On the edge of your seat: demand for football on television and the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis.
Alavy, Kevin ; Gaskell, Alison ; Leach, Stephanie 等
Introduction
The most fundamental issue in the study of the economics of sport
is the "uncertainty of outcome" hypothesis. According to this
hypothesis, the greater the uncertainty of outcome of a sporting event,
the greater the demand. (1) Sports leagues have consistently justified
competitive restraints on the grounds that they permit resource
distribution, which in turn promotes outcome uncertainty and thereby
benefits the consumer by providing a more attractive league product.
Sports leagues are, on the face of it, cartels. (2) Agreements among the
clubs to restrain economic competition, such as salary caps, roster
limits, draft rules, transfer fee systems, or agreements to share income
from ticket sales, broadcasting, or merchandising would in any other
context be prohibited. Yet such agreements have been accepted by the
courts (3) and even encouraged by the legislature, (4) largely on the
basis of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis.
There exists a substantial economics literature aimed at testing
the hypothesis by relating game attendance to some ex ante measure of
uncertainty. Such studies are fraught with difficulty for a number of
reasons. First, since the majority of attendees are fans of the home
team, they presumably demand a strong probability that their team will
win, and so home team demand may well be decreasing in the uncertainty
of outcome, at least over a significant range of the data. Second, it is
often hard to disentangle the quality of the two teams from the balance
of the competition, and therefore hard to identify the true impact of
outcome uncertainty. Third, game attendance is often determined by
factors that have little to do with the outcome uncertainty of the game
in question; for example, season-ticket owners are likely to be
committed to attending regardless of the current balance between the
opposing teams. Fourth, many games in the major leagues are sold out and
therefore observed demand cannot be explained by outcome uncertainty.
In this paper we adopt a novel approach that evades these problems
and therefore offers a more plausible estimate of the impact of outcome
uncertainty on demand. Instead of using game attendance we use TV
viewing figures, so that all else equal, supporters of the away team are
as capable of viewing the match as supporters of the home team. (5)
Furthermore, we use viewing data measured on a minute-by-minute basis
throughout the game. This allows us to control for game-specific
factors, such as the quality of the teams, while examining the effect on
demand of the evolving outcome uncertainty of the game. To do this we
estimate the probability of each possible result (a home win, an away
win, a no-score draw or a score draw) (6) conditional on the current
score at each minute of the game, each team's form, and red cards.
We examine three measures of outcome uncertainty:
1. The squared difference between the probability of the home team
winning and the away team winning.
2. The probability of draws.
3. The sum of squared deviations from the initial probabilities.
We find that viewership is decreasing in the first of these
measures, so that a more even game, in the sense that either side could
win, attracts more viewers. This result is consistent with the
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. However, we also find that viewership
is also decreasing in the probability of draw, suggesting that viewers
are averse to watching games that are expected to end in a stalemate.
Lastly, we find some evidence to support the proposition that viewership
is increasing in the deviation of outcome probabilities during the game
from the initial outcome probabilities (i.e., those at the start of the
game), suggesting that viewers are attracted to the unexpected.
To the extent that we can generalize from the case of the English
Premier League, these results significantly enhance our understanding of
the relationship between demand and uncertainty in sport. Leagues have
consistently pleaded the need to maintain competitive balance among
teams as a justification for restraints on economic competition in the
labor market and in the product market (e.g., collective selling of
rights). While this justification is intuitively appealing, the precise
kind of uncertainty that is desirable has proved difficult to
articulate. Our results do not support the idea that simply evening up
resources among teams will improve the attractiveness of games; much
depends on the predictability of the contests that the leagues create.
Data
Description
Television ratings data were collected for 248 English F.A.
Premiership matches broadcast on television between January 1, 2002, and
May 15, 2005. Data on audience size were estimates made by the
Broadcasters' Audience Research Board Ltd. (BARB). Supplemental
television information was collected from the Monopolies and Merger
Commission (1999) report. Individual match data for all Premiership
games including team fixtures, positions, goals scored, and red cards
were taken from the Rothmans Football Yearbooks (7) and
http://www.soccerbase.com. (8) Actual match kick-off times and injury
minutes played were supplied by PA Sport.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Demand and Outcome Uncertainty
Testing Outcome Uncertainty
There are at least three measures of outcome uncertainty used in
the literature:
1. Match (game based measures).
2. Seasonal/ championship (measures based on the state of the
championship or the dispersion of results within the season).
3. Long run (between season uncertainty, using measures of between
season dispersion and persistence).
The economic analysis of the relationship between demand and
outcome uncertainty goes back to Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964).
Rottenberg (1956) first postulated the theory that attendance is a
function of the quality of play and if there is a wide dispersion in
quality, the contests would be more predictable, thereby reducing
attendance. Neale (1964) also noted that sport is a complex product that
consists not only of the match itself but also the "League-Standing
Effect" where utility is generated by the excitement surrounding
the standings of the clubs and the churn of those standings. The more
teams alternate league positions, the more exciting the championship
race.
There is a large literature dedicated to measuring the relationship
between demand and outcome uncertainty which has focused on a variety of
different leagues and different measures for uncertainty. Most US
studies have focused on Major League Baseball or American Football
(e.g., Knowles, Sherony, & Haupert, 1992; Welki & Zlatoper,
1999), whereas the majority of UK studies have centered on football
(e.g., Peel & Thomas, 1988; Baimbridge, Cameron, & Dawson, 1996;
Forrest & Simmons, 2002). Empirical tests have also been extended to
other sports such as rugby (Peel & Thomas, 1997) and cricket (Hynds
& Smith, 1994) as well as football in other countries (Falter &
Perignon, 2000; Garcia & Rodriguez, 2002). Measures of outcome
uncertainty have mostly been derived from match betting odds (Peel &
Thomas, 1988; Peel & Thomas, 1992) or team positions (Baimbridge et
al., 1996; Garcia & Rodriguez, 2002). (9)
The problems in testing the relationship between demand and outcome
uncertainty center on the choice of measures for uncertainty and demand.
Forrest and Simmons (2002) show that UK betting odds are biased and
therefore do not reflect the true probabilities of the various match
outcomes. They find that the probability of a home win may be
understated while an away win is overstated. (10) With respect to
demand, almost all studies focusing on match uncertainty use the average
gate attendance. Two problems arise when using gate attendance: (1)
attendance is 'censored' because of capacity constraints and
(2) stadium attendance is mostly composed of home fans, many of whom are
season ticket holders. Because home fans usually want to see their team
win and because season ticket holders purchase their seats in advance,
these fans may be less likely to be affected by uncertainty of outcome.
