurred from 1993 to 1995.
These infamous negotiations resulted in the cancellation of the 1994
World Series and a delay in the start of the 1995 season. Negotiations
began in early 1993 when the owners voted 15-13 to reopen the existing
CBA early. However, little progress was made in negotiations throughout
1993 and the deal was to expire on December 3 of that year. The owners
were pushing hard for a salary cap to curb the growth of players'
salaries. Their chief negotiator, Dick Ravitch, proposed a system that
included both a salary cap and increased revenue sharing to aid
small-market teams and increase competitive balance. The MLBPA chief,
Donald Fehr, strongly opposed any system that would limit the amount an
owner could spend on player salaries but indicated that he would be open
to discussion of the issue if the owners opened their financial books
and agreed to share more revenue. However, Ravitch had a major problem;
he could not obtain an agreement among his owners on the issue of
revenue sharing. Several big-market owners were against sharing their
revenue with the smaller, poorer teams. This led to a great deal of
confusion and a lack of unity on the side of ownership (Zimbalist,
2003b).
As stated earlier, little progress between the owners and MLBPA
occurred from January to July of 1993. Fehr started to believe that the
owners' talk of revenue sharing was a delaying tactic since most of
the owners' network television revenue came at the end of the
season, after the World Series. Fehr believed that the owners were
stalling. By doing this, the owners would have the ability to declare a
bargaining impasse at the end of the 1993 season. Once an impasse was
declared, the owners could then unilaterally impose their last offer as
the CBA for the 1994 season. In hindsight, Fehr was probably correct on
his views of owner behavior. The first substantive proposal by the
owners to the MLBPA was not made until June 1994. It included a salary
cap based on a 50/50 split of revenues. At that time, the players'
salaries accounted for about 56% of revenues, so a 50/50 split would cut
greatly into player salaries. In addition, no team could spend more than
110% of the salary cap figure while no team could also spend less than
84% of that amount. Under the owners' proposal, the cap was to be
phased in over a four-year time period.
The owners also asked for the elimination of salary arbitration in
exchange for players becoming free agents after four years of service.
Lastly, the owners called for a 50/50 split of player licensing revenue;
previously, the players kept 100% of this money. The players proposed no
changes to the licensing revenue system, maintenance of the salary
arbitration system that was in place, and a general desire to keep the
status quo from the previous agreement. Donald Fehr stated that
owners' proposals would cost the players about $1.5 billion in lost
wages and benefits over the deal's seven years. Similar to past
negotiations, both sides worked hard to win public and media support for
their side of the argument (Zimbalist, 2003b).
With no agreement in sight, on July 28, 1994, the MLBPA set a
strike date of August 12. The owners responded by refusing to make a
scheduled payment into the players' pension fund. The players'
response to this was to file an unfair labor practices suit. The MLBPA
went through with their threat and walked away from the ballparks in
August. After one month of the strike and with no end in the foreseeable
future, new MLB commissioner and Milwaukee Brewers owner Bud Selig cancelled the remainder of the season, including the World Series, on
September 14, 1994. It had been over a century since no World Series had
been played. The stalemate continued through the fall of 1994. The
situation became so dire that President Bill Clinton appointed a
mediator, William Usery, to the case. But Usery had little luck in
forging an agreement and in December 1994, the owners announced a
bargaining impasse. Their plan was to unilaterally impose the salary cap
for the 1995 season. In response, the MLBPA filed another unfair labor
practices suit claiming that the talks were ongoing and no impasse had
occurred. By January 1995, the owners announced that they were prepared
to start the season with non-union players (Zimbalist, 2003b).
A break in the situation occurred in late March 1995, when the NLRB
voted 3-2 in favor of the MLBPA on their claim of unfair labor practices
and the owners were not permitted to invoke their new labor system for
the 1995 season. Five days after that ruling, it was upheld on appeal in
the New York federal court of appeals. The judge, current U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, issued an injunction that forced the
owners to restore all the terms of the previous CBA. At that point, the
exhibition season had already begun with non-union players. The owners
decided that it was too risky to lock out the players and they went back
to the ballparks under the previous CBA. These events also kick-started
negotiations between the two sides. The negotiations went on during the
1995 season and eventually resulted in an agreement on a new CBA in
November 1995; though ratification of the CBA did not occur until the
spring of 1996. The new six-year agreement called for a revenue sharing
system that was phased in over the length of the CBA. Each team would be
taxed 20% of their net local revenue with three-quarters of the total
tax money being split equally among all teams. The remaining one-quarter
would be distributed to the teams with below average revenue levels. In
2001, approximately $168 million was redistributed from large-market to
small-market teams through this revenue sharing plan (Zimbalist, 2003b).
Another important aspect of the agreement was the imposition of a
competitive balance tax, commonly known as the luxury tax. Under the
plan, a team would pay a tax to the league if it spent over a designated
amount on player salaries. The system was first used for the 1997
season. For example, the top five payroll teams in 1997 paid a 35% tax
on the amount of money they spent on salary over the midpoint of the
fifth and sixth highest payroll teams. So, if a team was $10 million
over that amount, it paid a tax of $3.5 million. The collected tax money
was distributed to teams that did not pay the tax. Another outcome of
the 1995 CBA was a realization that small-and large-market owners had
increasingly divergent interests. In some ways, the rift between large-
and small-market owners had as much impact on the difficulty in getting
a deal done as the differences between players and owners.
The fallout from the 1994-95 strike has been greatly studied in
academic literature. Staudohar (2000) reported that average game
attendance fell by over 20% from early 1994 to 1995 and that owners
reported losses of over $1 billion from the cancelled games. In
comparison, Schmidt and Berri (2002, 2004) concluded that the impact was
actually about a 35% drop in attendance, but that it recovered quickly
in subsequent seasons. Coates and Harrison (2005) found that the strike
had about a 24% impact on attendance, but it also recovered by the next
season. The 1981 and 1972 strikes resulted in losses of about 10-12%,
and even previous work stoppages that did not result in missed regular
or postseason games had negative impacts on attendance of between 3-7%
according to Coates and Harrison (2005). On the other hand, Matheson
(2006) showed that once the positive impact of new stadiums was
accounted for, baseball attendance from 1995 to 2003 continued to remain
lower than pre-1994 levels.
The CBA negotiations that followed the lost World Series were
amicable in comparison to 1995. The next round of discussions began in
2001 as the 1995 deal was nearing expiration. An important aspect of
these negotiations was that they occurred shortly after the MLB owners
and Selig published the findings of their Blue Ribbon panel in July
2000. The panel, comprised of 12 owners and four outside experts, was
asked to study MLB's economic system and to make recommendations
for improvement of the game in areas such as competitive balance. No
player input was asked for with respect to the Blue Ribbon panel. The
panel made several recommendations such as increased revenue sharing, a
more restrictive luxury tax system, and changes to the amateur draft. In
part, the panel and its findings appeared to be a strategy by the owners
to set the parameters for their bargaining position going into the 2001
negotiations.
The negotiations began rather slowly, with no talks beginning until
the spring of 2001. Selig's strategy appeared to be a delay in
substantive talks in an effort to improve the owners' bargaining
power. Selig did not attend any bargaining sessions until January 2002;
two months after the previous deal expired. In November 2001, no formal
offers had been made by the owners and in a surprise move right after
the World Series, Selig announced, with no prior signal to the MLBPA, a
plan to contract two teams and thus eliminate 50 Major League roster
spots. Noll (2003) calculated that $1 billion would accrue to the rest
of the teams in MLB as a result of contracting the two weakest teams. He
noted that the incentives to contract teams increased with more revenue
sharing. Without revenue sharing, a weak team must stand on its own, but
with revenue sharing the strongest clubs ultimately subsidize the
weakest ones.
