All knowledge is not created equal: knowledge effects and the 2012 presidential debates.
Gottfried, Jeffrey A. ; Hardy, Bruce W. ; Winneg, Kenneth M. 等
Decades of research have confirmed that debates increase viewer
knowledge about the issue stands of the candidates (e.g., Benoit,
Hansen, and Verser 2003). However, the conditions under which viewers
learn are less well understood. In this article, we examine how
differences in the context of information in presidential debates affect
both who learns from such debates and what they learn. We ask three
research questions regarding learning from exposure to the 2012 general
election presidential debates: (1) Did these debates increase knowledge
of the content discussed in them? (2) Were viewers more likely to learn
about issues and matters relevant to the 2012 presidential election when
one candidate challenged the other's view or when the
candidate's statement was not contested? (3) Does learning occur at
the same rate regardless of viewer political predispositions, or did
confirmation bias determine whether and which individuals learned from
the debates?
Issue Knowledge and "Correct" Voting
For a representative democracy to work, citizens must be able to
cast a "correct vote" (Lau and Redlawsk 1997), one in line
with their policy preferences. In a world in which presidential
campaigns do at times mislead (see Jackson and Jamieson 2007), citizens
may vote for a candidate on the supposition that their positions align
when in fact they do not (see Waldman and Jamieson 2006). In 2008, for
example, the Obama campaign used targeted radio ads to deceptively cast
Senator John McCain as opposed to federal funding for stem-cell research
(see Kenski, Hardy, and Jamieson 2010). If a stem-cell issue voter voted
against McCain based on this deceptive message, then an "incorrect
vote" was cast.
Because most of us do not personally know national political
actors, we rely on media and campaign events to provide the necessary
information to cast a "correct vote." One important function
of presidential campaigns, then, is to inform voters of candidate policy
stands and of other factual information that is relevant to the
election. In our system of government, this function is central because,
as Gans (2003) wrote, "The country's democracy may belong
directly or indirectly to its citizens, but the democratic process can
only be truly meaningful if these citizens are informed" (1).
Debates offer a unique opportunity for voters to gain such information.
Debates and Learning
Since incumbent president and Republican nominee Gerald R. Ford
challenged Democrat Jimmy Carter to a series of nationally televised
debates in 1976, broadcast debates have become standard campaign events
in U.S. politics. These quadrennial events demand an unmatched level of
accountability of those seeking public office. Research on debate
viewing effects has focused primarily on political learning and shifts
in vote intentions (e.g., Benoit and Hansen 2004; Chaffee 1978; Jamieson
and Adasiewicz 2000). We focus on the former.
Past studies have consistently linked debates viewing with higher
levels of political knowledge. A meta-analysis of 18 studies on debates
from 1976 to 2000 (total N--7,202) found a mean weighted correlation
coefficient of 0.256 between debates and political knowledge, suggesting
that on average, debate viewing has a substantial impact on viewer
learning of the candidates' policy positions (Benoit, Hansen, and
Verser 2003). Some research suggests that debates increase issue
salience and have an agenda-setting effect (Becker et al. 1978; Benoit
and Hansen 2004). Benoit and Hansen (2004) examined the 1976, 1984,
1996, and 2000 data in the American National Election Studies (ANES) and
found that debate watchers cited more issues in their evaluations of the
candidates than did nondebate watchers. Consistent with these findings,
we hypothesize,
Hypothesis 1: Exposure to the 2012 presidential debates will
increase accurate knowledge of the issues and matters discussed in the
debates themselves.
Debate Learning by Type of Information
This study adds to the existing literature by examining whether and
how the context in which information is discussed within a presidential
debate affects rates of learning. In debates, information can be divided
into two categories: that which is contested and uncontested. Contested
information is presented by one candidate and challenged by the other.
Uncontested information is presented without challenge. We will treat
these information structures as two different informational contexts.
The structure of campaign information can influence the motivation
and the ability of individuals to process it (Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida
1994). For example, a candidate speech is a simple structure that is
often person-centered and invites easy candidate evaluation. Debates, on
the other hand, are more complex, presenting information on a number of
different facets from two or more candidates in an alternating format.
Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994) characterize debates as a
dimension-center format and conclude that the more person-centered
information contexts, such as the candidate speeches, require less
cognitive effort to process, whereas in the more dimension-centered
contexts, such as debates, the complex presentation of the information
may interfere with the ability to make sense of the information (Rahn,
Aldrich, and Borgida 1994). This finding is consistent with Just,
Crigler, and Wallach's (1990) finding that political ads are more
likely to increase candidate knowledge than debates.
Like the candidate speech, uncontested information provides a
single viewpoint or dimension. By contrast, contested information
creates a more complex context. Among other things, the presence of two
or more sides to an argument can lead to confusion. Thus, we further
hypothesize,
Hypothesis 2: Information introduced by one candidate and not
rebutted by the other-uncontested information--is learned at the greater
rate than information that is presented by one candidate but challenged
by the opponent--contested information.
Similar to Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994), we hypothesize that
motivation and ability to process information in these two different
contexts will vary based on viewers' political sophistication.
Because political sophisticates have greater "cognitive dexterity,
they should be less constrained by the structure of the information
imposed on them" (Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994, 195). Likewise,
since processing contested information requires greater cognitive effort
than uncontested information (see Hypothesis 2) and since political
sophisticates have greater cognitive dexterity, they should be less
hobbled by complex information contexts than political nonsophisticates.
Thus,
Hypothesis 3: The rate of learning in general and learning from
contested exchanges in particular will be greater among political
sophisticates than political nonsophisticates.