Using tobit estimations such as those in Welki and Zlatoper (1999) and
Czarnitzski and Stadtmann (2002) gets around the first problem but not
the second. To avoid both of these estimation issues, Forrest, Simmons,
and Buraimo (2005) utilize television audiences as a measure of demand.
Television audiences are not limited in that those who want to watch the
match can do so by viewing at home or in a public place such as a sports
bar. Secondly, television audience is more likely to be evenly divided
between not only home and away fans, but also casual spectators. Two
previous American studies, Hausman and Leonard (1997) and Kanazawa and
Funk (2001) both look into the determinants of viewership with a focus
on the effects of superstars and race, respectively, but neither
investigate the effect of outcome uncertainty on audience size. Forrest
et al. (2005) do, however, test the effect of outcome uncertainty on
viewership and find that although the impact is modest, it is a
significant determinant of audience size.
Our analysis builds on Forrest et al. by using previously
unavailable minute-by-minute audience data. By using minute-by-minute
audience estimates we are able to measure the relationship between
demand and outcome uncertainty as the match progresses. To begin
building our measures of outcome uncertainty, we first estimate the
probabilities of a home win, an away win, and a draw as a game
progresses conditional on the current score of the game.
Television Ratings
Our dataset consists of 248 matches broadcast on Sky Sports between
2002 and 2005. The formation of the FA Premier League and the
broadcasting of live matches by the satellite television company BSkyB
were almost concurrent. In 1992 BSkyB outbid free-to-air television
broadcasters ITV and the BBC for the exclusive rights to show
Premiership matches and since then all Premiership matches have been
broadcast on Sky Sports channels. (11) Sky initially broadcast 60
matches out of 380 Premiership fixtures eventually expanding the
schedule to the current broadcast of 138 matches where 88 are shown on
Sky Sports 1, 2, or 3 and 50 are televised on Prem-Plus. (12) Sky Sports
channels are subscription based and only accessible via a satellite or
cable platform. We have excluded pay-per-view programming (Prem-Plus)
since these games cost extra and viewing behavior may be less
susceptible to outcome uncertainty. This is something to consider for
future research, however.
The most widely used measure of demand for TV viewership is the TVR (or television viewership rating). A TVR is the percentage of viewers
watching the program out of a potential audience, called a universe. For
example, if a match has a rating of 2.53, this translates to 1.404
million viewers out of a terrestrial universe of 55.4 million. (13)
Appendix 2 provides additional definitions for television
terminology.
Methodology
Stage 1: Probability Model
In order to derive our measures of outcome uncertainty, we need to
estimate the probability of the four distinct match outcomes (a no-score
draw, a score draw, and a home or away win) at every minute during the
game. We distinguish between score draws (both teams score the same
number of goals) and no score draws (neither team scores) because the
former involves significant changes in the outcome probability during
the game (i.e., after each goal is scored), and therefore it is possible
that demand may respond to these discrete events. We also separate
no-score and score draws because people may be turned off by a boring
0-0 stalemate, but entertained by a 4-4 draw. Using only one variable
for a 'draw' outcome could compound the two effects and be
misleading. (14)
We therefore construct a multinomial logit model of match outcome
for each minute during the match. While our viewership sample may be
small relative to the number of games broadcast since 1992, there is no
reason to restrict our logit estimation. Thus, we utilize the entire
population of games ever played in the English Premiership to get a more
accurate distribution of the various possibilities and changes that
occur during the game. From its inaugural season in 1992-1993 until the
end of the 2004-2005 season, there were 5,186 Premiership matches, which
implies over 466,740 match minutes. (15) The outcome will also be
dependent on the relative strength of the two teams. We constructed a
team 'form' variable using the average points earned per game
for each team over the previous five games, a form variable similar to
that used by Forrest et al. (2005). (16) We also condition the outcome
on red cards (17) as these should have an effect on the probability of a
team winning. We excluded yellow cards on the grounds that they are
likely to have a relatively small impact on the outcome of a game.
A multinomial logit regression was run for each minute during a
match for four possible outcomes (0 = no-score draw, 1 = score draw, 2 =
away win, 3 = home win) on home and away goals, home and away red cards,
and both the home and away team form. Home advantage is implicitly
captured in the home win coefficient for the probability calculation as
home teams are designated separately from away teams and this is
apparent by the probabilities for each outcome in minute zero (see
Minute Zero in Table 8).
Our general multinomial logit model (Greene, 2000) is the
following,
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (1)
where j is the outcome and an [x.sub.i] vector of explanatory variables which consists of the following:
* home goals
* away goals
* home team red cards
* away team red cards
* home team form
* away team form
The results correlate well with the actual match outcomes for a
given score and at a specific minute. Both the logit probabilities and
actual frequencies for a no-score are highly correlated whereas there is
a slight discrepancy between the two score-draw probabilities.
Using these probabilities, we construct our measures of outcome
uncertainty and test whether these have any effect on demand, as
measured by television ratings.
Stage 2: Viewership Model
We constructed three distinct measures of outcome uncertainty:
1. SQOU_[W.sub.t] = [([PR.sup.hwin.sub.t] -
[PR.sup.awin.sub.t]).sup.2]
2. Draws: [PR.sup.sdraw.sub.t] and [PR.sup.nsdraw.sub.t]
3. [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
These measures capture the different aspects of outcome
uncertainty. The uncertainty of outcome hypothesis states that the more
uncertain the outcome of the game, the more "exciting" it is,
thus driving up demand. The first variable, SQOU Wt, relates to the
relative strengths of the two teams. It incorporates not only team
quality and form but also home team advantage. As the value of this
variable decreases, the more uncertain the winner. The variables
PRnsdraw jk, t and PRsdraw jk, t are the probabilities at minute t of a
draw between home team j playing away team k. Unlike US sports, football
has three outcomes. The third potential outcome (the draw) can be
independent of the balance of the winning probabilities, e.g., it may
reflect different playing conditions or strategic conditions. For
example, some teams may be playing for a draw, e.g., a weak team playing
away at a strong team may use this strategy to avoid losing. This
variable might convey some of the dissatisfaction of viewers watching
defensive-minded games. Secondly, draws may not be appealing to neutral
spectators who want to see lots of goals and an eventual winner. The
third variable measures uncertainty relative to the initial
expectations. In addition to our uncertainty measure, we hypothesize that goals should increase the excitement of a game, though too many
could make the game more certain and reduce viewership. It is also
apparent there is some inertia in viewership so we include lagged
variables to capture this effect.