The owners' first formal proposal in January 2002, included
many ideas presented in the Blue Ribbon panel report such as amateur
draft changes; along with new ideas such as contraction, the right for a
franchise to release a player if it believed the salary arbitration
figure determined by the impartial arbitrator was too high, a call for
high-salary teams to pay more into the pension fund than low-salary
teams, and, of course, a salary cap. The MLBPA believed, and rightly so,
that the owners' proposals were an attempt to reduce future player
salaries. For example, a team would perhaps be less willing to increase
their payroll if it must also pay more into the players' pension
fund by doing so.
This initial proposal was coldly received by the MLBPA. The union
believed that the owners' tough demands were nothing more than a
bargaining ploy. By asking for significant changes, the owners knew that
they would not get them all. If they only got a portion of these
demands, the owners would be quite happy with the agreement. In the end,
it turned out that the owners got almost none of their proposed changes
to the CBA. In mid-August, the MLBPA set a strike date of August 30,
2002. An agreement was reached between the players and owners on the
afternoon of that day; just a few hours before games were to be played.
In stark contrast to 1994-95, no strike occurred and no games were lost.
It was the first time in over two decades that no work stoppage occurred
as a result of stalled CBA negotiations. It appeared that both sides had
learned their lesson from 1995 and did not want to suffer the financial
and public relations damage from a work stoppage. These negotiations
also occurred less than a year after the 9/11 tragedy, in which MLB
played a very public role in helping the citizens of the United States heal. Following the burst of the technology bubble, it was also a time
when the American economy was rather weak (Zimbalist, 2003b).
The new four-year agreement was similar to the prior deal with the
exception of a few changes. The minimum player salary was increased 50%
to $300,000 and more revenue was shared among owners. The new plan
called for 34% of net local revenues to be shared across teams. This
resulted in $229 million to $258 million being shared annually over the
course of the deal. Table 4 provides data on the amount of revenue that
was paid or received by each team for 2002 and 2003, and Table 5 shows
the total amount of revenue that was shared across selected years.
Additionally, the players' benefit fund was increased and plans
were made for the initiation of a drug testing program for steroids.
Another area that was changed by the new deal was the competitive
balance tax, also known as the luxury tax. Under the prior deal, the tax
only affected the top five payroll teams, and it appeared that the
luxury tax had little effect on salaries over the course of the deal, so
it was eliminated entirely for the 2000-2002 seasons (Zimbalist, 2003b).
Under the new agreement, the rule that the top five payroll teams
pay the tax was eliminated. In its place, payroll thresholds were
established, and any team that surpassed the threshold level was
required to pay a percentage tax on the amount of overage. The threshold
was set at $117 million for 2003, and it escalated each year until it
was up to $136 million for the final year, 2006. The tax rate was 17.5%
for first offenders, 30% for second offenders immediately after the
first offense, and 40% thereafter for consecutive offenders (Zimbalist,
2003a). In retrospect, the luxury tax did little to curb rising team
salaries. Most teams did not have the financial ability to go over the
high tax thresholds and those that did, such as the New York Yankees,
could afford to pay the tax. Table 6 displays the teams and amounts paid
in luxury tax from 1997 to 1999 and 2003 to 2011. As stated earlier, no
luxury tax system was implemented from 2000 to 2002. After receiving a
great deal of attention after Commissioner Selig's public
statements on the matter, contraction was ultimately set aside. Somewhat
ironically, as revenue sharing continued to increase, the incentives for
contraction grew. However, to this day it still remains dormant.
Covington (2003) noted that the issue of whether the owners must bargain
over contraction or can act unilaterally is still undecided.
An important result of the revenue sharing plan that began in 1997
and was extended in the 2003 agreement was that it actually made
competitive balance worse according to Maxcy (2009) and Zimbalist
(2003a). As smaller market teams produced more revenue, they received
less revenue from the sharing plan. Thus, their incentives to invest in
higher revenue producing assets, like better players, was reduced,
leaving them with the highest marginal tax rate within the revenue
sharing system. Zimbalist (2003a) calculated that the marginal tax rate
for low revenue producing teams was about 41% at the end of the 1997
agreement. It increased to about 47% with the 2003 CBA.
Individual case studies of teams (as reported by the media; see
Bloom, 2006a; Dosh, 2007; Kovacevic, 2005; Snel, 2005; Weir, 2002) found
that some teams appeared to be simply pocketing the money received from
revenue sharing. For example, the Pirates, Expos, and Brewers lowered
their player payrolls after receiving increases in revenue sharing
payments. The CBA required owners to spend the money on improving their
performance on the field, but that does not mean that the teams'
payrolls had to increase from the year before. Given that money in this
case is fungible, owners could do what they wanted with their revenue
sharing allotment. In fact, some of the small-market owners are notable
billionaires and if they thought that investing more money in players
would increase their profits or utility, they certainly could do so
without relying on MLB's revenue sharing money. Therefore, it is
not surprising that some revenue-sharing recipients choose to spend that
money elsewhere and not on player payroll.
Interestingly, at the time neither side foresaw that the most
controversial topic that was discussed in this round of negotiations was
steroid use and the testing for performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs). It
was a short time after this agreement was signed that PED use in MLB
became a national issue when the BALCO controversy brought national
media attention to players such as Barry Bonds.
In October 2006, Selig and Fehr held a press conference to announce
that a new CBA had been agreed upon. At five years in length, it was the
longest deal ever agreed upon by the two sides. The negotiations
occurred with little public bickering and fanfare. At the time, MLB was
on firm financial footing with league revenues and player salaries being
at all-time highs. The U.S. economy was booming, and corporations and
media outlets were spending on MLB, while attendance numbers were also
increasing. In short, both sides were happy and this made for easy
negotiations. A minor change was made to the luxury tax system with
higher payroll thresholds going into effect; by 2011, the threshold was
$178 million. While the old CBA had not been reopened between 2002 and
2006, the drug testing portion of it was changed, with the agreement of
both sides, in the wake of the steroid scandal. Testing was increased
and stiffer penalties were invoked. These provisions were extended
through the 2006 deal and an agreement was reached to discuss mandatory
testing for human growth hormones (Bloom, 2006b). The drug testing
program was bilaterally stiffened again in 2008 by the MLBPA and owners.
The New Deal and Changes From the 2006 MLB CBA
There were several changes made to the MLB collective bargaining
agreement in 2011. Three of these changes directly dealt with the nature
of the game itself. First, the two sides agreed to add a second Wild
Card team in both the American and National Leagues. Under the new
format, each division winner along with the two teams with the best
winning percentage in their league, the so-called Wild Card teams,
qualify for the postseason. The two Wild Card teams will have a one-game
playoff to determine who will advance to the league divisional series.
The goal of this change was to increase the number of playoff games and
to keep more teams in the late-season race for the playoffs. Some
research has shown that fans want more playoff games and an increase in
the likelihood of teams reaching the post-season. This new format may
also lead to an increase in television revenues with two additional
postseason games being played (O'Reilly, 2011). This should have a
slight positive effect on lowering the dispersion of revenues across
franchises as more teams vie for the playoffs.