Previous studies have found that one's political beliefs will
influence how one interacts with and processes political information
because of selective attention and exposure (Graf and Aday 2008; Stroud
2008, 2011). But when viewers are exposed to a source that presents
information that is both consistent and inconsistent with their
political beliefs, viewers will likely rely on heuristics, such as
candidate preference, in determining which side is accurate. The
confirmation bias hypothesis suggests that people bolster
"hypotheses or beliefs whose truth is in question," create
"one-sided case building processes]," and interpret
"evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs,
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand" (Nickerson 1998, 175). When
exposed to information in a debate, particularly information that is
contested, confirmation bias should be actively and forcefully at play.
The same may not be true of uncontested information because the accuracy
of this information is not in question. Specifically, viewers may
respond to uncontested claims using a simple heuristic that assumes if
the statement was not accurate, the side disadvantaged by the
information would flag the inaccuracy. Therefore, we hypothesize,
Hypothesis 4: When information in a debate is contested, viewers
will be more likely to accept the interpretation offered by their
preferred candidate, but uncontested information will be accepted
regardless of candidate preference.
Method
We analyze data from the Annenberg Public Policy Center's
(APPC) Institutions of Democracy 2012 Political Knowledge Survey, a
six-wave national cross-sectional telephone survey of U.S. adults, 18
years or older, conducted during and after the 2012 presidential
election. In this article, we use waves 3 and 4 since they were
conducted immediately following the second and third presidential
debates. Wave 3 was fielded between October 17 and October 23, 2012, and
wave 4 between October 24 and October 29, 2012. Throughout the analyses
in this article, wave 3 is used to test the hypotheses only for the
second presidential debate, and wave 4 is used to test the hypothesis
only for the third presidential debate, since each wave was fielded
immediately following each respective debate.
Under contract to APPC, Social Science Research Solutions (SSRS)
completed a total of 1,233 interviews for wave 3 and 1,248 for wave 4
with randomly selected adults contacted through random-digit dialing
(RDD) of cell phones (wave 3: N = 422; wave 4: N = 430) and landline
telephones (wave 3: N = 811; wave 4: N = 818). (1) We oversampled
households in battleground states; 53.0% of the sample (N = 653) in wave
3 and 49.1% of the sample (N = 613) in wave 4 is residents in a
battleground state. (2)
Dependent Variables
Total Knowledge of the Second and Third Presidential Debates. Our
focus in this article is not on recall of what was said in the debates
but on the accuracy of the knowledge gained from exposure. Consequently,
we rely on a series of knowledge questions that asked respondents about
content discussed in the second and third presidential debates. In wave
3, respondents were asked 16 items about the second presidential debate,
and in wave 4, they were asked six items about the third presidential
debate. All six items asked about the third presidential debate in wave
4 were also asked in wave 3. (3) Table 1 presents the wave 3 items,
their correct answers, and the percent of the sample that answered each
item correctly; (4) Table 2 presents the same for the items in wave 4.
Each item was first coded to indicate whether a respondent answered it
correctly or not. (5) Scales were then created to indicate the percent
of total items answered correctly about the second presidential debate
from wave 3 (mean = 55.24%; SD = 18.62) and the third presidential
debate from wave 4 (mean = 51.38%; SD = 21.58).
Contested and Uncontested Debate Knowledge. The knowledge items
were categorized into two groupings: knowledge based on information that
was contested and knowledge based on accurate information that was not
contested in either debate. The categorization of each item is dependent
only on whether the information was contested or uncontested in the
second presidential debate for the wave 3 items and in the third
presidential debate for the wave 4 items, and not whether it was
contested or uncontested in any other form of communication, including
other debates. A question based on contested information asked,
"Has oil production on federal lands increased, decreased, or
stayed the same under President Obama?" In the debate, Obama
stated, "So here's what I've done since I've been
president. We have increased oil production to the highest levels in 16
years." Romney followed up this claim by arguing, "As a matter
of fact, oil production is down 14 percent this year on federal land,
and gas production is down 9 percent. Why? Because the president cut in
half the number of licenses and permits for drilling on federal lands
and in federal waters." A question drawing on accurate uncontested
information from the second debate is "Which candidate proposes
raising federal income taxes on households earning 250 thousand dollars
or more per year? Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Both, or Neither?" In
this debate, Obama clearly says that he plans to raise federal income
taxes on households earning $250,000 a year, and the statement was not
challenged by Romney:
PRESIDENT OBAMA: [I]n addition to some tough spending cuts,
we've also got to make sure that the wealthy do a little bit more.
So what I've said is your first $250,000 worth of income, no
change. And that means 98 percent of American families, 97 percent of
small businesses, they will not see a tax increase. I'm ready to
sign that bill right now.... But what I've also said is for above
250,000 (dollars), we can go back to the tax rates we had when Bill
Clinton was president."
For the second presidential debate (wave 3), four items were
categorized as based on information that was contested and 11 were based
on accurate information that was uncontested. One item was categorized
as neither based on contested nor on uncontested accurate information
and thus not included in either scale. For the third presidential debate
(wave 4), three items were classed as based on information that was
contested in the debate and three on accurate information that was
uncontested. The categorization of each item is also presented in Tables
1 and 2. Scales were created in both waves that indicate the percent of
items based on contested information answered correctly (wave 3: mean =
39-52%, SD = 22.97; wave 4: mean = 39-21%, SD = 26.72) and based on
accurate uncontested information answered correctly (wave 3: mean =
63-21%, SD = 23-61; wave 4: mean = 63.62%, SD = 31.98).
Independent Variables
Second and Third Presidential Debate Viewership. Respondents were
asked in wave 3 how much of the second presidential debate they watched,
and respondents in wave 4 were asked how much of the third presidential
debate they watched. These two variables are on a four-point scale
ranging from 0 (none) to 3 (all) (wave 3: mean = 1.73, SD = 1.25; wave
4: mean = 1.48; SD = 1.27).
