Partners in Power: The Clintons and Their America.

Anderson, Dennis M.

Roger Morris, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1996), 503 pp. $27.50 hardcover (ISBN 0-8050-2804-8).

Readers who are interested in in-depth answers to the "why" questions about the Clinton presidency will find them in Stanley Renshon's High Hopes, the centerpiece of this collection of five books. In addition to Renshon's psychological biography, two of the other works are full-fledged biographies, The President We Deserve Bill Clinton by Martin Walker and Partners in Power by Roger Morris. As is apparent from their titles Walker's offering is sympathetic and Morris's is critical of both Bill and Hillary Clinton. The Choice by Bob Woodward is an in-the-heat-of-the-battle as-told-to account of the nineteen months following the election of 1994. John L. Jackley's Below the Beltway is largely a muckraking collection of anecdotes.

The Morris and Jackley books focus heavily on the culture of Washington, D.C., Jackley's Below the Bel" almost exclusively. Morris's Partners in Power moves back and forth between Little Rock and Washington as he tells the tale of Bill and Hillary's careers. Jackley's work is an expose of an insular, inbred, and money-dominated Washington. Morris argues in a much more carefully developed way that a traditional corporate elite-dominated Little Rock culture is largely a replica in miniature of the culture of the nation's capitol. Walker has a short but dispassionate analysis of the culture of Washington in his chapter on "The Dreadful Start" of the Clinton administration.

Let us begin with the least consequential of these works: John Jackley's Below the Beltway: Money, Power, and Sex in Bill Clinton's Washington. In spite of its subtitle, this book has only a few things to say about Bill Clinton. Because Clinton has no "set core Beliefs" to rely upon, his "Eternal Search" is for a formula (or "something that works as opposed to something he believes in" (p. 37).

According to Jackley, "Washington is less a town of respectable institutions than a conversation of thieves, a teeming casbah of hucsters, hustlers, scam artists, minor despots, and peacocks" (p. 78). The quote conveys the breezy flavor of the book. Its central theme is that the culture of Washington sucks everyone there into a "devil's bargain" with "the dark side" which separates its political players from the good plain people in the rest of America--like a Frank Capra movie without the hero. Jackley repeats unconfirmed stories he has heard recounted by his lobbyist friends. His most convincing chapter ("Eggheads and Quote Machines") is a critique of the irrelevance of most academic political science to the nation's problems. As for the rest of the book I would not discount his reports but the lack of documentation and anonymous sources suggest agonisticism is in order toward Jackley's principal theme.

When Jackley discusses solutions the intellect" confusion at the core of the book becomes evident. He argues at several points that our salvation is not to be found in politics. For example, he places no hope in third parties saying that because they are composed of human beings they will come to operate on the "dark side" as do the Democrats and Republicans. He also claims that "reinventing" government is a cosmetic activity. Yet at the end of the book he inconsistently asserts that the problem "does not mean doing away with politics, but does mean . . . [a] reform [of] our illusions" (p. 195).

Finally, after waffling about institutional solutions his only suggestion is to propose term limits!: (1) As if the solution were to limit the power of voters; or, (2) as if the money driven estrangement of Washington from the rest of the country would be cured by lopping off the political heads of the only members of the Washington crowd who go home every weekend; or, (3) as if one could assume short-term representatives will be more scrupulous about protecting their reputations than veteran members who have a lot more invested in theirs; or, (4) as if the ex-members of Congress would not come back as lobbyists, congressional staffers, or executive bureaucrats, none of whom are subject to term limits. Jackley's book is, however, good for a few laughs.

Roger Morris's Partners in Power shares Jackley's jaundiced view of Washington, but his stories rest on extensive documentation and have a unity tied together by the story of Bill and Hillary. Morris takes us from their births to the 1992 election and provides three chapters on Hillary Rodham's life before she met Bill. Morris's chapters on the early lives of the Clinton's have rich detail, and the picture of their respective childhoods are even more dour than Renshon's treatment. Morris's portrayal of Bill Clinton's maternal grandmother (Edith Cassidy) as a shrew is more unrelentingly negative than Renshon's. Morris also finds some negatives in the Rodham household that Renshon does not emphasize. According to Morris, Hillary's father, Hugh Rodham, created a negative atmosphere in the home by never validating any of his children with praise. (In his chapter on Hillary, Renshon reports that Hillary never gives validation to her husband who desperately craves it.)