Second, the new CBA also calls for an equal number of teams in both
leagues. As of the 2012 season, the National League had 16 teams while
the American League had 14 members. Under the new CBA, the Houston
Astros will move from the NL to the AL in 2013 to create two leagues of
15. Third, along with this move, the number of intraleague games played between NL and AL teams will increase in the future and will be played
throughout the season ("Summary," 2011). In the past, there
have been certain segments of the season where intraleague games were
played. The continuous playing of intraleague games must occur with an
odd number of teams in each league.
The CBA also resulted in relatively minor changes in the revenue
sharing system. Under the 2006 CBA, approximately $325-350 million was
transferred from the large-revenue clubs to small-revenue clubs. This
level of revenue transfer will continue in the future, with growth in
transfers coming if league revenues grow and the disparity between small
and large revenue teams widens. Thirty-one percent of net local revenues
will be shared, plus additional central revenues, and re-distributed
based on market potential. Recipients must have payrolls that are 25%
greater than the revenue sharing funds received, and they must document
that the money is not spent on debt reduction, but to improve their
team. This will help deter recipient teams from pocketing the money,
which should improve competitive balance substantially, to the extent
that this is enforceable.
One change that was made is that the new CBA states that by 2016,
the 15 teams in the largest markets will be disqualified from
revenue-sharing ("Summary," 2011). Thus, those teams in large
markets that fail to generate the larger revenues will no longer have
the ability to be revenue-sharing recipients. This rule penalizes
large-market clubs that fail to generate revenues that would place them
in the top half of the league. There is no provision allowing teams in
shared markets to potentially be revenue-sharing recipients. Another
provision of the new CBA was that the Commissioner's Discretionary
Fund was increased from $10 million to $15 million. This is a pool of
money that can be distributed to different clubs based on the decision
of the Commissioner's office and has been traditionally given to
small-market clubs ("Summary," 2011).
Another change in the new CBA was in the dollar amounts for the
competitive balance (luxury) tax. The team salary threshold level of
$178 million will be unchanged for the 2012 and 2013 seasons. However,
it will increase to $189 million for the 2014, 2015, and 2016 seasons.
The tax rate for first-time offenders will drop from 22.5% to 17.5%, but
it will increase from 40% to 50% when a team goes over the cap number
for the fourth time. The rates will remain the same, 30% and 40% for
second and third offenders, respectively ("Summary," 2011).
Given the MLBPA's opposition to any type of luxury tax or salary
cap, this appears to be a compromise for both sides. While new offenders
will pay a smaller penalty for going over the tax amount, perpetual
repeat offenders such as the New York Yankees will pay a steeper price.
These changes should have a minimal effect on competitive balance given
that they are a relatively small deviation from the prior CBA. Moreover,
the tax revenues will not go directly to small-market teams, but to
general industry growth. The impact on competitive balance comes from
taxing high-spending clubs and thus reducing their expenditures--not
from re-allocating that money to small market clubs.
An adjustment was also made to the salary arbitration system. The
number of two-year players who are eligible for arbitration went from
the top 17% to the top 22%, based on service time ("Summary,"
2011). More second-year players will now be eligible to apply for salary
arbitration if they cannot agree on a new contract with their team. This
may have a long-term effect of increasing player salaries since we have
seen arbitration positively influence salaries over the past four
decades. However, similar to the adjustment in the luxury tax, this
provision is a relatively minor change from the prior CBA and may
perhaps have little, if any, long-term effect on player salaries.
Another change that will directly affect player salaries is an
increase in the minimum salary. The minimum salary will rise to $480,000
in 2012, a $69,000 increase from 2011. It will increase to $500,000 by
2014, and cost-of-living adjustments will occur for 2015 and 2016
("Summary," 2011). These changes will benefit the players,
though they may negatively impact low-revenue teams that often have more
players under the reserve clause versus large-market teams. If the new
minimum salary has a greater impact on low-revenue teams, that may also
then affect competitive balance across MLB.
A few minor changes were made to the free agency system as a result
of the new CBA. The changes primarily deal with draft pick compensation
for teams that lose players via free agency. Previously, MLB had a
system in place where players were designated as Type A or Type B free
agents based on performance with the amount of compensation for the team
that lost the player based on that player's designation. For
example, if a team lost a Type B player, it would receive an additional
amateur draft pick that would occur between the first and second rounds,
known as a "sandwich" pick. This system has been altered with
the new CBA. Under the new deal, a team is only available for
compensation if the player they lost via free agency was with their team
for the entirety of the previous season. So, if a player who was in the
last year of their contract is traded in July, which has been quite
common, the team that acquires the player is not eligible for
compensation if they lose the player via free agency. Additionally, a
player will only be subject to compensation if his prior team made him
an offer of a minimum one-year guaranteed contract with a salary equal
to the average salary of the top 125 highest-paid players from the prior
season. This rule takes the place of the Type A/B free agent
designations. If a player meets the requirements for compensation, the
team that loses that player will still receive an additional pick
between the first and second rounds of the amateur draft, as it did
under the prior CBA ("Summary," 2011).
The amateur draft was amended in several other areas. The draft has
been and will continue to be held annually in June. However, the
deadline by which draftees must be signed by their club will be moved
from August 15 to between July 12 and July 18, possibly forcing the
drafted players to sign earlier and get them onto minor league rosters.
One issue that has been raised in recent years has been the amount of
money that teams have spent on signing bonuses for top draft picks. The
numbers have grown rapidly over the past decade. In the past several
years, players such as Bryce Harper, Stephen Strasburg, and Jamison
Taillon have received signing bonuses in excess of $6 million. In
comparison, the top signing bonus in 1996 was about $2 million. In
response to increasing signing bonuses, the new CBA institutes a signing
bonus pool system in which each team will be allocated an amount of
money for the signing of all their draftees within the first 10 rounds.
The amount of money that each team will be allocated for these signing
bonuses will be based on the quantity and position of the team's
picks. Dollar values are assigned to the draft picks and any player
taken after the first 10 rounds will not count toward the signing pool
amount unless the player receives a bonus in excess of $100,000. If a
team goes over their bonus pool amount by 0-5%, it will pay a 75% tax on
the overage. That amount increases to a 100% tax if the team is over the
pool amount by 10% or more. The actual dollar amounts of the signing
bonus pools were not enumerated in the CBA. Additionally, a team may
also lose future draft picks if it is more than five percent over its
pool amount. The money generated from the signing bonus pool will be
redistributed to teams that do not exceed their bonus pool cap, and any
lost draft picks will be assigned to those teams through a lottery. The
lottery will be weighted toward those teams with the lowest winning
percentage and/or smallest revenues in the previous season
("Summary," 2011).
Another change to the amateur draft is that teams with the lowest
revenues and the smallest markets will have the opportunity to obtain
additional draft picks. Historically, draft order was based on the
winning percentages of the teams. The goal of this new provision is to
aid the poorer teams in improving on-field quality. These additional
picks should help the small-market teams put a better product on the
field. Under the new system, the 10 clubs with the lowest revenues and
the 10 clubs with the smallest markets will be entered into a lottery
for six picks that will occur after completion of the first round. The
lottery is weighted toward those teams with the lowest winning
percentage in the previous season. Also, those clubs that do not obtain
a pick through this lottery, along with the clubs who make payments
under the revenue sharing plan, will be entered into a second lottery
for six picks at the conclusion of the second round. This lottery will
be weighted based on previous season winning percentage
("Summary," 2011). Again, the goal of this CBA provision is to
aid small-market teams and provide more competitive balance to MLB, an
area that has received a great deal of attention from owners, media, and
fans over the past decade.