Political Sophistication. In the same vein as Rahn, Aldrich, and
Borgida (1994), we created a composite index from several different
measures for our measure of political sophistication. We standardized
and took the mean of three measures: total news media consumption, how
closely respondents were following the election, and basic campaign
knowledge. Total news media consumption was measured by taking the mean
of five items that indicate the days/week that individuals watch local
news, broadcast national nightly news, their most frequently watched
cable news channel, listened to talk radio, or read a newspaper. The
scale ranges from 0 (very low news media consumption) to 7 (very high
news media consumption) (wave 3: mean = 3.14, SD = 1.68; wave 4: mean =
2.97, SD = 1.69). Closely following was measured with a single item that
asked respondents "How closely are you following the 2012
presidential campaign?" ranging from 1 (not closely at all) to 4
(very closely) (wave 3: mean = 3.31, SD = 0.89; wave 4: mean = 3.26, SD
= 0.96). Basic campaign knowledge was measured with two items that asked
respondents to name the current vice president of the United States and
the Republican vice presidential candidate. A three-point scale ranging
from 0 to 2 correct answers was created (wave 3: mean = 1.45, SD = 0.80;
wave 4: mean = 1.47, SD = 0.76). The standardized scale from these three
items was split at the median to determine whether respondents were
political sophisticates or nonsophisticates. The measure varied somewhat
from Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida's (1994); notably, we did not
include a measure of participation in political activities.
Candidate Favorability. This variable was constructed by
subtracting a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 to 10 for Mitt Romney
from that of Barack Obama, creating a scale ranging from -10 (very high
favorability of Romney over Obama) to 10 (very high favorability of
Obama over Romney) (wave 3: mean = 0.58, SD = 7.16; wave 4: mean = 0.54,
SD = 7.07).
Analyses
First, for the test of Hypothesis 1, multiple linear regression
models predicting total debate knowledge from debate viewing were
created. Next, for the tests of Hypothesis 2, linear regression models
were conducted to predict the scales for knowledge based on information
that was contested in the debates and knowledge based on accurate
information that was uncontested in the debates. For the test of
Hypothesis 3, multiple linear regression models were constructed to
predict each of the three knowledge scales from debate viewing,
political sophistication, and the interaction between debate viewing and
political sophistication. Finally, for the test of Hypothesis 4, two
logistic regression models were conducted for each individual knowledge
item to test whether the effect of debate viewing varies by candidate
favorability; one model predicted correct knowledge of each item from
debate viewership, and a second included candidate favorability and an
interaction between debate viewership and candidate favorability. In
addition to the independent variables already discussed, each model
controls for total news media consumption, basic campaign knowledge, (6)
residence in a battleground state, political party identification,
political ideology, years of education, race, gender, and age. (7)
Results
Table 3 presents the models that predict each of the three
knowledge scales of the second presidential debate (wave 3)--total
knowledge, knowledge based on information that was contested, and
knowledge based on accurate information that was uncontested. Table 4
presents the same for the third presidential debate (wave 4). The first
model in both Tables 3 and 4 tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that
debate exposure will increase total knowledge of content discussed in
the debate. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find that reported debate
viewership increased total knowledge in both debates; reporting watching
all of the second debate increased the percent of questions answered
correctly by 11.9% compared to not watching any of the debate (t = 9-88,
p < .001), and reported viewing all of the third debate increased the
number of questions answered correctly by 15.2% compared to not watching
any of that debate (t = 10.53, p < .001).(8)
It should first be noted that respondents answered more of the
questions based on accurate uncontested information correctly than those
based on contested information; 63.2% (wave 3) and 63.6% (wave 4) of the
items based on accurate uncontested information were answered correctly
compared to 39.5% (wave 3) and 39.2% (wave 4) of items based on
information that was contested.
The second and third models in Tables 3 and 4 test Hypothesis 2,
which predicts that debate exposure will increase knowledge based on
information that was uncontested in the debates more so than knowledge
based on information that was contested. First, we find strong evidence
from both waves that viewing the debates increased accurate information
that was uncontested. Watching all of the second debate increased
knowledge of the accurate uncontested information by 16.0% (t= 10.53,
p< .001) compared to not watching any of that debate, and watching
all of the third debate increased accurate uncontested knowledge by
22.2% (t = 10.12, p < .001) compared to not watching any of that
debate. Additionally, we find evidence from wave 4 that debate viewing
increased knowledge based on information that was contested. Watching
all of the third presidential debate increased contested knowledge by
8.4% (t = 4.35, p < .001) compared to not watching that debate at
all. While the coefficient for the effect of watching the second
presidential debate on knowledge based on contested information was also
positive in wave 3, it does not meet conventional standards of
statistical significance.
Further, consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient of debate
viewership significantly differs between the two knowledge scales for
both debates; the effect of debate viewership was greater on knowledge
based on accurate uncontested information than on knowledge based on
contested information (wave 3: F = 36.95, p < .001; wave 4: F =
21.76, p < .001). The predicted values for the effects of debate
watching on the two knowledge scales for the second presidential debate
are presented in Figure 1, and for the third presidential debate, they
are presented in Figure 2. The slope of the lines for both knowledge
based on accurate uncontested information and knowledge based on
contested information increases as the amount of debate viewing does
(though not significantly for knowledge based on contested information
for the second presidential debate), but at a greater rate for knowledge
based on accurate uncontested information.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Tables 5 and 6 present the models for the test of Hypothesis 3,
which predict that political sophisticates will learn from the debates
at a greater rate than nonsophisticates, particularly for the knowledge
based on contested information. First, we find that political
sophisticates were significantly more knowledgeable than
nonsophisticates for total knowledge and knowledge based on accurate
uncontested information in both waves. While also in the expected
positive direction, the coefficients for being a political sophisticate
in the models that predict knowledge based on contested information are
not significant in either wave. Additionally, there is no evidence in
any of the models that the effect of debate viewership on total
knowledge, knowledge based on contested information, or knowledge based
on accurate uncontested information varied between political
sophisticates and nonsophisticates, as seen with the nonsignificant
interaction terms. Thus, we find no evidence for Hypothesis 3.