Roger Morris depicts a couple driven by ambition unalloyed by substantial commitment to larger public purposes. His accounts of their Little Rock years are replete with examples of a self-serving currying of favor with the corporate establishment. While most politicians make their peace with the elites in greater or lesser measure, Morris's narrative cuts the Clintons no slack.

From his earliest age, Bill Clinton was never a rebel. Rather, he was one to propitiate entrenched power apparently even in Hot Springs High School where some of his fellow students felt he deferred to the school "administration rather than independently representing students' concerns" (p. 55). Even during the pro tests against the Vietnam War, his opposition was a very well mannered dissent. Morris argues it is a myth to say Clinton's defeat for re-election as governor in 1980 was because of an excess of progressivism or an overly ambitious agenda. Clinton never mobilized the public except on behalf of his own election. He "snuggled gamely" but only at the "margins" caving in to Arkansas Power and Light, the medical lobby, and the timber and trucking industries during his first term (pp. 21922).

Morris offers a litany of incidents illustrating the nexus between corporate power and privilege in Arkansas and its politicians. Some of his well-known stories have new detail; others are not well known. The story of Hillary Clinton's $100,000 profit on commodities trading receives a thorough recounting Morris cites a study by two economists who ran a statistical model based on "all available records as well as market data from the Wall Street Journal" which concluded that the probability against her making such a profit using normal and proper trading rules and procedures was "less than one in 250,000,000" (p. 233).

The role of both of the "Partners in Power" in Whitewater is laid out in an understandable way. Described are Jim McDougal's use of Madison Guarantee monies to finance the Whitewater development; McDougal "Knocking out" Clinton's 1984 campaign deficit with a fundraiser for executives and employees of Madison, part of which was paid for by checks drawn on Madison yet attributed to "phantom contributors"; and the failure of federal bank regulators to crack down on McDougal for twenty-six months after they had known Madison Guarantee was unsafe. One technically legal but telling part of the Whitewater land venture were "harshly punitive real estate contracts(s)" (p. 377) where buyers who fell more than thirty days behind in their payments "found that all their previous payments were classified merely as `rent.'" These buyers, who typically were elderly couples of modest means, were declared in default, and lost an equity in their property. Morris reports "Whitewater carried on a flourishing traffic in repossessions and resales" (p. 377). Morris quotes a Rose law firm member: "Hillary was the point person on everything to do with McDougal and his banks and deals from the beginning" (p. 368).

Another scandal concerns the CIA, and well protected gun and drug smuggling out of the Intermountain Regional Airport in northwest Arkansas near a rural county seat named Mena. According to Morris, the airport at "Mena, Arkansas became in the 1980's one of the world centers of the narcotics trade and the base of what many believed was the single-largest cocaine-smuggling operation in US history" (p. 393). A CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency employee, an adventurer named Barry Seal, flew arms for the Contras to Latin America and brought back cocaine to the United States. Shortly after Seals operation began, the well-wooded area around Mena became a "training ground for Contra guerrillas and pilots" (p. 394). The operation continued throughout the 1980s even after Seal's assassination. Morn's draws linkages to Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton suggesting all three knew about this operation. Morris's description of this cover-up includes deceptive comments by Governor Clinton about the state's role.

According to Morris, Bill Clinton's sexual forays were not "some scrupulously separate private life." Rather, the use of state cars, use of state "troopers to facilitate, stand guard and cover up" plus the prestige of the governor's office made it "an abuse of power and trust" (pp. 441-2). Morris also tells of noisy parties that Governor Clinton attended at his half-brother Roger's apartment with girls, marijuana, and cocaine (p. 325). The larger significance of these parties is that, if true, Governor Clinton lied when he stated that he was not aware his brother was taking drugs until shortly before his arrest.