Another area of discussion in recent years for MLB has been the
acquisition of international talent. Historically, players coming from
nations such as Taiwan and Japan have not been included in the June
Amateur Draft. Once eligible to play in MLB, they have been considered
free agents, and this has led to bidding wars amongst teams for talented
international players such as Daisuke Matsuzaka (Dice-K) and Yu Darvish.
In the case of Dice-K, the Boston Red Sox paid $51 million to his
Japanese professional team for the right to negotiate a contract with
him over a 30-day period. The Red Sox eventually gave Dice-K a six-year,
$52 million contract. So, ultimately, it cost Boston over $100 million
to acquire Matsuzaka. Due to these high contract amounts for
international star players, most of them have signed with high-revenue,
big-market teams such as the Red Sox, Yankees, Cubs, and Dodgers. Many
small-market teams have been highly critical of this system and have
demanded changes.
Note: CB is competitive balance; PES is Performance Enhancing
Substance. Sources: Larry Coon at cbafaq.com provided some of the
information for the NBA; Brian Hampton, Director of Football
Administration, San Francisco 49ers, provided some of the information
for the NFL; CBAs for each league.
The 2011 CBA is the first to formally address the amount of money
spent on international talent. Similar to the Amateur Draft Signing
Bonus Pool, a signing bonus pool has been established for international
talent. For the post-2012 season signing period, each team will be
assigned an equal signing bonus pool amount. In later seasons, the
amount for each team will be determined based on winning percentage in
the previous season. The team with the lowest winning percentage will
have the largest pool amount. A team will pay a tax, ranging from 75% to
100%, on the amount of overage over their designated signing pool amount
that the team spends to acquire international talent
("Summary," 2011).
Since the 2002 CBA, there has been a debt service rule in MLB in
effect to curb the accrual of high levels of debt by team owners. Under
the old agreement, a team's debt was limited to 10 times their
level of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). One exception to this rule was that teams with new or
renovated ballparks could have debt up to 15 times their EBITDA. The
2011 CBA reduces these levels to eight times EBITDA for clubs, and 12
times EBITDA for clubs in new or renovated ballparks.
With respect to the players' benefit and pension plans, the
new CBA continues to give the players the maximum pension benefit that
is allowable under IRS rules. Currently, the club owners make an annual
contribution of approximately $184.5 million to the players'
pension fund. Some minor improvements to the pension and life insurance
benefits of certain classes of retired players and their widows were
made, while the waiting period for life insurance and disability
insurance was eliminated for some active players. Access to health
insurance has also been improved for international players and their
families ("Summary," 2011).
Several changes have been made under the new CBA with respect to
the safety and health of players, coaches, and managers. First, the use
of smokeless tobacco, an accepted product in baseball for decades, will
be prohibited during televised interviews and team appearances.
Additionally, any time that fans are permitted into the ballpark, all
containers for smokeless tobacco must be concealed. Violators are
subject to discipline and both parties agreed to participate in
educational programs and community outreach to publicize the danger of
smokeless tobacco products. Both parties also agreed to a program of
mandatory evaluation by a trained professional for players who are
suspected of alcohol use problems. This includes players who are
arrested for driving while intoxicated and for players arrested for
crimes involving the use of violence ("Summary," 2011).
Lastly, the drug testing program that was enacted in 2008 after the
steroid scandal will remain in effect. One new component of the program
is that beginning with the 2012 Spring Training, all players are given a
blood test for human growth hormone (HGH). Additionally, players may
undergo random HGH tests at any time during the year if reasonable cause
exists. Beginning in 2013, all players will be subject to random,
unannounced testing for HGH.
Comparison of 2011 CBA Negotiations in MLB to NFL, NBA, and NHL
A key result of the new CBAs in football, basketball, and baseball,
and the NHL's current CBA that ends in 2012, is the convergence of
player pay toward 50% of total league revenues. NBA players'
salaries came down in their recent CBA from 57% to a range between
49-51% of basketball-related income (see Berri, pp. 158-175 of this
journal issue). The salary cap in the NFL went from 57% of total revenue
(TR) in 2006 to the current level, which is capped at 48% in 2012
(Zimbalist, 2010; Singer-Vine, 2011; see Quinn, pp. 141-157 of this
journal issue). Yet, since the cap allows for exceptions, Zimbalist
calculated that NFL players actually received about 58.4% of TR in 2006.
In the NHL, players currently receive between 54-57% of hockey-related
revenue. (1) See Table 7 for a comparison of key provisions of the Big
4's CBAs and side agreements. While a revenue split of 50% should
not be a magical number, Billy Hunter of the NBPA noted in public that
he thought the players deserved more than the owners simply because they
were the ones playing the game and generating the revenues (Beck, 2011).
In that context, 50% is very meaningful.
In MLB, the percentage of total revenues that players receive has
been more volatile over the years, likely because there is no cap to
tether player salaries directly to league revenue. From a peak of 67% in
2002, it went down to about 51% in 2007. Zimbalist (2010) noted that
over 6% of MLB's revenues go toward paying minor league players,
and some of the cost of acquiring players in MLB from overseas goes to
the overseas club and not to the player. For example, about half of
Matsuzaka's $103 million cost went to his former club in Japan.
Also, while no salary cap exists in MLB as it does in the NFL, NBA, and
NHL, the luxury tax and revenue sharing plan act as a drag on players' salaries. The data described above bear this out, as there
has been an increase in revenue sharing and luxury taxes paid over the
past decade in MLB. This may also be true of the provisions for draft
pick compensation and draft signing pools under the new CBA.
Interestingly, the owners offered a team payroll floor of about $40
million in the 2002 bargaining session as an alternative to the enhanced
revenue sharing system. The goal was to help improve competitive
balance, especially since it is possible for revenue sharing recipients
to avoid using the revenue sharing money to directly improve the quality
of play on the field, but a team salary minimum could not be avoided.
The players rejected this option because they did not want it to be the
first step toward a team salary cap, and the $40 million was close to
the lowest team payrolls at the time anyway (Zimbalist, 2010).
How did MLB avoid the pitfalls of lockouts and lawsuits that
plagued the NFL and NBA negotiations? Before answering that question, a
result of less contention is less media coverage. Evidence showing that
the MLB negotiations were either less contentious or less public, or
both, comes from an examination of media coverage. A search on the New
York Times website for the six months leading up to the deals'
being reached for the NFL, NBA, and MLB found 82 articles for the NFL,
13 for the NBA, and two for MLB. The following search terms were used:
"NFL collective bargaining," "NBA collective
bargaining," and "MLB collective bargaining." (2) On
Google.com, a search using the same timeframe and search terms yielded
72,200 hits for the NBA; 70,800 for the NBA; and 40,800 for MLB.
Revenues in MLB have been growing substantially, up 30% since the
last CBA was negotiated in 2006, partially due to the aggressive growth
pursued by MLB Advanced Media utilizing non-traditional sports league revenue streams. This growth has undoubtedly helped make the
negotiations in MLB less antagonistic. Second, MLB has had the longest
history of problematic CBA negotiations, with the result being missed
games and post-season cancellation. As noted by Matheson (2006), this
has had a true negative and lasting impact on attendance. Both sides
seem to realize this and worked hard to avoid a work stoppage in 2011.
Third, the purposeful act of staying out of the media has made the
controversies within the negotiations private. The leaders have been
successful in keeping their respective constituents quiet. Fourth, the
absence of a salary cap in MLB means that a team, if it desires, can
spend as much as it wants, subject to a luxury tax, on players'
compensation. Thus, the amount that players will receive from a new CBA
is uncertain and that uncertainty may actually help lead to agreement.
