Congressional Abdication on War and Spending.

Burgin, Eileen

Congressional Abdication on War and Spending. By Louis Fisher. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000. 220 pp.

Those familiar with Louis Fisher's works will not be disappointed by Congressional Abdication on War and Spending. And for those not familiar with Fisher's writings, but interested in the presidency, Congress, or domestic and foreign policy generally, this book is a "must-read"--the arguments are clear and carefully documented, and the judgments are sharp, perceptive, and provocative.

Fisher captures his theme in the title--he contends that Congress has abdicated its constitutional war and spending powers since 1950. The framers' belief that each branch would be vigilant in guarding its own prerogatives was correct for about 160 years, he argues, but is not accurate today. This shift in war and spending powers from Congress to the president is an alarming development in Fisher's view and needs to be addressed and remedied. "At stake is not just congressional prerogatives but representative government and democratic values" (p. 163).

Two exceptional features of the book deserve highlighting. First, Fisher makes complex issues accessible to a wide audience. In his explanation of the framers' design and of why war and spending powers were clearly placed with Congress, as well as in his analysis of how Congress has transferred spending power to the president, he writes with such clarity that even undergraduates not well versed in these topics will find the material comprehensible. And considering that "members have made the budget process increasingly technical and generally incomprehensible to the public and to most of the lawmakers" (p. 161), this is quite an accomplishment on Fisher's part. Second, in discussing how Congress has relinquished its constitutional prerogatives regarding the use of force and spending power, Fisher carefully chronicles and documents how specific pieces of legislation have actually decreased Congress's war and spending powers, despite the conventional assessments that these very measures have served to reassert congressional prerogatives. In challenging the common critiques of particular laws, he succeeds in challenging the reader to probe below the surface and question unintended consequences.

Notwithstanding the strengths in Fisher's book, there are nits to pick as well--one minor quibble and one broader concern. First, Fisher neglects to mention a provision in the War Powers Resolution that is quite relevant to his discussion and to his claims regarding abdication of power. The law stipulates in section 5(c) that at any time when U.S. forces are engaged "without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization," the president must remove the forces "if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution." While Fisher's overall characterization of the War Powers Resolution reflects the working reality, as members of Congress have not voted to instruct a president to withdraw forces, it is misleading not to acknowledge the existence of this provision in the critique of the sponsors' actions and the law itself. And given Fisher's excellent discussion of aspects of section 5(c) in Presidential War Power (1995), it seems odd that this was overlooked here. More significantly, the recommendations of how Congress, the public, and the media might help to restore a vigorous system of checks and balances are both too ambiguous and, in terms of congressional action, unattainable if one accepts Fisher's own description of recent Congresses and the reasons for congressional abdication. Why would members of Congress, for instance, "reeducate themselves on their institutional duties and constitutional prerogatives," as he encourages (p. 182)? This suggestion seems implausible considering Fisher's claim that members are less interested in "protecting their institution" than in protecting "themselves and their reelection chances" (p. 163). What is going to alter members' sense that it is "more convenient to acquiesce" in a pending military action and "avoid possible criticism that they interfered with a necessary mission" (p. 163)? And why will members not continue to simply "authorize the president to cancel budget items" to "protect themselves from the charge that they tolerate wasteful spending" (p. 163)? Perhaps in his next book Fisher will take his thoughts a step further, a step that undeniably is fraught with many challenges. Yet, Fisher's insightful and provocative writings put him in the somewhat unenviable position of being asked to do more.

In sum, Congressional Abdication on War and Spending merits serious attention and should be required for students of Congress and the presidency. Readers should, however, consider what more concrete and viable recommendations might be made to address the situation Fisher so clearly and thoughtfully presents.

Reference

Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential war power. Lawrence: University of Kansas.

--Eileen Burgin
University of Vermont