In The President We Deserve Bill Clinton, Martin Walker argues that Bill Clinton will be remembered in history for being instrumental in the creation of a world trading system (p. 283) and for crafting a new domestic consensus to supplant the old New Deal (p. 341). In a chapter on "Trade Wars" Walker describes the intricate negotiations over NAFTA, GATT, and other regional trading blocks, and concludes that Clinton's strategy of locking the United States into Pacific, European, and Western Hemisphere blocks will make him the "true architect of the post-cold war world" (p. 284). The elements of Clinton's "new [domestic] consensus" as a "new Democrat" involve a limited range of federal programs focusing mainly on education, training, and technology and "a firm new American consensus to cut government spending and balance the budget" (p. 341). Walker talks about the political "tectonic" plates shifting but wisely does not use the word "realignment." Clinton's emphasis on trade as the new post-Cold War foreign policy is anathema to labor and is more reminiscent of an earlier generation's "liberal Republicanism." These considerations suggest that his domestic caution does not very likely constitute accommodation to the legacy of FDR and the New Deal as much as a surrender to Republican success in controlling the ideological content of the public dialogue.

Walker, a journalist "acquaintance" of Bill Clinton of long standing, explains his book's tide by remarking: "He was, in his flaws and sensual weaknesses, his readiness to put off hard decisions until it was almost too late . . . utterly typical of the America of his day. He was, in that sense, the president America deserved" (p. 344). Although Walker does not ignore critical incidents he brushes by much of President Clinton's shortcomings with little in-depth examination. For example, Walker's one-paragraph treatment of Clinton's term as Arkansas Attorney General begins with: "As Attorney General, Clinton was determinedly populist, challenging the powerful utility corporations, from Arkansas Power and Light and Arkansas-Missouri Power to the telephone companies, when they tried to raise the cost of a pay phone call from a dime to a quarter" (p. 85). In Morris's much longer account of Clinton's time as attorney general we are told that "Clinton claimed to have recovered hundreds of thousands of dollars for buyers in a General Motors recall, though the rebates came out of a class action by other attorneys general. He boasted of aggressive policing of utilities, though his much-publicized appearances and statements at regulatory hearings added no meaningful consumer rights. `I had to press over and over again for him to be aggressive at all.' said a deputy who worked on regulatory problems, `but in the end he was mostly just talk'" (p. 205).

Walker's book covers much ground quickly. He takes us from Bill Clinton's birth to Oxford in one chapter, and from meeting Hillary to his first term as governor in another. His book ends on the eve of the 1996 election. Walker's chapter on Whitewater is treated like a Washington scandal and recounted as it unfolded as a part of the chronology of the Clinton presidency rather than as an investigative report focusing on what happened earlier in Little Rock. This approach makes Walker's failure to probe seem natural.

The most definitive book in this collection is High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition by Stanley A. Renshon, a licensed therapist as well as a political scientist. Renshon's focus is on Clinton's psychology and its relationship to his performance as president. He addresses the question "Are Clinton's particular skills . . . the talents necessary for a successful presidency in this political period" (p. 7)? Each president faces a basic public dilemma which depends on the circumstances of his own time and "the major public dilemma that Bill Clinton faces is the dilemma of trust in public policy" (p. 31). One question which drives the analysis is: How does a man with considerable political talent and skills get into so much trouble?

Renshon argues that Clinton has an idealized view of himself and cannot abide suggestions to the contrary. The key to explaining Clinton's behavior lies in the interaction of ambition (the ability to invest oneself in accomplishing one's purposes), character-integrity (our fidelity to our ideals as we pursue our ambitions and forge our identities), and "relatedness" (the ways in which he is connected to other people). His interpersonal style with regard to his relationship with others is to reach out to people, moving toward them as successful presidents must. Clinton has always been the central part of any group he has been in and has collected, cultivated, and kept track of 10,000 "friends" he has met at every stage of life. According to Renshon, three elements motivating Clinton are ambition, immense self-confidence coupled with an ideological view of his fidelity to the ideals he espouses, and a distinct and powerful turn toward others in his interpersonal relationships, motivated by his strong need for validation of his somewhat idealized view of himself (p. 50).