To begin understanding why there are the differences in the rates
of learning of each type of knowledge, as found in the test of
Hypothesis 2, we turn to the logistic regression models in Table 7 that
predict each knowledge item individually. There are two separate models
for each item; the first column for each item is a model that predicts
having answered the item correctly from debate viewing, and the second
column includes candidate favorability and the interaction between
debate viewing and candidate favorability.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
From the models in the first column for each item, we find that two
of the seven (28.6%) items based on contested information across the two
debates (zero of four items from the second debate and two of the three
from the third debate) were significantly and positively predicted by
debate viewing. Comparatively, 11 of the 14 (78.6%) items based on
accurate uncontested information (eight of 11 items from the second
debate and all three from the third debate) were significantly predicted
by debate viewing. Information complexity, then, provides one
explanation for why the rate of learning contested information is lower
than uncontested accurate information. When accurate information is
rebutted during a debate, complexity increases, and audiences are less
likely to learn.(9)
These differences in the rates of learning based on contested
compared to uncontested information also presumably occur because
viewers assume that arguments advanced by their candidate are accurate
regardless of whether or not they are, as stated in Hypothesis 4, which
predicts that viewers would be more likely to learn the interpretation
offered by their preferred candidate among the information that is
contested in the debates. The models for the test of this hypothesis are
presented in the second column for each item in Table 7. Starting with
the knowledge based on accurate uncontested information, there is only
evidence for four of the 14 (28.6%) items that learning varied by
respondents' preference for one candidate over the other. Thus, for
the items based on information that was accurate and uncontested in the
debates, learning from debate viewing occurred for a vast majority of
these items and most often occurred at the same rate regardless of which
candidate the respondents supported.
While learning often did not vary by candidate preference among the
knowledge items based on information that was accurate and uncontested
in the debates, learning often did vary by candidate preference among
the knowledge items based on information that was contested in the
debates. Among four of the seven (57.1%) knowledge items based on
contested information--two of the four from the second presidential
debate and two of three from the third presidential debate--the rate of
learning varied with candidate preference. A positive interaction
indicates that Obama supporters learned that specific piece of
information at a greater rate than Romney supporters, while a negative
interaction indicates that Romney supporters learned at a greater rate
than Obama supporters. Nonsignificant interaction terms indicate that
the rate of learning, if any, does not differ by candidate preference.
Of the two contested items that are significantly predicted by debate
viewing, both vary by respondent candidate preference, suggesting that
when learning occurred overall, it occurred at a depressed rate.
Further, among two of the contested items in which learning overall did
not occur, the effect of debate viewing varied by respondent disposition
toward the candidates. In other words, for these two items, learning of
correct and incorrect answers both occurred, but the overall effects of
debate viewing on knowledge was cancelled out by partisan preference.
Because both of these items were from the second presidential debate,
this explains why there was no significant effect of debate viewing on
knowledge of information based on contested information in the second
debate. For the remaining three contested knowledge items, there is no
evidence of learning of any kind. Overall, these results provide
evidence for confirmation bias in that learning information that is
contested is largely affected by candidate preference.
Further, the directions of the interaction terms suggest that those
who preferred Obama over Romney gained accurate knowledge about the
contested items in which the correct answer was favorable to the Obama
candidacy, and those who preferred Romney over Obama gained accurate
knowledge about the contested items in which the correct answer was
favorable to the Romney candidacy. For example, for the item that asks
the accuracy of the statement, "While in foreign countries, Barack
Obama has repeatedly apologized for America" (third debate, wave
4), the positive interaction suggests that as favorability for Obama
over Romney increased, so did the likelihood of reporting the correct
answer from viewing the third debate. This relationship can be seen in
Figure 3.10 Conversely, for the statement that asks about the accuracy
of the statement, "Governor Romney wanted to take Detroit auto
manufacturers into bankruptcy without providing any form of federal
aid" (third debate, wave 4), the negative interaction suggests that
as support for Romney over Obama increased, the rate of reporting the
correct answer increased.(11) This relationship can be seen in Figure 4.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Discussion
This study explores how the context of information in debates
influences rates of learning and who learns. First, consistent with
previous literature, we report that watching the debates increased
knowledge of campaign issues and related matters discussed in the
debates. We also found that knowledge based on accurate information that
was uncontested in the debate was gained at a greater rate than
knowledge based on information that was presented by one candidate but
contested by the other. Thus, when accurate information is presented in
a debate, the context of the exchange influences the rate of learning.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
We did not find differences in the amount of knowledge political
sophisticates and nonsophisticates gained from debates. Debates may
provide a venue in which learning the issues and matters relevant to a
specific presidential campaign occurs regardless of how politically
sophisticated viewers are. We do realize, though, that there may be
limitation in our measure of sophistication.
Consistent with confirmation bias, learning based on information
that was contested in the debate was influenced by viewers'
candidate preferences more often than not. Yet, learning largely
occurred at the same rate for knowledge that was based on accurate
information that was uncontested in the debate. These findings suggest
that in a debate format, confirmation bias often, but does not always,
influence whether viewers will gain accurate knowledge when information
is contested. Additionally, even though there was uncontested
information about both candidates, in most cases if the information was
presented without rebuttal, it was learned equally among both Romney and
Obama supporters. This result confirms a civic function of debates.
Specifically, in some contexts they can increase viewer knowledge about
both candidates regardless of candidate preference.
Some notable limitations exist in this research. First, the
analyses are based on observational survey data, whose internal validity
is less robust than experimental designs. Replicating these results
through an experimental design would be the next step. Specifically, due
to the nature of observational survey data, the reverse relationship
between debate viewership and knowledge is possible in that those who
are more knowledgeable about campaign content are more likely to have
viewed the debates. Given the specificity of the questions asked about
the debate content, the extensive list of controls, and the consistency
of the findings with previous research, though, we suspect that the
direction of the relationship of exposure increasing knowledge is more
plausible. Next, we recognize the research that suggests that people
overreport their media and presidential debate consumption (e.g., Prior
2009, 2012). However, since we examine the effect of debate viewership
on knowledge, overreported debate viewership would understate effects
because those who falsely reported viewing the debates were analyzed as
viewing them, diminishing the actual knowledge effects of those who
accurately reported viewing the debates.