In the other leagues, a salary cap is the key negotiating point because
it is directly tied to player pay, almost dollar for dollar.
How do the CBAs differ across the major professional North American
sports leagues? As noted by Vrooman (2009): "As recent power
conflicts have been resolved, the various collective bargaining
solutions are becoming remarkably similar." MLB's deal is the
shortest at five years, while the NFL's is the longest. With a hard
salary cap in place, the NFL can achieve more certainty in terms of
expenses versus revenues regardless of if the league grows quickly over
the next decade. In MLB, since player payroll is untethered from
revenues, one of the sides may feel that it is losing a lot after half
of a decade. The NFL still shares the most revenue due to the
substantially larger national media deal, but both MLB and the NBA have
increased their revenue sharing and specifically push money down to
lower-revenue teams as opposed to equally sharing a larger sum of money.
Also, MLB and the NBA have a luxury tax in place that punishes teams
spending above a certain level: the soft salary cap in the NBA and
luxury tax payroll thresholds in MLB.
As mentioned elsewhere, MLB stands alone with no salary cap and a
high luxury tax threshold; it will be $178 million in 2012. However, the
increased revenue sharing should lower the incentive to pay more for
players. The tightening of the enforcement of having recipient teams
spend that money will help offset those incentives and get lower-revenue
teams to spend more on players instead of pocketing the money. On
balance, MLB still has the most restrictive free agency rules at six
years of MLB service. The NHL is between four and seven years of
service, depending on the age of the player, with both the NFL and NBA
granting free agency to players with three to four years in their
respective league when their contract expires. However, MLB does have
salary arbitration available for players with two to three years of
service. In comparison, the NHL grants salary arbitration after four
years of service. In general, arbitration raises MLB salaries to levels
between the reserve clause and free agent pay, all else equal.
Interesting changes to MLB's draft policies have made the
draft more beneficial to lower-revenue teams by providing more picks and
lowering the cost of signing bonuses. Given that drafted players in
baseball do not enter MLB immediately, but play in the minors, the
impact of the draft on MLB club team quality has always been less direct
and certain. The new rules help compensate for that lack of parity due
to the draft, but still not as much as reverse-order drafts in the other
sports, where the players immediately play in the top league.
MLB still does not have rookie pay caps, unlike the other leagues,
but has capped signing bonuses, and the players stay under the reserve
clause longer than in other leagues. One could imagine rookie salary
caps in MLB as a future negotiating point for MLB owners and current
players given that rookies will not be at the bargaining table to fight
for their own rights. MLB still has more pay guaranteed, by far, than
the other leagues with the NHL next and the NFL last.
Collective bargaining in MLB is atypical when compared to union
negotiations in other non-sport industries. The next section will
address some of these structural differences, such as the relative
leverage of both sides, typical negotiating timetables, and bargaining
techniques.
Comparison of MLB Bargaining Context to Non-Sports Industries
Unlike the recent bargaining in the NBA and NFL, MLB's
bargaining for the 2011 deal was very quiet. As stated earlier, this was
also true of the 2006 MLB bargaining process. There may be several
reasons for the relative lack of media attention to both deals, but the
most important is probably the moratoriums that were placed on the two
sides by both Commissioner Selig and the head of the MLBPA, Donald Fehr
in 2006 and Michael Weiner in 2011. This kept the bargaining at the
table and out of the headlines. Given the public nature of bargaining in
the NFL and NBA, and the relatively calm MLB negotiations of 2006, it is
not clear that the economic recession was actually a factor in
MLB's negotiations.
Historically, what has made labor relations in MLB so turbulent?
Covington (2003) noted that three bodies of law play a role in MLB labor
relations. First, antitrust laws have been available to players since
the 1998 passage of the Curt Flood Act, which repealed the antitrust exemption solely as it relates to owner/player relations. Second, the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) governs collective bargaining
between the players' union and the owners. However, it often lacks
the teeth to be able to force quick solutions. Instead, both sides
negotiate in circles until a crisis develops, such as the cancellation
of regular-season or post-season games. After Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc. (1996), players can only pursue relief via the antitrust laws if
they choose to not pursue relief through formal collective bargaining.
In other words, they have to choose one or the other. Hence, we recently
saw the decision by NBA players to disband their union and file an
antitrust lawsuit. Third, the Taft-Hartley Act (1947) pushes for
arbitration to resolve disputes, which has been used in professional
baseball to resolve issues. Examples of this are the Messersmith and
McNally arbitrations that opened the door to free agency.
There are several factors related to the structure of the
players' union that affect the bargaining process. For example, the
MLBPA cannot bargain for those players who are not in the union.
However, as Gould (2011) notes, the NLRA defines "employee" in
a broad enough sense to allow the MLB CBA to create draft rules, for
instance, which involve amateur players. The MLBPA is also exclusive and
a "closed shop" in that it represents all players and all
players must join the union. Perhaps the biggest historical impediment to successful labor union negotiations has been the lack of trust by the
players with respect to the amount that the owners could afford to pay.
The players have asked the courts to force the teams to open their
books, and the courts have continually denied this request (Silverman v.
MLBPRC, 1981). In 2011, the NFL Players Association was only able to get
minimal financial data, mostly on the revenue side, from the NFL owners
during their negotiations.
Comparison to Traditional American Unions
Traditional labor/management bargaining situations in the U.S.
involved unskilled or low-skilled workers, with more highly skilled
workers unionizing at a later date. Typically, workers attempted to
achieve control over their work conditions including hours, pay, safety,
and tasks (Rainsberger, 2009). As stated previously, in its early days
the MLBPA was primarily focused on issues related to pension funding,
increasing the minimum salary, bringing an end to the reserve clause,
and improving work conditions. However, over the decades, the MLBPA
expanded its economic and political interests. For example, the MLBPA
was involved in the formation and passing of the Curt Flood Act in 1998,
which put MLB players in the same position as athletes in other sports
with respect to their antitrust rights. The goals of the MLBPA have
changed over time. Presently, their goals are primarily related to
compensation and risk minimization through the protection of guaranteed
contracts. Similar to other American industries over the past century,
MLBPA has achieved success on issues such as hours worked and safety
issues, and is now focused on the nuances of retirement benefits and
total compensation.
Like most bargaining situations, the relative power of the MLBPA
and MLB owners determines the outcome, subject to the NLRA and antitrust
laws. The necessary conditions for the MLBPA to advance its causes, as
with most labor unions, are favorable product market factors, labor
market factors, bargaining structure, and the bargaining climate.
The key product market factor that affects CBA outcomes is the
employer's ability to pay (Rainsberger, 2009). This has been a
contentious issue for most sports leagues, MLB included. There has been
a lack of trust between the players and owners regarding economic
profitability and franchise valuations. MLB's revenues have grown
rapidly over the past decade, and since the 2006 agreement was signed,
revenues have grown an estimated 30% as reported annually by Forbes. For
example, MLB's intellectual property arm, MLB Advanced Media, is
reportedly worth $5 billion (Carter, 2011).
Productivity increases are usually another key item in bargaining
(Rainsberger, 2009). In MLB, productivity can be addressed in several
ways. More games can be played, although the number of games during the
regular season has not been a bargaining issue in MLB, unlike the NFL.