In discussing his character, Renshon notes that Clinton's core identity has been a matter of ambiguity and controversy even for his closest aides. Renshon relates Clinton's broken promises ("an instinct to be disingenuous') (p. 79) to a lack of integrated core values and principles. This lack of core values that could "organize and weigh the myriad facts that surround each policy" lead Clinton to case-by-case decision making and a reluctance to bring closure to policy discussions. Clinton's proclivity to mask his own views for political advantage is dangerous because it leads him to "abdicate the president's responsibility for educating the public about solutions to their problems" (p. 83). Clinton's disinclination to make hard choices is because he hates to accept limits (p. 84). And this is because Clinton has serious boundary problems going back to lessons from childhood. According to Renshon, Clinton has a "strong component of self-idealization" tending to attribute "to oneself good intentions gone awry, this time because of the faults of others" (p. 85). This is the key to his "rambling tirades" of temper when questioned about his character. Clinton is less likely to engage in self-examination and introspection because of his high self-confidence that his "own view is correct" (P. 87). A problem, in turn, with too much self-confidence is that it leads to a sense of "grandiosity" and over-confidence. These traits manifest themselves in lack of planning and naivete (pp. 91-2).

Clinton, in Renshon's account, has a strong need to be validated (which is not the same as a need to be liked). Evidence of this may be seen in his public touting of his own accomplishments, comparisons to FDR, and promises of more accomplishments to come (pp. 100-1). Renshon cites some of Clinton's temper tantrums ("purple fits") (p. 10) to suggest that his "attractive, outgoing, charming outer psychology" is a facade masking "a more angry, demanding, entitled inner psychology" (p. 104). Contrary to the common view, Clinton is not an active positive president but "likely . . . represents a `masked active-negative' type" more similar in his "deeper psychology" to Richard Nixon than to John Kennedy or Franklin Roosevelt (p. 103). Renshon associates Clinton's rages with Heinz Kohut's concept of "narcissistic rage" which are "extreme emotionally violent reactions" to threats to one's "idealized (grandiose) self-image" entailing expressions of the "need for revenge, righting a wrong, undoing a hurt by whatever means."

Renshon cites influences in Bill Clinton's early life which could account for why he is the way he is. Renshon argues that the view of Clinton's childhood experience as an "embodiment of 'small town values' is a public relations creation." His mother, Virginia Kelley, had no interest in civic affairs, politics, or religion. Virginia Kelley was a charming, party-loving woman who refused to be bound by conventions or rules, and valued appearances over substance, especially in her choice of men. Because no father was present in the early years, her personality and child rearing assumed much more importance for young Bill. While doting and overprotective, Virginia Kelley was also not in tune to her son's needs which left a heavy psychological burden on him.

The loss of his biological father and the loss of his mother (going to school) from ages one to three was a powerful inducement to seek out others. However, Bill Clinton's sense of empathy was what Renshon calls strategic empathy, an empathy that reflects a lack of trust in people. The instability and unreliability of Virginia Kelley and her second husband Roger Clinton left Bill with a feeling that "commitments, even though by a parent were ultimately unreliable." Renshon concludes that these experiences are consistent with his adult behavior, specifically his lack of fidelity in his commitments to others-supporters, colleagues, voters--and his admission that he has "caused pain in his marriage" (p. 189).

Renshon links Bill Clinton's self-esteem with the adoration showered on him by his mother and grandmother. His mother's perceived "abandonment" of him left Bill Clinton with an aversion to being by himself and to a lifelong sense of entitlement. Never being alone means avoiding the terror that could come from introspection. The early deprivation and adoration led to a feeling he should not be confined by rules or conventional boundaries.