Overall, this study is important for three reasons. First, it
confirms that debates remain important events that foster learning about
the candidates and their issue stands. Second, it details the influence
of context (specifically whether information is or is not contested) on
learning in absorption of debate content. Finally, it underscores the
finding that confirmation bias is strongly at play among debate viewers
but plays a lesser role in the face of uncontested than contested
information.
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JEFFREY A. GOTTFRIED
Pew Research Center
BRUCE W. HARDY
Annenberg Public Policy Center
University of Pennsylvania
KENNETH M. WINNEG
Annenberg Public Policy Center
University of Pennsylvania
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON
Annenberg Public Policy Center
University of Pennsylvania
(1.) All interviews were conducted by live interviewers using
computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) software. In households
reached by landline, an adult was selected at random based on their age
(or most recent birthday). The questionnaire was delivered in Spanish
for those who selected that option. Nonresponsive phone numbers were
contacted up to six times, and in cases where initial attempts were met
with soft refusal (i.e., abrupt hang-ups), refusal-conversion attempts
were made. Accounting for design effects produced by survey weights, the
margin of error is 3.7 percent for wave 3 and 3.6 percent for wave 4.
The response rate was 13% for wave 3 and 11% for wave 4. Response rate
uses the standard AAPOR RR3 formula.
(2.) These percentages are not weighted; every other raw percent in
this article is weighted by national population parameters. Battleground
states were defined as Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
The total share of adults residing in these states is 28.9% based on the
2012 March Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau's Current
Population Survey (CPS) (http://www.census.gov/cps).
(3.) Questions were chosen for inclusion in the debate knowledge
scales only if they were directly and explicitly discussed by either
candidate in the second and third presidential debates. If a question
was not directly and explicitly discussed in the debate, then it was not
included in the scale for that debate. There were no questions that met
this requirement that were omitted from the analysis. The difference in
the number of questions used for the scales between the second and third
debates is due to there being fewer questions asked that met this
requirement for the third debate.
(4.) To determine whether a candidate's statement about his or
his opponent's future plans were accurate in the debates, we relied
on candidate statements in speeches and on the candidates' web
site. Many of the issues and claims about past actions or the content of
speeches asked about in our survey were discussed by the four major
national fact-checking organizations (Washington Post's Fact
Checker. Pulitijact, FactCheck.org, and the Associated Press). For those
questions in which the issues and claims were discussed by these
organizations, we adopted their conclusions to determine the correct
answer to each of our questions.
(5.) Do not know responses were coded as not correct. Refusals were
coded as missing.
(6.) The models for Hypotheses 3 do not include total news media
consumption and basic campaign knowledge since the measure of political
sophistication already includes these two measures.
(7.) The following is the demographic breakdown of wave 3:
political party identification--25.8% Republican, 33-6% Democrat;
political ideology (l=very libetal; 5 = very conservative)--mean = 3.15,
SD = 1.26; years of education--mean--13.82; SD = 2.51; race--12.4%
black, 12.5% Hispanic; gender--51.4% female; age--mean = 47.78, SD =
17.80. The following is the demographic breakdown of wave 4: political
party identification--22.6% Republican, 34.5% Democrat; political
ideology (l=very liberal; 5= very conservative)--mean = 3.27, SD = 1.19;
years of education--mean = 13.84; SD = 2.50; race--13-4% black, 13.5%
Hispanic; gender--51.7% female; age--mean = 47.14, SD = 17.87.
(8.) For the models in Tables 3 and 4, we did not control for
closely following the election because while this variable may be a
confounding variable, it also theoretically can serve as a mediating
variable between debate viewership and knowledge. That said, we ran an
additional set of models with closely following as a control. In these
models the magnitude of the coefficient for debate viewership across
models is slightly depressed, but in the same direction, and significant
where they were significant in Tables 3 and 4.
(9.) For the models in Table 7, we did not control for closely
following the election for reasons previously mentioned. That said, we
ran additional models with closely following as a control. The only
mentionable differences for the second debate items are that the main
effect of debate viewing in the noninteraction models of items 5 and 9
falls below significance, and the interaction between candidate
favorability and debate watching becomes significant for item 11. For
the third presidential debate, the only mentionable difference is that
the main effect for debate viewership in the noninteraction model for
item 1 falls below significance.
(10.) Figures 3 and 4 were created by plotting the predicted values
for these two knowledge items at three different intervals of candidate
favorability: completely favorable of Obama over Romney (i.e., 10 on the
candidate favorability scale), completely favorable of Romney over Obama
(i.e., -10 on the candidate favorability scale), and not favorable of
one candidate over the other (i.e., 0 on the candidate favorability
scale). These three theoretical points were chosen specifically as
examples of the extremes of candidate favorability and a midpoint of no
preference. Thus, this graph should not be interpreted as three groups
of individuals, but instead as three lines of the ranges of the rates of
learning since the candidate favorability scale is a continuum from -10
to 10. Based on the logistic regression models, the baseline respondents
could be interpreted as those who did not favor one candidate over the
other and did not watch any of the debate.
(11.) It should be noted that based on the predicted values in
Figure 4, the rate of learning among those who completely favored Obama
over Romney (i.e., 10 on the candidate favorability scale) is virtually
flat. This is consistent with the notion that those who favored Romney
learned at a greater rate about contested knowledge that was favorable
of Romney and that those who favored Obama would learn at a depressed
rate, if at all.