We construct a viewership model based on the 248 matches for which
we have the minute-by-minute television ratings data. Dynamic panel data
estimation appears to be the most appropriate model. Observation of
viewing trends during a match suggest a strong inertia in viewership,
therefore we will incorporate several lags of the dependent variable
into the model. A common problem of panel data estimation with dynamic
models is the potential for the lagged dependent variable to be
correlated with the disturbance, which could encapsulate unvarying
unobserved effects. (18) This correlation leads to inconsistent
estimators and therefore an estimation method using instrumental
variables is necessary. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested first
dfferencing to wipe out the unobserved fixed effects and using lagged
levels of the dependent variable as instruments. (19) Arellano and Bond
(1991) developed a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure to find
a more efficient estimator using additional instruments. We apply the
Arellano-Bond (AB) technique for our model of television demand since we
believe a dynamic model most appropriately captures viewership inertia
(i.e., once people tune in, they tend to remain tuned in) and since it
is likely that some effects are unobservable. Our model estimated using
the AB estimator is the following (see Appendix 1 for variable
definitions):
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
The general model is presented in Table 3.
Results
Regression Estimation
The results from the Arellano-Bond one-step and two-step GMM
dynamic estimations are listed in Table 3. We also estimated models with
different versions of the outcome uncertainty variables. In Model (2) we
do not distinguish between a no-score and a score draw, and in Model (3)
we use a variation of the [EXPECT.sub.jk,t] variable where the
individual terms are the absolute deviations instead of the squared
terms.
Diagnostic checks for the GMM estimators include tests for serial
correlation in the errors and a test that checks the instruments are not
correlated with the errors. If the errors are correlated the GMM
estimator will be inconsistent. Arellano and Bond state that there
should be first order but no second order serial correlation. The
results here indicate that this is the case for our sample.
Additionally, the Sargan statistics cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the errors. (20)
Most of the signs and significance of the outcome uncertainty
variables conform to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. The SQOU
Wjk,t variable (which measures the difference in the probabilities for a
home or away win) is negative (21) and significant at the 1% level,
which means the greater the uncertainty about which side will win, the
more viewers that will watch the game. If outcome uncertainty falls,
then viewers may switch to other channels or turn off the television.
However, if outcome uncertainty rises, channel hoppers may decide to
stay with the game. It is also possible that potential viewers may
receive updates about the state of the game from other sources such as
the radio, Internet, or mobile phone texts and may decide to start
watching based on the current level of outcome uncertainty.
To the extent that the [PR.sup.nsdraw.sub.jk,t] and
[PR.sup.sdraw.sub.jk,t] variables are interpreted as measures of outcome
uncertainty, the signs are perverse. However these variables may
indicate other aspects of the quality of the game, e.g.,
"boring" characteristics such as non-attacking play, few
goals, etc. which could reduce viewership. A striking result of the
estimation is that score draws were also negatively signed albeit with a
smaller magnitude. In our estimation sample of 248 matches, 65 games
were draws of which 30% (20 matches) were no-score draws. In fact, out
of all Premiership games (from the 1992-1993 season to the close of the
2004-2005 season) approximately 27.7% of the matches were draws. (22)
One explanation for the negatively signed score-draw coefficient is that
for most of the minutes, the score is level and no team is leading. For
all of the score-draw matches in our sample, approximately 60% of the
minutes were where the score was level. Conversely, for games where
there was a winner, 60% of the minutes were where one team was leading.
The longer the minutes are level, viewers may anticipate that a draw is
inevitable and attacking play will subside. Table 4 below lists the
proportion of 'level score minutes' in the score draw matches
in our sample.
Even if the final result ended up as a win, viewership would have
been lower on average if a goal was only scored in the dying minutes of
the game. By looking matches that ended 1-0 (and 0-1), and comparing the
viewership of those matches that had a 'last minute' goal
versus those matches that had a goal scored earlier in the match, there
are lower viewership figures for these late scoring matches. Obviously
one reason could be that viewers surmise that the match will end as a
no-score draw. Similarly, these games may be defensively fought matches
where both sides are 'playing for the draw,' whereas in an
early scoring match, the 'losing' side is forced to play more
attacking football in order to get the equalizer or to achieve victory.
Table 6 lists the comparison of viewership for 1-0 results.
The [SQEXPECT.sub.jk,t] variable is consistent with the outcome
uncertainty hypothesis and is positively signed and significant at the
5% level, indicating that unexpected outcomes attracts viewers. A goal
having occurred in the past minute boosted viewership as did total goals
though the latter did not at a statistically significant level.
The time dummies corrected for peaks and troughs in the data.
During the 46th minute, fans are still 'away' from the half
time break and take a couple of minutes to return to viewing as
indicated by the large drop for minute 46 and large spike at minute 47.
What may be peculiar at first are the significance minutes 15, 17, 24,
31, 36, 55 56, 70, and 71. Upon further investigation, there is a very
simple explanation for these unusual increases and decreases. For
specific kick-off times, these minutes correspond to a specific time in
the 24-hour clock. Table 7 below should make it easier to see why these
minutes are significant.
The times in bold indicate times when viewers are likely to be
switching channels to tune in or in the case of boring matches, turning
off. By looking at the average change in rating minute by minute, the
general trend is steadily increasing. However for minutes listed above
there was a shift in this trend. For minutes 55, 56, 70, and 71, it is
expected that they might not fall exactly on the hour and half hour as
half time most likely runs past the allotted 15 minutes. This is
confirmed by the PA sport data which gives the second half kick-off
times. By examining channel switching reports (23) there is a strong
indication that new viewers do in fact tune in near the hour and half
hour and that almost equal portions of these viewers either tune in from
other channels or are turning on their televisions to watch the game.
For minute 24, more than two thirds of the new viewers are tuning in from other satellite channels, while in minute 55 most of the viewers
that decide to turn off the match are switching to other channels.
Viewers may decide to turn off if the match is boring and choose to do
so as another program starts on a different channel.
We also included the variable [g.sub.jk,t] (10) (a dummy variable if a goal had been scored within the last 10 minutes) and [g.sub.jk,t]
(15) (similarly, a dummy variable if a goal had been scored within the
last 15 minutes) to capture any lingering effect on viewership. These
were not significant. We also estimated models which included red cards
and interaction variables; none of these variables were significant.
Size of the Impact of Outcome Uncertainty on Viewership-Simulations
Given that our outcome uncertainty measures are contingent on the
state of the game (in terms of the score), there is no simple way to
summarize the impact of outcome uncertainty on average. Here we
illustrate the effect of outcome uncertainty on viewership by simulating
a hypothetical game with five possible results:
(a) A no-score draw.
(b) An away win (0-1).
(c) A home win (1-0).
(d) A score-draw where the home team scores first (1-1).
(e) A score-draw where the away team scores first (1-1).