President Clinton's poignantly sad childhood and resulting psychological burden underscore the problem for Clinton and the country in facing the public dilemma. A country whose greatest current need is to believe that its policies are fair and its leaders trustworthy has a president who has not always proved trustworthy and who does not really trust others. "Clinton's promise . . . has floundered on the shoals of his character" (p. 259). Renshon suggests in the last section of his book that the quality of judgment the president brings to decision making is more important than "greatness" defined by legislative success (p. 247). Good judgment is linked to character not intelligence, and poor judgment is associated with feelings of "high self-regard, [p. 250] . . . ambitions and sense of entitlement" (p. 253).

In his last chapter, "Lost Opportunities: President Clinton's First Term," Renshon argues that Clinton needs to take the public into his confidence (p. 297). Rather than treating policy development as a focus-group driven marketing problem to be solved by packaging and slogans (p. 277), the president should educate the public on the substance of policy. He also sees Clinton's ambitious policy agenda as being at odds with the mood of the country.

The effect of my summarizing Renshon's argument is to leave out much of the supporting evidence, development of his arguments, and subtlety. It is fair to note also that Renshon does not make claims that the psychological approach is the only one. His book will richly deserve the controversial attention it is certain to get.

Bob Woodward's The Choice is an account of the inside goings on among premier players mostly in Washington, D.C. Woven throughout the description of many campaign events are two primary stones. The first is President Clinton's recovery from the trauma of the 1994 elections and successful outmaneuvering of the Republicans in Congress principally over the budget deadlock and government shutdown. This is an outcome in which Dick Morris figures prominently. The second major story is the Republican presidential nominating campaign starring Bob Dole (who has equal billing with the president).

Because 1996 was not an election with much policy substance, one wonders from reading The Choice if all the campaign strategizing and manipulating is nothing more than a strategic game for campaign operatives. Except for pointing out the closeness of the differences in the Republican and administration "cuts" in Medicare and Medicaid, there is little about what might have been at stake in the election.

The Choice moves briskly without stopping to analyze. For example, we are told that both Bob Dole and Bill Clinton have trouble making decisions. Readers of Renshon and Moms will have some idea why this is so for President Clinton. But we will not find out why from Bob Woodward. There is also a problem of subjectivity resulting from Woodward's method. One is left with uncertainty about whose point of view is being represented in scenes described by Woodward when we have only unattributed quotations.

These five books on Bill Clinton have different purposes. Walker tries to lay out what may come to be seen as Clinton's historic contributions. Renshon's concern is to explain Clinton's behavior. Mom's wants to unmask what he believes is a phony populist and relate a documented story. Woodward and Jackley tell undocumented stories.

Many of the behaviors reported in the biographies are explained in Renshon: failure of cloture in decision making, "regular fits" of temper, lack of introspection (Mom's p. 275), trying to have it both ways, and a tendency to blame others (Mom's pp. 249-50; Woodward p. 54). However, Woodward's description of Clinton, Gore, and Anthony Lake turning around our Bosnia policy brings credit on the Clinton administration's decision making. Missing on that occasion are the bad decision-making habits described by Renshon and Mom's.

Renshon suggests that the Republican capture of Congress may be a blessing in disguise for Clinton insofar as it may provide a needed externally imposed limit or boundary as a substitute for the boundaries he lacks internally. Three recent attempts by President Clinton to have it both ways argue against getting our hopes up too high. First, Clinton appeased the right-wingers in Congress by signing the Helms-Burton Act while he also expects to minimize damage to our angry trading partners regarding sanctions for their actions in Cuba. Second, President Clinton signed a welfare "reform" law which removes the federal safety net for children yet expects the same elements in Congress who passed the law to agree to his proposals to "fix" it. Third, he has stated that he is still against a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution but will not oppose it vigorously. If one understands the deleterious consequences of the Balanced Budget Amendment one would think good judgment would call for vigorous opposition to it.

In this collection there is some agreement about President Clinton but no attempt at global evaluation (except for Walker) or premature claiming of historical status for their views. Still, the message of three of these works has to be disconcerting for most of us.