There are some exceptions, like adding more playoff teams, so that more
postseason games are played. This was witnessed with the expansion of
the playoffs through the addition of two wild card teams as part of the
2011 CBA. Alternatively, productivity can be measured by the number of
units sold per game (e.g., attendance, viewership, or merchandise),
which has risen over time. Player pay loosely tracks player
productivity, measured as marginal revenue product, notwithstanding
structural institutions in place like the reserve clause. At a minimum,
the MLBPA wants player compensation to equal the increases in revenue
that occur because of increases in MRP. Owners may claim, however, that
much of the increase in demand is due to new stadiums, better marketing,
better pricing, new licensing opportunities, and new media outlets.
With respect to labor market factors, the MLBPA may be viewed as
both a craft-based union such as the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America and an industrial union like the United Auto
Workers. In other industries, the bargaining power of such a narrow
union might be relatively low because of the substitutability of similar
craft workers in another industry. However, MLB players are highly
skilled and unique; therefore, they are very hard to replace without a
loss of productivity.
The MLBPA is also a closed shop; this means that players are
automatically part of the bargaining unit and there is no competitive
union. Occasionally, star athletes have opted out of certain aspects of
the MLBPA. For instance, in 2003, Barry Bonds chose to not participate
in the group licensing agreement managed by the MLBPA. He preferred to
sign his own licensing deals for products such as video games and
trading cards instead of automatically being included in the group
licensing deal. However, these cases are extremely rare.
Another factor that affects owner-union relations in MLB is the
bargaining structure that is in place. Most collective bargaining in the
U.S. occurs between firms in an oligopolistic or competitive structure
with the workers organized in the form of unions. While the union may
have more monopoly power than the firms have market power, union strikes
are financially painful for union members, so it can be difficult for
unions to commit to lengthy strikes. Professional baseball is a
bilateral monopoly. MLB has no competitors vying for professional
baseball talent, notwithstanding a few MLB players who go overseas to
play in countries like Japan or Korea, and the MLBPA is composed of
uniquely skilled professionals with little, if any, external
competition. Given these characteristics and the overall popularity of
MLB globally, both sides have benefitted financially, with MLB
generating in excess of $7 billion in annual revenue and the average MLB
player making over $3.3 million a year. There are very few unions, if
any, outside of sport where union members earn that type of average
salary. Due to this, both players and owners can withstand, at extreme
financial loss, lengthy work stoppages. Compared with other sports
leagues, MLB players have relatively long careers and have, at times,
been willing to forego millions of dollars in current earnings in
exchange for higher future earnings and advancements in other areas such
as pensions, free agency, and salary arbitration.
The 2011 round of collective bargaining in MLB was notable for
having been finalized over three months prior to the beginning of spring
training for next season. In other words, it did not seem to follow the
classic bargaining pattern of early, middle, and crisis/closing
bargaining periods. One reason for a relatively easy agreement process
was that revenues have been rising quickly in MLB. Over the past decade,
league-wide revenues have more than doubled. It appears that both sides
recognized that the fan base was very sensitive to millionaires and
billionaires arguing over how to divide tens of billions of dollars. Two
other factors that contributed to the ease of negotiations were the weak
state of the global economy and the nasty public nature of the
negotiations in the NFL and the NBA.
To understand how collective bargaining progresses, it is important
to account for the bargaining climate (Rainsberger, 2009). In the early
years of the MLBPA, it followed other young unions in negotiating for
rights like union recognition; a formal grievance process; protection
against unjust disciplinary action; and contract term, expiration, and
renegotiation provisions. However, even in its infancy MLBPA addressed
economic goals. Currently, the union is interested in areas such as
minimum salaries, health/pension benefits, revenue sharing, and luxury
taxes. Another area that is of high interest to the MLBPA is the
mandatory testing procedures for PEDs and the accompanying penalty
system for failed tests. Management is also interested in compensation
issues along with competitive balance. Luxury taxes, revenue sharing,
and a salary cap that is desired by most owners are all tools related to
compensation and parity. Owners are also interested in retaining all
rights not specifically bargained over like the schedule of games and
the number of teams.
Finally, bargaining techniques are a factor in the success of
collective bargaining (Rainsberger, 2009). Typical ground rules include
aspects such as the time, place, and frequency of bargaining sessions;
methods of communication between sessions; an understanding that all
agreements are contingent on the entire package being agreed upon;
restrictions on external communications; and the order in which topics
will be bargained. It is imperative in bargaining that each side be
unified in its approach at the table. This has been a real problem over
the years, especially in the mid-1990s, between large- and small-market
clubs on the owners' side, but less so between journeymen and star
players on the players' side. Without a salary cap, there are fewer
direct dollar-for-dollar tradeoffs amongst players' salaries. This
is in contrast to other leagues such as the NBA where, for instance,
Michael Jordan allegedly attempted to decertify the players' union
(Bradley, n.d.; Quirk & Fort, 1999).
The Future
In the next 5-10 years, MLB should see improved competitive balance
because revenue-sharing recipients will find it more difficult to avoid
using their additional funds to improve their on-the-field product, and
large market clubs will be exempt from being recipients of
revenue-sharing money. The elephant in the room will continue to be the
salary cap, but the competitive balance argument may carry less weight
if the other measures improve competitive balance.
Both owners and players recognize that they need to grow their fan
base, both domestically and internationally. The Industry Growth Fund
coming from luxury taxes will help, as will the growth of the Australian
Baseball League and domestic leagues in other countries. The World
Baseball Classic should help speed up the growth of baseball worldwide,
which will position MLB as the premier league for a new generation of
fans (Nagel, Brown, Rascher, & McEvoy, 2010). These issues, while
relatively uncontroversial, will be a focus in future CBAs.
Very soon, all international players will become incorporated into
the amateur draft (partially because they will not be at the table to
represent their interests). Additionally, issues surrounding performance
enhancing drugs and how to prevent their use will grow in importance in
the next decade. Similarly, new research on head injuries will play a
role in MLB during the future, with some aspects negotiated at the
bargaining table.
Finally, the major North American sports leagues will continue to
converge in terms of the structure of the relationship between the
owners and the players, with MLB players continuing to have the most
relative leverage of the various leagues because of the average length
of players' careers.
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Endnotes
(1) The definitions of basketball-related income, hockey-related
revenue, and total revenue take up dozens of pages in the respective
CBAs, but over time have expanded to include more revenue streams.
(2) The NFL deal was agreed upon on July 21, 2011; the NBA deal was
reached on November 26, 2011; and MLB's deal was reached on
November 17, 2011.
Daniel A. Rascher [1] and Timothy D. DeSchriver [2]
[1] University of San Francisco
[2] University of Delaware
Daniel A. Rascher is a professor and the director of academic
programs for the sport management program. His research interests
include sport economics, finance, business research, marketing, and
valuation across multiple sports.
Timothy D. DeSchriver is an associate professor of sport management
in the Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics. His research
interests include sport finance, economics and marketing; specifically
in the areas of professional sport and collegiate athletics.
Table 1: History of Work Stoppages in Major League Baseball
Regular Season
Year Nature Length (Days) Games Lost
1,972 Strike 14 86
1,973 Lockout 12 0
1,976 Lockout 17 0
1,980 Strike 8 0
1,981 Strike 50 712
1,985 Strike 2 0
1,990 Lockout 32 0
1994-1995 Strike 232 938
Source: Zimbalist (2003b).