The teams are assumed to be near-equal strength, with a slight form
advantage for the away team. The initial rating is assumed to be 2.37,
the average of our dataset. The first goal occurs in the 25th minute
with the second goal coming in the 80th minute in the case of the
score-draw. Clearly the no-score draw (case (a)) does not attract as
many viewers as would a 0-1 (case (b)) or 1-0 (case (c)) result. The 1-1
(case (e)) result hurts viewership relative to case (b) but the 1-1
(case (d)) result increases viewership slightly relative to case (c).
This can be attributed to the change in expectations of the away team
scoring. Due to home advantage, home teams are twice as likely to win as
the away team, thus an away goal occurring first generates an element of
surprise. By looking at Figure 2, there is a larger jump in viewership
when the away team scores first rather than if the home team leads
initially, although either team scoring increases viewership over no
score. However, in the case where the away team scores first and then
the home team equalizes, expectations of a home win (or at least a draw)
are brought back into line. This is seen in the decreasing rate
viewership after the goal in the 80th minute. While it may appear that a
1-1 increases overall viewership over a no-score draw, it is not due to
the draw but rather the viewership increase is driven by the away team
leading. In the case where the home team scores first and the away team
equalizes, it will actually shift viewership up but then level off. The
average television ratings for the five results are summarized below in
Table 8.
In another example we assume a very strong team (with an average of
2.4 points per game over the last 5 games) plays away at a relatively
weaker team (an average of .4 points per game). Given this scenario the
away team is expected to win. In this case we plot the 20 different
results including the 2-2 final score that could have been reached via
six different scoring patterns:
--Two home goals followed by two away goals (hhaa).
--Alternating goals with the home team scoring first (haha).
--Two away goals between two home goals (haah).
--Two home goals sandwiched between two away goals (ahha).
--Alternating goals with the away team scoring first (ahah).
--Two away goals followed by two home goals (aahh).
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
We assume a lower initial rating of 1.00 with goals coming in the
42nd, 60th, 75th, and 82nd minutes. Tables 9, 10, and 11 compares the
different results with the percentage change in rating if the match had
ended differently.
Again the element of surprise raises the average rating relative to
what one would have expected. Given that the away team was expected to
win, average ratings are higher when the home team scores first (cases
b, d, e, h, i, j, n, o, p) and win relative to the other outcomes. The
scoring pattern in case (n) generates the optimal ratings for a 22
result. Comparing cases (i) and (j), at the 75th minute the value for
[SQOUW.sub.jk,t] is lower for case (i) and [SQEXPECT.sub.jk,t] is higher
which increases the average rating over that of case (j).
Discussion and Conclusions
The competitive balance of popular sport is not just an important
economic issue, it has become a matter of political significance. As far
back as the 1950s the United States Congress held hearings to discuss
the validity of imposing competitive restraints in the players'
labor market in order to achieve a desirable level of competitive
balance. In 2005 the European Commission instituted a review of the
governance of football to investigate, inter alia, whether European
soccer leagues were sufficiently balanced and, if not, to suggest what
political measures might be taken to increase that balance. Such
interventions are to a significant degree motivated by the argument that
a sporting contest must entail sufficient uncertainty of outcome to
maintain the interest of spectators.
Empirical studies of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis have
dealt almost exclusively with this question in terms of match
attendance. In this paper we have looked at television viewing.
Television is rapidly becoming the principal source of revenues for
football leagues in Europe, and is already the dominant source for the
American major leagues, most notably American football. To our knowledge
Forrest et al, (2005) provide the first empirical measures of the impact
of uncertainty on TV viewers, comparing average viewership of games with
different levels of ex ante uncertainty. Our study is the first to
analyze the impact of uncertainty on the level of viewership within a
game, minute by minute.
Our findings suggest a complex picture. Uncertainty matters in the
sense that viewership is decreasing in the gap in the probabilities of
each side winning, but is also decreasing in the probability of a draw.
This suggests that a significant proportion of viewers want something
more than statistical uncertainty. The fact that our measure of the
unexpected (the difference between pre-match probabilities and within
match probabilities) tends to be positively associated with viewership
lends weight to the idea that fans demand excitement, which is likely to
be associated with eventful games in which one side wins, rather than
tame draws.
Our findings show that audience fluctuations within matches are
significantly affected by the progress of the game. Fans may switch
channels away from the game if they find the probability of a draw is
increasing, or they may switch to and stick with a game that has an
exciting result in prospect. We found significant evidence of fan
switching at times when programs on other channels were likely to end.
Games that produce a result are likely to have significantly higher
audiences than games which end up as 0-0 draws. However, even games that
involve goals being scored may have relatively low viewership if the
game ends up as a draw. Using some simulation exercises we were able to
show that in some cases a drawn match can attract a lower viewership
than a match which end up with a win for one team, depending on the
evolution of the game.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
These results suggest that there is need for a certain amount of
caution about the proposed interventions to redistribute resources in
order to create an appropriate level of competitive balance. Reforms
that increased the probability of a win rather than a draw could
increase viewership, if the probabilities were evenly balanced between
the two teams. Given that there exists a natural home advantage, some of
the most well balanced and exciting games are likely to be between a
strong team playing away against a relatively weak team. Given home
advantage, a league of equally strong teams might even reduce
viewership.
Finally, it is worth commenting on the desirability of draws. In
the North American major leagues, tied games have been abolished by
requiring a result (with overtime in American football and extra innings in baseball). Would measures to ensure a result, such as the penalty
shoot-out, be desirable in European football? Our results suggest
caution on this front as well. While a penalty shoot-out may guarantee a
result, what matters for viewership is the pattern of play over the
whole game, not just the end result. Teams (especially weak ones) often
prefer a penalty shoot-out to taking risks during regulation time and
therefore forcing a result in this way may provoke even more
conservative play attracting fewer viewers.
Appendix 1. Definitions
Variable Definition
[r.sub.t] Television rating.
[PR.sup.hwin.sub.t] Probability of a home win at time t.
[PR.sup.awin.sub.t] Probability of an away win at time t.
[PR.sup.nsdraw.sub.t] Probability of a non-score draw at time t.
[PR.sup.sdraw.sub.t] Probability of a score draw at time t.
[PR.sup.draw.sub.t] Probability of any draw at time t.
[tg.sub.t] Total number of goals (home and away) at
time t.
[g.sub.t-1] If a goal was scored in the last minute.
