ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia.
Chen, Kai
ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia. By Lee
Jones. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 280 pp. $90.00 (cloth).
In ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia, Lee
Jones explores "when sovereignty is and is not transgressed"
(p. 11) and raises doubts and difficult questions on ASEAN's
principle of noninterference. According to the dominant mind-set to this
principle, it is always interpreted as "ASEAN's success as the
leading instantiation of third-world regionalism" (p. 2).
From a context-sensitive perspective, Jones argues that
ASEAN's principle of noninterference has been misunderstood as a
consensus among all ASEAN states, for a long time. Both interference and
noninterference are relatively dynamic. Though there are differences of
opinion regarding the noninterference principle within ASEAN, many
scholars (e.g., realists and constructivists) and political elite still
consider that ASEAN states have achieved a consensus on the
noninterference principle. In fact, the applicability of the principle
of noninterference is limited. As Jones demonstrates, some ASEAN member
states did intervene in their neighboring countries, contradictory to
ASEAN's principle of noninterference, a fact that has been ignored
or downplayed by academics and policymakers to a large extent.
To fill in the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of
noninterference, Jones advances a context-sensitive approach to explain
the interventions and noninterventions within ASEAN. Jones analyzes the
neglected cases of ASEAN states' interventions in different
historical periods, including the cases of Cambodia and East Timor in
the Cold War era, the cases of Cambodia and East Timor in the period
from the end of the Cold War to the Asian financial crisis, and Myanmar
in the post--Cold War era.
As Jones notes, ASEAN states' interventions are highly
selective, and the selectivity is not based on "whether target
states are ASEAN members or not" (p. 30). The ASEAN member states,
which are tacitly acknowledged as coherent actors, are constrained by
internal disagreement (e.g., struggles among powerful social groups and
interelite conflicts) and external challenges. In other words, the
decision whether to intervene or not intervene is determined by
complicated interactions among these factors. In the words of Jones,
noninterference is a "technology of power" (p. 226).
In Jones's opinion, noninterference is not "agential
forces standing outside history or above real human subjects" (p.
222). For example, in the Cold War era, the national interests were
largely yielded to a singular logic: "the defence of non-communist
social order" (p. 212), which was the main motivating factor of
ASEAN states' interventions, such as Indonesia's intervening
in East Timor and ASEAN's intervening in Vietnam's invasion of
Cambodia. In the post-Cold War era, the internal divisions in ASEAN
states became increasingly tense. As a result, ASEAN's dynamic
involvement fluctuated between nonintervention and intervention. In
1997, due to competing interests of state-linked business groups and the
new business elites, ASEAN imposed creeping conditionality on
Cambodia's ASEAN membership, which was "far from helping to
create political stability in Cambodia, but the exact opposite" (p.
149). Moreover, the intervention in East Timor in the post-Cold War era
also clearly indicates ASEAN's fluctuations between nonintervention
and intervention. After the Asian financial crisis, many ASEAN states
faced the decline of state-linked business groups, domestic legitimacy
crises, and geopolitical shifts, which prompted ASEAN to shift to a new
strategy, that is, "promoting political and economic reforms"
(p. 209) in the targeted state. ASEAN's attitude toward Myanmar
illustrated this shift.
In summary, noninterference is no longer a catch-all resolution for
ASEAN, and many cases of nonintervention analyzed in this book have had
destructive consequences; however, there may be less-destructive
alternatives to noninterference. As Jones describes, the Aceh Monitoring
Mission concentrates its efforts so as to monitor and support a peace
process accepted by all the parties to a conflict rather than to simply
"impose a settlement on domestic social conflicts" (p. 228).
This raises two questions open for discussion: First, how would ASEAN
find a proper approach to monitor and support a peace process in a
target state (e.g., Myanmar) in the future? Second, would an expansion
of ASEAN (e.g., ASEAN Plus Eight) contribute to advancing an alterative option for noninterference? The answers to these questions may be useful
to research of nonintervention in ASEAN.
ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia develops its
own alternative perspective of sovereignty, interference, and
noninterference in ASEAN, and disproves the stereotype that ASEAN has
been "socialized into a norm of non-interference" (p. 224).
Academics, researchers, and students of international relations
(especially those interested in sovereignty and noninterference) as well
as readers concerned about ASEAN and Southeast Asia studies will benefit
from this well-researched book.
Kai Chen
Center for Nontraditional Security and Peaceful Development
Studies, College of Public Administration
Zhejiang University, China