Jeffrey A. Gottfried is a research associate for the Pew Research
Center for the People & the Press and the Pew Research Journalism
Project.
Bruce W. Hardy is a senior researcher in political communication at
the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.
Kenneth Winneg is the managing director of Survey Research at the
Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.
Kathleen HallJamieson is the Elizabeth Ware Packard Professor at
the Annenberg School for Communication and director of the Annenberg
Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.
TABLE 1
Knowledge Items Asked of Second Presidential Debate (Wave 3)
Question Wording Correct Answer % Correct
Knowledge Based on Contested
Information
1 Mitt Romney's tax plan will Not Accurate 46.9%
increase the deficit by over 4 and
a half trillion dollars. How
accurate do you think that
statement is? Would you say it is
very accurate, somewhat accurate,
not too accurate, or not accurate
at all?
2 Has oil production on federal lands Increased 30.3%
increased, decreased, or stayed the
same under President Obama?
3 Governor Romney wanted to take Not Accurate 24.2%
Detroit auto manufacturers into
bankruptcy without providing any
form of federal aid. How accurate
do you think that statement is?
Would you say it is very accurate,
somewhat accurate, not too
accurate, or not accurate at all?
4 No new jobs have been created as a Not Accurate 56.7%
result of the stimulus which was
passed in the first year of Obama's
presidency. How accurate do you
think that statement is? Would you
say it is very accurate, somewhat
accurate, not too accurate, or not
accurate at all?
Knowledge Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
5 Which candidate would push for Barack Obama 49.2%
passage of the assault weapons ban?
Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, both, or
neither?
6 Which candidate favors branding Mitt Romney 58.0%
China as a currency manipulator and
imposing tariffs on Chinese goods?
Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Both, or
Neither?
7 In early October, the Bureau of Accurate 65.5%
Labor Statistics announced that the
national unemployment rate dropped
below eight percent. How accurate
do you think that statement is?
Would you say it is very accurate,
somewhat accurate, not too
accurate, or not accurate at all?
8 Which candidate has promised to Mitt Romney 58.1%
increase military spending? Barack
Obama, Mitt Romney, Both, or
Neither?
9 Which candidate proposes raising Barack Obama 57.9%
federal income taxes on households
earning 250 thousand dollars or
more per year? Barack Obama, Mitt
Romney, both, or neither?
10 Which candidate says he will keep Mitt Romney 55.3%
the Bush tax cuts in place
permanently? Barack Obama, Mitt
Romney, both, or neither?
11 Which candidate favors building the Mitt Romney 65.5%
Keystone pipe line without delay?
Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, both, or
neither?
12 Mitt Romney has investments in Accurate 77.3%
Chinese companies. How accurate do
you think that statement is? Would
you say it is very accurate,
somewhat accurate, not too
accurate, or not accurate at all?
13 Which candidate supports the Dream Barack Obama 73.6%
act which provides a path to
permanent residence status for
young undocumented immigrants who
were brought to this country
illegally as children. Barack
Obama, Mitt Romney, both, or
neither?
14 Which candidate favors eliminating Mitt Romney 72.9%
funding for the Public Broadcasting
Service, also known as PBS? Barack
Obama, Mitt Romney, both, or
neither?
15 The Obama administration cut banks Accurate 63.2%
out as the middlemen in the student
loan program and put the money
saved back into student loans. How
accurate do you think that
statement is? Would you say it is
very accurate, somewhat accurate,
not too accurate, or not accurate
at all?
Based on Neither Contested nor
Accurate Uncontested Information
16 While in foreign countries, Barack Not Accurate 30.9%
Obama has repeatedly apologized for
America. How accurate do you think
that statement is? Would you say it
is very accurate, somewhat
accurate, not too accurate, or not
accurate at all?
TABLE 2
Knowledge Items Asked of Third Presidential Debate (Wave 4)
Question Wording Correct Answer % Correct
Knowledge Based on Contested
Information
1 While in foreign countries, Barack Not Accurate 36.7%
Obama has repeatedly apologized for
America. How accurate do you think
that statement is? Would you say it
is very accurate, somewhat accurate,
not too accurate, or not accurate at
all?
2 Mitt Romney's tax plan will increase Not Accurate 45.1%
the deficit by over 4 and a half
trillion dollars. How accurate do
you think that statement is? Would
you say it is very accurate,
somewhat accurate, not too accurate,
or not accurate at all?
3 Governor Romney wanted to take Not Accurate 36.0%
Detroit auto manufacturers into
bankruptcy without providing any
form of federal aid. How accurate do
you think that statement is? Would
you say it is very accurate,
somewhat accurate, not too accurate,
or not accurate at all?
Knowledge Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
4 Which candidate has promised to Mitt Romney 58.7%
increase military spending? Barack
Obama, Mitt Romney, Both, or Neither
5 Which candidate favors branding Mitt Romney 58.4%
China as a currency manipulator and
imposing tariffs on Chinese good?
Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Both, or
Neither?
6 Mitt Romney has investments in Accurate 73.8%
Chinese companies. How accurate do
you think that statement is? Would
you say it is very accurate,
somewhat accurate, not too accurate,
or not accurate at all?