[SQOU_W.sub.t] [([PR.sup.hwin.sub.t] -
[PR.sup.awin.sub.t]).sup.2]
[SQEXCEPT.sub.t] [([PR.sup.hwin.sub.jk,t] -
[PR.sup.hwin.sub.jk,0]).sup.2] +
[([PR.sup.awin.sub.jk,t] -
[PR.sup.awin.sub.jk,0]).sup.2]
[([PR.sup.nsdraw.sub.jk,t] -
[PR.sup.nsdraw.sub.jk,0]).sup.2] +
[([PR.sup.sdraw.sub.jk,t] -
[PR.sup.sdraw.sub.jk,0]).sup.2]
Appendix 2. Television Terminology
The following television terms are according to the BARB website:
* Television Rating--The TVR (Television Rating) measures the
popularity of a program, daypart, commercial break, or advertisement by
comparing its audience to the population as a whole. One TVR is
numerically equivalent to one per cent of a target audience.
* Reach--The net number or percentage of people who have seen a
particular piece of broadcast output (e.g., a program, daypart, channel,
TV advertising campaign). The BARB definition is for this to be at least
three consecutive minutes.
* Share--The percentage of the total viewing audience watching over
a given period of time. This can apply to channels, programs, time
periods, etc.
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Endnotes
(1) The earliest statements of this hypothesis are to be found in
Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964).
(2) According to Fort and Quirk (1995) "Professional team
sports leagues are classic, even textbook, examples of business
cartels."
(3) For a brief review of court cases in the US and Europe see
Szymanski (2003), pp. 1178-1181; for a more detailed review of US case
history see Weiler and Roberts (1998).
(4) For example, the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act in the US
permitted collective selling of broadcast rights by a league, while in
Germany, parliament amended the competition act to exempt collective
selling of football rights after the courts ruled collective selling
anticompetitive.
(5) In the US there are often TV blackouts of home games within a
certain radius of the locale of the home team. This is to encourage
attendance at the stadium. Some home fans may have restricted
opportunities to watch on TV. However, there is no local area blackout in English soccer. For further information on how blackouts may affect
attendance see Siegfried and Hinshaw (1979), Welki and Zlatoper (1999),
and Putsis and Sen (2000).
(6) No-score draws are where neither team scores; score draws are
where both teams score the same number of goals.
(7) Now published as the Sky Sports Football Yearbook.
(8) An extensive football database that supplies betting and match
result information to The Racing Post, The Mirror, The Sunday Mirror,
The People, and the Belfast Newsletter.
(9) Borland and McDonald (2003) and Szymanski (2003) provide
literature surveys about these and other studies concerning demand and
outcome uncertainty.
(10) This is known in the literature as the "favorite-longshot
bias" See Cain, Law, and Peel (2000).
(11) Initially, most matches were broadcast on Sky Sports, now
known as Sky Sports 1. During the 1990s, the sports-dedicated channels
expanded to include Sky Sports 2 (1994), Sky Sports 3 (1996), and Sky
Sports Xtra (1999). A pay-per-view channel, Premiership Plus (now known
as Prem-Plus), was started in 2001. Sky Sports News (2000) could be
counted as a sixth channel as it shows some highlights and interviews.
(12) See Forrest, Simmons, and Szymanski (2004) for an anti-trust
discussion about the restriction of games broadcast.
(13) We base our ratings on the terrestrial television universe
because it is a more stable measure than a Sky-subscriber only universe.
Since the late 1990s, Sky subscribers have been increasing along with
the number of channels available to subscribers. If we utilized the Sky
audience universe, it would give the impression that fewer people are
watching when in reality it is the denominator (or universe) that is
increasing. Although this will not make a difference for the
minute-by-minute analysis, it could give the impression that games in
2002 were more popular and that audiences are in decline relative to the
recent seasons.
(14) Additionally, the separation of draws into no-score and score
draws is particularly important for betting pools. Before the National
Lottery came into prominence in 1994, betting on the football pools was
one of the largest and most accessible forms of gambling available in
the United Kingdom. Every week, participants would try to select eight
football matches whose results would maximize the bettors' points
according to a specific scoring scheme. Predicting the score draws
maximized the points received thereby increasing the chances of winning
a percentage of the pool. In this scoring scheme, points were awarded
depending if a match was a score draw, a no-score draw or a home or away
win. In current pools betting, score draws are awarded three points,
no-score draws receive two points, and a home or away win will get one
point. (Source: http://www.littlewoodspools.co.uk.) Pools were also
important because a small percentage of the entry fees went to the
Football Trust, which distributed the money amongst the teams to help
finance seater stadia after the Hillsborough disaster in 1989 in which
96 fans were crushed during an F.A. Cup semi-final between Liverpool and
Nottingham Forest.
(15) Implicitly there are more than 90 match minutes due to injury
time. However, goals are recorded in the 45th or 90th minute even if
they were actually scored in injury time.
(16) An additional form variable was also calculated based on the
average number of points earned over the past five home games for the
home team and over the past give away games for the away team. It could
be the case that some teams do well at home but fail to succeed while
playing away. (Although the reverse could also be true.) Calculating the
'home-team form' based on home games and the 'away-team
form' would capture this trend. Form based on 'home' or
'away' games would also account for home advantage. This did
not alter the probability distribution significantly, and we chose to
use the measure based on the past five games (as opposed to the past
five home or away games). The form variable using the five most recent
games is more likely to capture the impact of injuries or player
performance than a measure incorporating games potentially played more
than eight weeks prior.
(17) When a player receives a red card, he is ejected from the
match and his team must play with one less player.
(18) See Greene (2000), Baltagi (1995), Wooldridge (2002), or Hsiao
(2003) for a summary.
(19) For example using [y.sub.i,t-2] as an instrument for
[DELTA][y.sub.i,t-2].
(20) Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using the two-step results
for the Sargan test. The Sargan test has low power and the null is
easily rejected if heteroskedasticity is present. Therefore, for the
one-step estimation we use White's procedure for robust standard
errors.
(21) The sign is negative because the more the value approaches
zero (gets smaller) the more uncertain the winner.
(22) Out of all the draws that occurred in the Premiership from
1993-2005, 31.9% were no-score draws and only 17.6% were high-scoring
draws (2-2 and higher).
(23) These reports indicate the source of new viewers as well as
where viewers go if they change channels or switch off.
Authors' Note
The full version of this paper can be downloaded at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/spe/wpa per/0631.html
Kevin Alavy [1], Alison Gaskell [1], Stephanie Leach [2], and
Stefan Szymanski [3]
[1] futures sports + entertainment
[2] Imperial College London, South Kensington campus
[3] City University London
Kevin Alavy is director for futures sport + entertainment in
London. His research interests include investigating how events on the
sports field influence fans' attitudes and behavior, and vice
versa.
Alison Gaskell is analytics manager for futures sport +
entertainment in London. Her research interests include understanding
the global popularity and potential of all sports, especially tennis.