Table 2: Progression of Minimum and Average Player Salaries
in Major League Baseball
Minimum Average
Year Salary ($) Salary ($)
1,970 12,000 29,303
1,975 16,000 44,676
1,980 30,000 143,756
1,985 60,000 371,571
1,990 100,000 578,930
1,995 109,000 1,071,029
2,000 200,000 1,998,034
2,002 300,000 2,383,235
2,005 316,000 2,632,655
2,006 327,000 2,866,544
2,007 380,000 2,699,292
2,008 390,000 3,154,845
2,009 400,000 3,240,206
2,010 414,000 3,297,828
2,011 480,000 3,305,393
Source: http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Minimum_salary
Table 3. History of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Major
League Baseball
Element 2,011 2,006
Length of CBA 5 years 5 years
Revenue The net Marginal tax
Sharing transfer value of rates are
the Revenue reduced
Sharing Plan because of use
will be the of new central
same as the fund
current plan. redistribution,
Net transfer with high-revenue
amounts will team rate
continue to dropping from
grow with 40 percent to
revenue and 31 percent and
changes in low-revenue
disparity. The team rate
15 clubs in the dropping from
largest markets 48 percent to
will be 31 percent.
disqualified The new transfer
from receiving will remain
revenue sharing the same as the
by 2016. previous
agreement
($326 million
in 2006).
Luxury Tax 2012-2013: 2007: $148
Threshold $178 million; million; 2008:
2014-2016: $155 million;
$189 million. 2009: $162
million; 2010:
$170 million;
2011: $178
million.
Luxury Tax 1st offenders: 1st offenders:
Rates 17.5%; 2nd 22.5%; 2nd
offenders: offenders:
30%; 3rd 30%; 3rd or
offenders: more offenders:
40%; 4th or 40%.
more offenders:
50%.
Free Agency n/c n/c
Salary Arbitration n/c
Arbitration for players
with 3-5 years'
experience
and top 20%
of 2-year
players, based on
days of service.
Player Players will Owner
Pension continue to contribution
receive the will average
maximum $154.5 million
allowable annually, with
pension benefit benefits at the
under IRS IRS maximum.
rules. Owners
will make a
$184.5 million
annual
contribution.
1,997
4 years +
Element 2,003 1 year player
Length of CBA 4 years option
Revenue $258 million 20% of net
Sharing each year, local revenues
phased in over went into a
four years, pool; 75% of
about 34% of that pool
net local divided equally
revenues. Base: among all
$175 billion clubs with
distributed to remaining
each club on a 25% divided
straight-pool among clubs
basis. The below the
remainder is mean under a
split by the prescribed
Commissioner formula; $168
out of the million
central fund and redistributed from
discretionary large to small
fund, phasing market teams
in at $230 over course of
million in 2003, CBA (about
$243 million $40 million
in 2004, $258 per year). Plan
in 2005, and phased in
$301 million from 1996 to
in 2006. 1,999
Luxury Tax 2003: $117 Top 5 payroll
Threshold million; 2004: teams paid the
$120.5 luxury tax. No
million; 2005: luxury tax for
$128 million; 2000-2002.
2006: $136
million.
Luxury Tax 1st offenders: 35% tax rate
Rates 17.5%; 2nd on Top 5 payroll
offenders: teams for
30%; 3rd or 1997/1998;
more offenders: 34% rate for
40%. 1,999
Free Agency n/c n/c
Salary n/c n/c
Arbitration
Player Owner Owner
Pension contribution of contribution of
$114 million- approximately
$115 million $70 million
annually. annually.
Element 1,990 1,985
Length of CBA 4 years 5 years
Revenue N/A $20 million
Sharing taken from
national TV
deal and given
to small market
teams.
Luxury Tax
Threshold
Luxury Tax
Rates
Free Agency n/c n/c
Salary Arbitration Arbitration
Arbitration for players limited to
with 3-5 years' players with
experience 3-5 years playing
and top 17% experience.
of 2-year players, 2-year players
based on no longer
days of experience. granted
arbitration rights.
Player Owner Owner
Pension contribution of contribution of
$55 million $33 million for
annually. 1985-1988.
Amount
increased to
$39 million
for 1989.
1,980
4 years; was
Element later extended 1,976 1,973
Length of CBA 1 more year 4 years 3 years
Revenue
Sharing
Luxury Tax
Threshold
Luxury Tax
Rates
Free Agency n/c Unlimited free
agency granted
to players with
6 or more years
of MLB experience.
Salary n/c n/c Salary
Arbitration arbitration
granted for
players with
between 2 and
6 years'
experience.
Player Owners Owner contribution Owner
Pension retroactively of $15.5 million. contribution
increased 1984 Owner contribution of $6.15
and 1985 of $8.3 million million for
contributions annually to 1973 and
to $25 million players' pension 1974. $6.45
and $33 fund. million for
million. 1975.
Notes: n/c = No change. n/a = Information not available
Table 4: Revenue Sharing Amounts, by Team, for 2002-2003
Team 2,003 2,002
Montreal $29,517,000 $28,493,994
Florida 21,030,000 20,946,573
Tampa Bay 20,464,000 14,724,463
Kansas City 19,042,000 16,629,872
Toronto 18,735,000 13,691,953
Minnesota 17,249,000 12,977,421
Detroit 16,738,000 11,615,688
Milwaukee 16,555,000 8,502,007
Pittsburgh 13,299,000 6,400,652
San Diego 13,250,000 6,283,572
Oakland 11,756,000 9,201,545
Philadelphia 9,013,000 9,834,124
Cincinnati 6,469,000 9,807,244
Colorado 2,469,000 (-5,127,222)
Anaheim 1,874,000 (-1,303,070)
Arizona 1,456,000 (-3,255,682)
Houston 1,182,000 (-4,326,392)
Baltimore 252,000 (-5,337,479)
Cleveland (-4,828,000) (-10,612,923)
Chicago White Sox (-4,833,000) (-3,823,142)
Texas (-7,162,000) (-8,205,165)
St. Louis (-9,202,000) (-8,385,888)
Los Angeles (-9,490,000) (-9,278,555)
Atlanta (-11,291,000) (-9,753,575)
San Francisco (-12,959,000) (-9,638,790)
Chicago Cubs (-16,731,000) (-8,280,260)
NY Mets (-21,473,000) (-17,366,067)
Seattle (-31,023,000) (-19,877,788)
Boston (-38,692,000) (-17,896,820)
NY Yankees (-52,650,000) (-26,640,289)
Total Transfer $220,350,000 $169,109,108
Note: Amounts in parentheses are revenue payers, all other
amounts are revenue receivers.
Table 5: Selected Rvenue Sharing Amounts, by Year
Year Revenue Sharing Amounts
1,996 $50 million
2,002 $169 million
2,003 $220 million
2,005 $312 million
2,006 $326 million
2,009 $433 million
2,010 $404 million
Table 6: Luxury Tax Payers, 1997-1999; 2003-2011
Year Yankees Red Sox Angels Tigers
1,997 $4,431,180
1,998 684,390 $2,184,734
1,999 4,804,081 21,226
2,003 11,798,357
2,004 30,637,531 3,155,234 $927,059
2,005 34,053,787 4,156,476
2,006 26,000,000 497,549
2,007 23,880,000 6,060,000
2,008 26,900,000 $1,300,000
2,009 25,700,000
2,010 18,000,000 1,490,000
2,011 13,900,000 3,400,000
Team
Year Orioles Indians Braves
1,997 $4,030,226 $2,065,496 $1,299,957
1,998 3,138,621 495,625
1,999 3,457,046
2,003
2,004
2,005
2,006
2,007
2,008
2,009
2,010
2,011
Year Marlins Dodgers Mets
1,997 $139,607 $1,137,992
1,998 $49,593
1,999 2,663,079
2,003
2,004
2,005
2,006
2,007
2,008
2,009
2,010
2,011
Note: Luxury tax was not utilized from 2000-2002.