TABLE 3
Effect of Watching the Second Presidential Debate on Knowledge of
Issues and Matters Discussed in the Debate (Wave 3)
Knowledge
Based on
Contested
Total Knowledge Information
b std err b std err
Amount of Second Presidential 3.98 *** 0.40 0.75 0.61
Debate Watched
Total News Media Consumption 0.17 0.30 -0.09 0.45
Basic Campaign Knowledge 7.41 *** 0.69 1.03 1.04
Lives in Battleground State 0.21 0.88 -2.18 1.32
Republican -1.55 1.15 1.03 1.73
Democrat 2.69 * 1.11 1.14 1.66
Conservative -1.44 *** 0.41 0.33 0.61
Education (years) 0.94 *** 0.19 0.40 0.29
Hispanic -1.96 1.78 2.03 2.67
Black -1.07 1.53 0.23 2.29
Female -4.62 *** 0.89 -1.25 1.33
Age -0.08 ** 0.03 -0.08 0.04
Constant 35.04 34.89
N 1,108 1,108
[R.sup.2] 0.32 0.02
Knowledge Based
on Accurate
Uncontested
Information
b std err
Amount of Second Presidential 5.32 *** 0.51
Debate Watched
Total News Media Consumption 0.25 0.38
Basic Campaign Knowledge 10.33 *** 0.87
Lives in Battleground State 1.04 1.10
Republican -1.67 1.44
Democrat 1.89 1.39
Conservative -1.13 * 0.51
Education (years) 1.07 *** 0.24
Hispanic -3.63 2.23
Black -0.98 1.91
Female -6.37 *** 1.11
Age -0.08 * 0.04
Constant 35.00
N 1,108
[R.sup.2] 0.34
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Annenberg Public Policy Center's Institutions of Democracy
2012 Political Knowledge Survey.
TABLE 4
Effect of Watching the Third Presidential Debate on Knowledge of
Issues and Matters Discussed in the Debate (Wave 4)
Knowledge Based on
Contested
Total Knowledge Information
b std err b std err
Amount of Third 5.07 *** 0.48 2 80 *** 0.64
Presidential Debate
Watched
Total News Media 0.92 * 0.38 0.50 0.51
Consumption
Basic Campaign Knowledge 5.73 *** 0.93 1.98 1.24
Lives in Battleground 0.10 1.08 0.46 1.45
State
Republican 3.22 * 1.43 8.16 *** 1.91
Democrat -2.40 1.37 -3.15 1.83
Conservative 0.62 0.52 1.64 * 0.70
Education [years) 0.90 *** 0.25 1.07 *** 0.33
Hispanic 0.59 1.94 6.15 * 2.59
Black -1.38 1.99 -0.07 2.65
Female -3.03 ** 1.11 -2.72 1.49
Age -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.05
Constant 23.28 11.42
N 1,112 1,112
[R.sup.2] 0.25 0.10
Knowledge Based on
Accurate
Uncontested
Information
b std err
Amount of Third 7.38 *** 0.73
Presidential Debate
Watched
Total News Media 1.30 * 0.58
Consumption
Basic Campaign Knowledge 9.60 *** 1.41
Lives in Battleground -0.41 1.64
State
Republican -1.79 2.17
Democrat -1.45 2.08
Conservative -0.30 0.79
Education [years) 0.71 0.37
Hispanic -5.32 2.94
Black -2.79 3.01
Female -3.12 1.69
Age -0.08 0.05
Constant 34.74
N 1,111
[R.sup.2] 0.22
* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Annenberg Public Policy Center's Institutions of Democracy
2012 Political Knowledge Survey.
TABLE 5
Models Predicting Knowledge of Issues and Matters Discussed in the
Second Presidential Debate by Debate Viewership and Political
Sophistication (Wave 3)
Knowledge Based
on Contested
Total Knowledge Information
b std err b std err
Amount of Second 4.13 *** 0.53 1.01 0.77
Presidential Debate
Watched
Political Sophisticate 7.72 *** 2.06 4.56 3.00
Debate Watched * -0.36 0.87 -1.28 1.27
Sophisticate
Lives in Battleground State 0.47 0.90 -2.12 1.31
Republican -0.70 1.18 1.03 1.72
Democrat 2.68 * 1.14 1.11 1.66
Conservative -1.47 *** 0.42 0.37 0.61
Education (years) 1.35 *** 0.90 0.41 0.28
Hispanic -3.36 1.83 1.75 2.67
Black -2.67 1.55 -0.08 2.26
Female -4.90 *** 0.92 -1.20 1.33
Age -0.11 *** 0.03 -0.09 * 0.04
Constant 39.77 35.51
N 1,109 1,109
[R.sup.2] 0.28 0.02
Knowledge Based on
Accurate
Uncontested
Information
b std err
Amount of Second 5.51 *** 0.67
Presidential Debate
Watched
Political Sophisticate 9.93 *** 2.60
Debate Watched * -0.26 1.10
Sophisticate
Lives in Battleground State 1.41 1.14
Republican -0.45 1.49
Democrat 1.89 1.44
Conservative -1.19 * 0.53
Education (years) 1.66 *** 0.24
Hispanic -5.56 * 2.32
Black -3.20 1.97
Female -6.79 *** 1.16
Age -0.13 *** 0.04
Constant 41.52
N 1,109
[R.sup.2] 0.29
* p< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Annenberg Public Policy Center's Institutions of Democracy
2012 Political Knowledge Survey.
TABLE 6
Models Predicting Knowledge of Issues and Matters Discussed in the
Third Presidential Debate by Debate Viewership and Political
Sophistication (Wave 4)
Knowledge Based on
Contested
Total Knowledge Information
b std err b std err
Amount of Third 6.04 *** 0.64 3.41 *** 0.85
Presidential Debate
Watched
Political Sophisticate 7.41 *** 2.21 1.67 2.93
Debate Watched * -1.39 0.99 -0.44 1.31
Sophisticate
Lives in Battleground 0.18 1.10 0.77 1.46
State
Republican 3.32 * 1.46 8.18 *** 1.93
Democrat -2.80 * 1.39 -3.33 1.84
Conservative 0.55 0.53 1.55 * 0.70
Education (years) 1.18 *** 0.24 1.15 *** 0.32
Hispanic -0.28 1.96 5.68 * 2.60
Black -1.94 1.98 0.25 2.63
Female -3.13 ** 1.13 -3.00 * 1.49
Age -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.04
Constant 28.35 13.91
N 1,116 1,116
[R.sup.2] 0.23 0.10
Knowledge Based on
Accurate
Uncontested
Information
b std err
Amount of Third 8.78 *** 0.98
Presidential Debate
Watched
Political Sophisticate 13.04 *** 3.35
Debate Watched * -2.41 1.50
Sophisticate
Lives in Battleground -0.45 1.67
State
Republican -1.66 2.21
Democrat -2.22 2.11
Conservative -0.40 0.80
Education (years) 1.20 *** 0.37
Hispanic -6.63 * 2.98
Black -4.29 3.01
Female -3.12 1.71
Age -0.08 0.05
Constant 42.54
N 1,115
[R.sup.2] 0.19
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Annenberg Public Policy Center's Institutions of Democracy