Stephanie Leach completed her PhD thesis at Imperial College
Business School and subsequently worked for media strategy consultants
Oliver & Ohlbaum. She is currently a professional football
specialist at UEFA in Nyon, Switzerland.
Stefan Szymanski is a professor of economics at Cass Business
School City University London. His research interests include most
aspects of the economics and business of sport.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Premiership Games Broadcast 2002-2005
Averages
Season Number TV Goal
of Games Rating Difference
Broadcast ([dagger]) ([double dagger])
2002 * 30 1.79 1.60
2003 65 2.45 1.37
2004 66 2.44 1.15
2005 87 2.21 1.13
Averages
Total Goals Scored
Season All All Score
Games Draws Draws Wins
2002 * 2.8 2.4 2.67 2.41
2003 2.88 2.59 2.93 1.83
2004 2.67 1.90 3.16 3.00
2005 2.41 1.82 3.00 2.63
* Games between January 1, and May 11, 2002.
([dagger]) Does not include Prem-Plus or pay-per-view.
([double dagger]) A TV Rating is the percentage of people
watching that program out of the television population.
Table 2: Summary of Match Outcomes for Games Broadcast
2002-2005
Result Number % of Total Average
of Games TV Rating
No-score Draw 20 8.1% 2.58 *
Score Draw 45 18.1% 2.35
Home Win by 1 goal 61 24.6% 2.28
Home Win by 2 goals 29 11.7% 2.21
Home Win by 3 goals 7 2.8% 2.08
Home Win by 4 goals 5 2.0% 1.85
Home Win by 5 goals 3 1.2% 2.1
Home Win by 6 goals 1 0.4% 1.21
Away Win by 1 goal 47 19.0% 2.29
Away Win by 2 goals 17 6.9% 2.4
Away Win by 3 goals 5 2.0% 1.86
Away Win by 4 goals 6 2.4% 2.21
Away Win by 5 goals 2 0.8% 1.84
* Almost half of these were 'big' matches or derby matches.
Excluding those matches, the average was 2.04.
Table 3: Viewership Regression: Arellano-Bond One-Step and
Two-Step GMM Estimation
Explanatory Model 1
Variables
One Step Two Step
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-1] 0.6633 * 0.6608 *
(0.0206) (0.0049)
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-2] 0.0881 * 0.0913 *
(0.0106) (0.0034)
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-3] 0.0205 ([dagger]) 0.0226 *
(0.0091) (0.0026)
[DELTA][tg.sub.jk,t-1] 0.0032 0.0032 *
(0.0046) (0.0012)
[DELTA][g.sub.jk,t] 0.0089 ([dagger]) 0.0097 *
(0.0043) (0.0011)
[DELTA] -0.1558 * -0.1600 *
[PR.sup.nsdraw.sub.jk,t] -0.0433 (0.0153)
[DELTA] -0.1171 * -0.1154 *
[PR.sup.sdraw.sub.jk,t] (0.0441) (0.0139)
[DELTA] -0.1437863 * -0.1269 *
[PR.sup.draw.sub.jk,t] -0.0417092 (0.0112)
[DELTA][SQOUW.sub.jk,t] -0.0843 * -0.0838 *
(0.0289) (0.0095)
[DELTA][EXPECT.sub.jk,t] 0.0219 * 0.0175 *
(0.0143) (0.0052)
[DELTA] 0.0496 ([dagger]) 0.0528 *
[SQEXPECT.sub.jk,t] (0.0215) (0.0076)
Minute 15 -0.0075 ([dagger]) -0.0067 *
(0.0035) (0.0008)
Minute 17 0.0147 * 0.0149 *
(0.0034) (0.0010)
Minute 24 0.0161 * 0.0155 *
(0.0031) (0.0006)
Minute 31 -0.0127 * -0.0124 *
(0.0029) (0.0008)
Minute 36 0.0077 * 0.0074 *
(0.0025) (0.0006)
Minute 46 -0.1868 * -0.1845 *
(0.0151) (0.0038)
Minute 47 0.1631 * 0.1622 *
(0.0122) (0.0029)
Minute 48 0.0245 * 0.0241*
(0.0054) (0.0016)
Minute 55 -0.0196 * -0.0197*
(0.0047) (0.0011)
Minute 56 0.0135 * 0.0146*
(0.0046) (0.0013)
Minute 70 -0.0110 ([dagger]) -0.0126*
(0.0051) (0.0016)
Minute 71 0.0063 0.0072*
(0.0049) (0.0016)
Constant 0.0020 * 0.0019*
(0.0003) (0.0001)
AR(1) z = -13.82 z = -14.19
Pr > z = 0.00 Pr > z = 0.00
AR(2) z = 0.40 z = 0.00
Pr > z = 0.69 Pr > z = 0.99
Sargan Test [chi square] (429) = 228.81
Pr > [chi square] = 1.00
Explanatory Model 2
Variables
One Step Two Step
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-1] 0.6629 * 0.6595 *
(0.0206) -0.0043
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-2] 0.0882 * 0.0906 *
0.0106) (0.0037)
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-3] 0.0206 ([dagger]) 0.0236 *
(0.0091) (0.0033)
[DELTA][tg.sub.jk,t-1] 0.0056 0.0058 *
(0.0042) (0.0011)
[DELTA][g.sub.jk,t] 0.0089 ([dagger]) 0.0094 *
(0.0043) (0.0011)
[DELTA]
[PR.sup.nsdraw.sub.jk,t]
[DELTA]
[PR.sup.sdraw.sub.jk,t]
[DELTA] -0.1155 * -0.0996 *
[PR.sup.draw.sub.jk,t] (0.0413) (0.0150)
[DELTA][SQOUW.sub.jk,t] -0.0930077 * -0.0768 *
(0.0289193) (0.0078)
[DELTA][EXPECT.sub.jk,t]
[DELTA] 0.0513136 ([dagger]) 0.04626 *
[SQEXPECT.sub.jk,t] (0.0218821) (0.0063)
Minute 15 -0.0074822 ([dagger]) -0.0072 *
(0.0035887) (0.0009)
Minute 17 0.0146918 * 0.0141 *
(0.0034655) (0.0009)
Minute 24 0.0162 * 0.0159 *
(0.0031) (0.0007)
Minute 31 -0.0127 * -0.0133 *
(0.0030) (0.0007)
Minute 36 0.0077 * 0.0070 *
(0.0026) (0.0007)
Minute 46 -0.1869 * -0.1824 *
(0.0151) (0.0039)
Minute 47 0.1630 * 0.1584 *
(0.0122) (0.0031)
Minute 48 0.0245 * 0.0248 *
(0.0054) (0.0016)
Minute 55 -0.0197 * -0.0195 *
(0.0047) (0.0012)
Minute 56 0.0136 * 0.0137 *
(0.0046) (0.0013)
Minute 70 -0.0107 ([dagger]) -0.0100 *
(0.0052) (0.0016)
Minute 71 0.0065 0.0036 ([dagger])