Table 7: Collective Bargaining Agreements Across Leagues, 2012
CBA Component MLB NFL
Length of Deal 5 years (2012-16) 10 years (2011-2020)
Teams in 10 of 30 teams 12 of 30 teams
Postseason
Revenue Sharing 31% of net local League national
revenues are revenues
shared plus distributed evenly.
additional Portion of ticket
central revenues sales shared
and re-distributed evenly. Other
based on Team revenues
market potential. partially
Recipients redistributed from
must have top earning
payrolls 25% clubs to low
greater than earning clubs
revenue sharing who meet
funds received. specific spending
Must document requirements.
that it's not
spent on debt
reduction, but
to improve
team.
Luxury Tax None because
Payrolls over there is a hard
$178 million are salary cap
subject to a tax
that escalates
depending on
how many
times in a row a
team exceeds
the threshold.
Tax revenues go
to industry
growth initiatives
Salary Cap/ No salary cap or Hard cap of
Minimum team minimum. $120.375M (+
Players earned $22.025M of
51% of league player benefits)
revenues in in 2011, growing
2,007 annually
with revenues.
League
minimum in 2011
and 2012, Team
minimum in 4
year blocks
2013-2016 and
2017-2020.
Total Player
Comp = 55% of
projected
League Media
Revenue + 45%
of projected
NFL Ventures
Revenue + 40%
of projected
Local Revenue
+ if applicable,
50% of the net
AR for new line
of business
projects less
47.5% of the
Joint
Contribution
Amount
Individual Player Minimum is Minimum
Salary Minimum $480,000 in ranges from
& Maximum 2012. There is $375,000 for
no maximum. rookies to
$910,000 for
veterans with
10+ years of
service for 2011.
Levels increase
by $15,000 each
year.
Free Agency Players with 6 Players with 4
or more years or more
of service (in accrued seasons
40-man roster) become
are eligible for unrestricted free
free agency. agents at end of
Draft pick their contract.
compensation for Players with 3
previous club. accrued seasons
can be retained
as restricted free
agents (draft
pick compensation
for prior
club).
Salary Top 22% of None
Arbitration players with
two years of
service are eligible
for salary
arbitration
Draft Reverse-order Seven rounds
Restrictions draft plus (reverse order
additional CB of finish) plus
enhancements. compensatory
International picks at end of
players are free rounds 3-7
agents. Teams based on
have a total sum unrestricted free
of money for agents lost in
signing bonuses prior year.
Eligibility
requires being 3
years removed
from high
school.
Debt Service Maximum debt General debt
Rule is 8*EBITDA ceiling of $150
(12*EBITDA million with
for teams with waivers possible.
new stadiums) Separate
rules for G-3
loan.
CBA Component MLB NFL
Rookie No maximum Each team has a
Compensation for rookie MLB Maximum 1st
players year allotment
based on draft
slots and each
player has a
minimum 1st
year comp so
contracts must
be negotiated
within set
parameters. 5
year contracts
for 1st round, 4
years for 2nd
7th rounds, 3
years for
undrafted.
Squad Size 25 players until 53 in season (46
Sept. 1, then 40 active for
players games), 80 in
off-season
Guaranteed 100% of Negotiated.
Contracts remaining value Outside of 1st
is guaranteed round draft
picks contracts
are almost
never fully
guaranteed.
Drug Testing PES testing Increasing
(incl. HGH) discipline for
throughout failed or diluted
2012 season for tests. More
reasonable frequent tests for
cause. First those who have
offense is 50- failed a prior
game suspension. test.
Head Injury Improved upon Player with
Program 2011 concussion concussion
policy (specifics symptoms is
not yet available) removed for
remainder of
game and cannot
return to
practice or play
until he passes
strict testing
requirements
CBA Component NBA NHL
Length of Deal 10 years (2011-2020), 5 years, but
mutual opt-out optioned for 1
after 6. more (2006-7
through 2011-12
season)
Teams in 16 of 30 teams 16 of 30 teams
Postseason
Revenue Sharing 50% of a team's Lower-revenue
revenue minus and small
certain expenses market clubs will
will be thrown receive revenue
into a revenue from central
sharing pot. fund and
Teams with directly from 10
most need highest revenue
receive up to clubs
$16 million per
year. Total pot
should be about
$200 million by
2013-14 season.
Luxury Tax Escalating luxury None
tax paid for
payrolls above
the salary cap.
Escalation
occurs based on
amount above
the cap and
whether team
continuously
goes above the
cap.
Salary Cap/ Soft cap with Players will
Minimum many exceptions. receive 54-57%
Players of defined
receive between revenues (escalating
49-51% of as league
defined revenues rise).
revenues. Team $64.3 million in
minimum is 2011-12.
80% of cap in
2011-12, 85%
in 2012-13,
90% thereafter.
Level in 2011-12
is same as
2010-11 ($58
million), but
pro-rated for
shortened
season.
Individual Player Minimum $525,000
Salary Minimum ranges from minimum in 2011-12.
& Maximum $473,604 for No player
rookies to can earn more
$1,352,181 for than 20% of
veterans with team salary cap.
10+ years of
service for
2010-11. Players
can sign for up
to 35% of team
salary cap or
105% of previous
year's
salary, whichever
is higher.
Free Agency Players are free Players 27 years
agents at or older (with 4
termination of accrued seasons),
contract. Certain or players
players are with 7 accrued
subject to restricted seasons will be
free agency. No unrestricted
compensation free agents.
for teams that Restricted FAs
lose free agents. are subject to
right of first
refusal and
draft pick
compensation for
prior club.
Salary None After 4 years in
Arbitration the league, players
are eligible
for salary
arbitration.
Draft Two rounds; Reverse-order
Restrictions same order in weighted draft.
both rounds. Free agent and
No compensatory other draft pick
picks. Extensive compensation.
eligibility rules. Min. 18 years of
age.
Debt Service None None
Rule
CBA Component NBA NHL
Rookie Rookie salary $925,000 plus
Compensation scale in place substantial
for 1st round bonuses.
picks (covering Younger players
first 2-4 years). stay under these
Cap for first Entry Level
pick is $4.3 contracts for
million in 2011-12 longer before
(pro-rated). becoming arbitration
eligible.
Squad Size 15 maximum, 23 players on
13 minimum. active roster (20
eligible to play
per game)
Guaranteed Certain salary 1/3 of remaining
Contracts must be guar- salary, if less
anteed. Rest is a than 28 years
matter of negotiation. old; 2/3 of
In practice, the remaining value
majority of if over 28.
NBA contracts
are fully
guaranteed.
Drug Testing Players subject PES testing
to random testing twice per year,
during the with 20-game
pre-season period suspension for
(no HGH), first offense.
rookies are
subject to random
testing three
times during
the regular
season, and all
players are
subject to testing
for reasonable
causes at any
time. Steroids
were added to
the list of
banned substances
in 1999.
First offense is a
10-game
suspension.
Head Injury Players diagnosed Player removed
Program with concussion from game and
go through series tested after each
of escalating possible incident.
tests. Then, just
remain asymptomatic
for 24 hours. May
miss days or weeks.
Note: CB is competitive balance; PES is Performance Enhancing
Substance.
Sources: Larry Coon at cbafaq.com provided some of the
information for the NBA; Brian Hampton, Director of Football
Administration, San Francisco 49ers, provided some of the
information for the NFL; CBAs for each league.