2012 Political Knowledge Survey.
TABLE 7
Logistic Regression Models Predicting Each Knowledge
Item from Debate Viewing and Candidate Favorability
Debate 2 Items
Based on Contested
Information
([dagger]) 2
Amount of Second 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.06
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- -0.14 *** -- .08 **
Favorability * Debate -- -0.02 * -- 0.02 *
Watch
Constant -1.47 -0.44 -0.26 -0.91
N 1,107 1,096 1,106 1,095
McFadden [R.sup.2] .14 .24 .10 .16
Debate 2 Items
Based on Contested
Information
3 4
Amount of Second -0.05 -0.09 0.03 0.06
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- -0.06 * -- .11 ***
Favorability * Debate -- -0.01 -- 0.00
Watch
Constant -0.34 0.28 -0.46 -1.22
N 1,106 1,095 1,106 1,095
McFadden [R.sup.2] .08 .10 .09 .14
Debate 2 Items
Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
5 6
Amount of Second 0.20 ** 0.18 ** 0.44 *** 0.47 ***
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- -0.04 -- 0.00
Favorability * Debate -- 0.02 * -- -0.04 ***
Watch
Constant -0.96 -0.83 -2.11 -1.79
N 1,107 1,096 1,107 1,096
McFadden [R.sup.2] .05 .05 .11 .14
Debate 2 Items
Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
7 8
Amount of Second 0.12 0.14 * 0 41 *** 0.40 ***
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- 0.11 *** -- 0.00
Favorability * Debate -- 0.00 -- 0.01
Watch
Constant 0.86 0.18 -1.80 -1.90
N 1,107 1,097 1,107 1,096
McFadden [R.sup.2] .08 .11 .11 .11
Debate 2 Items
Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
9 10
Amount of Second 0.19 ** 0.18 ** 0.01 0.00
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- 0.05 * -- -0.01
Favorability * Debate -- -0.01 -- 0.01
Watch
Constant -1.93 -2.13 -1.23 -1.34
N 1,107 1,096 1,106 1,095
McFadden [R.sup.2] .10 .10 .07 .07
Debate 2 Items
Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
11 12
Amount of Second .53 *** 0.54 *** .46 *** .48 ***
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- -0.03 -- 0.07 **
Favorability * Debate -- -0.02 -- -0.01
Watch
Constant -1.59 -1.23 0.87 0.57
N 1,107 1,096 1,104 1,093
McFadden [R.sup.2] .25 .26 .08 .09
Debate 2 Items
Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
13 ([dagger]) 14
Amount of Second 0.03 0.04 .39 *** 0.37 ***
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- 0.02 -- 0.08 **
Favorability * Debate -- 0.01 -- -0.02 *
Watch
Constant -1.74 -1.91 -0.99 -1.08
N 1,107 1,096 1,103 1,092
McFadden [R.sup.2] .08 .08 .19 .19
Debate 2 Items
Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
15
Amount of Second 0.34 *** 0.38 ***
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- 0.07 **
Favorability * Debate -- 0.01
Watch
Constant 2.16 1.72
N 1,105 1,094
McFadden [R.sup.2] .10 .14
Debate 3 Items
Based on Contested
Information
1 2
Amount of Third 0.16 * 0.10 0.06 0.04
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- 0.11 *** -- -0.13 ***
Favorability * Debate -- 0.05 *** -- -0.01
Watch
Constant -1.50 -2.59 -2.43 -1.59
N 1,109 1,103 1,112 1,106
McFadden [R.sup.2] .25 .36 .18 .25
Debate 3 Items
Based on Contested
Information
3
Amount of Third .22 *** 0.16 *
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- -0.09 ***
Favorability * Debate -- -0.02 *
Watch
Constant -1.91 -1.05
N 1,109 1,103
McFadden [R.sup.2] .14 .19
Debate 3 Items
Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
4 5
Amount of Third 0.38 *** 0.39 *** 0.42 *** 0 46 ** *
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- 0.02 -- 0.01
Favorability * Debate -- -0.01 -- -0.04 ***
Watch
Constant -1.82 -1.78 -1.69 -1.40
N 1,110 1,104 1,109 1,104
McFadden [R.sup.2] .12 .12 .12 .12
Debate 3 Items
Based on Accurate
Uncontested Information
6
Amount of Third 0.33 *** 0.37 ***
Presidential Debate
Watched
Candidate Favorability -- 0.04 *
Favorability * Debate -- 0.01
Watch
Constant 1.57 1.22
N 1,105 1,099
McFadden [R.sup.2] .06 .07
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Notes: All models control for total news media consumption, basic
campaign knowledge, lives in battleground state, party
identification, political ideology, education, race, gender, and
age.
([dagger)] Question wording for each item can be found in Table
1. The numbers correspond to each respective item in Table 1.
Source: Annenberg Public Policy Center's Institutions of
Democracy 2012 Political Knowledge Survey.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Notes: All models control for total news media consumption, basic
campaign knowledge, lives in battleground state, party
identification, political ideology, education, race, gender, and
age.
([dagger]) Question wording for each item can be found in Tables
1 and 2. The numbers correspond to each respective item in Table
1 for the second presidential debate and 2 for the third
presidential debate.
Source: Annenberg Public Policy Center's Institutions of
Democracy 2012 Political Knowledge Survey.