(0.0049) (0.0015)
Constant 0.0022 * 0.0020 *
(0.0004) (0.0001)
AR(1) z = -13.81 z = -14.22
Pr > z = 0.00 Pr > z = 0.00
AR(2) z = 0.43 z = 0.10
Pr > z = 0.67 Pr > z = 0.92
Sargan Test [chi square] (429) = 224.25
Pr > [chi square] = 1.00
Explanatory Model 3
Variables
One Step Two Step
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-1] 0.6546 * 0.6497 *
(0.0202) (0.0034)
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-2] 0.0864 * 0.0898 *
(0.0106) (0.0030)
[DELTA][r.sub.jk,t-3] 0.0193 ([dagger]) 0.0235 *
(0.0092) (0.0034)
[DELTA][tg.sub.jk,t-1] 0.0048 0.0067 *
(0.0042) (0.0011)
[DELTA][g.sub.jk,t] 0.0089 ([dagger]) 0.0090 *
(0.0043) (0.0012)
[DELTA]
[PR.sup.nsdraw.sub.jk,t]
[DELTA]
[PR.sup.sdraw.sub.jk,t]
[DELTA]
[PR.sup.draw.sub.jk,t]
[DELTA][SQOUW.sub.jk,t] -0.0748 ([dagger]) -0.0617 *
(0.0303) (0.0108)
[DELTA][EXPECT.sub.jk,t]
[DELTA]
[SQEXPECT.sub.jk,t]
Minute 15 -0.0084 ([dagger]) -0.0082 *
(0.0037) (0.0010)
Minute 17 0.0138 * 0.0128 *
(0.0034) (0.0008)
Minute 24 0.0149 * 0.0157 *
(0.0032) (0.0007)
Minute 31 -0.0140 * -0.0136 *
(0.0029) (0.0009)
Minute 36 0.0061 ([dagger]) 0.0052 *
(0.0025) (0.0006)
Minute 46 -0.1879 * -0.1852 *
(0.0151) (0.0035)
Minute 47 0.1613 * 0.1586 *
(0.0121) (0.0031)
Minute 48 0.0245 * 0.0260 *
(0.0054) (0.0018)
Minute 55 -0.0196 * -0.0201 *
(0.0047) (0.0011)
Minute 56 0.0127 * 0.0133 *
(0.0046) (0.0012)
Minute 70 -0.0113 ([dagger]) -0.0125 *
(0.0051) (0.0017)
Minute 71 0.0067 0.0069 *
(0.0049) (0.0016)
Constant 0.0022 * 0.0020 *
(0.0004) (0.0001)
AR(1) z = -13.86 z = -14.19
Pr > z = 0.00 Pr > z = 0.00
AR(2) z = 0.36 z = 0.06
Pr > z = 0.72 Pr > z = 0.95
Sargan Test [chi square] (429) = 225.87
Pr > [chi square] = 1 .00
* Indicates Significance at 1% level
([dagger]) Indicates Significance at 5% level
([double dagger]) Indicates Significance at 10% level
Table 4: Proportion of 'Level Minutes' in Score-Draws
for Games Broadcast 2002-2005
Minute Number of Absolute Within
Timeband Level Percent First & Last
Minutes 30 Minutes
1-5 203 90.2%
6-10 163 72.4%
11-15 150 66.7%
16-20 132 58.7%
21-25 126 56.0%
26-30 113 50.2% 65.7%
31-35 106 47.1%
36-40 94 41.8%
41-45 98 43.6%
46-50 102 45.3%
51-55 113 50.2%
56-60 118 52.4%
61-65 122 54.2%
66-70 128 56.9%
71-75 137 60.9%
76-80 152 67.6%
81-85 173 76.9%
86-90 200 88.9% 67.6%
Minute Goal Proportion
Timeband Difference of Minutes
at Goal Diff
1-5 0 60.0%
6-10 1 37.8%
11-15 2 2.2%
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
66-70
71-75
76-80
81-85
86-90
Games = 45
Table 5: Proportion of 'Level Minutes' in Score-Draws
for Premiership 1993-2005
Minute Number of Absolute Within
Timeband Level Percent First & Last
Minutes 30 Minutes
1-5 4605 94.3%
6-10 4079 83.5%
11-15 3648 74.7%
16-20 3231 66.1%
21-25 2933 60.0%
26-30 2626 53.8% 72.1%
31-35 2432 49.8%
36-40 2291 46.9%
41-45 2166 44.3%
46-50 2118 43.4%
51-55 2129 43.6%
56-60 2153 44.1%
61-65 2191 44.9%
66-70 2384 48.8%
71-75 2650 54.2%
76-80 2961 60.6%
81-85 3410 69.8%
86-90 4188 85.7% 62.1%
Minute Goal Proportion
Timeband Difference of Minutes
at Score
1-5 0 59.360%
6-10 1 38.166%
11-15 2 2.430%
16-20 3 0.044%
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
66-70
71-75
76-80
81-85
86-90
Games = 977
Table 6: Comparison of Viewership for Matches Ending as 1-0 (0-1)
Goal Scored
Before Minute
All 21 26 29
Rating 2.36 2.91 2.94 3
Means Test
All 1-0 (0-1): 15.99 * 18.88 * 22.71 *
Before Minute 21: 0.99 2.52 ([dagger])
Before Minute 26: 1.76 ([double
dagger])
Before Minute 29:
After Minute 74:
After Minute 79:
Games 56 8 10 13
Goal Scored Goal Scored
Before Minute After Minute
74 79 84
Rating 2.29 2.28 2.2
Means Test
All 1-0 (0-1): -2.13 -2.36 -4.26 *
([dagger]) ([dagger])
Before Minute 21: -16.93 * -17.06 * -18.50 *
Before Minute 26: -19.48 * -19.53 * -20.94 *
Before Minute 29: -20.51 * -20.02 * -20.68 *
After Minute 74: -0.36 -2.43 ([dagger])
After Minute 79: -2.08 ([dagger])
Games 11 9 7
* Indicates Significance at 1% level
([dagger]) Indicates Significance at 5% level
([double dagger]) Indicates Significance at 10% level
Table 7: Significance of Time Dummies
Kick-off Time after Match Minute:
15 17 24 31 36 55 70
hh:00 hh:15 hh:17 hh:24 hh:30 hh:36 hh:15 hh:30
hh:15 hh:30 hh:32 hh:39 hh:45 hh:51 hh:25 hh:40
hh:30 hh:45 hh:47 hh:54 hh:00 hh:06 hh:40 hh:55
hh:45 hh:00 hh:02 hh:39 hh:15 hh:21 hh:55 hh:10
hh:05 hh:20 hh:22 hh:29 hh:35 hh:41 hh:15 hh:30
Table 8: Simulation of Five Different Results and the Impact on
Viewership
Result Average Percent Percent Percent
Rating Increase Increase Increase
Over 0-0 Over 1-0 Over 0-1
(a) 0-0 2.635
(b) 0-1 2.75 4.39%
(3.88 *)
(c) 1-0 2.7 2.50%
(2.41) ([dagger])
(d) 1-1(ha) 2.703 2.60% 0.10%
(2.47) ([dagger]) (0.08)
(e) 1-1(ah) 2.747 4.26% -0.12%
(3.82) * (-0.10)
t-statistics for means test are in parentheses.
* Indicates Significance at 1% level
([dagger]) Indicates Significance at 5% level
Table 9: Simulation of a 2-2 Draw and the Impact of
Viewership (a)
(Case) Result Average Percent Percent
Rating Increase Increase
Over 0-0 Over 1-0
(a) 0-0 1.257
(b) 1-0 1.35 7.36%
(3.18 *)
(c) 0-1 1.325 5.38%
(2.48 ([dagger]))
(d) 2-0 1.356 7.82% 0.43%
(3.30 *) -0.16
(e) 1-1(ha) 1.352 7.53% 0.16%
(3.24 *) -0.06
(f) 1-1(ah) 1.340 6.61%
(2.88 *)
(g) 0-2 1.329 5.70%
(2.57 ([dagger]))
(h) 2-1(hha) 1.355 7.75% 0.36%
(3.28 *) -0.14
(i) 2-1(hah) 1.358 7.99% 0.59%
(3.35 *) -0.22
(j) 1-2(haa) 1.352 7.54% 0.17%
(3.24 *) -0.06
(k) 2-1(ahh) 1.346 7.07%
(3.00 *)
(l) 1-2(aha) 1.340 6.62%
(2.88 *)
(Case) Result Percent Percent Percent
Increase Increase Increase
Over 0-1 Over 1(h)-1 Over 1(a)-1
(a) 0-0
(b) 1-0
(c) 0-1
(d) 2-0
(e) 1-1(ha)
(f) 1-1(ah) 1.17%
(0.47)
(g) 0-2 0.30%
(0.12)
(h) 2-1(hha)
(i) 2-1(hah) 0.43%
(0.16)
(j) 1-2(haa) 0.01%
(0.00)
(k) 2-1(ahh) 1.61% 0.43%
(0.63) (0.16)
(l) 1-2(aha) 1.18% 0.01%
(0.47) (0.00)
(Case) Result Percent Percent
Increase Increase
Over 2-0 Over 0-2
(a) 0-0
(b) 1-0
(c) 0-1
(d) 2-0
(e) 1-1(ha)
(f) 1-1(ah)
(g) 0-2
(h) 2-1(hha) -0.06%
(-0.02)
(i) 2-1(hah)
(j) 1-2(haa)
(k) 2-1(ahh)
(l) 1-2(aha)
t-statistics for means test are in parentheses.
* Indicates Significance at 1% level
([dagger]) Indicates Significance at 5% level
Table 10: Simulation of a 2-2 Draw and the Impact of
Viewership (b)
Average Rating Percent Percent
Result Increase Increase
Over 0-0 Over 1-0
(m) 1-2(aah) 1.329 5.73%
(2.58 ([dagger]))
(n) 2-2(hhaa) 1.352 7.56% 0.19%
(3.24 *) (0.07)
(o) 2-2(haha) 1.355 7.80% 0.41%
(p) 2-2(haah) 1.352 (3.31 *) (0.16)
7.57% 0.20%
(q) 2-2(ahha) 1.344 (3.25 *) (0.08)
6.89%
(r) 2-2(ahah) 1.341 (2.95 *)
(s) 2-2(aahh) 1.33 6.65%
(2.89 *)
5.76%
(2.59 ([dagger]))
Average Percent Percent Percent
Result Increase Increase Increase
Over 0-1 Over 1(h)-1 Over 1(a)-1
(m) 1-2(aah) 0.33%
(0.14)
(n) 2-2(hhaa)
0.25%
(o) 2-2(haha) (0.10)
(p) 2-2(haah) 0.04%
(0.10)
(q) 2-2(ahha) 1.43% 0.25%
(0.57) (0.10)
(r) 2-2(ahah) 1.21% 0.04%
(s) 2-2(aahh) (0.48) (0.01)
0.36%
(0.15)
Average Percent Percent
Result Increase Increase
Over 2-0 Over 0-2
(m) 1-2(aah) 0.03%
(0.01)
(n) 2-2(hhaa) -0.24%
(-0.09)
(o) 2-2(haha)
(p) 2-2(haah)
(q) 2-2(ahha)
(r) 2-2(ahah)
(s) 2-2(aahh) 0.06%
(0.02)
t-statistics for means test are in parentheses.
* Indicates Significance at 1% level
([dagger]) Indicates Significance at 5% level
Table 11: Simulation of a 2-2 Draw and the Impact on
Viewership (c)
(Case) Result Average Percent Percent
Rating Increase Increase
Over 2-1 Over 2-1
(hha) (hah)
(n) 2-2(hhaa) 1.352 -0.1748%
(-0.07)
(o) 2-2(haha) 1.355 -0.1744%
(-0.07)
(p) 2-2(haah) 1.352
(q) 2-2(ahha) 1.344
(r) 2-2(ahah) 1.341
(s) 2-2(aahh) 1.330
(Case) Result Percent Percent
Increase Increase
Over 2-1 Over 1-2
(ahh) (aha)
(n) 2-2(hhaa)
(o) 2-2(haha)
(p) 2-2(haah)
(q) 2-2(ahha) -0.1759%
(-0.07)
(r) 2-2(ahah) 0.03%
(0.01)
(s) 2-2(aahh)
(Case) Result Percent Percent
Increase Increase
Over 1-2 Over 1-2
(haa) (aah)
(n) 2-2(hhaa)
(o) 2-2(haha)
(p) 2-2(haah) 0.03%
(0.01)
(q) 2-2(ahha)
(r) 2-2(ahah)
(s) 2-2(aahh) 0.03%
(0.01)
t-statistics for means test are in parentheses.